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# INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

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## HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION  
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER  
INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-SECOND CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

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PART 10

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MARCH 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 14, AND 21, 1952

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Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary

~~Kucinich Business Branch~~

~~DEC 24 1952~~





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UNITED STATES  
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# INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

TUESDAY, MARCH 4, 1930

Union Pacific Building  
Room 2012, 10th Floor, Omaha, Neb.

Arrival of the Special  
Delegation of the American  
Legation, London, England

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## INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

TUESDAY, MARCH 4, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,  
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE  
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL  
SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY  
LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,  
*Washington, D. C.*

The subcommittee met at 10:15 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Hon. Pat McCarran (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran, Smith, O'Connor, Ferguson, Watkins, and Jenner.

Also present: Senator McCarthy, J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, research director.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

### TESTIMONY OF OWEN LATTIMORE, ACCOMPANIED BY THURMAN ARNOLD, ESQ., COUNSEL—Resumed

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, the other day, at the close of the hearing, I said I had some questions to ask in relation to the reports that came out of the Moscow meeting.

It was indicated that Mr. Lattimore did not know anything about these reports that appeared now in the evidence.

Is that still your contention, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, sir. To the best of my recollection, I don't remember them.

Senator FERGUSON. What is it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I say to the best of my recollection, I don't remember ever seeing those minutes before.

Senator FERGUSON. You wrote Ordeal by Slander?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. And you feel that you are responsible for all that is in it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Then I ask you to look at page 51. It is a chapter by your wife:

We had breakfast with Edward C. Carter. Mr. Carter had been secretary-general of the Institute of Pacific Relations when Owen had edited Pacific Affairs, and I wanted to see him because McCarthy's speech had dealt at length with the IPR and Owen's connection with it, all still based on Kohlberg and China Lobby, and had laid great stress on Owen's one visit to Moscow where he had spent 10 days with Carter on IPR business in 1936.

Now, that is the meeting that we were talking about the other day; is it not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Then I read further:

The present secretary-general, William Holland, and his family, also old friends of ours, were staying at the Carters', and it made me happy to know that I had won support and help of all of them. Mr. Carter gave me copies of old reports he and Owen had made to the IPR about the Moscow visit, and also a copy of a statement about it he had released to the press the night before.

Now, where are those reports?

Mr. LATTIMORE. We have them in our file now.

Senator FERGUSON. Are they the same as this report?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I don't believe so.

Senator FERGUSON. Why did you not tell us before about these reports?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Why should I?

Senator FERGUSON. Why should you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you not sworn to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?

Mr. LATTIMORE. At the time of these hearings, this whole business that some reports that I had written at that time had been shown to my wife had completely slipped my mind. It is in a printed book.

Senator FERGUSON. When we produced the reports out of the files that we obtained up in the barn, did you not indicate to us that you were in no way responsible for any of those reports, and inferred any other reports?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I didn't infer anything of the kind, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you produce the reports now that are mixed in here?

Mr. LATTIMORE. They are in a printed book somewhere. I will try and find them for you and bring them to you.

Senator FERGUSON. Were they made from these typewritten reports?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you know that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Because I remember that the general procedure was that when I came back from a trip of that kind, I think I would write in a sort of letter report.

Senator FERGUSON. But here were official reports as if they were taken at the meetings; is that not true?

The CHAIRMAN. Answer audibly, please.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is what they appear to be; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And did you not infer in your answers that you felt that we should not use that kind of report, because you had no knowledge of them?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir. All that I inferred was that the statements there made about what was being discussed were reports of my words and were not a stenographic record of what I had actually said, and I also stated that I did not recall ever having seen those reports.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you not suppose that those reports were used by Carter, at least, in making up the reports?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no idea how Carter made up his reports.

Senator FERGUSON. It says here that you and Carter made them up.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I made a report, and Carter made a report, I believe.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that what this says?

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I see that?

(A document was handed to the witness.)

Senator FERGUSON. Will you give us the report that you made?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I will try and find the book in which it is; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Let us have the report. The report was not in a book; you did not write the book and give it to them?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I wrote a report to the IPR, I believe, which was included in one of the IPR publications.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you keep a copy?

Mr. LATTIMORE. When I wrote it?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I may have. I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you look and see?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I haven't seen it.

Senator FERGUSON. Does that show that you wrote a report or you and Carter wrote a report?

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

Mr. Carter gave me copies of old reports. \* \* \*

That is indicating more than one report—

\* \* \* He and Owen had made to the IPR about the Moscow visit.

That would indicate to me that he had made a report and I had made a report—

And also a copy of a statement about it he had released to the press the night before.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever see that press release?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall ever seeing it, no.

Senator FERGUSON. You passed off rather lightly this meeting with Moscow in your Ordeal by Slander; did you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I didn't think it was a very important meeting.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not think it was important. That is all at the present time. I will have further questions when we see your report.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Morris.

Mr. Sourwine, I think you drew my attention to the fact that a question was pending when we concluded.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is correct, Mr. Chairman, according to my memory. The witness had begun an answer and had not concluded at the time the recess was called.

The CHAIRMAN. Is the record of yesterday's proceedings available?

Mr. MORRIS. It will be here in a moment, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Morris; you may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will you receive into the record at this time the date of the Russian-Japanese Nonaggression Pact that was signed in 1941?

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. I read from the World Almanac of 1944, page 36, under the heading of Japan: "Signed 5 year neutrality pact with Russia April 13, 1941."

The CHAIRMAN. What is the object of that? Will you please connect that up?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the witness yesterday gave testimony concerning a meeting that was held in Washington on June 18, 1931, and we were trying to determine the political atmosphere that prevailed at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed, sir.

Before you proceed, I have here page 5337 of the record of these proceedings. Mr. Lattimore was under examination by Mr. Morris. I read from that page to connect it up:

Mr. MORRIS. Who was present at the meeting?

Does that give you a connection, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. SOURWINE. Reference was being had to the luncheon with Rogov, I believe.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think it was a luncheon.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is correct. You stated that it was not a luncheon. I am sorry.

The CHAIRMAN (reading):

Mr. SOURWINE. It was pretty late in the afternoon to have a luncheon?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The middle of the afternoon.

Mr. MORRIS. How long did it last, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was present at the meeting?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The only person that I clearly recall being present, because I walked out with him afterward \* \* \*

Do you wish to finish that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The only person I recall was Mr. C. F. Remer, who was at that time, I believe, connected with OSS, one of the United States intelligence agencies, and I believe I recall commenting to him as we went out about some of the questions that had been asked Rogov.

I may say that I remember asking Rogov only one question myself.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, how long did that meeting last?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know.

Mr. MORRIS. Was John Carter Vincent present?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember whether he was present or not.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, on our exhibit No. 26, introduced into the open hearings, is the document from Rose Yardumian, of the Institute of Pacific Relations, to Mr. Edward C. Carter.

The postscript on that reads:

Rogov and Bill have been at the Cosmos Club for the last two and a half hours, talking with Lattimore, Remer, and Vincent.

That is the notation on this letter which describes the meeting that the witness is now testifying to. That is already in our record, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Senator FERGUSON. Does that refresh your memory?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not very much.

According to my memory, there would have been more people present than that.

Senator FERGUSON. Does it refresh your memory that you were there for several hours, two and a half hours?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not very clearly, no.

Mr. MORRIS. It could have been longer, too, could it not have been, Mr. Lattimore?

At that point it lasted two and a half hours.

Mr. LATTIMORE. It could have been longer, or it could have been shorter.

Senator FERGUSON. The only Vincent that was indicated there would have been Vincent of the State Department, would it not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Up here in the letter itself it is: "talked with Owen Lattimore, Carl Remer, and John Carter Vincent."

Mr. LATTIMORE. I may point out, Mr. Senator, that here was a Russian who had been in Japanese occupied Shanghai, and it was a highly proper thing at that time for American Government personnel to interview such a person and see if they could get any information out of him.

Senator FERGUSON. But there was not any doubt about him being a Communist, was there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Nor was there any doubt even of the fact that American Government personnel should try to get any information they could out of Japanese occupied Shanghai, in 1944.

Senator FERGUSON. But did not your book say that you did not know any Russians or Communists?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think if you will read the context of that, Senator Ferguson, you will see that it clearly shows that my wife was writing in 1950, that as of 1950 I didn't know any Russians in this country.

Mr. MORRIS. When you say you didn't know—

Senator FERGUSON. Just a minute.

Do I understand you want to convey to us now that your wife was writing and you approved it in your book that, as of the date that you wrote the book, you did not know any Russians or Communists? In 1950? Why do you limit it to 1950?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am not limiting it in that manner at all, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you mean by 1950?

Mr. LATTIMORE. This was written in 1950. Where is the reference?

The CHAIRMAN. Just one moment. I would like to have the record read back there, if you please.

(The record, as heretofore transcribed, was read by the reporter.)

Mr. LATTIMORE. I limit it to 1950 because it was written in 1950, and the context clearly shows that she was writing about the general period of 1950, and the McCarthy charges.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you charged as of 1950 of associating with the Communists on the day that she wrote it? It does not say anything about 1950 there.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I still haven't been able to find the exact reference.

Mr. MORRIS. It is page 35, Mr. Lattimore. You will probably find it underlined.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; here is the context.

Senator FERGUSON. Read it.

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

McCarthy had replied that this is completely untrue. This man has a desk at the State Department and has access to the files, at least he had until 4 or 5 weeks ago. He is one of the top advisers on Far Eastern affairs, has been for a long time, and they know it.

Nothing in McCarthy's description fitted Owen, but the thought crossed my mind that Tydings' description did. He had been on the Reparations Mission to Japan 5 years ago. It was a White House mission, but I just discovered in looking through old records that he had been paid by the State Department. But the thought was too fantastic. He didn't know any Russians in this country or any Communists. He didn't have access to any secret material. How could anybody, even McCarthy, accuse him of being a spy?

Senator FERGUSON. You claim that that refers only to the time that she was writing?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That refers to the general period in which she was writing, and in which McCarthy was saying that I was—apparently McCarthy meant at that time—the top Soviet agent in this country.

Senator FERGUSON. And also does it not say that: "He had been on the Reparations Commission to Japan 5 years ago"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Did that refer to the time she was writing?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It would mean that at the time she was writing, she was actually stating that 5 years before I had been in Japan.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, would not Mrs. Lattimore have written "he doesn't know any Russians" if she were talking about that present time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Morris, I think this is a rather quibbling question about grammar.

The CHAIRMAN. Just a minute.

Mr. MORRIS. It is not quibbling. She would have said "He doesn't know any Russians," to bear out your interpretation.

Mr. LATTIMORE. She is writing a chapter there about her experiences before I got home from Afghanistan, and she was saying that as of this time of her experiences, before I got back from Afghanistan, she was saying that I didn't know any Russians in this country.

Senator FERGUSON. And also she was writing at a time, Mr. Lattimore, was she not, when you were coming back, and you approved this?

Mr. LATTIMORE. She was not writing at that time. She was writing about it.

The CHAIRMAN. Wait until the Senator finishes his question.

Senator FERGUSON. But she was also writing, and putting it in your book, and had it distributed after the Tydings hearings; is that not right?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. And did you not feel that that was the end of all hearings on that question?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I certainly hoped it was. However, I was already somewhat aware of the new practice of multiple jeopardy.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you call this multiple jeopardy?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, sir; I do.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think this was all brought out in the Tydings hearings?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think it was quite sufficiently brought out in the Tydings hearings.

Senator FERGUSON. I would think that you would think it was sufficiently brought out there, but we did not.

Now, the Tydings hearings have access to the documents in reply to this, showing that you did know Communists?

Mr. LATTIMORE. None of the documents that had been brought out show that I knew Communists in 1950, or Russians, in this country.

Senator FERGUSON. So you want to limit this now to your activities in 1950?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I would just like a distinction kept clear between the period that my wife was quite obviously writing about and the period ranging up to 10 and more years previously, covered by these various items from the IPR files that Mr. Morris has been bringing out.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, when did you leave the IPR?

Mr. LATTIMORE. When did I leave it?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. You mean its employ?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I left its employ in 1941.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you cease being a member of the trustees?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe I am still a trustee.

Senator FERGUSON. You still are a trustee?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And you think that your activities as far as this book was concerned, you were limiting them to 1950?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I am saying that my wife's statement was limited to the general period of 1950.

Senator FERGUSON. That did not become your statement by the publishing of the book?

That is not a legal problem?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Would you repeat that, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. Did it not become your statement when you published the book?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It became the statement in a book published, of which I was listed as the author, certainly.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that the way you want to answer the question?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is the way I want to answer it; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, in connection with this mention of the man Rogoff in this line of questioning, I would like to have a little background from the previous testimony about this.

Mr. Mandel, will you read from the bottom of page 528 in the Budenz testimony?

The CHAIRMAN. The Budenz testimony is before this committee?

Mr. MORRIS. Before this committee, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment.

Mr. Budenz was then under oath?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MANDEL. (Reading):

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, can you tell us of another meeting you attended which Mr. Field reported for the IPR?

Mr. BUDENZ. That was a meeting of 1943 when I began to anticipate and then thought of the 1940 series of meetings. At this meeting of the political bureau at which Earl Browder I know definitely was present, and I believe Robert William Weiner. His name strikes me because he was not always present at these meetings, and other members of the Politburo who were not generally there, including Trachtenberg. At this meeting Mr. Field stated that he had received word from Mr. Lattimore. It is my impression that he had seen Mr. Lattimore personally just a day or two before, but I may be mistaken. It was a

communication either personally or in some other way. Mr. Field just returned from a trip and I get the impression that he had talked to Mr. Lattimore personally, and Mr. Lattimore stated that information coming to him from the international Communist apparatus where he was located indicated that there was to be a change of line very sharply on Chiang Kai-shek, that is to say that the negative opposition to Chiang Kai-shek was to change to a positive opposition and that more stress was to be put upon attacking Chiang Kai-shek.

Mr. MORRIS. Did the Communist Party line change at that time?

Mr. BUDENZ. The Communists took action to discover the accuracy of this. They were advised that there was in the course of preparation an article by Vladimir Rogoff, the Tass correspondent, written at Moscow's request on this question which would attack the appeasers in China and Chiang Kai-shek.

The CHAIRMAN. The Tass correspondent, you say?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you explain what Tass was?

Mr. BUDENZ. Tass was the official Soviet news agency in this country and so far as I know still is, but I knew it then quite definitely.

Mr. MORRIS. Was this article subsequently communicated to the Daily Worker?

Mr. BUDENZ. This article was communicated to the Daily Worker. The first message was received through Grace Granich who had been in charge of the Intercontinent News, a Soviet agency, which had been put out of business by the Department of Justice, but who continued to maintain her relations with the Soviet Embassy, consulate, and other sources of information, including communications to Moscow and we were advised of the coming of this article and then we received it.

Mr. MORRIS. And was the Communist line actually changed as a result of these steps that were taken?

Mr. BUDENZ. The Politburo suggested that someone, and the name of T. A. Bisson was mentioned in that connection, be enlisted to write an article in connection with the Institute of Pacific Affairs publication on this matter explaining the democratic character of the Chinese Communists and indicating that Chiang Kai-shek and his group represented antidemocracy.

Mr. SOURWINE. Pardon me, Mr. Budenz, but you mentioned the Institute of Pacific Affairs. You were referring to the Institute of Pacific Relations and its publication Pacific Affairs?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct. I sort of got the two together.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, did T. A. Bisson write an article for the IPR at that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe he did; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the name of the article, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall the name of the article. I recall that it was not published in Pacific Affairs as implied in the testimony just read.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, is the article by Mr. Bisson which was written for the Institute of Pacific Relations in our record now?

Mr. MANDEL. It is in our record on page 534 of our hearings.

Senator FERGUSON. What is the date of that article?

Mr. MANDEL. The date of the article is July 14, 1943, published in the Far Eastern Survey.

Mr. MORRIS. Is the Far Eastern Survey an official publication of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. It is an official organ of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me get this straight, now.

This article that you are about to read, the witness says was not published in the publication Pacific Relations?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not published in Pacific Affairs.

The CHAIRMAN. You are now reading from another magazine?

Mr. MORRIS. There were only two publications of the Institute of Pacific Relations, one Pacific Affairs and the other Far Eastern Survey.

The CHAIRMAN. And this is from the Far Eastern Survey.

Senator SMITH. What connection did he have with that?

Mr. MORRIS. It is going to be brought out, Senator, the connection there.

Will you read the two passages?

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

However, these are only party labels. To be more descriptive, the one might be called Feudal China; the other Democratic China. These terms express the actualities as they exist today, the real institutional distinctions between the two Chinas.

Then further:

The key to the successful mobilization of the war potential of so-called Communist China lies in the extent to which its leaders have thrown off the feudal incubus which has weighed China down for centuries. No single measure can be pointed to as the open sesame which has increasingly achieved this objective. Economic reforms have been intertwined with political reforms, the one supporting the other. Basic to the whole program has been the land reform which has freed the peasant—the primary producer in these areas, and, indeed, over most of China—from the crushing weight of rent, taxes, and usurious interest charges as levied by a feudal economy.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, does not Mr. T. A. Bisson there label Nationalist China feudal China, and Communist China a democratic China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Apparently he does.

Mr. MORRIS. Did that particular article provoke the Chinese Council of the IPR?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe I have subsequently read somewhere, maybe in the transcript of these proceedings, that it did. I had nothing to do with the article at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you read the article?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe I did. At that time I was exceedingly busy as Deputy Director of OWI in San Francisco, and I don't believe I was keeping up with the Institute of Pacific Relations' publications at all.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you agree with that particular article by Mr. Bisson?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would have to read the whole article to determine whether I agreed with it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Might I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You knew about this article, did you not, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. At the time?

Mr. SOURWINE. At the time and here, as of today, yesterday, the day before yesterday?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Subsequently I have seen it mentioned in the transcripts that I have read. I haven't reread the article.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, did you not have this article so clearly in mind that when Senator Ferguson the other day referred to the matter you corrected him both as to the name of the author and as to the place where the article had appeared?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I remember it clearly enough for that.

Senator FERGUSON. And you knew that that was the change in policy, did you not?

MR. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I knew from reading the transcript of these proceedings, and also, I believe, the 'Tydings proceedings, that this had been referred to as having something to do with a change in line.

With the article I had no connection whatever. I don't know enough about the history of the Communist line to know whether that was in fact a switch in the Communist line; but whether it was a switch or a continuation of an old line, or whatever it may be, it certainly did not coincide with what I was saying and writing at the time.

SENATOR FERGUSON. Did you know there was a party line, that the Communists had a party line?

MR. LATTIMORE. I know in general that the Communists have a party line; yes.

SENATOR FERGUSON. When would you say that you acquired that knowledge?

MR. LATTIMORE. It would be impossible to say.

SENATOR FERGUSON. About when?

MR. LATTIMORE. It would be impossible to say. The party line is something that is generally associated with Communists.

SENATOR FERGUSON. And has been for years, has it not?

MR. LATTIMORE. And has been for years. I don't know how long. I have never been a specialist in Communist politics, and I have never made it my business to analyze the Communist Party line or the switches, or anything of that kind.

MR. MORRIS. Is it your testimony, then, Mr. Lattimore, that you did not at that time read the Bisson article and that the Bisson article was contrary to things you were writing at that time?

MR. LATTIMORE. It is my testimony that, to the best of my recollection, I did not read the article at that time, didn't even know of it until some vague time later, and most of my knowledge of it at this moment is based on reading the transcripts of these proceedings.

MR. MORRIS. And could it not coincide with what you were saying at that time?

MR. LATTIMORE. If it is a line that says—what is it supposed to have said?

MR. MORRIS. That Nationalist China was feudal China, and that Communist China was democratic China.

MR. LATTIMORE. All I remember is that as of 1943 I gave a couple of lectures down at Pomona College in San Francisco.

THE CHAIRMAN. That is not an answer.

Will you read the question, please, Mr. Reporter? Read Mr. Morris's question.

(The record, as heretofore recorded, was read by the reporter).

THE CHAIRMAN. The question was, Was it contrary to the line you were writing at that time?

MR. LATTIMORE. Yes, I believe it is completely contrary.

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this letter, please?

MR. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, on the letterhead of the Office of War Information at 111 Center Street, San Francisco, Calif., dated July 26, 1943, addressed to Mr. W. L. Holland, signed "Owen," and typed signature "Owen Lattimore, Director, Pacific Operations."

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, will you look at that letter and testify as to whether or not you wrote that letter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I must have written this letter, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read the first paragraph, please?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, sir. [Reading:]

DEAR BILL: Your letter of July 20 arrived just as I was reading T. A. Bisson's article on China. I was trying to formulate for myself some way of expressing an opinion. I think you do this very well. Bisson's terminology will turn away a number of people whom he might have persuaded with use of a different terminology. Nevertheless, I think his main points are as sound as you think they are.

It is just possible that I may get to Washington at the end of this month and if so I hope to see you and Carter before you leave.

Mr. MORRIS. There is no use reading the rest of it unless you care to, Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't need to. This apparently indicates that I agreed with some opinion that Mr. Holland expressed at that time which I had not seen.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that be received in the record?

The CHAIRMAN. It may be received in the record.

(Document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 512" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 512

OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION,  
111 SUTTER STREET,  
San Francisco, Calif., July 26, 1943.

Mr. W. L. HOLLAND,  
*Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East Fifty-second Street,  
New York City 22, N. Y.*

DEAR BILL: Your letter of July 20 arrived just as I was reading T. A. Bisson's article on China. I was trying to formulate for myself some way of expressing an opinion. I think you do this very well. Bisson's terminology will turn away a number of people whom he might have persuaded with use of a different terminology. Nevertheless I think his main points are as sound as you think they are.

It is just possible that I may get to Washington at the end of this month and if so I hope to see you and Carter before you leave.

I am very much ashamed of having fallen down on my review assignment. I think I can assure you of the review article by September 15. However, the difference in publication date is not serious as the dating of the book itself now makes it a matter of the historical record of stages in Russian opinion about China, rather than an urgent current presentation.

If the University of California Press write to me for an opinion on Norin's manuscript, I shall be very glad to give a recommendation.

Yours,

Owen /s/  
OWEN LATTIMORE,  
Director, Pacific Operations.

Mr. MORRIS. Did T. A. Bisson go with you when you went to Yen'an?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; he did.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you make that trip to Yen'an?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It was in the spring of 1937 sometime.

Mr. MORRIS. What arrangement did you make for that trip, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. We traveled from Peking by rail up to Shansi Province, then down south through Shansi Province, then west into Shensi Province, and got to what I think was the railhead at the city of Sian, and then we chartered a motor car and drove up to Yen'an.

The CHAIRMAN. You say we. We was in the party?

Mr. MORRIS. Who accompanied you on that trip?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr Bisson and Mr. and Mrs. Jaffe.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you confer with Mao Tse-tung when you were in Yen-an?

Mr. LATTIMORE. We had an interview with——

The CHAIRMAN. The question is: Did you confer with Mao Tse-tung?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I did not call it conferring.

Mr. MORRIS. How much time did you spend with Mao Tse-tung?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember. I think there were a couple of interviews at which he was asked questions, principally by Mr. Bisson and Mr. Jaffe. Each of those interviews would probably last an hour or two. I am not sure how long.

Mr. MORRIS. Where did you stay? Did you stay at the Foreign Office in Yen-an?

Mr. LATTIMORE. We stayed at, I believe, a sort of hostel that they had for visitors.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you, Mr. Lattimore, confer with Chu Teh?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would not say that we conferred with him, no.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you speak with him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, I spoke with him.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you speak with Chou En-lai?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you address a mass meeting in Yen-an?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I made some general remarks, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, did you write an account of that for the London Times, that trip to Yen-an?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember that. Maybe I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that document, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, marked in the corner "F. V. F. etc." The title is "The Strongholds of Chinese Communism, a Journey to North Shensi," by Owen Lattimore. In the upper left-hand corner it says: "Sent by O. L. to Times, London (may not be published, of course)."

Mr. MORRIS. Do you recall that article, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't recall it, and I don't recall whether it was published, or not. I did occasionally publish articles in the London Times.

Mr. MORRIS. Then does that recall anything to you, Mr. Lattimore?

The CHAIRMAN. You are referring to the exhibit identified by Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right, Mr. Chairman.

Does not that purport to be an article that you prepared for the London Times, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It certainly appears to be. I had completely forgotten it, forgotten about it.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that a true account of your experiences in Yen-an?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Presumably it is. I haven't read it yet. May I read it?

Mr. MORRIS. You may.

Mr. LATTIMORE. This is headed "One," indicating that there may have been a later one. [Reading:]

(EXHIBIT No. 513)

Many people at Nanking will tell you that Chinese communism is finished. The appeal to class war has been dropped. The landlords are no longer being appropriated. The territory held by the Communists is poor in agriculture and almost barren of other resources. The Communists are already accepting subsidy from Nanking, and are offering to accept incorporation into Nanking's armies. This must mean, in the end, the "fading army" of the Communists as a separate political and military force, unless perhaps they faintly survive as a left-wing group within the orthodox Chinese nationalism.

Yet, if this be collapse, the Communists are not in the least anxious to cover it up. On the contrary, they claim that the present situation is chiefly of their own asking. It was they who relaxed the lockjaw silence of the Sian crisis last winter with the magic of their united-front slogans. They did not intervene until after Marshal Chiang Kai-shek had been made prisoner by the mutinous remnants of the old Manchurian armies. When they did intervene, it was to save the life of the Generalissimo, their mortal enemy of 10 years of civil war. This they did to show that they were more eager to rally the nation against Japan than to triumph over Nanking. The implication of what they say is that they do not intend to wither away in the ravines and loess plateau of north Shensi. There is more than a hint, in the assured maneuvering of the youthful veterans who led the Red armies, that they believe already that they have a negative control strong enough to prevent Nanking from doing what they do not like, which may yet be converted into positive control and full command of the situation.

All of this makes north Shensi not only a mystery, but a region in which perhaps can be discovered important clues to the unfolding history of eastern Asia; the struggle for unity in China; the forces welding illiterate millions into increasingly solid and formidable resistance against Japan; the convergence on China, from different directions, of Japan and the Soviet Union.

Not knowing of any underground tunnels that would lead me to north Shensi, I set about planning the journey in trustful innocence. I sent a letter to the Red capital, by ordinary mail, with my address candidly printed on the back of the envelope—and got in answer a cordial invitation. Accordingly, I went by train to Sian, the capital of Shensi, and then by car to Yen-an, the Red capital, about 250 miles to the north.

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, may I interrupt at that point?

Is that a true account of your preliminary arrangements to Yen-an?

MR. LATTIMORE. It sounds like it. I had completely forgotten about it.

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I read from the testimony of Mr. Lattimore, taken in executive session before this committee?

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

MR. MORRIS. I am reading from page 71:

MR. MORRIS. And before you went beyond that line—

That is the line separating Communist China from Nationalist China—

demarkation, it would be necessary to have the Communist authorities' permission; isn't that right?

MR. LATTIMORE. No.

MR. MORRIS. You mean anyone could go up there?

MR. LATTIMORE. At that time, the Communists were welcoming anybody who would go in. The government authorities were trying to stop people from going in.

MR. MORRIS. The Nationalist Government?

MR. LATTIMORE. The Nationalist Government.

MR. MORRIS. So the only objection to going up there would come from the Nationalist Government?

MR. LATTIMORE. The only objection came from the Nationalist Government.

MR. MORRIS. Is it your testimony that you or anybody in your party did not make any prearrangements with the Communist Party in order to get in?

MR. LATTIMORE. None whatever.

Senator FERGUSON. Which is correct?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I see no conflict, Senator Ferguson.

Apparently, according to this account, I wrote up to the Reds and said, "Would it be all right if I came up?" and they said, "Sure, fine," and I went on up. They didn't make the arrangements.

And, as I state in this article, which I had completely forgotten, I didn't know about any underground tunnels leading up there. I just got on a train and went.

Senator FERGUSON. Read the last answer.

Mr. MORRIS (reading):

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony that you or anybody in your party did not make any prearrangements with the Communist Party in order to get in?

Mr. LATTIMORE. None whatever.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not tell us about writing the letter.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I had completely forgotten about it. I wrote from Peking and I didn't consider that this indicates a prearrangement for travel arrangements at all.

Senator FERGUSON. You felt that you could not get in without the consent of the Communists or you would have never written them.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I wanted to have the whole thing completely in the open, so I wrote a letter up there saying, "Would it be all right if I wanted to come?"

I knew in general that all of the newspapermen were trying to get up there. I don't know whether other newspapermen used the same method that I did, or not.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know other newspapermen, whether they did get up?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, other newspapermen did get up.

Senator FERGUSON. Who did you take with you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I went with Mr. Bisson and Mr. and Mrs. Jaffe.

Senator FERGUSON. And did your letter state you wanted them to come along?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no recollection whatever. It may well have. I don't know about Mr. and Mrs. Jaffe, but the suggestion of going up there was, to the best of my recollection, originally made to me by Mr. Bisson.

Senator FERGUSON. Bisson suggested it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think so; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, when you wrote, would you not include Bisson and Jaffe if they were to go along with you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know. It depends on what time the letter was written.

Mr. SOURWINE. To whom did you address your letter, Mr. Lattimore, do you remember that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no idea, no.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know anyone in Yen-an?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I didn't know anyone in Yen-an.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you would write to the government, would you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I might write to—I don't know that I would have called it the government at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. To whom did you write, then? What would you write a letter for?

MR. LATTIMORE. I would write a letter to indicate that I was not somebody trying to sneak in; that I was just somebody who wanted to come up.

Senator FERGUSON. Who would be inclined to keep you out? You would have to write to those persons. Who would they be?

MR. LATTIMORE. That would depend, Senator, on what was the terminology being used at that time. After the Sian incident in December 1936, the Nationalist Government had given the Communists up there some kind of status—I don't remember exactly what it was—and I would presumably write to whatever administrative organ was indicated by the terminology of the time.

The CHAIRMAN. You wrote a letter up there, but you say now you cannot recall to whom you wrote it; is that right, Mr. Lattimore?

MR. LATTIMORE. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. To whom you addressed the letter is something you cannot remember?

MR. LATTIMORE. That is right. It was presumably addressed to some sort of office rather than a person.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you help me? I have trouble at times with your testimony along this line, that you know nothing about communism, and at other times it appears to me the testimony indicates that you know all about communism.

On this, will you know about this communism in China?

MR. LATTIMORE. I knew that there were Communists in northwest China, and I was very eager to go up and see something about it.

Just not long before that, a 10-year news famine on the Chinese Communists had been broken by Mr. Snow, who had succeeded in coming up there and coming out with a story that had set every other newspaperman in China trying to get up there.

Senator FERGUSON. Did not this article in the London Times, whether it appeared or not, that you are reading, did not the first part of it indicate that you were well familiar with Communists in China and Communist activities?

MR. LATTIMORE. No, sir; it indicates that I was familiar, as the first paragraph shows, with what people at Nanking were saying and thinking, and it indicates, as the second paragraph shows, that I was familiar with whatever I was able to observe while I was up there, for about 4 days.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, does not this letter that was read to you just a few moments ago, July 26, about the Bisson article, indicate that you knew something about Communists when you said:

Bisson's terminology will turn away a number of people whom he might have persuaded with the use of a different terminology.

In other words, he was calling, in that article, the Communists of China the democrats. Did this not indicate that you knew all about communism and that the line was not to use words here in the articles to turn people away?

MR. LATTIMORE. No, sir; it indicates that—

Senator FERGUSON. What was the terminology that you were talking about here?

MR. LATTIMORE. I would have to reread the article to know that, Senator.

MR. MORRIS. May I see that, Mr. Lattimore?

I am going to suggest that since it is two and a half pages long, rather than to go into the whole thing, I would just like one more paragraph placed.

But if you care to read the whole thing——

Mr. ARNOLD. I haven't seen it. He would like to read the whole thing.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the witness has expressed a wish to read the whole letter.

The CHAIRMAN. He may read the whole letter.

Mr. SOURWINE. For the sake of continuity of the record, Mr. Chairman, may I ask that the witness be permitted to read it all the way through?

The CHAIRMAN. Beginning at the first?

Mr. SOURWINE. No, beginning where he left off.

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

It took 4 days to get there from Sian and 6 to get back, because the rains were on and we were driving through the heart of the loess country. The yellow, wind-dropped soil lies hundreds of feet thick over what used to be the face of the earth. The hills are smothered, but a network of streams has cut down to the ancient valley beds, so that the formation is now one of innumerable plateaux, some of them higher and some lower, but all flat-topped and all divided from each other by straight-sided ravines. When it rains, the whole landscape becomes a nightmare of rather inferior, pale-colored chocolate. The streams boil up in flood and the cubes of tableland sag and slump. As a matter of fact, it is not a country made for wheels at all. The local inhabitant prefers pack mules, when it is dry, and when it is wet, he gives up altogether, because even a mule skids on wet loess. Only the foreigner, winching and flinching from the memory of fleas indoors, and the revolutionary, who has been trained to follow a line even when skidding, stay out in the wet and strive to make progress. It is not easy, because the newly and crudely made motor road traverses the pale chocolate nightmare in appalling ascents and descents. From each ravine it attacks the next cube of tableland at a corner, climbing at angles that are difficult even for trucks with five gears; it then rushes across the top of the cube and falls over the far edge in a series of even more terrifying swoops.

In spite of this, it has become a pilgrim's highway. Chinese educators and students are going up by the hundred, and many of them stay to take courses in the Red academy. Foreign visitors are welcomed, and missionaries are being urged to come up and see for themselves that their premises are undamaged and the Chinese Christians left undisturbed to preach in public or pray in private, as they like. The only foreign visitors thus far have been Americans, but the Communists profess impatience to see representatives of other nations, and judging from the way they talk, the first Englishman to arrive will be a good deal of a hero.

There is in this a slightly wry contract with the history of the last 10 years, when missionaries fled at the whisper of a Red raid, and when Great Britain, rather than Japan, was the bull's eye in the target of Communist propaganda. What does this reversal mean? Is this the true end of the long march? When the ghost army of the Reds was flitting from Kiangsi round by the fringes of Tibet to the uneasy lands of the partly Muslim, partly Chinese, partly Mongol northwest, a curious thing became noticeable. Whenever it was officially reported that a detachment of the Red army had been surrounded and annihilated, that particular column invariably turned up, a little later, 50 or a hundred miles farther ahead on its appointed line of march. Bearing this in mind I was particularly eager, when the Sung pagoda overlooking Yen'an came in view to find out whether the famed, almost fabulous, leaders of the Red army showed any signs of that fading-out so knowingly predicted of them in the best semi-official quarters. As a matter of fact, one of the first things I heard was that in a blockhouse on another hill, opposite the pagoda, built before the Reds came, to defend the town from them, there still stand the proclamations offering large rewards for Mao Tse-tung and Chu Te, dead or alive. The Reds had never assaulted the town. It was the defense that faded out, leaving only the notices behind it. Another omen?

Mao Tse-tung, the first of the leaders that I met, did not look faded. In fact, they say he has put on a little weight during the recent months of relative inactivity. It is absurd, looking at him, to think of the rumors current for years that he was about to die of tuberculosis. It would be equally absurd to think of him as a ravening bandit or as a cold doctrinaire.

The CHAIRMAN. Who is that you are speaking of there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mao Tse-tung.

Senator FERGUSON. Might I inquire?

That was your own opinion? That was not what somebody was telling you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That was my opinion at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Indicating that I didn't know much about communism.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he one of the revolutionary people that you were talking about following the line that you referred to before?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I presume he would be generally included, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew about the party line, then?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I knew there was such a thing, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And you knew how Communists followed it, as indicated in your remarks in there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Generally speaking, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. That was specific; was it not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. What?

No; it is just a general reference to the fact that there is such a thing as a Communist line, and that Communists follow the line even when they skid, or try to.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, proceed.

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

In the course of a few days I saw him in many moods; at interviews that lasted for hours; at meals, at the theater (in the church of the English Baptist Mission), where sketches and short plays were being put on that substituted United Front propaganda for Communist indoctrination. One of my most vivid impressions was on the evening of my departure. The room was full; Chu Te and Chou En-lai had their heads together over a statement to the press; others were arguing, laughing, giving verbal and written messages to be taken "out"—for communication between the Red world and the outside world is not yet entirely free. I happened to glance at Mao Tse-tung, who was sitting in the middle of it all. His head had sunk forward a little, his arms hung limp, his face was expressionless, and his eyes without luster. He had completely withdrawn himself from his surroundings. Then someone spoke to him, and he joined in at once, as though he had subconsciously kept up with all the conversation going on around him.

This is a trivial example of a flexibility that is really amazing. Mao Tse-tung can range from the widest philosophical concepts on which the Communist policy is based to the narrowest detail of practical application, without haste, without delay, and without the slightest blurring of focus. He has fire and passion, but so matured and tempered that there seems to be no personal warping of his thought; and yet, in a long extemporaneous discussion of a complicated subject there will not be a single cliché (and Chinese is more full of clichés than even English); every phrase has a personal stamp.

It would be misleading, however, to give too many personal details about Mao, Chu Te, and other leaders. So little is known of the inside workings of the Communist movement in China that it is almost always spoken of in terms of its leading personalities. At Yenan a contrast is immediately noticeable: The Communists themselves never speak of Nanking in terms of Chiang Kai-shek, or any other leader. They stick to estimates of groups and movements and economic, social, and political forces.

From this alone it is obvious that they are not either bandits preying on society or condottieri aiming at power for the sake of power. This is as true

now that they have compromised on a united front as it was when they were at open war with Nanking. Some of their more positive characteristics I shall try to describe in a second article.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you do that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember. If I did, it must be in this file. I don't have it.

Senator FERGUSON. How would this get into the IPR files?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Evidently I sent it, marked in the top corner FVF, who was at that time, I believe, secretary of the American Council.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Field, F. V. Field.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have to have clearance by Field?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Why would you send this article to Field?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was following the usual IPR practice of sending articles for information to the IPR office, and since Mr. Field was the secretary, he was the obvious person to send it to.

The CHAIRMAN. This instrument that is being discussed is not in the record. Do you wish it in the record?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 513" and was read in full by Mr. Lattimore beginning on page 3289.)

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, was all of your time taken by the IPR?

Mr. LATTIMORE. At that time?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. I cannot understand why you would be sending this to Field, an article that you were trying to sell to the London Times.

Mr. LATTIMORE. It was an article I was sending to the New York office, Mr. Field being secretary.

I had just been up to a then still mysterious and exciting part of China that everybody was trying to get to, and I thought that my best chance of writing an article would be for the London Times.

But rather than write a long description of a journey that I knew would be of interest to the New York office, since, after all, the IPR was studying China, among other countries, I simply sent a carbon copy of the article. That would be my present reconstruction of what happened.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you paid personally or was the IPR paid on an article like this?

Mr. LATTIMORE. On an article like this, I would be paid personally.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. This goes back just a little way, Mr. Lattimore: Did you find Yenan in any way crowded with non-Communist tourists?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I should say fairly crowded.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have said several times that everyone was trying to get up there.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was everyone able to get up there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; not everybody. A number of people were stopped by the Chinese Government authorities.

I remember in the papers at the time there was a good deal of talk about the fact that the correspondent of the New York Herald Tribune was forced to leave the plane on which he was trying to fly up there.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did you send up your original letter asking if you could come?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Judging from the account that has just been read out, I stuck it in the mail with my return address on the back, and it went on up.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were the mails operating into Communist-held China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. They were; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you not say in this article that as you were ready to leave, they were crowding around to give you messages, because communications were difficult, or words to that effect?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know whether those communications were given to us, or not. There were, I think, several cars leaving at the same time.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is: Do you not say in this article that they were crowding around to give you messages? That is the question.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am trying now to throw my memory back. Let's see—

The CHAIRMAN. You do not have to throw your memory back. It is right there in the article.

Mr. LATTIMORE. It is 15 years or more.

The CHAIRMAN. Read the article, Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Do you want me to read that passage again?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Read the article, Mr. Lattimore.

The question is: Do you not say in that article that they were crowding around to give you messages?

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

Others were arguing, laughing, giving verbal and written messages to be taken out, for communication between the Red world and the outside world is not yet entirely free.

I suppose that indicates that the mails were censored.

Senator FERGUSON. That was not the question. The question was whether or not they were giving to you and your party the messages.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe they were.

As far as my recollection goes, Mrs. Edgar Snow was up there at the time and asked us to take a letter back to her husband for her, and I believe—here my memory is extremely uncertain—that she may have also asked us to take down to her husband some of the material that she had been collecting up there so as to have it in Peking when she got back.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, as I understand it, there was one lady.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. You wrote this whole paragraph around the fact that Mrs. Snow wanted you to take a letter to her husband.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is all that I remember that our party took out.

Senator FERGUSON. No; I did not ask you what you took out at all. I want to know what you were describing in that article, and now

you leave us with the opinion that all you were doing was describing the fact that Mrs. Snow was sending a letter down to her husband with you or one of your party.

Mr. ARNOLD. May he read the article again?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

But it is what he is telling us what he meant by that, now.

Mr. ARNOLD. I thought it was what was in the article.

The CHAIRMAN. Let him read the article again.

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

Others were arguing, laughing, giving verbal and written messages to be taken out, for communication between the Red world and the outside world is not yet entirely free.

Mr. SOURWINE. The important thing, Mr. Lattimore, is that question of what the communications between the Red world, as you have spoken of it, and the outside world, were.

I do not mean to labor the point, sir, but I would like to know: Are you testifying here that you sent your letter to Yen-an and received an answer through the ordinary course of the mails; that you made no special arrangements to have that letter delivered in Red China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that your testimony?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is my testimony.

And if I had received no reply to that letter, I would have considered an indication of the extent to which the Red region was still being blockaded or sequestered, or whatever you like to call it.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Does the word "others" describe Mrs. Snow alone?

Mr. LATTIMORE. At this moment, I have no recollection, sir. There were a number of people preparing to leave Yen-an at that time, and I was just giving a journalist's general impression of what was going on.

I think the fact that I was writing it for a London newspaper, with a hope of publication, is a fairly obvious indication that it was nothing that anybody regarded as surreptitious.

Senator FERGUSON. But you do not mean to convey the idea, do you, that when you were selling these articles you were not writing the truth?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was certainly writing the truth as I understood it at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Then we would take the idea that it was more than Mrs. Snow that wanted to send articles out.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Presumably, it was. That is the way it reads.

Then I will distinguish from that as significant that the only things that I remember our party taking out were some messages and manuscripts of Mrs. Snow's.

I think the way to settle this would be to ask some of the other people who were up there at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Where was this particular meeting that you describe Mao sitting in the meeting?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Somewhere in one of the offices in Yen-an, I suppose, or guest rooms, or hostel, or somewhere.

Senator FERGUSON. But it was not a public place?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Oh, yes; everything there was pretty public.

Senator FERGUSON. Was not he one of the leaders of this movement?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, he was one of the leaders in the movement.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was the head of that government?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He was.

The CHAIRMAN. Referring to whom? Mao Tse-tung?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mao Tse-tung; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Was not this in one of his residences, or offices?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall clearly at the time, but I would say it was much more probably at the guest hostel where a lot of them came to say good-by to people who were leaving.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I have a bypath I would like to follow briefly, if I may, for 2 or 3 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were with Mr. Bisson in Yenan; is that right, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you were in Japan in the fall of 1945, did you see Mr. Bisson there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I met Mr. Bisson very briefly.

As I remember, the United States strategic bomb survey mission was arriving in Tokyo just about the time the reparations mission was leaving, and Mr. Bisson was attached to the strategic bomb survey, and I saw him just before he left Tokyo.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you travel anywhere with him in Japan in the fall of 1945?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't believe I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, do you know Shiro Takeda?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't believe I do.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Nobuyoshi Nakamura?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't believe I do.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Teiji Koide?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe I do.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who any of those three men are?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I cannot place them.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did they accompany you to or within Japan in 1945?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not than I can recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you make any trips with them?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think so. Let me see. I don't think I made any trips out of Tokyo.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you go around Tokyo with them? Did they accompany you, or did you accompany them in Tokyo on any occasions?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I may have. I can't recall it at the moment.

Mr. SOURWINE. Thank you.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I add into the record at this time an article which appeared in the New Masses on October 12, 1937, by Mr. Philip Jaffe?

The CHAIRMAN. We have a peculiar situation here now. You have the witness saying that he did not know these parties named by counsel.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That I don't recall them. I don't believe I met them.

The CHAIRMAN. And that they may have conducted him around Tokyo.

Do you want to straighten that out, or not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would like to explain, Mr. Chairman, a number of times in these hearings the names of people have been mentioned whom I totally failed to recall, and later on some memorandum or other document is brought out which indicates that I did meet them. This is part of the whole procedure, which I should very respectfully like to criticize.

The CHAIRMAN. That part will be stricken from the record. You are not here for the purpose of criticizing; you are here for the purpose of testifying under oath, and you are under oath.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I introduce into the record the article by Philip J. Jaffe who, as the witness has testified, was one of the four people in his party at Yenan?

This appeared in the New Masses of October 12, 1937.

The CHAIRMAN. You had better listen to the question, Mr. Lattimore.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, would you let me ask one question before Mr. Morris proceeds?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Lattimore, you referred in your testimony to interviews with Mao Tse-tung.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator SMITH. How many interviews did you have with him? You mentioned several hours. How many times did you interview Mao Tse-tung, or were you present with him in the interview?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think I myself personally, not more than two.

Senator SMITH. Were you present when others were interviewing him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. As far as I remember, the only interviewing was done by others.

Senator SMITH. Who were present with you at those interviews? What other individuals?

Mr. LATTIMORE. To the best of my recollection, Mr. Bisson and Mr. Jaffe.

Senator SMITH. Were Mrs. Snow and Mrs. Jaffe present at those interviews?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think so.

Senator SMITH. Were any other individuals present besides you and Mr. Jaffe and Mr. Snow and Mr. Bisson?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The only other person that I recall was a young Chinese who was acting as Mr. Mao's interpreter.

Senator SMITH. So that each time you had an interview with Mao Tse-tung, it was just the three or four of you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator SMITH. So it was more or less, then, you might say, a private interview or private hearing with Mao Tse-tung, was it not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It was.

I don't know whether "private" is the right word to characterize it. He was giving some foreigners some information for publication if they felt it. So I wouldn't call it very private.

Senator SMITH. Did he give you permission to publish everything he said to you there?

MR. LATTIMORE. To the best of my recollection, that was the basis on which the interviews were held, just like a journalistic interview which is for the purpose of publication.

Senator SMITH. At that time he was the commander in chief, was he not, and the head man, so to speak, of the Chinese Communists?

MR. LATTIMORE. Yes; that would be my assumption. I don't know exactly how the committee structure of the Communists went at that time; whether he was regarded as a member of a committee or as the individual head.

Senator SMITH. Did he not have a residence, an official residence?

MR. LATTIMORE. He had a small mud house off in a corner of the town.

Senator SMITH. You do not mean to convey the impression just now, then, do you, that he just met you around in any particular public places?

MR. LATTIMORE. He also met us around in public places.

Senator SMITH. How many times?

MR. LATTIMORE. We were there 4 days. I don't remember whether we saw him each of those 4 days, or not.

Senator SMITH. Did you inquire about the people in attendance at the Red academy which you mentioned?

MR. LATTIMORE. Not in detail; no.

Senator SMITH. Did you write an article about the work being done in the Red academy?

MR. LATTIMORE. I don't believe I did, unless there is a second article for the London Times here, in which I said something about it.

Senator SMITH. I believe that is all at the moment, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. All right; Mr. Morris.

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will you receive in the record the article I described, namely, the newspaper article of October 12, 1937, written by Philip J. Jaffe, who was one of the party of four accompanying Mr. Lattimore on this trip to Yen-an, about which we have had testimony today?

The CHAIRMAN. Where do you get that?

MR. MORRIS. This is from the New Masses of October 12, 1937.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, it can be tied in to Mr. Lattimore's visit.

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to read two passages here which relate to the witness today.

MR. ARNOLD. Do you have a copy?

MR. MORRIS. No; we do not.

Senator SMITH. Is the New Masses a Communist publication? Is it true, or is it not?

What is the proof you have up to now?

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you give us the document on the New Masses?

MR. MANDEL. The New Masses was cited as a Communist periodical by the Attorney General Francis Biddle in September 1942.

MR. MORRIS. I am now reading from page 5, column 1. This is by Mr. Jaffe, who accompanied Mr. Lattimore, according to Mr. Lattimore's testimony, on that trip to Yen-an:

While in Yen-an our party which included beside myself, T. A. Bisson of the Foreign Policy Association, and Owen Lattimore, editor of Pacific Affairs,

stayed at the foreign office. The building was soon buzzing with excitement. We had barely finished our first dinner in Yen-an, when guests arrived: Ting Ling, China's foremost woman writer; Li Li-san, an old associate of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the only two non-Chinese then in the region, Agnes Smedley and Peggy Snow, wife of the American writer, Edgar Snow, and many Communist leaders. Before long, we were talking and singing in a variety of languages. In the midst of our animated discussion, somebody entered quietly and sat down. "Comrade Mao" someone said—Mao Tse-tung, the political leader of the then Chinese Soviet Government.

I would now like to turn to page 10, reading from column 2.

The CHAIRMAN. The same article?

Mr. MORRIS. The same article, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. By whom?

Mr. MORRIS. By Philip J. Jaffe, who was one of the people on that trip.

Our visit to Yen-an was climaxed by a huge mass meeting, addressed by Chu Teh—

Who is now the head of the Chinese Communists; is he not, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I couldn't answer that.

Mr. MORRIS (reading):

Bisson, Lattimore, and myself and attended by the 1,500 cadet students of the People's Anti-Japanese Military-Political University and about 500 from other schools. \* \* \*

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to have you go back to the first excerpt you read there, where it speaks of those who were there.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you read it again, please?

Mr. MORRIS (reading):

While in Yen-an our party, which included besides myself T. A. Bisson of the Foreign Policy Association, and Owen Lattimore, editor of Pacific Affairs, stayed at the Foreign Office. The building was soon buzzing with excitement. We had barely finished our first dinner in Yen-an when guests arrived: Ting Ling, China's foremost woman writer; Li Li-san, an old associate of Dr. Sun Yat-sen; the only two non-Chinese then in the region, Agnes Smedley and Peggy Snow, wife of the American writer, Edgar Snow; and many Communist leaders. \* \* \*

The CHAIRMAN. I want to refer to that one remark about the only two non-Chinese in the region.

Mr. MORRIS. "The only two non-Chinese then in the region." That is in contradiction of the testimony we have had here today; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The witness stated here today that there were many people there.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. I didn't state they were there at the time I was there. A number of them got there before I was there and a number got there after I was there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, I asked you if you found the place crowded with tourists.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Chinese. Chinese are also tourists sometimes.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, were you restricted in any way while you were there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes. I would say I was.

Senator FERGUSON. How?

Mr. LATTIMORE. One of my principal interests in being there was to try to find out how the Communists were dealing with minority groups such as the Chinese Moslems and the Mongols.

This was near to Mongol territory. And I heard while I was there that there was a school for such people situated just outside of Yen-an, very close, and I repeatedly asked to be taken there and allowed to interview people. But this was not permitted.

Finally, they said that they would bring in a delegation from there, and they brought in a number of what they called students in a school for minorities that they had there. These included Moslems, Tibetans, Mongols, and various tribal people like Lolos and so forth. And they had a Chinese there in charge of them, and he was an English-speaking Chinese, and he started to ask them various routine questions in Chinese.

Presumably, part of their education in this school was that they were all learning Chinese, which he would then interpret into English.

Having spotted a couple of Mongols, I started talking to them in Mongol. They were delighted to find someone who spoke Mongol and began to respond very eagerly. But the Chinese in charge of them became so obviously agitated at my having direct access to them without his control that I broke it off for fear of getting the poor boys into trouble.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have a camera?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you restricted in taking pictures?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think we were restricted at all in taking pictures.

Senator FERGUSON. You seem to have a very fine memory on this conversation when you had the Chinese interpreter who brought in these people.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Naturally. These Chinese minorities were my special subject of interest and research study.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not mention them, though, in your article, did you, in the London Times?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know whether I mentioned them in a subsequent article, if there was one, or not.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you try and find if you have a copy of that article?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Surely I will.

The CHAIRMAN. Does Mao Tse-tung speak English?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did he speak Russian?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe so.

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Chairman, could I ask a question right there?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Lattimore, was any conversation had, prior to your addressing the students, as to under what circumstances you would address them, or in what manner?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. There was an address of some sort by, I think, Chu Teh, who was presiding. And he said: "We have many visitors here, including some foreign visitors, and we welcome them all," and, you know, that kind of thing. And then somebody who was standing beside them said, "One of these foreigners talks Chinese; how about having him come up?" and there was a sort of clamor from the crowd, and they said, "Make the foreigner talk Chinese."

So I, unwilling, scrambled on the platform. At that time I had never made a public speech in Chinese; I had nothing prepared, and

so I got up and made some remarks. And there were a lot of guffaws because I used rather colloquial language instead of formal lecture language, and then I scrambled down.

There was a mixture of laughter and applause.

Senator O'CONOR. About what were your remarks?

Mr. LATTIMORE. A general kind, that we were very glad to be up there and we thanked them for their hospitality, and we wanted to see what was going on—that sort of thing, you know.

Senator O'CONOR. How about Mr. Jaffe's and Mr. Bisson's remarks?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall whether they made remarks or not. If they did, it would have to be through interpreters, of course.

Senator O'CONOR. Of course, you noted Mr. Jaffe's reference to the article in the New Masses.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I skipped that. Did he say they addressed the—

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. He said three of them.

Senator O'CONOR. All three of them addressed.

Will you read that please, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS (reading):

Our visit to Yen-an was climaxed by a huge mass meeting, addressed by Chu Teh, Bisson, Lattimore, and myself. \* \* \*

Senator O'CONOR. That is to what I was referring.

What have you to say with reference to their addressing the group?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no recollection of what they were talking about, Senator. My recollection is one of sort of mingled pleasure at having been able to scramble through a speech in Chinese and embarrassment in having made slips in the use of colloquial language that made people laugh. So I was not psychologically in the right mood for paying close attention to what other people were saying.

Senator O'CONOR. In view of the other observations that were made, as to the difficulties confronting others in getting up there, the impression is left, at least on me, that you were not only welcome, but that you were given more or less free rein to do as you pleased while you were there. Would that be correct?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Roughly correct, Senator.

If I may explain, we were certainly given remarkable opportunities to interview people and to ask questions.

As I say, I personally found restriction on my movements and opportunities when I tried to get into the one thing that interested me most.

I can't answer for the journalists who got there before me and got there after me, except in the general sense that the newspaper accounts published by such people at the time all laid stress on at least the relative frankness and willingness to talk of Communist leaders when interviewed up there.

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Lattimore, the only other question I would like to ask is this: You have previously indicated or stated that you are unfamiliar with the Communist line and with Communist teachings and precepts.

In the article in the London Times, in your reference to Mao, you not only speak quite approvingly of him, but you indicate that he was

quite adept at speaking on the philosophies and other things. How do you know that he was adhering to those things of the Communist line if you did not know the Communist line?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is the impression that I got by sitting by while Bisson and Jaffe were interviewing him. And this was the general period when, by agreement between both the Communists and the Nationalist Government, the united front was being worked out, and they were asking him a lot of technical questions about "What do you mean by 'united front'?" et cetera, et cetera.

And my impression, from listening to those answers, was that he was in full command of exactly what he meant and exactly what he didn't mean.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Lattimore, did you have any form or type of letter of introduction or credentials; anything of that sort, to present there to Mao's government, or Mao's officials when you arrived?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I don't think we had anything whatever of the kind.

Senator SMITH. Were you just accepted at face value by Mao and his attendants?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right. That was the practice at the time, Senator. They were accepting any kind of journalists, particularly any foreign visitor who would come up.

Senator SMITH. I thought you told us earlier, though, that you feared you would have some trouble getting up there, and that was the reason you wrote that first letter. That there was a line beyond which the Communists did not allow journalists to come, except by prearrangement.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. I don't think my writing them a letter implies that at all. All I was doing was trying to let the Communists know that I had the intention to come up there and see things, if I was allowed to see things, and that I was not trying, so to speak, to sneak in on them.

Senator SMITH. Do you recall where you posted that letter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think just in an ordinary letter box in Peking City.

Senator SMITH. I missed that.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would——

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to leave that as soon as I have Mr. Lattimore identify one picture in this article.

Mr. Lattimore, I offer you page 7 and call your attention to the top picture.

The CHAIRMAN. Page 7 of what?

Mr. MORRIS. That is the New Masses article which has been introduced into the record, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it admitted, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will you admit it into evidence?

The CHAIRMAN. The article may be admitted. It will have to be copied out of there.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 514" and is as follows:)

## EXHIBIT No. 514

[New Masses, October 12, 1937]

## CHINA'S COMMUNISTS TOLD ME—A SPECIALIST IN FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS INTERVIEWS THE LEADING MEN OF RED CHINA IN THEIR HOME TERRITORIES

(By Philip J. Jaffe)

Fifteen days before Japanese troops opened fire on a Chinese garrison near Peiping, I was seated in the one bare room which is the home of Mao Tse-tung, the political leader of the Chinese Communist Party. In the course of the interview Mao Tse-tung said to me: "Japan cannot stop now. Japan wants to swallow China. Its next step will not be long delayed. You ask about the future of the united front? The united front is inevitable because Japan's invasion farther into the heart of China is inevitable."

Twenty-four hours later, in the military headquarters of the former Chinese Red Army, only two big rooms, walls covered with huge military maps, I asked the most famous of the Communist commanders, General Chu Teh: "Why do you think that General Chiang Kai-shek will have to accept the aid of the Red Army?"

Chu Teh replied: "A form of the united front has now existed for several months and has resulted in a large measure of internal peace. The Chinese bourgeoisie, however, is not easily able to forget its ten-year fight against the Red Army. But when the war with Japan eventually begins, it will not be a question of what the bourgeoisie wants; they will have to have the Red Army. In a war with Japan, it will not only be a question of regular troops. China must also depend on its peasants and workers whom the Communists alone can lead. It is not merely the numbers of the army which count; it is the mass population as well. If Chiang Kai-shek thinks that he can raise a large army to fight Japan, without at the same enrolling the masses as the backbone of the struggle, then he will be rudely disappointed. No war against Japan can be successful without a correct organization of the peasants and workers, and this only the Red Army can successfully carry out."

Two weeks later I know that the prophecy made by the two famous leaders of the former Chinese Red Army had been fulfilled. On July 7, Japan invaded North China. On August 22, the first stage of the united front—that of military cooperation—was concluded between the Nanking and Red Armies. In the words of the official communiqué from Nanking, "the Chinese government and the Communist army have been fighting for the last ten years; this is the official conclusion of the war." Mao Tse-tung has since been appointed governor of the former Soviet region, now renamed the Special Administrative District. Chu Teh has been appointed commander in chief of the former Red Army, now called the Eighth Route Army. Chou En-lai, another outstanding Communist with whom I spoke, is the official Communist representative on the general staff in Nanking.

*Mao Tse-tung, political leader.*—Yenan is the capital of the former Soviet region. On June 21, after four days' travel from Sian, the capital of Shensi province, scene of the Chiang Kai-shek incident of last December, through semi-starved villages, on bridgeless rivers, and roads deep with gullies, we finally passed through the beautiful, ancient main gate of Yen-an. We were greeted at the gate by Agnes Smedley, the distinguished American writer and an old friend of the Chinese people. While in Yen-an our party which included beside myself, T. A. Bisson of the Foreign Policy Association, and Owen Lattimore, editor of *Pacific Affairs*, stayed at the Foreign Office. The building was soon buzzing with excitement. We had barely finished our first dinner in Yen-an, when guests arrived: Ting Ling, China's foremost woman writer; Li Li-san, an old associate of Dr. Sun Yat-sen; the only two non-Chinese then in the region; Agnes Smedley and Peggy Snow, wife of the American writer, Edgar Snow; and many Communist leaders. Before long we were talking and singing in a variety of languages. In the midst of our animated discussion somebody entered quietly and sat down. "Comrade Mao," someone said—Mao Tse-tung, the political leader of the then Chinese Soviet Government.

We spent many hours with him after that evening—at interviews, during meals, at the theater—and we were increasingly impressed by the complete sincerity and lack of ostentation that is so typical of him and of the other leaders we saw. It was during these visits that we grew to feel his tremendous force, a force likely to be overlooked at first because of the low, even voice, the quiet

restraint of his movements, and the beautiful hands, almost too delicate for a soldier, but so dextrous with the writing brush. But the quiet voice speaks with brilliance and authority, the movements of the tall, slim body with slightly stooped shoulders are sure and well coordinated. Like all other Red Army commanders, Mao wears exactly the same uniform as the rank-and-file soldiers, eats the same food, sleeps on the same sort of k'ang (a low, long bed of stone), avoids all social ceremonies, and altogether lives an extremely simple life. It becomes easy to understand the tremendous personal appeal which Mao has as a leader. This leadership dates from the first organizational meeting of the committee which organized the Chinese Communist Party in Shanghai in 1920. Mao was an important figure at that meeting.

Our interviews with Mao Tse-tung were many and on a host of topics: the evolution of Nanking's policy; the inner political struggle within Nanking; the Sian incident; the united front; the student movement; the role of other powers in Far Eastern affairs; and the perspective of China's future development, etc. But since Mao Tse-tung asked me to transmit a message to the American people, it is perhaps best to confine his remarks to those concerning America and its isolationist policy.

"Though there are many Americans who are isolationist in principle," he began, "America is not and cannot be isolationist. America is in this respect like other capitalist countries; part proletariat, part capitalist. Neither one nor the other can be isolationist. Capitalism in the imperialist countries is world-wide, and so is the problem of liberation which needs the effort of the world proletariat. Not only does China need the help of the American proletariat, but the American proletariat also needs the help of the Chinese peasants and workers. The relation of American capitalism to China is similar to that of other capitalist countries. These countries have common interests as well as conflicting ones—common in that they all exploit China, conflicting in that each wants what the other has, as exemplified by the conflict between Great Britain and the United States, as well as between Japan, Britain, and the United States. If China is subjugated by Japan, it will not only be a catastrophe for the Chinese people, but a serious loss to other imperialist powers."

At this point Mao was handed a wireless message announcing both the fall of Bilbao and the resignation of France's premier, Léon Blum. We discussed the probable causes of both these events. Mao clearly showed his grasp of the world situation, despite the isolating distance. We took time off to answer a host of questions, this time by him. What is comparative strength of the Socialist and Communist Parties in America? Did we know the life stories of John L. Lewis and Earl Browder? The strength of the American labor unions? The Trotskyites? American official opinion on the Far East?

Then Mao Tse-tung continued: "The Chinese revolution is not an exception; it is one part of the world revolution. It has special characteristics, but fundamentally it is similar to the Spanish, French, American, and British struggles. These struggles are all progressive. Therein lies their similarity. It is this similarity that evokes the broad sympathy of the American masses and their concern with the fate of the Chinese people. We, on our part, are also concerned with the fate of the American people. Please convey this message to your people. The difference between our peoples lies in this: the Chinese people, unlike the Americans are oppressed by outside invaders. The American people are, of course, oppressed from the inside, but not by feudal forces. It is the hope common to all of us that our two countries shall work together."

*Chu Teh, military leader.*—Though Chu Teh is known to the outside world for his military exploits, his other activities are many and varied. We first met Chu Teh in a class he was teaching on the "Fundamental Problems of the Chinese Revolution." Wearing spectacles, he could very well have been mistaken for a professional teacher. At the People's Anti-Japanese Military Political University at Yen-an, he teaches both military tactics and Marxist-Leninist principles. From 1922 to 1925, Chu Teh studied political and economic science, philosophy, and military strategy in Germany. As a result he speaks German freely. His favorite recreations are reading, conversation, horseback riding, and basketball. The latter sport is a subject for much fun among the troops. His love for the game is greater than his ability and he can often be found hanging about a group which is choosing sides. If he is not picked, he quietly moves on to the next court in the hope that there his luck will turn. My greatest disappointment at Yen-an was that rain ruined an appointment we had to play basketball with him.

Chu Teh, commander in chief of the Eighth Route Army, is the personification of the spirit of these armies which for 10 years have been continuously victorious in the face of overwhelming odds. His career has been devoted mainly to the military side of revolutionary activities. Fifty-one years old, he has taken part in the entire development of modern China, from the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty in 1911 to the present struggle against Japan. Beginning with August 1, 1927, when together with another famous Red commander, Ho Lung, he organized the Nanchang uprising, he participated in exploits which have now become legend. In November 1931, the first All-Soviet Congress in Juikin, Kiangsi, bestowed upon him the title of commander in chief of the army. Even in Nanking I heard many call Chu Teh the greatest military genius in all China.

There is strength and assurance in that square, stocky figure, in that strong peasant face, weather-beaten by a life of campaigning, and in those small bright eyes which are quite hidden when he laughs, and he laughs frequently. We took a picture of him standing with legs apart and hands on hips. That is Chu Teh.

"The Red Army in this region under our direct command numbers about ninety thousand," he began. "This force occupies a contiguous territory extending from North Shensi to East Kansu and South Ninghsia. From Yen-an to Sanyan there are some partisan troops in Kuomintang uniforms. In this region professional full-time partisans number from ten to twenty thousand. The number of part-time partisans is much larger; their duties are to maintain order in their districts.

"Of the ninety thousand regular troops here, only twenty to thirty thousand come from the original Kiangsi district. About thirty thousand were recruited on the way, chiefly in Szechwan, and the rest are from local areas.

"In other partisan areas there are various groups numbering from one to three thousand soldiers, but it is hard to estimate the total figure; we ourselves are not certain about this. These partisan areas are located in southern Shensi (southwest of Sian), the Fukien-Kiangsi border, the Honan-Hupeh-Anhui border, northeastern Kiangsi, the Hunan-Hupeh-Kiangsi border, the Kwangtung-Hunan border, the Kiangsi-Hunan border, and the Shensi-Szechwan border. Connections with several of these are still maintained, but not with all; and these connections are irregular and uncertain." Asked if we might publish this, Chu Teh replied "It doesn't matter. The fact is well known throughout China."

Having seen many Red troops carrying on their maneuvers with excellent new rifles, machine guns, automatic rifles, and the ubiquitous Mausers, we were curious to know how well armed they were as a whole. Chu Teh replied, "Our regular ninety thousand troops in the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia region are in general well armed. Other equipment, such as clothes, food, and supplies, is not satisfactory. Although it greatly improved after the Sian incident, it is still far from sufficient. Though we had established contact with Chang Hsueh-liang before the Sian affair, it was only during the two weeks following the actual incident that any large quantity of munitions, clothing, and food reached us."

As Chu Teh continued the conversation, punctuated frequently by his broad, genial smile, he came to the discussion of his well-known theory of the military tactics necessary to defeat Japan, namely, to avoid decisive engagements in the early stages in favor of guerrilla tactics to encircle the enemy and harass it until its morale was shattered. We wanted to know something about the Manchurian volunteers. Were they really well organized or were they mere hungry "bandits"?

"At first," Chu Teh said, "the Manchurian volunteers were largely impoverished peasants and the scattered remnants of the defeated Manchurian troops. They operated without a plan, could not accomplish much, and finally were almost destroyed. The Communist Party then began to organize new peasant detachments, who were later joined by what remained of the original volunteers. As a result, most of these formerly leaderless forces have been converted into important detachments with wide popular support. This year there has been some increase in the number of volunteers along the Korean border, in eastern Fengtien, and in eastern Kirin. The increase has been more systematic than hitherto. New groups have recently been formed in Jehol and Chahar. About three months ago a report to me stated that the total number of Manchurian volunteers ranged from fifty to sixty thousand." In reply to a statement made by the Japanese to the effect that 70 percent of the Manchurian volunteers are Communists, Chu Teh said that this was not an exaggeration.

*On the United Front.*—Of all the questions facing China and the former Soviet area the most important is that of the united front. No one in Soviet China knows the details of the negotiations more intimately than Chou En-lai, vice chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council, and second in importance only

to Mao Tse-tung. It was he who carried on all the negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek. Born thirty-nine years ago of a mandarin family, Chou En-lai joined the revolutionary movement in 1911. Upon his return to China in 1924 from a stay abroad, he became chief of the political department of the Whampoa Military Academy under the direction of Chiang Kai-shek. It is said that even today the generalissimo has a great fondness for Chou. When asked why the united-front conversations were then not moving very fast, Chou En-lai said: "The form of the Chinese united front is quite different from that in Europe or the United States. In China two parties fought each other for ten years. The Communist Party representing the proletariat and peasantry was a revolutionary party with its own areas and military forces as well as its own social, political, and economic system. The Kuomintang represented the ruling social groups throughout the rest of China. But the position of the Chinese bourgeoisie was such that the obstacles arising from their class position could not forever bar a united struggle against Japan. The bourgeoisie of China have at last come to realize that the Japanese invasion harms all classes and that, standing alone, they are too weak to safeguard China's freedom and independence."

Up to the time of Japan's most recent invasion, the united-front negotiations had progressed quite slowly though not without positive results. Internal peace had been achieved, and the two armies no longer fought each other. Confiscation of land in the Soviet regions was abolished. The name of the Red Army was changed. Dramatic troupes began to tour the countryside to teach the peasants the meaning of democratic elections. Nanking began to contribute a considerable, though as yet insufficient, sum of money monthly to the Soviet area. Technical difficulties made a complete united front often seem impossible. But Japan's military aggression scattered all the major obstacles.

*The land problem.*—Ever since October 1935, when the main body of the Communist armies from Central and South China began to arrive in north Shensi, their immediate objectives have been twofold. First, to build a permanent base for internal development, and second and more important, to use this base as a spearhead for unifying all elements in China for a successful war of defense against the invading Japanese militarists. Despite the fact that the former Soviet area, the largest single contiguous territory ever held under Communist rule, stated as one of the most economically backward areas in China, the welfare of the peasants and workers has been improved considerably. There is not sufficient room here to tell all that we saw and heard, but a few high spots, in the words of Po K'u, one of the important leaders of the region, will perhaps shed some light.

Po K'u's home and office is in the abandoned compound of an English Baptist mission. When we expressed surprise at finding religious pictures hanging on his walls, Po K'u said that he left the compound just as he found it in the hope that the missionaries would return.

In reply to several questions on the land confiscation problem, Po K'u said in quite good English: "When the first Soviets were established in 1933 in Shensi, all the good land along the river banks was in the hands of rich landlords who used the great famine of 1930 as a lever for confiscating this land. From then until the Sian incident in December 1936, all this land was divided among the peasants; all taxation and levies were abolished; democratic liberty was extended to all; peasants built up their own armed forces for their protection instead of relying on landlords' forces; and peasants enjoyed the aid and direction of the Soviet government to increase production, improve the land, and develop consumer cooperatives.

"After the Sian incident when the united-front organizations had already begun, the redistribution of land among the peasants was stopped in districts occupied after the beginning of the negotiations. In general, the ownership of land is not the main problem in this territory. Land is plentiful, for Shensi is thinly populated, with an average of one family to every thirteen miles. The form of exploitation and, therefore, the main problems are usury and excessive interest rates on money and cattle. Land rents and money lending rates, therefore, have been reduced drastically. The maximum rent now permitted in the Soviet areas is 30 percent of the land produce, and peasants can bargain with landlords to further reduce this percentage, while the money-lending rate has been reduced from a general 10 percent monthly rate to a maximum of 2 percent. Even last year, when warfare was still going on, the Soviet government spent one hundred thousand dollars for ploughs, seeds, etc., while this year there will be an additional cash distribution of sixty thousand dollars."

Apparently there has been a great deal of confusion about this abandonment of land confiscation. Mao Tse-tung's pithy words perhaps explain it most

simply. He said: "It is not so much a question now of whether our lands belongs to the peasants or the landlords, but whether it is Chinese or Japanese." The same reasoning is applied by the Communist leaders to the larger question of China as a whole. To all of them "it is not a question now of which general controls which province, but whether the land will remain Chinese or come under Japanese control. If the latter should happen, the original problem disappears."

*Life in the Special Administrative District.*—Our visit, however, did not consist only of a series of interviews. We visited stores and shops, noting with interest how much cleaner and more orderly they were than any we had seen on our trip, and how relatively well-stocked they were. And the cheesecloth covering the food for sale stood in marked contrast to the cities in non-Soviet areas where the only coverings we had seen were armies of flies. Even the dogs, the most miserable of all living things in China, were active and barking. Anyone who has seen the worm-eaten, starved, gaunt dogs of China, too weak to move out of the way of a passing vehicle, will understand the meaning of that.

Culturally, too, the Soviet region is making great strides. Besides Yen-an, the present capital, three other cities are being developed as cultural centers: Tingpien, Yenchang, and Chingyang. Anti-Japanese academies and dramatic groups are the axes around which the cultural life is being developed. Study classes, reading room, theatricals, dances, lectures, and mass meetings are regular features of life in the Soviet territories. We were amused to hear the universal complaint of all librarians. "They keep the books out too long."

But most interesting and important of all was our visit to the theater. A troupe of players was scheduled to go on the road the following day, and they graciously went through their repertoire for us as well as for their own delighted audience. In a packed auditorium, seated on low, narrow, backless wooden benches, before a crude stage whose footlights were flickering candles, we sat through four hours of amazingly excellent plays, superbly acted. With perfect realism (so different from the classical Chinese theater) and delightful humor, they presented plays designed to teach the peasants how to vote and how to unite. They explained the value of cleanliness, of vaccination, of education, and the stupidity and danger of superstitions. At one point, for instance, one character complained of being tired. "We weren't tired on our seven thousand-mile march," was the reply. And the audience roared as did Mao-Chu Teh, and the rest of the leaders who sat next to us, having as good a time as anyone. The high spot of the evening was a really professional performance of a scene from Gorki's *Mother*, which had been given at the Gorki memorial evening celebrated in Yen-an, and a Living Newspaper by the young people on such subjects as bribery, bureaucracy, and hygiene. All these plays were being sent out to the villages.

Our visit to Yen-an was climaxed by a huge mass meeting, addressed by Chu Teh, Bisson, Lattimore, and myself and attended by the one thousand five hundred cadet students of the People's Anti-Japanese Military-Political University and about five hundred from other schools. Here are some questions asked of me. "What is the position of woman in the U.S.A.? How do American workers live and how developed is their movement? What are the results of Roosevelt's N.R.A. campaign? What is the present situation in the Left literary movement in America? What do the American people think of our long march west?" And innumerable questions concerning America's attitude in the event of a Sino-Japanese conflict, the American attitude toward the war in Spain, and what Americans think of the Kuomintang-Communist cooperation.

This stress on the role of the United States is altogether typical of the reaction throughout China. These people have traditionally considered Americans as their friends and they do not want us to fail them now. A few days after our arrival in Shanghai, I received a letter from Agnes Smedley which tells better than I am able how much hope and enthusiasm the visit of Americans evoked in the former Soviet regions.

"In my imagination I follow your journey from here, and my friends and I speculate as to your exact location day by day, and your exact occupation. I want to tell you that you left behind remarkable friends. I did not realize the effect of that meeting until two or three days had passed. Then it began to roll in. I have no reason to tell you tales. But the meeting, and your speech in particular, has had a colossal effect upon all people. One was so moved by it that he could not sleep that night but spent the night writing a poem in praise

of you all. I enclose the poem. It is not good from the literary viewpoint. But from the viewpoint of the emotion behind it, it is of value. It is a deeply passionate poem. It is not good enough to publish, but it is good enough to carry next to your heart in the years to come. To that meeting, it may interest you to know, came delegations sent by every institution. Many institutions could not cross the rivers. But they sent activists, groups of six to a dozen. They later gave extensive reports. I am getting those reports from instructors day by day. All are deeply impressed and moved and grateful to you and all of you. There has never been anything like this here before."

Mr. LATTIMORE. Do you want me to read the caption of this photograph?

Mr. MORRIS. Please.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The photograph is captioned:

Troops marching through the main gate of Yen-an to their drill grounds. The crouching figure with the camera is Owen Lattimore, editor of Pacific Affairs.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that a picture of you, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. As well as a man can identify a rather distant profile picture of himself, I would say so, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there any evidence there of your being supervised?

Mr. LATTIMORE. There is no evidence in that picture, except, of course, that this was an arranged parade. I suppose you might call that being supervised.

The CHAIRMAN. Did they parade for you by arrangement?

Mr. LATTIMORE. As I recall, we asked if we could take some photographs of—

The CHAIRMAN. Wait a minute. I asked if they paraded for you by arrangement.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I believe it was by arrangement.

My recollection is rather hazy, but I believe we asked if we could take some pictures of troops.

The CHAIRMAN. You reviewed them?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

And they said, "We will have some troops out on the parade ground tomorrow and you can come and take pictures, if you like."

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Morris.

Senator WATKINS. May I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. Was this before, or after you were adviser to the Nationalist Government of Chiang Kai-shek?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It was long before.

The CHAIRMAN. What was that question?

Senator WATKINS. I asked him if it was before or after he was adviser to the Generalissimo.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I may say, Senator, that the Generalissimo was very much interested in my having been up there at that time, and we had quite a talk about it.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like now to get back to Rogoff and War and the Working Class, which started out this questioning about the change in line.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. We have introduced into the record, Mr. Chairman, as our exhibit No. 26, the letter from Rose Yardumian to Mr. Edward Carter. I would like to read it at this time.

This is January 20, 1944:

DEAR MR. CARTER: I received your letter of January 17 with copies of the telegrams you sent Mr. Hiss and Mr. Currie. I called Alger Hiss yesterday morning and he told me that he had received your wire, but was sure that I would understand that he could not make the first advance in arranging a private talk with Rogoff. He mentioned the Rogoff articles *In War and the Working Class* and that Rogoff's material had caused considerable controversy in circles here. \* \* \*

Mr. Lattimore, is it your testimony that you know nothing of those articles in *War and the Working Class* at that time?

MR. LATTIMORE. I believe at that time I knew nothing about it.

MR. MORRIS. So Rose Yardumian knew about it, but you did not?

MR. LATTIMORE. I know about that now; yes.

MR. MORRIS. I mean is it your testimony that at that time, Rose Yardumian, who wrote this letter, knew about the articles of Rogoff *War and the Working Class*, but that you did not?

MR. LATTIMORE. That would be my presumption from the wording of the letter that she knew about it. I don't recall knowing about the article at all. I did get hold of the article later on, I think several years later, and looked it up.

MR. MORRIS. Did you know Rose Yardumian?

MR. LATTIMORE. Yes; I knew her.

MR. MORRIS. She was the secretary of the Washington office of the IPR, was she not?

MR. LATTIMORE. I believe she was.

I can't recall now whether she was the secretary or one of the girls in the office, or what.

MR. MORRIS. Are you acquainted with the testimony before this committee that she was on the board of a Communist publication last year in Communist China?

MR. LATTIMORE. No, I don't remember seeing that.

MR. MORRIS. You did not read that part of your testimony?

MR. LATTIMORE. I don't think so. No. I read so much testimony, I am not sure of the details.

MR. MORRIS. I am continuing reading now:

\* \* \* He said that if Larry Todd wanted to bring Rogoff to Hornbeck's office, they would not refuse to see him. I am not sure that I understand the mechanizations of our State Department. Bill Johnstone saw no point in my trying to get in touch with Mr. Hornbeck directly, since presumably Hiss had consulted with Hornbeck.

Mr. Currie has arranged to see Rogoff at 12 o'clock today. Colonel Faymonville is returning to Washington from New York this morning and is supposed to get in touch with our office then.

Rogoff visited our offices yesterday afternoon and Bill and I had a little talk with him about the small meeting which we had hoped to hold Thursday at 5:30. Rogoff said that he thought that it was unwise for us to hold the meeting; that certain Chinese groups in Washington were very distressed at the fact that he was talking so much. He thinks that it would be bad for the Institute of Pacific Relations to have him speak under its auspices. \* \* \*

Do you understand the reasoning of Mr. Rogoff there, Mr. Lattimore?

MR. LATTIMORE. No; I am afraid I don't.

MR. MORRIS (reading):

\* \* \* Bill and Anne Johnstone had hoped to get a small group of people together at their home this evening—the Hornbecks, Remers, Blakeslees, and a few others—but time is very short and many of these people have already made plans for this evening, so the Johnstone idea will probably not come off. How-

ever, Rogoff is coming into our office at 2 o'clock today. Bill is planning to take him to the Cosmos Club to talk with Owen Lattimore, Carl Remer, and John Carter Vincent. After he talks with these people, we are making arrangements to take him to the Library of Congress and a few other places.

I am sorry that our meeting did not work out for him, as I know that there are many people here would have enjoyed hearing him.

Sincerely yours,

Rose  
ROSE YARDUMIAN.

P. S.—I am enclosing a list of the Army-Navy people who have accepted to date.  
P. P. S.—Rogoff and Bill have been at the Cosmos Club for the last 2½ hours talking with Lattimore, Remer, and Vincent.

The CHAIRMAN. To whom was that letter addressed?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Edward C. Carter, of the International Secretariat.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the date of that?

Mr. MORRIS. January 20, 1944.

The CHAIRMAN. That is in the record, is it not?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, sir.

This bears on the knowledge that the Institute of Pacific Relations had with respect to Rogoff's article, which, according to testimony before this committee, signalized the change in Communist Party thinking in 1943.

Mr. Lattimore, did you know Mr. Vladimir Romm in this country?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes. I met him at the Yosemite Conference of the IPR in the summer of 1936, at which he was one of the two, I think, Soviet delegates.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you meet Mr. Motiliev in this country?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; at the same time.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you ever met Mr. Litvinoff in this country?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes. I called on Mr. Litvinoff when I was Chiang Kai-shek's adviser when I was back here on leave in 1942.

Mr. MORRIS. On how many occasions did you see Mr. Litvinoff?

Mr. LATTIMORE. One, I think.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you ever seen Mr. Panyushkin, Soviet Ambassador in this country?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think I have seen him in this country. I saw him in Chungking.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever give him or his office something for the Soviet pouch?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe that it would be accurate to describe it as giving it to him for the Soviet pouch. I wrote to him stating that I would like to try to make a trip to Outer Mongolia and as there was no Outer Mongolian representation in this country, I would appreciate it if he would convey my request to the Outer Mongolian Embassy, or whatever it may be, in Moscow.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, did you ever meet Mr. Gromyko in the United States?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think I ever did.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, did you make an arrangement with Mr. Gromyko to have your book *Solution in Asia* published in the Soviet Union?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think I did. I seem to remember reading something about that in the testimony. Carter may have suggested it, or something of that sort.

Mr. MORRIS. But it is your testimony that you did not, is it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My memory is very vague on the subject, but I don't think that I did myself.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify these two letters, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a carbon copy of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated February 26, 1945, addressed to Mrs. Owen Lattimore, Ruxton, Md., with the typed signature of Edward C. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. And the second?

Mr. MANDEL. The second is a photostat of a carbon, a document, from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated March 3, 1945, addressed to Owen Lattimore, with the typed signature of Edward C. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have these letters read into the record at this time since they bear on the series of questions being addressed to the witness.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 515 and 516," and were read by Mr. Mandel.)

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you read those two letters, please?

Mr. MANDEL. The letter of February 26, 1945 (exhibit No. 515) :

DEAR ELEANOR: This is just to thank you for your lovely hospitality on Sunday. Your place is so lovely, the food so good, and the conversation so stimulating that I do want you to know what great pleasure and profit you gave me.

I had a good talk with Owen on the train and I hope I can be of a little assistance in carrying out his project.

A part of my purpose in getting a number of low-cost copies of *Solution in Asia* fits right into the build-up which is desirable as preparation for getting an invitation from across the water for Owen to go abroad.

I have discovered that Owen's 40-percent discount is better for the IPR than anything we can get from the publisher. I would be grateful therefore if you could have 12 copies sent me as speedily as possible together with your bill.

Ever gratefully yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

The second letter is dated March 3, 1945 (exhibit No. 516) :

DEAR OWEN: Would you be willing to do a review of Rowe's book *China Among the Powers for Pacific Affairs*?

Our reviewers still have to do their reviews as a labor of love even though they may have no burning affection for the book to be reviewed. If you are willing to undertake this task we would like to have your review by March 27, but if this is impossible and you could do it for us later we would prefer to have a review from your pen in a subsequent issue rather than to get a substitute writer for the next issue. If you will accept I will, of course, send you immediately a reviewer's copy of the book.

As soon as possible after receipt of extra copies of *Solution in Asia* I am going to descend upon Gromyko and begin to lay the plans for exploring the feasibility of your recent proposal.

I felt that of all the speakers you did by far the best job at the town hall.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, what did Mr. Carter mean when he said he was going to "descend upon Gromyko and begin to lay the plans for exploring the feasibility of your recent proposal"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Subject to the limitations of being able to say what was in another man's mind—

Mr. MORRIS. He is talking about "your recent proposal," Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would say that my "recent proposal" must have been my same old proposal that went on for years and years, of trying to get into Outer Mongolia.

Mr. MORRIS. And that bore no relation to having a publishing of Solution in Asia done for Soviet internal consumption?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no idea what that would be.

Mr. MORRIS. You have read Mr. Carter's testimony on that point, have you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, I have read it.

Mr. MORRIS. Which is contradictory to what your understanding was at that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. In what way?

Mr. MORRIS. Did he not testify that there was such a project?

Mr. LATTIMORE. A project for—

Mr. MORRIS. Having the Soviets publish a version of your book, a copy of your book, an edition of your book.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Oh, I didn't remember that. As far as I can see from this present correspondence, he was trying to get some copies of my book to send—what is it now—to send presumably to Russia, but whether the project included a translation or a Russian edition, I don't know.

Mr. MORRIS. You did send copies of Solution in Asia to the Soviet Union, did you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think I sent them to Mr. Carter. I don't think I remember sending any to the Soviet Union.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that document?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a memorandum. In the corner is "OL." This is a photostat from the documents from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. It reads as follows:

(EXHIBIT No. 517)

Distribution of 12 copies of Solution in Asia—

and these names are listed:

W. K. Hancock—for review 3-12-45—Mrs. V. L. Pandit

K. P. Chen

Gromyko (2)—1 for Zhukov

Kisselev—for Kemenov and Voi

Litvinoff—for Varga and Voitinsky

3-14-45—Stepanov—for Mikoyan (for Lozovsky and Voitinsky??)

The CHAIRMAN. What do you want done with that?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, from your knowledge of IPR documents, the fact that "OL" appears in the upper right-hand corner indicates, does it not, that you were to get a copy of that distribution made of your book?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Presumably. Well, it would mean—I question that I had received a copy.

Is that my initial? I mean did I initial that to show I had received it, or did somebody else?

Mr. SOURWINE. Look at the photostat and see if those are your initials.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, the "OL" there isn't my writing.

Mr. MORRIS. But from your knowledge of markings of institute papers, does that not indicate to you that that meant a copy of that should go to you for distribution?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Very probably; yes. It might mean simply that it was to be put in the "OL" file in the IPR office. I wouldn't be able to tell you.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Morris, could you find out from the witness if he knows who these people are that are mentioned here?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

May we have that introduced in the record first?

The CHAIRMAN. It may be introduced in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 517" and was read in full.)

The CHAIRMAN. What is the question?

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Mr. Lozovsky, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't think I do.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Mr. Voitinsky?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Voitinsky I met in 1936.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Mr. Stepanov?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I can't place him.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Mr. Mikoyan?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I presume he is the same Mikoyan whose name I have seen in the press as a Soviet official.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is do you know him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't know him.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Mr. Zhukov?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't think I do.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Mr. Kemenov?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I can't place him.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Mr. Varga?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Varga? I know that he is a Soviet economist, but I don't think I have met him.

Mr. MORRIS. But you know who these people are?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is Gromyko's name in there?

Mr. MORRIS. Gromyko's name does appear there; yes, sir.

Do you know Mr. Gromyko?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't think I met him.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, identification of these men can be made at a later time.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The other names at the top of this list, Mr. W. K. Hancock, I don't think I have ever heard of him.

Mrs. V. L. Pandit is, of course, the recent Indian Ambassador in this country.

K. P. Chen is one of the leading bankers of China.

Senator FERGUSON. Is he in China now?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe he is in Hongkong. I am not sure.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, do you know that Soviet officials collected information on economic geography and statistics from United States Government departments for the IPR in the United States?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I didn't know that. At least, I don't believe I ever knew it. It would seem to me to be quite an ordinary procedure, if they did.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I have here the minutes of a meeting of April 2, 1936, and I am asking Mr. Mandel if he will identify this document.

The CHAIRMAN. Meeting of what?

Mr. MORRIS. Meeting in Moscow.

Mr. Mandel will identify it.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, headed "Meeting, April 2, 1936, Moscow : Mr. Carter, Mr. and Mrs. Lattimore, H. M. Harondar."

Mr. MORRIS. "H. M." is different from Harondar; is it?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Will a copy of that be made available to Mr. Lattimore, please?

This is April 2, 1936.

Mr. Lattimore, will you read the sixth paragraph on the front page, which begins with "Motiliev."

Mr. LATTIMORE. The sixth?

Mr. MORRIS. The one that says:

Motiliev said that he was interested in receiving \* \* \*.

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading) :

Motiliev said that he was interested in receiving from the United States more material on the economic geography of the country; the official publications of Government departments, particularly the statistical reports.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, did the IPR serve as a conduit for the Soviet officials to receive such information from the United States?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no idea.

Mr. MORRIS. I ask you to turn, Mr. Lattimore, to page 2 and take up the second item there on the top of the page, "II. In re: Pacific Affairs."

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading) :

The discussion of this point was postponed until Voitinsky could be present.

Mr. MORRIS. Why should that discussion be postponed until Voitinsky was present, Mr. Lattimore? Did you know at that time Mr. Voitinsky was the head of the far eastern section of the Comintern?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I did not.

As far as my recollection serves, Voitinsky was the editor, or one of the editors, of the publication which was regarded as the official publication of the Soviet council of the IPR and, therefore, would be a natural person to include in an editorial conference.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, may I call your attention to VII on page 3, just about the middle.

Mr. LATTIMORE. "In re International Secretariat Policy"?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you want?

Mr. MORRIS. I want Mr. Lattimore to read it, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading) :

Motiliev said that Voitinsky had not yet read ECC's report on the policy. He thought that there would be no objections in principle, although there might be some on details. He said that he had received a letter from Honolulu criticizing the policy and would like to discuss the whole question when Voitinsky was here.

Mr. MORRIS. And then, finally, Mr. Lattimore, I would like you to turn to the last page.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Who is "ECC"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Edward C. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. Beginning in the first paragraph on the last page, Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading) :

Motiliev said that he would like to wait to discuss this—

I don't know what "this" is—

when Voitinsky was here. He said that he did not think there would be any critique of the general policy of the IPR. There would be definite questions about Pacific Affairs, not as to its policy and contents but as to its juridical position as to the instrument of the IPR. He said there would be discussions and negotiations in connection with the question of preventing the publishing of articles which are in some way harmful to the U. S. S. R. IPR position.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, did you know at that time Mr. Voitinsky's position with the Communist International?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, does your research of Pacific Affairs at this period of time indicate that anything appeared therein along the description I just gave?

Mr. MANDEL. In the issue of September 1936 of Pacific Affairs—

Mr. MORRIS. That is just shortly after the meeting you were discussing, Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. MANDEL. Cited under the title "Literature on the Chinese Communist Movement" is the following notation of an article on British imperialism in China, from the Communist International, No. 6, November 1924, and another article by Mr. Voitinsky, entitled "The Situation in China," from the Communist International, No. 21, April 1925.

This is taken from Pacific Affairs of September 1936, listing the writings of G. Voitinsky.

Mr. MORRIS. And you were editor at that time, were you not, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Of Pacific Affairs; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, might that whole document be received into the record?

The CHAIRMAN. It may be received into the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 518" and is as follows:)

#### EXHIBIT No. 518

MEETING APRIL 2, 1936, MOSCOW: MR. CARTER, MR. AND MRS. LATTIMORE, H. M. HARONDAR

#### 1. In re exchange of books and periodicals.

ECC said that of the member countries those most interested in Soviet materials are the English, Chinese, and American Councils. The American Council is best equipped to use them. The two Chinese who know Russian are at present not in China. In England the Russian materials are used by some of the members of the Chatham House, but the staff is not able to make full use of them. Since the American Council could best use the books, the decision was to have the main IPR collection in New York temporarily.

HM explained that the exchange was very successful to date, but that there was difficulty in choosing what books were wanted because it was impossible to tell about their contents without some kind of bibliographical exchange.

Motiliev said that it would be possible to provide almost all the materials printed in the Soviet Union. Since the American Council is interested in books on the Soviet Union in general, it will be necessary to work out a system for selection.

Harondar said that he had already sent to New York the list of all the periodicals which the U. S. S. R. IPR is receiving for Mrs. Barnes to choose which ones were wanted in the U. S. He said that he now received library cards of all the books on pertinent subjects, with a short résumé of the contents. He will have these sent to the U. S. to serve as a basis for selection.

Motiliev said that the annual plan figures and the publications of the statistical institute would be sent regularly without a preliminary exchange of the bibliographical cards.

Motiliev said that he was interested in receiving from the U. S. more material on the economic geography of the country; the official publications of Government departments, particularly the statistical reports.

Harondar said that their library on Japan, in English, was meagre and they would like more books on this. If it is possible to have sent from America the Japanese Government reports in English, they would like to have them.

ECC said that Ushibe should be able to furnish those.

Lattimore asked if there were important materials in Mongolian and Chinese available here.

Motiliev said that there is very little. There is a magazine published in Mongolia in Russian. There is also a Russian newspaper in Buriat-Mongolia. There are Mongolian and Chinese newspapers for those peoples in the Soviet Far East. All of these can be sent.

Motiliev said that there was very little use made of latinized Chinese due to the difficulties of retaining contacts and connections with older Chinese literature and with contemporary publications in China. The Chinese newspaper occasionally publishes a supplement in latinized Chinese.

Motiliev said that it was easy to get materials on Buriat-Mongolia, but more difficult on Mongolia. Harondar will check on the publications available here in Mongolian.

Motiliev presented everyone with a copy of *U. S. S. R. Handbook* published by Gollanz. He also gave HM the latest number of *Sovietskie Kraebedenie* which is devoted entirely to Buriat-Mongolia. He shows Lattimore the new Mongolian Atlas and said that he would try to get a copy for him.

B. In re Exhibit of periodicals at Yosemite.

ECC explained that at Yosemite he wanted to have an exhibit of the most important periodicals appearing in the U. S. S. R. on the Far East, the Soviet Far East, and on the U. S. S. R. in general. He would like two copies of the monthly and quarterly magazines and four of the weekly magazines.

Motiliev said that there were few magazines on the Far East as such, but many general magazines that had important information on the Far East.

II. In re Pacific Affairs.

The discussion of this point was postponed until Voitinsky could be present.

III. In re the appointment of a Soviet member of the staff of the Sec'y Gen'l.

Motiliev said that this question could not be settled immediately, but he would like to know what type of person was wanted.

ECC said that the Soviet member should be able to do the following:

1. Visit the IPR library in N. Y. to find out in what particular fields it was weak.
2. To visit the other important libraries in the country at universities to find out how far they are equipped to supply people who are studying the Soviet Union.
3. To prepare summaries in English and descriptions of the Soviet periodicals for the exhibit in Yosemite.
4. To meet the people working in the universities on the Soviet Union.
5. To help on Pacific Affairs.

Motiliev said that this meant the Soviet member should be one of the leading people in the IPR group here and well-informed on the Far East, etc. This would be very difficult, because the institutions where such people are working are very hesitant to let them go for a long period. In principle he felt that such an arrangement would be a good thing.

IV. In re Motiliev's visits en route to Yosemite.

ECC reported that Liu Yu-Wan was very anxious to meet Motiliev in Shanghai. Liu Yu-Wan has now been made secretary of the Society for Sino-Soviet Cultural Relations, of which the Soviet ambassador is one of the officers.

Motiliev said that he was not sure that he would get to Shanghai before Liu Yu-Wan had left.

ECC said that Liu Yu-Wan was ready to wait for him. He also wants to come to Moscow after the conference.

ECC reported the invitation to Motiliev from Chatham House. Chatham House suggested that the middle of May might be a good time for such a visit.

Motiliev said that it would be very difficult for him to do it. This year is a very busy one for him since the first volume of the Atlas is to appear during the year. Likewise Voitinsky is very busy, as editor of the new quarterly. However, it might be possible to arrange for someone else to visit London. Motiliev is planning to finish his reports during the end of April and May. He considers that it is less important for him to visit England than China, since the opinions of leading English are more easily found in their articles and books than is the case with the Chinese.

#### V. In re Soviet participation at Yosemite.

(a) Personnel: ECC said that he was anxious to have as large a delegation as possible. He suggested that Romm would be very acceptable to the other countries. He also mentioned Neymann.

Motiliev said that this could not be settled immediately. Romm would undoubtedly represent Izvestia, and might be a member of the delegation.

#### (b) Documentation: Motiliev reported:

1. The Symposium on the Soviet Far East is almost ready. The last articles are going to be received soon. By the end of May it should be printed in English.

2. The Symposium on international relations in the Pacific Area will be ready at the same time. Most of the articles in it will be entirely new, but they may translate some of the articles from Tikhi Okean. He asked that HM give an opinion as to which articles would be more interesting.

3. Nationality Policy in the Soviet Far East. This paper was to be prepared by Dimanshtein. He is very busy and not very prompt. His secretary says that he probably cannot do it before the conference, but maybe it will be done afterwards.

4. Paper on Pacific relations in general, in connection with the fifth round-table. This paper is being prepared by Motiliev. It should be ready in May. He does not know how long and full he will be able to make it.

Motiliev asked if May would be too late for the papers.

ECC said that it would be too late for Australia and New Zealand, but in any case the most important use of the documentation comes after the conference.

Motiliev said that it might be possible to send mimeographed copies earlier. He said that the two symposiums would be of value for several years and that the Symposium on the Soviet Far East would be printed in 50,000 copies, since there was no such study in existence here.

Motiliev said that part of the Standard of Living study should be done by the conference. This is being written by Kravel who is vice president of Gosplan and director of all the statistical work.

#### VI. In re finance and budget.

ECC said that he would discuss this later alone with Motiliev.

#### VII. In re international secretariat policy.

Motiliev said that Voitinsky had not yet read ECC's report on the policy. He thought that there would be no objections in principle, although there might be some on details. He said that he had received a letter from Honolulu criticizing the policy and would like to discuss the whole question when Voitinsky was here.

#### VIII. In re HM's visit to Buriat Mongolia.

Motiliev said that he would be only too glad to arrange it, but due to the unstable conditions there, it was impossible to arrange it at present. Last year when he inquired as to the possibilities, the military institutions objected. At present Americans are allowed in Birobidjan. With Buriat-Mongolia it is just a question of time until the conditions become normal. If HM wants to visit other minor nationalities, as for instance in the Caucasus, it can be arranged.

#### IX. In re Lattimore's visit to Mongolia.

Motiliev said that the same thing applies to Mongolia as to Buriat-Mongolia, but there the question is more complicated since Mongolia is an independent country. Mongolia now is constantly ready for war and conditions are very unstable.

There is a Mongolian representative in Moscow, with whom Motiliev spoke when Lattimore first applied for permission. This representative did not refuse, but said he would have to write to Ulan Bator for permission and seemed reluctant to try to get permission. Moreover, there would not have been sufficient time to arrange this.

Motiliev did not try to get permission through Narkomindel. Since the U. S. S. R. IPR is in no way connected with the Narkomindel, he couldn't try to get permission from them without the approval of Lattimore and the Institute.

Lattimore said that he would rather not go by getting permission via Narkomindel.

Motiliev said that it would then be necessary to wait until conditions improved.

X. In re Soviet critique of international policy of IPR.

Motiliev said that he would like to wait to discuss this when Voitinsky was here. He said that he did not think there would be any critique of the general policy of the IPR. There would be definite questions about Pacific Affairs, not as to its policy and contents, but as to its juridical position as the instrument of the IPR. He said there would be discussions and negotiations in connection with the question of preventing the publishing of articles which are in some way harmful to the U. S. S. R. IPR position.

Motiliev said that although there were few subscriptions to Pacific Affairs here, it was read by many specialists and they found it very interesting.

Lattimore said that he would also like to discuss the institutional position of Pacific Affairs.

Motiliev said that the circulation of Tikhi Okean was between 3,000 and 5,000. The circulation is limited by a lack of paper rather than a lack of readers. When he was in the Far East he had great difficulty in finding any copies and it is impossible to get back numbers.

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I point out that at that time, I don't think that my knowledge of the Russian set-up included any assumption that the fact that a man had printed something for the Communist International meant that he held a position on the Comintern.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, did you offer to supply military information to the Soviet officials of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this document, please?

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, before proceeding with that, I am not clear on one position, back on page 4.

The CHAIRMAN. Of the last exhibit?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

\* \* \* he said there would be discussions and negotiations in connection with the question of preventing the publishing of articles which are in some way harmful to the U. S. S. R. IPR position.

In these previous minutes of the meeting we found that there was to be a line or policy, and we find articles carrying that out.

What do you say is meant by "the U. S. S. R. IPR position"?

Your wife just handed you a paper. Is that in relation to it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is in relation to the previous questioning here several days ago about the question of line in Pacific Affairs, on which I should like to make some amplifying remarks.

Senator FERGUSON. You can make those later.

Mr. LATTIMORE. All right.

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to have, though, what you mean here, or what was meant here by the "U. S. S. R. IPR position."

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no recollection of what that meant. That is something I didn't write. I don't remember ever seeing these minutes before, and it seems to me the wording is rather obscure, but may have something to do with institutional arrangements at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, does it not sound reasonable that if you and Mr. Carter were to make up reports on this meeting later—which you claim that you did and which was in your possession at the time you wrote the book—that you would get the minutes that were taken, which are now before you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; it doesn't, Senator. I don't think that, as of 1950, I knew there were such minutes.

Senator FERGUSON. I am not talking about 1950. I am talking about the time that you claim the reports were written.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I would write a report on my own recollections of what there was to report about.

I remember that at the Yosemite Conference in 1936 I was called upon to make a report to some kind of special committee for the purpose, on the editorial problems and policy of Pacific Affairs, and presumably there was some reference there to the visit that I had just then recently made to Moscow, the details of which were presumably then much more fresh in my head.

Senator FERGUSON. But is it not clear, from the minutes of the meetings that were taken by the IPR and placed in their files, that there was to be a U. S. S. R. policy line?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you explain the expression that I read?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The expression that concerns the "preventing the publishing of articles which are in some way harmful to the U. S. S. R. IPR position."

And I say that is an obscure wording, which at this time I can't identify, especially as I didn't write it and don't believe I have ever seen it before.

Senator FERGUSON. But taking all the other documents that we have had on the IPR, your meeting in Moscow, is it not a fair inference that there was a policy line and that that is the policy line that they were talking about there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir. I see no reason for such an inference.

May I, Senator Ferguson, at this moment advert to the question of line, as it was discussed the other day, because I think we may have been talking—

Senator FERGUSON. I don't have any question now, but I just want to say that I cannot agree with the witness' explanation that he has given at all.

Senator SMITH. May I ask one question about this line?

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Lattimore, where this memorandum, prepared, by Mr. Carter, says:

He said there would be discussions and negotiations in connection with the question of preventing the publishing of articles which are in some way harmful to the U. S. S. R. IPR position—

does not that sentence indicate that the U. S. S. R. position and the IPR position were one and the same, because it is in the singular and refers to the positions of the two?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That wouldn't be my conclusion, Senator.

Senator SMITH. It would not be?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator SMITH. What would be your conclusion about that, then?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, as I said, I think this wording is very obscure, but it seems to me that it refers to a U. S. S. R. and IPR position and possibly the relationship between the two.

Senator SMITH. It does not say "positions." Does not that sentence indicate that they are one and the same, U. S. S. R. IPR position?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator SMITH. If there had been two, would not that have said two, plural?

Mr. LATTIMORE. To put what I said before in a different way, it might refer to the position of the U. S. S. R. in the IPR.

Senator SMITH. Of course, it did not say that, though, did it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. That is what I say, that my interpretation is unauthorized and I think the whole wording is obscure.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, was not there a new policy laid down at the Moscow meetings?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; not in my opinion.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, were there not articles published in Pacific Affairs that the Soviet officials not like and brought up with you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. There had.

Mr. MORRIS. And did not you and Mr. Carter say that there had been mistakes in publishing?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would have to review the transcript at that point.

Senator FERGUSON. And, Mr. Lattimore, did they object, after the meeting in Moscow, to any articles?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I couldn't recall offhand.

Senator FERGUSON. But they had before?

Mr. LATTIMORE. If you will look over again those Moscow memoranda, one of the things that stands out is that we were trying to get the Russians to promise to contribute articles, which never came through.

Senator FERGUSON. That was not my question at all.

Mr. MORRIS. That is, you and Harriet Moore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is the IPR.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was with you at the time?

Harriet Moore was present, was she not, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think she was one of those present; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Was she a Communist at that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Kathleen Barnes present at that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe so.

Mr. MORRIS. She was present at these meetings, was she not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think so.

Mr. MORRIS. Was she a Communist at that time, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. MORRIS. You know they both have refused to testify before this committee, on the ground that their answers would incriminate them, when asked whether or not they were members of the Communist Party.

Mr. LATTIMORE. They have done so, to my great astonishment and distress.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, there is one other question I would like to ask Mr. Lattimore.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Lattimore, did you ever have a copy of the U. S. S. R. handbook, the Soviet Handbook?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In English, or Russian?

Senator SMITH. I do not know. Either one.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Is that an IPR publication?

Senator SMITH. No.

I refer to the third paragraph from the bottom on page 1 of the exhibit—and it mentions your name up in there—where it says:

Motiliev presented everyone with a copy of U. S. S. R. Handbook published by Gollanz. \* \* \*

Then it also refers to this:

He shows Lattimore the new Mongolian Atlas and said that he would try to get a copy for him.

Do you remember that handbook?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't remember that handbook.

Senator SMITH. You do not have it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I may have it; I don't know.

Senator SMITH. All right.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, I think we will recess now until 1:30, if that will be satisfactory to the Senators.

(Thereupon, at 12:15 p. m., the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene at 1:30 p. m., of the same day.)

#### AFTER RECESS

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. You may proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, I had reached the question, did you offer to supply military information to Soviet officials through the Institute of Pacific Relations, and the witness, I believe, had answered no.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I had answered that I had no recollection. Since my memory, however, is incomplete, if you have a document to refresh my recollection I shall be glad to see it.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you identified that document, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, headed "Meeting April 6; Motiliev; ECC; OL; FD; Harondar; HM," and then the penciled note 1936.

Mr. MORRIS. Who is FD, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know who FD was. It may have been one of Mr. Carter's secretaries.

Senator FERGUSON. How many people had gone over to this meeting in Moscow?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My wife and I came from Peking, accompanied by Miss Tyler, who had been doing some research on teaching of English in China, and we were met in Moscow by Mr. Carter, Miss Moore, and a secretary of Mr. Carter's whose name I forget.

Senator FERGUSON. Could that be the name that has been given to you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is why I suggested that might be, FD, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Who is Harondar?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He was secretary of the Soviet Council of the IPR.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not you discussed military activities at all at that meeting?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no present recollection of it whatever.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will this be introduced into the record?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Have you identified it?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, Mr. Chairman, we have.

The CHAIRMAN. This is a photostat of a document?

Mr. MORRIS. It is of a document taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. And so testified by Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MORRIS. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 519" and is as follows:)

#### EXHIBIT No. 519

MEETING APRIL 6; MOTILIEV; ECC; OL; FD; HARONDAR; HM

ECC explained about Cressey's proposed study of Soviet geography. Motiliev said that in principle he welcomed the idea, as there was so little work done in English on this phase of the Soviet Union. He asked whether the plan included economic geography. ECC answered that while it would be largely physical geography, some attention would be paid to economic geography. ECC gave Motiliev a copy of Cressey's outline and Motiliev said that he would discuss it later.

In re the preliminary agenda for the Conference: Motiliev said that the questions on the Soviet Union included in the section headed "International Implications" reflect a negative valuation of the Soviet Far Eastern policy. E. G. the question "Does the industrialization of the Far East work for or against the Peace Policy" is all right taken by itself, but when grouped with many other questions of this nature, the general impression is unfavorable to the policy.

Motiliev said that some of the questions would be very difficult to answer, since the delegation did not represent Narkomindel e. g. the questions of the strategic significance of industrialization and the questions on Sinkiang.

Motiliev said that it was not correct to lump Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia in one question. Outer Mongolia is an independent state while Sinkiang is part of China. The policy in regard to Sinkiang is just a detail of the general policy in regard to China. It is true that Sinkiang is very closely linked to the U. S. S. R. economically due to its geographical position, but it is part of China politically. Likewise Outer Mongolia should be called the Mongolian People's Republic to keep clear the difference in status between these places.

Motiliev said that the questions reflect the fears of their Far Eastern policy rather than the real essence of it.

Some of the questions which are included in the Soviet section would be impossible for them to answer. e. g. the question of whether or not other powers would let the U. S. S. R. give China aid in its reconstruction; question in re German-Japanese alliance which belongs in the section on the balance of power; the question in re U. S. recognition (No. 47).

In the questions on other countries many of the real problems of the Pacific are not treated adequately. e. g. the question of naval rivalry; of English-Japanese-Chinese relations; of American-Japanese relations and American interests in China; of American public opinion in re the Far East (does the opinion of the authors of Empire in the East, not including Pfeffer, reflect the opinion of the general people, of the intelligentsia, or of the controlling groups of bankers, etc.?). Many of these questions need additions and changes.

Motiliev said that some of the more fundamental problems and analyses would be included e. g. in his data paper he was going try to show that Orchard's analysis of Japan was illogical. (Lorwin agreed with Motiliev's criticisms of Orchard.) He feel that the analysis is superficial. Orchard finds that the density of population and the lack of land are the fundamental problems for Japan. If this is true then expansion is the only way out, and this justifies expansion as in the increases of the whole nation. Orchard's contentions are not supported statistically. Penrose, for instance does not come to the same conclusions about the population. Motiliev will try to prove that the fundamental problems are in the internal structure of the society and can be solved by changing that structure. One of the main problems is the fact that there are remnants of feudalism mixed up with capitalism. For instance 70 percent of the agricultural population are tenants.

Another interesting question is about the real causes for the American withdrawal from the Philippines. Motiliev found Quincy Wright's analysis very convincing.

Motiliev said that there were many articles in Pacific Affairs with which they did not agree. After the organizational question of P. A. has been discussed, they would like to discuss some of these articles.

In re question 48, on the effect of U. S. recognition of the U. S. S. R., ECC said that Roosevelt probably thought that recognition had prevented Japanese invasion of Siberia. Motiliev said that the main thing that had prevented that was the military preparation of the U. S. S. R. U. S.-U. S. S. R. relations have not been close. They have been passive both economically and politically.

Motiliev said that questions that have no direct political significance should be included e. g. the questions of the economic development of the Aleutian Islands and Alaska, and the Kurile Islands. Although the strategic importance of these places may have greater significance, it would be interesting to know of their economic importance. The Japanese have a fuelling station very near Kamachatka, which is in reality a military base.

Motiliev suggested that in order to prepare the final agenda, each Council be asked to submit proposals and changes. These suggestions should then be sent to the Councils concerned with the question for approval or disapproval. He does not want to have questions included which are embarrassing to any of the Councils. ECC said that previously those questions were included which were approved by three or four Councils. The publication of the preliminary agenda in IPR Notes was done in an effort to get such criticisms and suggestions from all the Councils.

Motiliev said that another interesting question was whether the position reflected in Empire in the East was due to the fact that questions of internal recovery had been so important in the last few years. If this were so, the position might be just temporary.

Motiliev said that the British Policy in the Pacific was the key to the situation. The policy is very indefinite and vacillating, just as in the European policy of England. While it was possible to see the general line, it was impossible to know what the policy would be tomorrow. He asked about the possibility of a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, and expressed the opinion that in the next few years it would be impossible, and on the contrary there would be growing contradictions between England and Japan. OL said that in an article by Asiaticus for PA on Financial Imperialism in the Far East, the opinion was expressed that England was drifting toward recognition of Japanese predominance in North China; consolidation of British influence and interests in South China; and the establishment of a "common hunting ground" in the Yangtze valley. At the same time Japan will not recognize a British sphere in China, even if it is of much smaller size. OL said that there was great opposition to the Anglo-Japanese alliance in England from the navy, the interests on the China Coast, the home financial interests, and from the Dominions. This is reflected in the British attitude toward the Philippines. Motiliev said that the British want the U. S. to keep the Philippines to act as a wall between Japan and the Empire.

Motiliev said that in the U. S. S. R. the general opinion as to the cause of the U. S. liberation of the Philippines was that they were very complex. The interests of the sugar industry were very important but not decisive. Here it is considered that it was a conscious step taken by the U. S. government to bring greater British activity in the Pacific. This is the idea expressed by Quincy Wright. Another idea is that from the military point of view the U. S. is glad not to have to protect the Philippines which are practically impossible to defend. On the other hand the independence is not real and for the next ten years the U. S. has the right to defend and use the Islands for military bases.

OL asked if there was any special interest in the U. S. S. R. about the question of air bases in the Pacific. Motiliev said that formerly the Soviet attitude was that war in the Pacific between Japan and the U. S. was impossible because of the distance between them. Now the development of aviation has changed this. The question of Guam is considered important here. Motiliev said that the Trans-Pacific air service was considered primarily of military importance in the Soviet Press, but it of course had some commercial value. ECC said that he thought the Trans-Pacific line was started partly to keep the British Imperial line out of that service; and partly because of the American idea that China was the great potential market for the U. S. Motiliev said that at present the competition between different countries on technical aspects of aviation is very great. The development of stratosphere airplanes was of greatest significance. In April there is to be a conference of specialists on this question here.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, will you read the last paragraph of that document?

The CHAIRMAN. The last paragraph, did you say?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

OL asked if there was any special interest in the U. S. S. R. about the question of air bases in the Pacific. Motiliev said that formerly the Soviet attitude was that war in the Pacific between Japan and the United States was impossible because of the distance between them. Now the development of aviation has changed this. The question of Guam is considered important here. Motiliev said that the Trans-Pacific Air Service was considered primarily of military importance in the Soviet press, but it of course had some commercial value. ECC said that he thought the Trans-Pacific line was started partly to keep the British Imperial line out of that service; and partly because of the American idea that China was the great potential market for the United States. Motiliev said that at present the competition between different countries on technical aspects of aviation is very great. The development of stratosphere airplanes was of greatest significance. In April there is to be a conference of specialists on this question here.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the next question?

Mr. MORRIS. When you dealt with the Soviet officials in Moscow, Mr. Lattimore, did you deal with them as if they could possibly be Communist intelligence agents?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. We, at least I, assumed that they were all connected with the Soviet Government in one form or another, but we had no knowledge of the individual status of the people beyond the way they described themselves when—you know, when we were introduced, and so on.

Of course, at the present time, I would generally assume that any Soviet citizen or subject is an intelligence agent or a potential one.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, back when you were discussing these problems with these people, you knew that they were Government officials?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And, therefore, anything that you told them could be used by their Government?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Of course it could.

Senator FERGUSON. Well then, how do you distinguish between an intelligence agent now and one then?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I suppose I mean in terms of belonging to organized intelligence services of any country. But, of course, we had no great concern on the subject since nobody connected with the IPR had access to secret information of any kind. We were entirely an organization dealing with published materials in the open market, and international discussion.

Senator FERGUSON. Why were you then discussing this question of war bases in the Pacific?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was asking if they would be interested in an article in Pacific Affairs on the subject. During my editorship of Pacific Affairs in those years, we published an article on submarine warfare as related to possibilities of submarine warfare, as related to Japan. That was by an American author.

We had an article on the significance of the Dutch Navy in the Pacific generally, that was by a Dutch naval officer or former naval officer. We had articles on guerrilla warfare in China, and so forth.

Senator FERGUSON. But, Mr. Lattimore, if a person had written the article that you had an interest in mind, in the first sentence, he would have had to obtain some information from the United States along that line.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I wouldn't say so, Senator. That is, any more than we had to obtain information from Government sources for the other articles we wrote on general questions of strategy in the Pacific.

Senator FERGUSON. Where would you get the information if you did not get it from our Government?

OL asked if there was any special interest in the U. S. S. R. about the question of air bases in the Pacific.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, Senator, as of 1936 I should say that the obvious question in that connection was Singapore, about which a great deal had been published. There had been a good deal of discussion about whether Singapore, as an air base, was a substitute for a naval base or in addition to its use as a naval base, and so on.

There was wide area of discussion of that kind of problem.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever write any articles or have them written on this question?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; we never did, and I don't believe—no, I think I can be quite sure in saying that we didn't even approach anyone to write such an article.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to read another paragraph here.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Is this from the same minutes?

Mr. MORRIS. From the same minutes. I am reading now a paragraph beginning with "Motiliev said that questions"—it is in the middle of page 2:

Motiliev said that questions that have no direct political significance should be included, e. g., the questions of the economic development of the Aleutian Islands and Alaska, and the Kurile Islands. Although the strategic importance of these places may have greater significance, it would be interesting to know of their economic importance. The Japanese have a fueling station very near Kamchatka, which is in reality a military base.

Then there are other paragraphs here along the same nature. Mr. Chairman, the whole thing is in the record.

I would like to ask Dr. Lattimore: In view of the desires being expressed by the Soviet officials here, whether or not General Barmine's testimony to the effect that the Soviet military intelligence was using IPR as a cover shop to secure military information from the United States and from Japan and China, whether or not that becomes plausible.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I think it is absolutely implausible. It seems to me that these are perfectly legitimate questions for general discussion as possibilities for articles in an international publication in 1936.

We did, in fact, have articles on the Soviet fisheries in the North Pacific, and on the disputes between the Russians and the Japanese over those fisheries, involving Kamchatka and the Kurile Islands, and so on. So if you want to be very far-fetched and say that this kind of thing was intelligence information, it was intelligence information about the Russians rather than to them.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that not a fact, that Mr. Carter has already testified that when he returned from some of these trips he reported to our G-2?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember that testimony, Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say that you had never heard that he had?

Mr. LATTIMORE. This is the first time I remember hearing it.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you ever requested to report to G-2?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have been asked to meet with various groups of people—

The CHAIRMAN. That is not the question.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Of our Armed Forces after returning from trips; not specifically G-2, as far as I know.

Senator FERGUSON. If it was not specifically, when you returned is it not true that you reported to some of our Armed Forces?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was asked to give general talks about my observations abroad to groups that included military personnel, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And did it not include G-2 officers?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I couldn't be precise about that without having a list of the people who attended.

Senator FERGUSON. And were you not asked questions about it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My memory is very unclear at the present time. I think that I was asked my opinion about this and that, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. That being true, did you not feel that the Russian authorities would be questioned by at least their intelligence officers, if they were not intelligence officers themselves?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir. As of 1936 I had no feelings of the kind because I didn't have experience of that kind.

Senator FERGUSON. You have had no feeling about it at all?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I had no feeling about it at all. If questions of real military importance had come up, I would certainly have mentioned them to, for instance, Colonel Faymonville, who was our military attaché in Moscow under Ambassador Bullitt.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that not the Colonel Faymonville who was sent back because he was too pro-Soviet, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know for what reason he was sent back. I know that there is a tribute to him in a book by former Assistant Secretary Sumner Welles as being the best-informed military officer we had on Russia.

Senator FERGUSON. Of course, that would not conflict with the fact that he was pro-Russian?

Mr. LATTIMORE. As far as I knew Colonel Faymonville, I had no reason to consider him pro-Russian.

Senator FERGUSON. How many times would you say that you had been interviewed by our authorities on the question, for instance, of this trip to Moscow?

Mr. LATTIMORE. On this trip to Moscow, I don't remember any questioning. I do remember having dinner at the American Embassy with various Embassy personnel, at which Colonel Faymonville and others were present, and which the general subject of our talks with the Russians was a part of the topic of conversation.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was the Ambassador at that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. William Bullitt.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you visit any high Russian officials at that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. At Ambassador Bullitt's suggestion, he took me to see a Russian official. I think he was a Vice Commissar of Foreign Affairs, or something of that sort.

Senator FERGUSON. And what did you talk about?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I gave some opinions on Inner Mongolia. May I explain?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Just about at this time, there had been some clashes on the Outer Mongolia frontier, between the Russian and Mongol forces and the Japanese. Roy Howard had just had an interview with Stalin, at which Stalin had made what was then considered a sensational statement that the Russians would defend Outer Mongolia in case of any invasion.

In connection with this, Ambassador Bullitt asked me about supplementary information from Inner Mongolia. I didn't know Outer Mongolia. But he was asking about general conditions in Inner Mongolia. And I told him what I knew, and my opinions about it as of that time, and I believe I mentioned the fact that the Russians had attacked my publications on the subject and had very strongly insinuated that I was pro-Japanese, and so on.

Mr. Bullitt said, "Well, I think what you are saying is extremely interesting, and I think the Russians ought to hear about it. Suppose I fix up an appointment. Would you mind talking to them?"

I said, "No; I will say to them just what I have said to you, if you think that is all right."

So he made the appointment and took me down there and, in his presence, I talked with the Soviet Vice Commissar.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you meet anyone else?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe we met anyone else.

Senator FERGUSON. Just the one occasion?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I know it was just that one occasion.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, might I inquire?

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is this Colonel Faymonville that you are speaking of here, is he the same Colonel Faymonville about whom Mr. Carter wrote you in June of 1941, that letter which went into the record yesterday?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you saying now that you knew Colonel Faymonville as early as 1936?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I first met him in Moscow in 1936.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether Mr. Carter knew that you knew him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I presume he did, since we were both in Moscow at the same time. He may have forgotten, of course.

Mr. SOURWINE. In his letter of June 20, 1941, Mr. Carter suggested that if you had time in San Francisco you and Mr. Holland might want to arrange a private talk with Colonel Faymonville, and he gave the headquarters, and then he described him to you.

He said, "He would, I think, have been thoroughly at home and at ease if he had luncheon with us at the Mayflower on Wednesday."

That was that luncheon with Ambassador Oumansky, was it not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. And he said, "I think you get the idea. It may be that if you get the same favorable impression of him which Harriet Moore and I have, he might be someone who could be exceptionally useful to you and the Generalissimo at some future time in Chungking."

Would you take it from that that Mr. Carter knew that you knew Mr. Faymonville?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It is not clear to me from that whether he knew it or not. I would assume he knew it since we were both in Moscow at the same time and dined at the Embassy together, and so on.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know definitely whether Mr. Carter knew that you were acquainted with Colonel Faymonville?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know definitely.

Mr. SOURWINE. Thank you.

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I explain a little bit more? One reason why I personally was very much interested in Colonel Faymonville was the fact that he had started life as an expert on Japan rather than Russia. He spoke Japanese in addition to Russian, and there were very few American military or civil personnel who had that kind of accomplishment. Hence, I would think that Faymonville's opinions on questions in northeast Asia, involving both Japan and Russia, would be valuable opinions.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Before this next document, Mr. Chairman, I would like the record to show that the last paragraph makes no mention of Mr. Lattimore supplying an article.

The first sentence is: "OL asked if there was any special interest in the U. S. S. R. about the question of air bases in the Pacific."

Mr. Lattimore, did Soviet officials collect economic and financial information on China and Japan for the IPR?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember whether they did or not, but if you have a document on the subject to refresh my memory I shall be glad to see it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Morris, are you about to leave this document?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Before we leave, may I ask a question?

You will recall, Mr. Lattimore, that on a previous occasion we have discussed here the meeting of the 8th of April.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was the meeting at which the minutes indicated that you had spoken of an article by a Communist writer to be published in Pacific Affairs.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. And we had some colloquy about whether you were referring to Asiaticus. The memorandum subsequently, that is, in one of its latter paragraphs, did mention Asiaticus.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. I believe some point was made of the fact that that mention of Asiaticus in the same memorandum was quite some time subsequent to the mention of an article by the Communist writer.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. I would like to call your attention to the fact that in this document, being the minutes of the meeting of April 6, there is also mention of Asiaticus, and I ask you if you recall that there had been such mention at the conference which this document purports to recount?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't recall it.

This, again, is a copy of some minutes that I don't remember seeing at the time or since. But, looking over those previous minutes, something has occurred to me which might clarify the questions you were asking me at that time about deadline for Pacific Affairs, and so on.

There are two points here: One is that I was not in control of the deadline of Pacific Affairs; that that was all handled in Washington, and sometimes—in New York, I mean—and sometimes I didn't know until an issue came out exactly what was in it.

The other thing is that very possibly, as subject matter for these discussions with the Russians, I had with me carbon copies of what I was expecting to be in the June issue of Pacific Affairs, and that therefore the next issue would refer to the September issue. That is a possibility. But it might straighten things out.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, as bearing on the question of whether the article by Asiaticus did appear in the June issue, was in fact in existence at the time of these conferences, you will note that at the bottom of page 2, beginning in the middle of the paragraph, these minutes read:

OL said that in an article by Asiaticus for PA on financial imperialism in the Far East, the opinion was expressed that England was drifting toward recognition of Japanese predominance in north China; consolidation of British influence and interests in south China, and the establishment of a "common hunting ground" in the Yangtze Valley.

That would indicate that the article was in being at that time, would it not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It would indicate that it was in being in manuscript.

Mr. SOURWINE. At least in manuscript?

Mr. LATTIMORE. At least in manuscript; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I want to offer at this time for the appendix of the record an article about Gen. Philip R. Faymonville, military aide to President Roosevelt, who "has spent 15 years in the U. S. S. R. His views on Soviet aims are somewhat at variance with 'Red menace' tales."

This is an article in the Daily People's World, Friday, February 18, 1949.

I think this paper has been described, has it not?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir; described in connection with the Senator Knowland comment.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; the editorial. And also of the ad concerning the witness' book.

Mr. MORRIS. That is described as a Communist paper?

Mr. MANDEL. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. You want that to go into the appendix of the record?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

(The document referred to appears in the appendix of the record as exhibit No. 472 on 3700.)

Mr. MORRIS. The next question is, Did Soviet officials like the militancy of Amerasia and understand why Pacific Affairs could not quite take the same line?

The CHAIRMAN. Let us hear the question again.

Mr. MORRIS. The question to Mr. Lattimore is, Did Soviet officials like the militancy of Amerasia and understand why Pacific Affairs could not quite take the same line?

Mr. LATTIMORE. They may have.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this document, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a carbon copy from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated July 11, 1939, addressed to Mr. Owen Lattimore, with the typed signature of Edward C. Carter.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be shown to the witness.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, do you recall having received that letter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I must have received it. I don't recall it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that go into the record?

The CHAIRMAN. It has been identified.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like the witness to read that letter, commencing at the outset.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Dated July 11, 1939, on board steamship *Aquitania*.

(EXHIBIT No. 520)

DEAR OWEN: The Chinese are more unanimously enthusiastic about Pacific Affairs than the members of any other group.

I might mention, of course, that this means the Chinese of the official Chinese Council:

Franklin Ho was immensely impressed by Guenther Stein's *The Yen and the Sword*. Ushiba assured me that the office of the Japanese Council was taking seriously your request for additional Japanese articles. Motylev was eager for much more intimate factual details giving both very recent economic information and also personal observations as to what is going on in China and Japan.

As you will see from the enclosed copy of my letter to Jaffe, he likes the militancy of Amerasia. He recognizes that Pacific Affairs cannot quite take this line but he still insists that no one can legitimately criticize you if you do decide to adopt his request to you of 3 years ago that Pacific Affairs come out strong consistently and repeatedly for the collective system.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, may I interrupt your letter there? Is that not going back to your meeting with them in Moscow?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is going back to that meeting and indicating that apparently Motylev considered that for 3 years I have not fulfilled his suggestion that Pacific Affairs take a stronger line denouncing Japanese aggression.

Senator FERGUSON. Does it not also show the opposite, that also you had agreed at that time with the Russians to take a line for the Russians?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, it doesn't. It indicates that at that time the Russians repeatedly brought up the idea that Pacific Affairs should take an editorial line of characterizing Japanese policy in China as aggression, and we repeatedly pointed out that Pacific Affairs was controlled by a number of National Councils, and that we had to try

to please everybody, and usually wound up by displeasing somebody in practically every issue.

Senator FERGUSON. Had the Russians asked you to use your magazine, the *Pacific Affairs*, to advocate the collective system?

Mr. LATTIMORE. What is clearly meant here by collective system is collective security system.

The CHAIRMAN. Now go back to the question, please.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he request you, when you were in Moscow—

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember that request in Moscow. As I remember just now, the minutes don't show it, but Carter after 3 years apparently feels that that was the general tenor of the conversation.

Senator FERGUSON. But is not that all they are talking about?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Because characterizing the Japanese policy in Asia as aggression would be one way of saying, "Well, there ought to be some collective security measures taken through the League of Nations to stop it."

Senator FERGUSON. Did not Russia enter into a pact with Japan on this question?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The next year.

Senator FERGUSON. The next year?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Some 8 months later.

Senator FERGUSON. And does not this indicate that at least one thing was discussed, that collective system by you and the Russian people at the Russian meeting in Moscow?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That indicates that from Mr. Carter's recollection 3 years later, it was that we talked about collective security.

Senator FERGUSON. Does it say collective security there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It seems to me that the context clearly indicates collective security.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is: Does it say collective security. Can you not answer that question?

Mr. LATTIMORE. What it says is "come out strong consistently and repeatedly for the collective system." And I can read the context in no other way than meaning collective-security system.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Senator, are there any further questions?

Senator FERGUSON. Not at the moment.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Morris, did you want Mr. Lattimore to continue reading?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. But my question was—there were two points that I made there—one of the questions was did Soviet officials collect economic and financial information on Japan through the IPR, and did Soviet officials like the militancy of Amerasia and understand why Pacific Affairs could not quite take the same line.

Question two was partly answered by the first paragraph, but it will not be answered until we get to the paragraph starting:

One of Motylev's most urgent requests was for information regarding Chinese internal economic and financial position.

However, if the witness would like to read the whole letter, I have no objection.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I answered Senator Ferguson that the difference referred to here between Amerasia and Pacific Affairs can easily and clearly be established; namely, that Amerasia did repeatedly charac-

terize Japanese policy in China as imperialism, Amerasia being an American magazine published in America, and therefore quite able to be strong on such a subject; whereas, Pacific Affairs, being under the control of a number of National Councils, some of whom objected to characterizing one member of the Institute as an aggressor, was always much milder in that respect.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever have any doubt that the Amerasia was a Communist magazine?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It never occurred to me to think that Amerasia was a Communist magazine. If you will go back over the issues of Amerasia at the time that was connected with it, up to 1941, you will see that it could not be characterized as even a left-wing magazine in those years [reading]:

Both he and Voitinsky regret that there is no evidence of our having taken seriously their request for this 3 years ago. They feel the necessity for this was never greater than today. Their insistence was of great interest to me for two reasons. First, because it is evidence that they treat the IPR seriously and have orderly memories of their suggestion. Second, because it contravenes the assertions of the reactionaries in Paris, London, and Washington that the retirement of Litvinoff meant that the Kremlin was throwing over its commitment to the collective system.

Could you use the present appearance of Sir Arthur Salter's "Security—Can It Be Retrieved?" as the occasion for an early full length treatment that will be so fundamental as to appeal to the more thoughtful members of the institute in every member country and so militant as to convince Motylev and Voitinsky that we are responding to their suggestion.

One of Motylev's most urgent requests was for information regarding Chinese internal economic and financial position. Happily this will be supplied by Chi's study for the inquiry. (You have doubtless seen his Virginia Quarterly article.) I am going to reopen with Jessup and Angus the question of publication of some Inquiry material in Pacific Affairs when it is of such a nature as to fit in with your own policy as editor and when it is of a kind which will make important and authentic information of which scholars and statesmen are in need available to a wide Pacific Affairs audience.

Your many friends all along the line inquired for you and sent you their warmest greetings. All are asking when your book will be published.

I learned in one or two quarters that Miss Virginia Thompson's book on Indochina is not being taken seriously because there is a criticism of Pelliot or an implied criticism of Pelliot's position. Do you happen to know what would be the basis of this and whether scholars in other countries regard Pelliot with the same degree of infallibility as he regards himself?

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. That letter is in the record, Mr. Chairman; is it not?

The CHAIRMAN. Very well, it is.

(The document, as previously read in full by the witness beginning on p. 3331 was marked "Exhibit No. 520.")

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, did you employ Y. Y. Hsu with the Office of War Information?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I did. My recollection is imperfect on the subject. If you have a document to refresh it, I would be glad to see it. But in the meantime I can tell you to the best of my recollection what the situation was.

The CHAIRMAN. Just a minute.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you employ Y. Y. Hsu with the OWI?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe I didn't. I have some recollections on the subject, but I don't believe that they included my employing him.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you say you did or you did not, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe I did not.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you offer to employ Y. Y. Hsu in the OWI?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe I did not. If you would allow me to state my recollection on the subject—

Mr. MORRIS. Go ahead, Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Then we will see if it corresponds with whatever documents you have.

Mr. MORRIS. Please do.

Mr. LATTIMORE. My recollection is that the Office of War Information, the New York office, needed materials to put out in Chinese language material to be sent to China, that the library resources for that kind of thing in New York were very restricted, and that a request was made to the New York office of IPR to know whether OWI could draw on the IPR's file of Chinese materials; that this was consented to and that Y. Y. Hsu was the man who was in charge of that material in the IPR office at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. How well did you know Mr. Hsu?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Rather slightly.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he ever visit you at your home?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes. He and his wife visited us in Baltimore.

Mr. MORRIS. How frequently?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Once, I think.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever visit him at his home?

Mr. LATTIMORE. We went and had dinner with him and his wife on Long Island somewhere once, I think.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know at that time of his Communist record?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I did not.

Mr. MORRIS. Where is Mr. Hsu now?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe he is in China.

Mr. MORRIS. Is he an official of the Red Chinese Government?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no knowledge on the subject.

Mr. MORRIS. But you do believe he is in Red China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe he is in Red China.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, would you put into the record at this time Mr. Y. Y. Hsu's Communist record as it existed in 1942?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a clipping from the Daily Worker of December 14, 1929, page 5.

Senator FERGUSON. What date?

Mr. MANDEL. 1929.

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment. What was the date of these dinner parties?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, what is the date of the dinner party at your home and Mr. Hsu's home that you just testified to?

Mr. LATTIMORE. After the war, I think.

Mr. MORRIS. That is sometime subsequent to 1945?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think so; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Mandel.

Mr. MANDEL. This article describes, and I quote:

Tonight in six great demonstrations the New York workers will protest against the butchery of thousands of thousands of workers in Haiti and China and will denounce the American Government, which is mobilizing all its forces for war against the Soviet Union, fatherland of the workers of the world.

Listed as speakers at these meetings are the following, who have recently been indicted as Communist leaders. I read the name of

I. Amter, Alexander Trachtenberg, and, listed also as a speaker, Y. Y. Hsu.

I have here another clipping from the Daily Worker of November 6, 1933, which says, in part, that 38 workers' organizations have endorsed the Communist Party ticket and program in the New York municipal elections. Listed as endorsing that program and ticket is Y. Y. Hsu.

The CHAIRMAN. That was what date, the date of that?

Mr. MORRIS. That, Mr. Chairman, was 1933.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here another clipping from the Daily Worker of August 13, 1928, page 1, which describes that 15 workers participated in a Chinese tag day under the auspices of the Committee to Aid the Chinese Trade-Unions, and it lists also the names of individuals who were arrested in connection with that tag day.

Among those arrested was Y. Y. Hsu, spelled here S-h-u, secretary of the New York Worker Peasant Alliance. A photograph is given with the article.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may these go into the record?

The CHAIRMAN. They may be inserted in the record.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 521" and are as follows:)

[Source: Daily Worker, December 14, 1929, p. 5]

#### SMASH ATTACK ON HAITI, U. S. S. R.—MASS MEETS MOBILIZE AGAINST IMPERIALISM

Tonight in six great demonstrations the New York workers will potest against the butchery of thousands of workers in Haiti and China and will denounce the American Government, which is mobilizing all its forces for war against the Soviet Union, Fatherland of the workers of the world.

Meetings will be held at St. Luke's Hall, 125 West 130th St.; Manhattan Lyceum, 66 East Fourth St. Speakers, H. Benjamin, Anna Daman, George Siskind, James Mo. Bryant Hall, Sixth Ave. near 42d St. Speakers, I. Amter, Max Bedacht, Harriet Silverman, Joseph Boruchowitz, Alexander Trachtenberg, T. H. Li, Sam Darey. Rose gardens, 1347 Boston Rd., Bronx. Speakers, Bill Dunne, T. Y. Hu, Leon Plott, G. Green, H. Sazer. 318 Grand St., Brooklyn. Speakers, J. L. Engdahl, Rose Wortis, J. Williamson, Y. Y. Hsu. Hopkinson Mansions, 428 Hopkinson Ave., Brooklyn. Speakers, M. J. Olgin, Otto Hall, T. P. Hu, Gertrude Welsh. Bohemian Hall, Second and Woolsey Aves., Astoria, L. I. Speakers, A. Markoff, Richard Moore, Tong Ping.

Tomorrow afternoon at 1:15 New York workers are urged to gather at Park Row and Broadway in front of the Federal Building to demonstrate against Wall Street's oppression, aided by the Washington Executive Council, of the Colonial and American workers and its attacks on the Soviet Union.

Dozen of organizations will participate in these demonstrations. At the Bryant Hall meeting, which takes place at 6 o'clock instead of 8, as at other demonstrations, leading members of the Needle Trades Workers' Industrial Union will speak also on the organization movement among the dressmakers and the false strike of the I. L. G. W. U.

[Source: Daily Worker, November 6, 1933, p. 2]

#### THIRTY-EIGHT WORKERS' ORGANIZATIONS ENDORSE COMMUNIST PARTY PROGRAM— PARTY'S FIGHT FOR MASSES' NEEDS CITED IN STATEMENT—INDUSTRIAL UNIONS, UNEMPLOYED, COUNCILS, WOMEN'S COUNCILS AMONG BACKERS OF RED CANDIDATES

NEW YORK.—Thirty-eight workers' organizations have endorsed the Communist Party ticket and program in the New York municipal elections. No other has shown daily its stubborn and ceaseless fight in the shops and streets for the

needs of the masses, says the statement signed by these unions, unemployed councils, and fraternal organizations.

Headed by such fighting unions as the Marine Workers Industrial Union, the Needle Trades Workers Industrial Union, the Steel and Metal Workers Industrial Union, the organizations supporting the Communist Party state:

"Only the Communist Party as the party of the working class represents the interests of the entire working population, stands squarely on the principle that the provision of adequate food, clothing and shelter, and the defense of the rights and living standards of the workers are the primary issues in this campaign."

Among the organizations signing endorsement for the Communist candidates are the Unemployed Councils, Friends of the Soviet Union, Councils of Working Class Women, Anti-Imperialist League, Workers Ex-Servicemen's League, and the Labor Sports Union.

**Needle Trade Industrial Union:**

Ben Gold, General Secretary  
 Louis Hyman, President  
 Irving Potash, Secretary  
 Isadore Weisberg, Manager, Dress Dept.  
 Joseph Boruchowitz, Manager of Cloak Dept.  
 Samuel Burt, Fur Dressing Dept.  
 Ben Stallman, Org. of Bathrobe Dept.  
 Dominick Montello, Org. of Custom Tailors  
 Steel and Metal Workers Industrial Union  
 James Lustig, Organizer  
 James Matlis, Secretary

**Marine Workers Industrial Union:**

Roy Hudson, National Secretary  
 Thomas Ray, Secretary

**Food Workers Industrial Union:**

Jay Rubin, General Secretary  
 William Albertson, Org. of Hotel and Restaurant Dept.  
 Sam Kramberg, Org. of Cafeteria Dept.

**Alteration Painters Union:** Morris Kushinsky, Secretary

**Shoe and Leather Workers Industrial Union:**

Fred Biedenkapp, Organizer  
 Isadore Rosenberg, Secretary

**Building Maintenance Workers Industrial Union:** Mort Sher, Secretary

**Drygoods Workers Union:**

Louis Kfare, Vice Chairman  
 Chester Fierstein, Chairman

**Furniture Workers Industrial Union:** Morris Pizer, Secretary

**Independent Carpenters Union:**

Isaac Berman, Organizer  
 Herman Bogartz, Secretary  
 Nathan Ellin, Treasurer

**Taxi Workers Union:**

Harold Eddy, Organizer  
 Abner Feigin, Financial Secretary

**Cleaners and Dyers Union:** Max Rosenberg, Secretary

**Laundry Workers Industrial Union:** Sam Berland, Secretary

**Building and Construction Workers League:**

Jack Taylor, Secretary  
 Sam Nessin, General Secretary

**Trade Union Unity Council:**

Andy Overgaard, Secretary  
 Rose Wortis, Assistant Secretary  
 Sheppard, Organizer

**Office Workers Union:** Laura Carmon, Organizer

**Unemployed Council:**

Israel Amter, National Secretary  
 Carl Winter, Secretary of Greater New York  
 Richard Sullivan, Org. of Greater New York

**International Labor Defense:**

William Lawrence, Secretary, New York District  
 William Patterson, National Secretary  
 William Fitzgerald, Org., Harlem Section

**Workers International Relief:**

Pauline Rogers, New York City Secretary

Alfred Wagenknecht, National Secretary

**Friends of the Soviet Union:** B. Friedman, Secretary**Anti-Imperialist League:**

William Simons, National Secretary

John Bruno, Secretary, New York

**Anti-Imperialist Alliance:** Y. Y. Hsu, National Secretary**Workers Ex-Servicemen's League:**

Harold Hickerson, National Secretary

Joseph Singer, Secretary, City Committee

Emanuel Levin, National Chairman

P. Cashione

**Council of Working Class Women:**

Clara Bodian, Secretary

Clara Shavelson, Educational Director

Sarah Licht, Org. Secretary

**Labor Sports Union:** Mack Gordon, Secretary, New York District**International Workers Order:**

Max Bedacht, National Secretary, Jewish Section

Harry Schiller, New York City Secretary

Sadie Doroshkin, Secretary City Central

**Russian Mutual Aid:** Joseph Soltan, President, New York District Committee**English Workers Clubs:**

J. Landy

Edith Zucker

**Finnish Workers Federation****Jewish City Club Committee**

[Source: Daily Worker, New York, Monday, August 13, 1928]

**FIFTEEN JAILED BY NEW YORK POLICE IN RELIEF COLLECTIONS FOR CHINESE TRADE-UNIONISTS—ARRESTS AIDED BY FOLLOWERS OF KUOMINTANG—SOLICITING WITHOUT PERMIT CHARGED**

Fifteen workers, who participated in the Chinese Tag Day under the auspices of the Committee to Aid the Chinese Trade-Unions, were arrested yesterday in Chinatown. They were charged with "soliciting without a permit" and were released on \$500 bail each, furnished by the local International Labor Defense. The collectors are to appear at the First District Court, White and Center Sts., at 9 a. m. today (Monday), where they will be defended by Jacques Buitenkant, retained by the New York Section of the International Labor Defense.

Those arrested were Y. Y. Shu, secretary of the New York Worker-Peasant Alliance; David Wee, 27; H. T. Tsiang, 28; David Kanner; Max Postolsky, 21; W. Martin, 18; Du Feld, 22; Yekelchik; M. Levin, 12; I. Kleinman, 19; R. Kleidmann, 20; B. Winnick, 17; B. Rosenberg, 22; and L. Chansik.

\* \* \* \* \*

[Picture head: ARRESTED LEADER]

Above is Y. Y. Shu, secretary of the New York Worker-Peasant Alliance, who was among the 15 workers arrested yesterday. Shu was active in the Chinese Relief Tag Days held yesterday and Saturday. Thousands of dollars were contributed by the workers of New York to aid the Chinese workers in their fight against imperialism and the Kuomintang reactionaries. Photo was taken during the recent antiwar demonstration at Union Square.

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify these next two documents?

MR. MANDEL. This is a carbon copy of a letter taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated April 24, 1942, addressed to Mr. Joseph Barnes, Coordinator of Information. It has a type-written signature of Yung-ying Hsu. It is dated April 24, 1942.

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will you receive that into the record?

THE CHAIRMAN. It has been identified as having come from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

MR. MORRIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mandel, will you read that letter for us, please?

The CHAIRMAN. To whom is it addressed?

Mr. MANDEL. To Mr. Joseph Barnes, Coordinator of Information.  
[Reading:]

(EXHIBIT No. 522)

DEAR SIR: It is a great pleasure to receive your letter of the 21st instant. I have just requested my alma mater, Leland Stanford University, for a transcript of my academic records to enable me to fill out the application blank with greater accuracy. The application will be sent to you at the earliest possible time.

Under Mr. Edward C. Carter's capable, enlightening and benevolent leadership I find my work in the Institute of Pacific Relations extremely interesting and enjoyable. However, if you think I can be of any help to your work, I will ask Mr. Carter to release me from my present position.

As you have been associated with the institute, you might agree with me that its equipment and environment are a great asset to writers either on or for the Far East. For the past 14 months I have been in charge of the Chinese collection here. It might be beneficial for both the institute and the Coordinator of Information that part of the work of the latter be done in the former. It is my opinion that Mr. Carter would be glad to offer the facilities of his organization to the war effort and welcome such an arrangement.

Permit me, sir, to express my deep appreciation of both your and Mr. Owen Lattimore's kindly attention.

Sincerely yours.

The CHAIRMAN. Who is it signed by?

Mr. MANDEL. Yung-ying Hsu.

Senator FERGUSON. That is Y. Y. Hsu?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted.

(The previous document as read by counsel was marked "Exhibit No. 522.")

The CHAIRMAN. Let us get this straight. Y. Y. Hsu and Yung-ying Hsu are one and the same individual?

Mr. MORRIS. Is that right, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Probably, yes. I don't know anything about the Y. Y. Hsu of the 1920's or 1930's. This is all new to me.

Mr. MORRIS. It is your testimony you did not know the Communist record of Y. Y. Hsu?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; that is my testimony. I have no recollection of it.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you receive copies of the Daily Worker?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, as they were issued?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. At no time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. At no time.

The CHAIRMAN. You were not a contributor to the Daily Worker?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Nor a subscriber?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, when you were with the OWI, did you make any investigation prior to employment of personnel?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir. Investigation of personnel was the function of a separate personnel branch of OWI.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know whether they made any examination or investigation of personnel?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe that all people employed by OWI, including myself, were subject to investigation by the Civil Service Commission which, my recollection is, was able to check with other investigating agencies, such as the FBI.

Senator FERGUSON. Were there any investigations for security purposes, to your knowledge?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, there was an investigation of individuals before they could be hired.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I had in mind.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. That is along the security line?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think every single person had to be investigated along loyalty and security lines.

The CHAIRMAN. When was OWI set up first? Do you remember?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know the precise date, Senator. It grew out of COI, Coordinator of Information, which was at some time split into OSS and OWI.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not come in then until it was OWI?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. And you came into it after what year, or about what time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I came into it, I think, in late December 1942.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the date of these articles in the Daily Worker?

Mr. MORRIS. The last one is 1933, Senator, the latest one is 1933.

Mr. Lattimore, I had asked you the question in connection with that letter Mr. Mandel read, what your recollection is of the kindly attention referred to in the last paragraph that you showed to Mr. Hsu.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no present recollection whatever. May I say that the set-up of OWI at that time, as far as Chinese work was concerned, was that all radio transmissions—

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Lattimore, I do not think you are answering the counsel's question now. If you want to go back, if you want to go back to a former question, that would be something else.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am explaining why it is difficult for me to answer this question, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Read the question, Mr. Reporter, of the counsel, Mr. Morris.

(The record was read by the reporter.)

The CHAIRMAN. That was his answer.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The Chinese personnel of the New York Office were under Mr. Barnes' jurisdiction, not under mine.

The CHAIRMAN. That does not belong to this question. That belongs to another question asked by Senator Ferguson. If you want to let it stand that way, it is all right, but it involves the thing more.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, did you have any dealings with Mr. Hsu when he was, as he says there, in charge of the Chinese collection of the IPR?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, no direct dealings, as far as I remember.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that document, please?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, showing a letterhead of the Office of War Information, 111 Sutter Street, San Francisco, Calif., dated March 12, 1943, addressed to Mr. W. L. Holland and signed "Owen."

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, can you recall sending that letter to Mr. Holland?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I can't recall sending it to him, but obviously I sent it.

Mr. MORRIS. Does that look like your signature at the bottom?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, it is.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you read that letter, please?

Mr. MANDEL. It is to Mr. W. L. Holland, Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East Fifty-second Street, New York, N. Y.:

(EXHIBIT No. 523)

DEAR BILL: Several weeks ago I was in New York, but only on Saturday and Sunday, and saw no one but people in our own office, except for the fact that I had lunch in the Hsu's apartment with old Prof. Chi and his wife and Harriet Chi.

Anytime that it would be useful to you to have Hsu working out here for the IPR, we should be very glad to take him on as a part-time consultant or research man for our Chinese Section.

Would you let me know if you have any ideas on the subject that I could help to follow up?

We are enjoying being in San Francisco again. Feels just like home (only a hell of a lot more crowded). David is taking Chinese lessons, writing and all. Love from us too to Doreen, Mrs. McGarry, and Patricia.

Yours,

OWEN.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that be inserted into the record?

The CHAIRMAN. It may be inserted.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 523" and was read in full.)

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, is that meeting that you had in Mr. Hsu's apartment still another meeting in addition to the one you testified to took place out on Long Island somewhere?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Probably the same, but I am not sure.

Mr. MORRIS. You also testified the other was after the war, did you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I thought it was after the war; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And on Long Island?

The CHAIRMAN. This is a different meeting. This was not on Long Island, as I understand it. This was in New York.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know from this letter whether the apartment was in New York or on Long Island.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where was Mr. Hsu's apartment, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recollect. The only place that I recollect is an apartment on Long Island, and I thought I was there after the war.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recollect an apartment on Long Island which was Mr. Hsu's apartment?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. So that if Mr. Y. Y. Hsu was not living on Long Island in 1943, this was a different apartment and a separate and second visit; is that right?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Presumably; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. And you knew Mr. Hsu well enough for him to be the only person you visited for that whole weekend?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I say here "saw no one but people in our office."

The CHAIRMAN. Now go back to the question again. What is your question? Do you know Mr. Hsu well enough so that he is the only one you visited during that weekend?

Mr. MORRIS. In addition to the people in your own office?

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember whether I had lunch outside the office with anybody else, or not.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that Harriet Chi mentioned in the first paragraph, was she ever your secretary?

Mr. LATTIMORE. She was my secretary for about 2 weeks in 1936.

Mr. MORRIS. She is the wife of the Chao-ting Chi that we have talked about at great length in this testimony, is she not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. She was at one time.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will you accept that into the record?

The CHAIRMAN. The one that has been read?

It is in the record.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, did you employ Jack Dinichi Kimoto as a translator for the Office of War Information?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no recollection of it.

But if you have a document there to refresh my memory, I may be able to recall.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Lattimore, have you ever met the Chinese—and here I am afraid I must spell them for you—C-h-a I-a-o M-u?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not that I can recall, unless he was one of the numerous staff we had at OWI, or unless you have some document there that I can refresh my memory with.

Mr. MORRIS. How about Mr. Kung P-eng?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The same answer.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever meet those two gentlemen in China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In China?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe so; no.

Mr. MORRIS. I wish you would recall, Mr. Lattimore, whether you ever met those two gentlemen in China.

Mr. LATTIMORE. If you could bring forward something—

Mr. MORRIS. That is, at the time you were adviser to the Generalissimo.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall the names at all, but they may be people that I met in connection with my official duties, working for the Generalissimo.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever pass on to them reports and information of any kind?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Again, not that I recall, unless you can refresh my necessarily imperfect memory.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever send coded messages to Yen-an while you were in Chungking?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Coded messages to Yen-an?

The CHAIRMAN. While you were in Chungking.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I wouldn't believe so, unless it was in connection with some of my official duties.

Mr. MORRIS. It is possible that you may have done it in connection with your official duties?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I should say so.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, after you sent your dispatch to Lauchlin Currie on November 25, 1941, urging a rejection of the *modus vivendi*, will you tell us what your itinerary was through December 7, 1941?

On the 25th you sent to Lauchlin Currie, on the 25th of November 1941, a dispatch suggesting that the proposed *modus vivendi*, whereby a truce would be effected, a temporary truce would be effected, between Japan and the United States in order to avert a war—you remember that dispatch, do you not, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, of course; I was not urging the *modus vivendi*.

Mr. MORRIS. You sent the dispatch, did you not, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I was reporting at the Generalissimo's request. I was reporting his action to that proposal.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, will you tell us what your itinerary was after you sent that dispatch on November 25, from Chungking, sir?

Where did you go up until December 7, 1941?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Beginning at the end of that, I remember that on December 7—that is, Pearl Harbor day—I was in Chungking, and I don't believe that I was out of Chungking between those two dates.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you in Hong Kong at that time, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Possibly; no I wasn't.

Mr. MORRIS. When were you in Hong Kong?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was in Hong Kong—let's see—I was in Hong Kong once between July, when I went out to Chungking, and Pearl Harbor. But I don't remember the exact time. I believe it was earlier than November—more likely September or October.

But my memory is not at all clear.

Mr. MORRIS. And how about December 8?

Mr. LATTIMORE. December 8?

December 8 I was booked to fly from Hong Kong on a clipper ship which was sunk at its moorings in Hong Kong. I never went down.

Mr. MORRIS. You were to go to Hong Kong by ship?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I was to fly to Hong Kong by plane from Chungking, and catch the Pan-American Clipper to fly for home. At something like 2 or 3 o'clock in the morning, before my plane was due to take off, one of the Generalissimo's aides rang me up and said the Japanese have attacked Pearl Harbor, "so your trip is obviously off."

Mr. MORRIS. And then what did you do after that, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Then I stayed in Chungking until I left for America via Burma and the "hump" sometime early in 1942.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Mr. Chi over there at that time? He flew over with you when he went to the Generalissimo's assignment, did he not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He and General Chenmault and I all went out on the same plane; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And you frequently saw him while you were serving that term with the Generalissimo, did you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I saw him fairly frequently, because he was one of the confidential secretaries of H. H. Kung, who was very, very close to the Generalissimo.

Mr. MORRIS. And all during that time, it is your testimony, is it not, that you did not know that he was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, you have testified, have you not, that you did not know that James S. Allen was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right. To the best of my knowledge, I never knew that he was a Communist until quite recently.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you testify that you never met James S. Allen?

Mr. LATTIMORE. To the best of my knowledge I never met him.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have an exhibit No. 53 which has already been introduced in open session. This is a carbon copy of a letter from Mr. Carter to Mr. Holland. I would like to show it to Mr. Lattimore and ask him if reading the last paragraph of that will refresh his recollection on the negative answer he gave to the question.

The CHAIRMAN. Does that bear any identification as having been admitted?

Mr. MORRIS. That has been admitted and is exhibit No. 53.

Mr. ARNOLD. May we have a copy?

Mr. MORRIS. I ask Mr. Lattimore to read the last paragraph.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The last paragraph of this letter from Mr. Carter to Mr. Holland says:

Last week we had a special meeting on Soviet policy in the Pacific, made up of some members of Corbett's group, but it was an ad hoc meeting. Those present were Kathleen Barnes, Lockwood, Grajdanzev, Corbett, Nuhle, Bisson, Moore, Field, James Allen, Bill Carter, E. C. Carter, and Owen Lattimore, and Leaning.

Mr. MORRIS. Does not that letter indicate that you and Mr. Allen met together?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe it does, Mr. Morris. I have seen this before, when it was issued as an exhibit, and I believe that it is a mistake on Mr. Carter's part. Maybe he had a list of people who had been invited to such a conference, but I don't remember taking part in it, and there is at least one person there besides Mr. Allen whom I never remember meeting.

I note that in this letter he says: "last week," and he may have been writing from a faulty recollection.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that James S. Allen has testified before this committee that he did attend that meeting?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I didn't know that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know, Mr. Lattimore, what the group is that is referred to?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have only a very imperfect recollection of the fact that at that time, 1940, Professor Corbett of Yale, who is an expert on Roman law and international law, and later made a special study of Soviet law, was conducting some kind of a study, I believe, under the auspices of the IPR.

Mr. SOURWINE. And his students were referred to as "Corbett's group;" is that what you mean?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't know whether they were students or other people who took part in a discussion group under the auspices of the IPR, or exactly what the arrangement was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you a member of that group, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you attend any meetings of that group?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't remember attending this or any other meeting.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you say that you did not attend that meeting that is referred to there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. To the best of my recollection, I never attended that meeting; no.

The CHAIRMAN. The names there are all familiar to you, are they not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not all of them; no. There is somebody here named Muhle, whom I can't place at all.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the only one that is not familiar to you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The others are familiar to me, that is, they are people I know or know of, know of slightly.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, I am now going to call your attention to our exhibit 455, which was introduced into the record on February 21, 1952. It takes the form of a memorandum on Philippine research, dated April 14, 1938, WWL to ECC. WWL is Mr. Lockwood, is it not, and ECC is Mr. Carter?

I ask you if, in the course of your duties as editor of Pacific Affairs, which you were at that time, that memorandum would have been in the purview of the documents available for your research?

Mr. SOURWINE. Before that question is answered, I think the question before the question last asked was not responded to.

I think the record should show that in response to the previous question, Mr. Lattimore nodded, but made no sound.

Mr. MORRIS. The nodding was yes, was it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The nodding was that I was prepared to look at this exhibit.

This exhibit I have also seen, because it was previously issued.

Until I saw it, I had no previous recollection of it, and I believe that I never saw it before. You will see that it is headed "Research." I was not connected with American Council Research at that time, and I was not in New York at that time. I was living in California, and had not been in New York for a couple of years.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you first see that document?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Some months ago, after it had been released by this committee.

Mr. MORRIS. Some months ago, that is February 21, Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. LATTIMORE. February. I thought you read February 21, 19—

Mr. MORRIS. No, 1952.

Mr. LATTIMORE. 1952?

Mr. MORRIS. This, Mr. Chairman, is obviously what Mr. Lattimore is referring to, judging by the period of time, and is a copy of the letter, and the Institute of Pacific Relations also retained a copy of this letter. So a copy is also available in their office.

The paragraph I would like to read, since you have seen it, Mr. Lattimore, is the third paragraph on the second page.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us go back and get the letter from whom to whom?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lockwood is writing to Mr. Carter. This is in 1938, at a time when Mr. Lattimore is the editor of Pacific Affairs. He has testified that in 1938 he was on the west coast.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. The paragraph reads:

Are you in touch with James Allen? I understand he is going to the islands in July to continue his investigation. His recent Pacific Affairs article on the agrarian question was most interesting and gave evidence of being a careful and scholarly piece of work. His earlier book on the Negro problem in the

United States was praised by scholars as an excellent piece of research, even though his Communist ideology led him off into a proposal for "national self-determination" in the Black Belt which most people thought rather fantastic.

Does not that indicate to you, Mr. Lattimore, that the people in the New York office knew that James S. Allen was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It certainly indicates that Mr. Lockwood thought he had a Communist ideology.

Senator FERGUSON. Of course, that would not make him a Communist, would it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not necessarily a Community Party member.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he ask you anything about membership?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I thought that question was usually asked with regard to membership, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. I think you had better watch the questions and do not read into this "membership" if it is not in it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. All right.

There are, after all, Senator, many are, and have been, many general Marxist writers who are sometimes loosely called Communists who have never engaged in Communist organizations.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all right. If you want to answer the particular question that way, and if you want to give that answer as far as Allen is concerned, is that your opinion?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, I don't have enough to go on to make any opinion one way or the other.

Senator FERGUSON. Then why did you give us that answer?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Because I didn't want to make my opinion positive in one sense or another when I don't know enough about it to be positive.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, did you know that Mr. Allen at that time was associated with the Daily Worker?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you read the testimony before this committee that he was an agent for the Communist International?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think I have seen some reference to that in the transcript; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And do you not know that he had a byline in the Daily Worker for a long period during the war, and was known as the foreign editor of the Daily Worker?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know all of that in detail. According to my recollection at the time of the Tydings hearings 2 years ago, the fact was brought up that he had some sort of Daily Worker connection.

I don't remember the details. But I believe that that was the first I know of it.

Mr. MORRIS. Does it not show at least a lack of coordination, let us say, Mr. Lattimore, that the New York office should know that James Allen was a Communist, and that you, as editor of Pacific Affairs, for which he was writing, should not know that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think no more lack of coordination that was fairly general around the IPR office. After all, we were not a Government office with chains of command and regular protocol on what went to who, when, and how, and so on.

Mr. MORRIS. When you wanted to be in touch with Mr. Allen, how did you get his address?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Presumably I got it either from the IPR or perhaps he wrote to me. I don't know.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever get his address from Mr. Field?

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. MORRIS, if I might interpose at that point: Your question was when you wanted to get in touch with Mr. Allen, "How did you get his address?"

I do not believe the witness means to say that when he wanted to get in touch with Mr. Allen, Mr. Allen wrote to him.

Is that what you meant to say, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Allen may have written to me in connection with the fact that I published a couple of articles, and I may have had his address that way.

Mr. SOURWINE. The question was, when you wanted to get in touch with Mr. Allen, how did you get his address?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well. I don't remember.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever get his address from Mr. Field?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no recollection on the subject, but if you have a document there I shall be glad to have my memory refreshed.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that document, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a carbon copy from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated April 27, 1939, addressed to Mr. Owen Lattimore from Frederick V. Field.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, do you recall having received that document?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't recall receiving it.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read it, Mr. Lattimore? It is short.

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

DEAR OWEN: Carter's office reports that James Allen may be reached at—  
Then I can't read this clearly—

\* \* \* 508 West One Hundred and Thirty-ninth Street—

I think it is—

New York City.

Sincerely yours,

(The document as previously read by the witness was marked "Exhibit No. 524," as above.)

Mr. LATTIMORE. I presume that Mr. Field was at that time—when was this, 1939?

I think he was still secretary of the American IPR. So, presumably, I wrote to him for the address.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you not testify several days ago that at that time you realized that Frederick Field was at that time a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I didn't. I testified that in 1952, seeing a letter written by Field in 1939, I would now say that my memory may have been in error by 2 years as to the time when I thought he was beginning to be a close fellow traveler of the record.

However, that projection of my memory back from 1952 to 1939 is not worth a great deal.

After all, the way people were writing about Russia and Russian policy in 1939 was pretty loose.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, did you not, in your voluntary statement that you brought in here, say that you knew Field was a Communist in the 1940's?

I even corrected you to show what you had said.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think I said that I believe that by the 1940's he had become a Communist, or something of that sort. I forget the exact wording.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

You are now talking about 1950. Well, then, did you know that in the 1940's, back in the 1940's, he was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; as of the 1950's, I remember that in the 1940's I considered him a Russian fellow traveler, or possibly a Communist fellow traveler. But I don't remember when I began to feel that way.

The CHAIRMAN. You came in here with your statement voluntarily. Do you recall your statement? It was to the effect that he was a Communist in the forties.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I said in my statement——

Senator FERGUSON. What page is that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Page 14——

I had no reason to consider him a Communist during the period when he was secretary of the American IPR in the 1930's, although I have no doubt he became one during the 1940's.

That is, I have, in 1952, no doubt that he became one during the 1940's. I may say that that is based not so much on my own recollection as on some testimony that I read in the transcript of the hearings of Mr. Carter here, much of which was entirely new to me.

Senator FERGUSON. Then there are some truths in this hearing that you take for granted?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My opinion of Mr. Carter has always been that he is an extremely honest man.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that where you got the idea "although I have no doubt that he became one during the 1940"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. As I say, it is partly from recollection, which is very vague, and difficult for me to specify as to year, but I also read some things in Mr. Carter's testimony which would now, in 1952, indicate to me that Field definitely became a Communist in the 1940's.

Senator FERGUSON. Then it would indicate that Carter's testimony shows the fact to be that Field became a Communist in the 1940's?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not Carter's opinion, but some of the facts given by Carter.

Senator FERGUSON. The facts given by Carter. It would, therefore, appear that while Field was connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations, he was a Communist, and Carter's facts show it; is that correct?

Mr. LATTIMORE. As of 1952 they create a strong presumption.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, have you read the testimony of Mr. Nathaniel Weyl before this committee, which was to the effect that Mr. Field became a Communist in 1935?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I haven't. Is that part of the——

Mr. MORRIS. That is public testimony.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Has that part of the transcript been printed yet?

Mr. MORRIS. It has not been printed yet. But you do read transcripts that the Institute of Pacific Relations obtains in New York, do you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I read some of them; by no means all of them.

Mr. MORRIS. But they are available to you.

Will you identify that letter, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a carbon copy taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated November 3, 1938, addressed to Mr. James S. Allen, care of American Express Co., Manila, Philippine Islands. It has the typed signature of Owen Lattimore.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, I ask you if you recall having written that letter to Mr. Allen.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall having written it, but I obviously wrote it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, will you read the letter, please?

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading) :

(EXHIBIT No. 525)

DEAR ALLEN : Immediately on receipt of your letter of which I herewith enclose a copy, I wrote to your American address. As I received no reply, and the deadline for the December number of Pacific Affairs was fast approaching, I had perforce to schedule the letter for publication without reply for you.

That must be a misprint for "from you" :

I added an editorial note to the effect that we expected a reply from you for our March number.

Now I have just heard from your wife, giving your Manila address. Although it is too late for you to send a reply for December publication, I am forwarding this by clipper mail in the hope that it may reach you before you leave the Philippines. I hope that this will not merely give you extra time before our March number, but possibly enable you to make a last-minute check-up on the data on which you founded your original statements.

As your article appeared to me, as a nonexpert, to have every external characteristic of careful observation and reasoned statement, while the vigor of the attached letter of refutation indicates great confidence on the part of the protesting company, I shall be extremely interested in following up, in due course, the discrepancy between the two statements.

Please note, by the way, my new permanent address, as given above.

Yours very sincerely.

Mr. MORRIS. May that be inserted into the record, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted into the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 525" and read in full.)

Mr. MORRIS. To what extent did you know James Allen's wife?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I never met her, to the best of my knowledge.

Mr. MORRIS. What name did she use when you spoke to her?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think I spoke to her. My recollection of this correspondence is that—what was the date of that letter from Field giving his address?

Mr. MORRIS. That is April 27, 1939.

Mr. LATTIMORE. April 27, 1939. This is previous. I must have written to Allen care of IPR, or whatever address I had for him, and the letter was presumably forwarded to his wife who told me that he was out of the country.

Mr. MORRIS. When did she tell you, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I presume she told me by letter.

Mr. MORRIS. How did she sign letters—Mrs. James S. Allen?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that James Allen is not the man's name at all?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have seen recently something in the newspapers to that effect. That was the first of it I knew.

Mr. MORRIS. How did she identify herself when she spoke to you or wrote to you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Presumably as Mrs. Allen.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the man we have been discussing, James S. Allen, has testified before this committee and he stated that his name is Sol Auerbach, but that he writes in these various publications under the name of James S. Allen.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Incidentally, Mr. Morris, I am all confused about this man Allen. I got the impression some time ago—I think it may have been at the time of the trial of the 11 Communists in New York—from reading the press, that Mr. Allen was a Negro. Now I am sure, if I had met a Negro expert on the Philippines, I would remember it.

Now, I see that his name is given as Sol Auerbach which doesn't sound to me like a Negro name, so I don't know what he is.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you ever heard the name Sol Auerbach?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Auerbach, I don't believe I ever have; no.

Mr. MORRIS. May I take one more letter?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. There has been identified a letter, Mr. Chairman, as exhibit 49, August 2, 1951: This is a letter that Mr. Lattimore wrote to Mr. Allen in 1939. Would you care to read it, Mr. Lattimore?

This is to Mr. James S. Allen.

Mr. LATTIMORE. It is dated February 27, 1939, addressed to Mr. James S. Allen, 508 West One Hundred and Thirty-ninth Street, Apartment 42, New York City [reading]:

DEAR ALLEN: Excuse my writing to you by dictaphone, as I am away from my office and kind of crowded for time.

It was good to hear from you again, and I am only sorry that your Letter to the Editor was not in time for publication in our March number. It will have to come out in June. I am returning to you herewith a copy of the letter as set up to go to the printer. I am also sending copies to the Compania and to the Philippine Branch of the IPR.

What about some more on the Philippines sometimes? We are really rather hard-pressed to get enough material that is not directly about the Japanese war on China. At the same time I needn't apologize for pointing out to you that we couldn't guarantee to take another article from you on the Philippines right away, if it would look to the Philippines IPR as though we only printed "radical" stuff on the islands. Have you done any work in French Indochina, the Malay Straits, or Netherlands Indies?

By the way, have you any ideas that I could use in expanding circulation in the Philippines for Pacific Affairs? I think it is a healthy thing not to depend entirely on the organizational efforts of the IPR in each area for subscriptions. The more we can widen out everywhere by getting people who are not just members or joiners to subscribe to Pacific Affairs, the better for us.

I may be in New York toward the end of March. If so, I very much hope that I may be able to make your acquaintance personally.

Yours very sincerely,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

Mr. SOURWINE. May I inquire?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, can you explain why you were concerned over the reaction of the Philippine IPR to your publication of fundamental stuff on the Philippine Islands?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Was that the reaction of the Philippine IPR I was concerned about, or the reaction of the tobacco company?

Mr. SOURWINE. The letter said, sir—

at the same time I needn't apologize for pointing out to you that we couldn't guarantee to take another article from you on the Philippines right away, if it

would look to the Philippines IPR as though we only printed "radical" stuff on the islands.

I was asking what was the basis for your feeling that the Philippine IPR would be concerned about your printing fundamental stuff on the Philippine Islands?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I suppose it was because of that protest from the tobacco company that disliked Allen's article. The Philippines council was one of the councils from which we had often tried unsuccessfully to get articles.

Then I got an article from somebody who had been to the Philippines, which raised a controversy in the Philippines. So I suppose the Philippines council might be concerned about it.

Incidentally, the tobacco company's criticism of Allen's figures and statements had raised absolutely no question of his being a Communist, and as far as concerns the conditions that he dealt with the accuracy of his investigation seems to be fully upheld by the report of the Joint Preparatory Committee on Philippine Affairs appointed by the President of the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you reading that, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you reading that from some document?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am reading that from some notes I have prepared.

The CHAIRMAN. Why do you not answer the question without reading it?

Who presented that to you? Where did you get that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I asked my wife for it.

Senator SMITH. Is that a memorandum you prepared yourself, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; it is a memorandum that I prepared myself.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you prepare that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In preparation for these hearings.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you prepare that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am not quite sure at what time. I have been preparing for these hearings for months.

Senator FERGUSON. Let us get a definite answer to this question: When did you prepare this document?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In the course of preparing for these hearings, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that the closest you can get to it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is the closest I can get to it.

The CHAIRMAN. Within how many months? Within a period of how many months?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Within a period of approximately 8 months.

Senator FERGUSON. What made you think that you might be asked about this article and about Allen? What made you think that you might be asked about this article and Allen?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Because of previous testimony, both at the time of the Tydings hearings and before this committee, for example—

Senator FERGUSON. Did you refresh your memory about Allen, try to find any of these letters to him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I looked up to see what I might have on the subject of Allen. Then I looked up the question of the situation at that time in the Philippines.

Senator FERGUSON. What is it that your counsel wants to call to your attention?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The entries on the subject of Sol Auerbach in the printed transcript of this hearing, part 1, July.

The CHAIRMAN. What date?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Part 1, July 25, 26, 31; August 2, 7, 1951.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, it is the import of your testimony to the effect that James S. Allen's article was not a Communist article?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is the import of my testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. What did you mean by the word "radical" in that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, I meant the word radical, in quotes, in the sense that as of that time any article which was contested by a plantation company about conditions of plantation labor might have been called radical by the plantation company.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean you did not here use it in the sense of fundamental?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Here I did not use it in the sense of fundamental, and I had it in quotes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, knowing what you do now about James S. Allen, do you think that he still could write an article that would not be a Communist article?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Morris, I don't know any way of preventing a Communist from occasionally taking an intelligent interest in an important problem. I should think that under certain circumstances a Communist would be quite capable of writing an article that could not be regarded as slanted in a Communist direction.

The CHAIRMAN. Even if he was writing under an assumed name?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Even if he was writing under assumed names. Other people also write under assumed names.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will stand in recess until tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 3:15 p. m. the committee recessed, to reconvene at 10 a. m., Wednesday, March 5, 1952.)



# INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

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WEDNESDAY, MARCH 5, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,  
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE  
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL  
SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY  
LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,  
*Washington, D. C.*

The subcommittee met at 10:15 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Hon. Pat McCarran, chairman, presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran, Eastland, Smith, O'Connor, Ferguson, and Watkins, and Jenner.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; Benjamin Mandel, research director.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

## TESTIMONY OF OWEN LATTIMORE, ACCOMPANIED BY THURMAN ARNOLD—Resumed

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, do you have a copy of the letter that you mentioned in the article to the London Times yesterday, of permission to go to Yenan?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't have it.

Mr. MORRIS. You do not have a copy of that.

Mr. Lattimore, did you ever express disagreement with the policy of the United States Government, that all aid to China should go through the accredited Chinese Nationalist Government?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no recollection of that, but my recollection isn't complete. If you have a document I would be glad to discuss it.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever recommend or protest that aid should be given to the Chinese Communists lest the United States appear partisan in withholding aid from the Chinese Communists?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember that, either, but again my recollection isn't complete.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever prepare a protest to an article written by Max Eastman and J. B. Powell, in the Reader's Digest, in 1945, which was destined for the New York Times, over the signature of Thomas Lamont?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I participated in that.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you explain what happened at that time, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Eastman and Mr. Powell had printed in the Reader's Digest which cast slurs on me and others. I wrote to the Reader's Digest and asked for an opportunity to reply, received what

I considered a very curt and rude reply, and a little bit later, I believe, Mr. Carter wrote to me and suggested that a letter be published, be offered to the New York Times for publication. He believed that Mr. Thomas Lamont might sign such a letter, and suggested that I draft it so that what I considered the relevant material would be in it.

Mr. MORRIS. So the views in that memorandum were your views?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know about the final state of it. I prepared a draft.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is, are the views in that draft your views?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In the views in my original draft were my views; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever read the letter that actually appeared in the New York Times?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think a letter did appear in the New York Times.

Senator FERGUSON. Did it appear anywhere?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe so.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify these documents, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is photostat of a carbon copy of a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated June 14, 1945, addressed to Owen Lattimore, with the typed signature of Edward C. Carter.

Attached thereto is a photostat of a letter to the editor of the New York Times, consisting of five pages. It is unsigned.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, I ask if you will look at that and answer whether or not that letter is addressed to you, whether that is a copy of a letter addressed to you, and whether the draft therein is your draft.

(A document was handed to the witness.)

The CHAIRMAN. As I understand it, all of this matter, a photostatic copy of which was presented to the witness here, was taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations; is that correct, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The letter from Mr. Carter to me is clearly written by him and received by me. If I may just look at this draft here—

I do not believe the draft is entirely my draft. I think it is probably a combined draft of some sort.

Senator FERGUSON. Whose work besides yours?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know, unless it was Mr. Carter or if he asked somebody else in New York to help him.

Senator FERGUSON. Did Mr. Lamont know anything about this subject?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, I believe there was some correspondence between Mr. Carter and Mr. Lamont on the subject.

Senator FERGUSON. But did he know anything personally about it, or was he merely the mouthpiece for you and Mr. Carter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Lamont had long been interested in China.

Senator FERGUSON. He had been?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe he had long been interested in China; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What do you say is in this document that is not yours?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It is impossible for me to recall at this time exactly what phrases were mine and what phrases were somebody else's.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it a matter of phrases, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Maybe partly a matter of phrases, partly, perhaps, a matter of paragraphs.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it a matter of substance?

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I read it out, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. MORRIS. Before doing that, you will be given that opportunity, Mr. Lattimore; I would like to ask a few questions beforehand.

Will you read that letter that accompanies the draft?

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

(EXHIBIT NO. 526)

DEAR OWEN: Although last night's suggestion for ghost writing for a downtown big shot has certain attractive features, my second thought is that my original suggestion should not be lightly discarded.

You are a pretty big shot yourself and a great many people will listen to you.

If on further thought you think that there would be even greater advantages in the proposal advanced last evening, I am willing to explore the possibility of it, but my original suggestion still is my first choice.

Sincerely yours,

Mr. MORRIS. At this point, Mr. Chairman, will you receive both the draft and the letter into evidence?

The CHAIRMAN. The draft and the letter have been identified as having been taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations and will be received in evidence.

(Documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 526," which was read in full above, and "Exhibit No. 527," which is as follows:)

To the EDITOR OF THE NEW YORK TIMES:

The San Francisco Conference has shown us that Soviet Russia is a country with which we can cooperate. The statesmanship of the Russian delegates, and concessions made by the Soviet Government, have contributed to this fortunate outcome. Tensions have eased, especially in Europe.

On the other hand there is cause for uneasiness in a new trend, which is now developing, toward criticism of Soviet motives and Soviet policies in Asia. We shall be well advised to consider this trend now, in advance of President Truman's first Big Three meeting with Mr. Churchill and Marshal Stalin. When that meeting is held public interest and public comment and speculation will inevitably be drawn toward Russia's position, and Russia's relationship to us, in Asia and the Pacific. We shall do well to prepare now for the thinking which will absorb our interest then. Should we prepare ourselves for this occasion by hardening, within our minds, the assumption that Soviet and American interests in Asia are inherently in conflict with each other? Ought we not rather to search for a larger framework of policy within which American and Soviet interests can be accommodated to each other?

An example of anticipatory alarm about Russia is to be found in the influential magazine Reader's Digest, under the title "The Fate of the World Is at Stake in China," by Max Eastman and J. B. Powell. In this article it is suggested that there is a danger that American policy might disastrously "sell out" President Chiang Kai-shek to the Chinese Communists, and "bring under totalitarian regimentation 450 million people." To bolster the case, the article casts doubts on the authoritativeness of several of those Americans who have, in fact, contributed most authoritatively to a clear American understanding of contemporary China and Contemporary Russia—including Owen Lattimore, Harrison Forman, and Edgar Snow. The publication of such an article invites a review of both American and Soviet policy in China. In making such a review, we should examine American policy just as closely as Soviet policy, and make our criticisms where they are due.

Under Pearl Harbor, the American policy was to support China while avoiding, as far as possible, a direct challenge to Japan. Since Pearl Harbor, our policy has been to give China the maximum aid permitted by difficulties of transport and the demands of other theaters of war. We have also, until quite recently, encouraged political unity in China, in order to facilitate the most effective resistance in Japan.

Soviet Russia has followed a parallel policy. Even during the period when there was a danger that Russia might be attacked from two sides by Germany and Japan, the Soviet Government accepted whatever risk there might be in giving aid to China. Moreover, Soviet aid, like American aid, encouraged political unity in China. No attempt was made to channel Soviet aid toward the Chinese Communists. All aid was delivered, with no restrictions attached, to the National Government headed by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. After the German invasion of Russia the flow of aid understandably decreased; but Madame Chiang has given us an authoritative statement of the extent and significance of Soviet aid up to 1941. Writing in *Liberty* magazine (January 21, 1941) she said:

"Intellectual honesty constrains me to point out that throughout the first three years of resistance, Soviet Russia extended to China, for the actual purchase of war materials and other necessities, credits several times larger than the credits given by either Great Britain or America. Both these countries, indeed, circumscribed their advances with conditions which prevented even one cent of the money from being used for badly needed munitions, equipment, or war materials of any kind \* \* \*. When Japan protested through the Ambassador at Moscow that the aid extended was a breach of neutrality, Russia did not wilt, or surrender, or compromise, but continued to send supplies of arms to China. It will doubtless be said that Russia has been aiding China for selfish interests. In reply to this I may point out that Russian help has been unconditional."

Russian and American policy in China can be made parallel, and we know from experience, not by guesswork, that the Russians are capable of contributing, at the very least, an equal share in making the policies of the two countries parallel.

At the present moment there is a danger that the parallel policy may not continue. This danger has not yet arisen from Russian policy, but it has arisen from American policy. Whereas Russian policy has never yet demanded the inclusion of the Chinese Communists in the benefits of Russian aid to China, American policy has recently explicitly excluded them from the benefits of American aid. Recent statements by General Hurley, our Ambassador to Chungking, and General Wedemeyer, the ranking American officer in the theater, have restricted the benefits of Lend-Lease to the forces politically identified with President Chiang Kai-shek, and have restricted American personnel from acting in ways that might benefit forces other than those politically identified with President Chiang.

As a result, American aid to China is now confined to such politically limited channels that, while we continue to aid China the nation, our aid now favors one political group against all others and is withheld from one major group, the Chinese Communists, which has armed forces in combat with the Japanese. American aid to China has thus become politically partisan at a time when the Russians are still scrupulously refraining from partisan activity. If this divergence of policy should create a strain in Russian-American relations, the blame cannot be thrown upon the Russians. On the contrary, if the Russians should in the future begin to extend direct aid to the Chinese Communists, they could justify themselves on the ground that they were merely following an American precedent.

Many issues are here involved. Not the least of them is the possibility of a complete reversal of the time-honored American policy of supporting the territorial and political integrity of China. American aid to one party in China, leading to Russian aid to another party, could easily result in indicting on China a terrible civil war, following more than eight years of heavy sacrifice in a war for national survival. American policy, which traditionally has always opposed the partition of China, might thus actually precipitate a partition by making the government of part of China dependent on American control and virtually compelling political opponents of that government to look for foreign support elsewhere.

To those who can think of American policy only in terms of an anti-Russian coalition, like the authors of the article in *Reader's Digest* from which I have quoted, such a prospect may seem to be only a bold move in power-politics. It is ironical to recall that one of them, Mr. Eastman, was long a supporter of Leon Trotsky, and is the translator of his works. Were Leon Trotsky in the

Kremlin today, and not Marshal Stalin, the prospect of the division of China between Russia and America, setting the stage for a world war between Communism and capitalism, might well be enticing to American Communists of the Trotskyist persuasion.

To other Americans it should be alarming to contemplate the possibility of an irrevocable reversal of historic American policy in China, leading to irremediable antagonism between us and Soviet Russia, threatening the foundations of world security that have been laid at San Francisco with Russian aid, and making America responsible for a new world phase of the politics of hostility.

The safeguard against these dangers lies not in limited support of one nation, or one party within a nation, but in wider and better-balanced cooperation with China, with Russia, and with Great Britain. Mr. Owen Lattimore, in his recent *Solution in Asia*, has wisely warned against an American policy which would make the Chinese Government "dependent on us to the point where it cannot deal with other governments without our backing," and has urged that "it is essential that America should cease to be so conspicuously the main link between China and the United Nations. Our interests are great, but they are not isolated. China policy must be brought into proper liaison with our Soviet and British policies."

Our interest—and it can be made a common interest with Great Britain and Russia—is that China should be strong, united, and independent. Only a China which is strong because it is united, and therefore capable of true independence, can inspire the permanent confidence of the American people and provide the conditions for expanding investment and trade which are needed by the rest of the world almost as much as they are needed by China herself.

At President Truman's forthcoming meeting with the others of the Big Three the necessary adjustments can and should be made, and they should have the widest support throughout the American Nation. American policy should be brought back to its traditional support for a politically and territorially united China, and this paramount requisite for the future stability of Asia should not be jeopardized by factious attacks on any of our allies.

Mr. SOURWINE. Might I ask a question there, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. MORRIS. We are still on the same subject.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; you may.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, would you look at page 3 of this draft?

This is the draft of the article?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. The paragraph at the bottom of that page.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. It says:

As a result, American aid to China is now confined to such politically limited channels that, while we continue to aid China the nation, our aid now favors one political group against all others and is withheld from one major group, the Chinese Communists, which has armed forces in combat with the Japanese. American aid to China has thus become politically partisan at a time when the Russians are still scrupulously refraining from partisan activity. If this divergence of policy should create a strain in Russian-American relations, the blame cannot be thrown upon the Russians. On the contrary, if the Russians should in the future begin to extend direct aid to the Chinese Communists, they could justify themselves on the ground that they were merely following an American precedent.

Can you say whether that is one of the portions of the draft which is yours?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe that was probably mine; yes. This is in line with the thinking that was very common at the time, of which I was aware, as I said in my statement, prepared statement for this committee, on page 44:

Some experienced observers were already beginning to believe the Chiang Kai-shek part of free China was in danger of being completely conquered by the Japanese. Some of these observers, including American military officers, even

felt that the American Government ought to assert its right to send supplies to the Communist areas of resistance.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you believe what you wrote here in this paragraph that I have just read?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Why, certainly, I believed it at the time; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you realize that this paragraph includes the statement that: "\* \* \* the Russians," at this time, which was 1945: "\* \* \* are still scrupulously refraining from partisan activity"?

Did you believe that?

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment, Mrs. Lattimore.

The Chair has borne with you now for several days in what appears to be your whispered answers to the witness on the stand. If it occurs again, the Chair will be constrained to have you moved from your position. I do not like to do that. I want to be as courteous to you as I can. The Chair is not going to endure this much longer.

That is an end to it, and that is all.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Your question, Mr. Sourwine?

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you realize, Mr. Lattimore, that that paragraph infers the statement that at the time, that is, in June of 1945, the Russians were, to use the words of the article: "Still scrupulously refraining from partisan activity."

Did you believe that at the time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believed that at the time, and I should like to ask permission to read a note on the subject in a printed book by General Chennault.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, if I might pursue this for just a moment before we have any extraneous matter put in?

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you not testify here, sir, I believe the day before yesterday, that you have believed, and now believe, since 1940, the Russians were supporting and have been supporting the Chinese Communists?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I clearly remember making that statement. The support of the Russians to the Chinese Communists during the war period, to the best of my knowledge, then and at this time, was propaganda support, moral support, anything except direct support in the way of arms and supplies.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think, sir, that that support, such as you speak of, even it was confined to moral support, propaganda support, and all of the other support short of arms, do you think that meets the description "scrupulously refraining from partisan activity?"

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, I believe it does, Mr. Sourwine. I believe the Russian support of those years emphasized the need for continuing unity in China, and not resorting to civil war at a time when all Chinese ought to be fighting the Japanese.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you believe, Mr. Lattimore, that the Russians were strictly impartial as between the Chinese Communists and the Chinese Nationalist Government?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no doubt, Mr. Sourwine, that the Russians were not impartial. But whatever their reasons, they were at that time, as far as I know to this day, scrupulously following an international policy of supporting the joint Chinese resistance to the Japanese.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that what you meant when you said the day before yesterday that the Chinese Communists were being supported by Russia?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is what I meant, yes. I did not mean military support or support of supplies.

I should like at this moment to read this citation from General Chennault, which I found quite recently when I was looking over the records.

The CHAIRMAN. Refer that to the counsel, please.

Mr. MORRIS. What relevancy does that have, Mr. Lattimore?

The CHAIRMAN. Before we go into that, just refer it to the counsel, please.

Have you got it with you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, I think I have it.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us have it, please.

Now you may pursue your questions. You may read it at a later time.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that last document?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a carbon copy of a letter which was taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated June 19, 1945, addressed to Owen Lattimore, with the typed signature of Edward C. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, I ask if you recall having received that letter.

(A document was handed to the witness.)

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't recall receiving it, but obviously I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will you receive it into the record?

The CHAIRMAN. It has been established as having come from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. Lattimore, will you read that letter, please?

Mr. LATTIMORE. This one?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, the one I just handed you.

This is already introduced, I understand, as exhibit 29, in the printed hearings, before this committee.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could we have an extra copy for Mr. Arnold?

Mr. ARNOLD. Thank you.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you read that, Mr. Lattimore, please?

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

DEAR OWEN: Here is a typed copy of the draft you handed me yesterday. Late last evening I went up to One Hundred and Sixty-sixth Street and saw the son. I discovered that, alas, his father left yesterday for Maine and probably will be gone all summer.

I explained the general situation to the son and said that I would like his advice as to who would be the best single person or group of three or four to sign such a letter. He made some academic suggestions and then finally suggested the possibility of his father.

He thought it would be better for me to approach him than for him to do so, though he said the chances weren't very good because his father is fatigued and doesn't usually like to take on extra burdens during his holiday.

Mr. MORRIS. Excuse me, Mr. Lattimore. Who is the person he referred to there as the son?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know of my own knowledge, Mr. Morris. I presume, from reading the transcript of these hearings, that it is Mr. Corliss Lamont, the son of Mr. Thomas Lamont.

Mr. MORRIS. At the time you received this letter from Mr. Carter, he presumed that you knew who the son would be when he wrote this letter, did he not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I presume so.

Mr. MORRIS. So it is your testimony that you may have known that the son at that time was Corliss Lamont, but at least the testimony to date has refreshed your recollection on that score?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The testimony to date has refreshed my recollection on that score, and I presume that I knew at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. Is there any doubt about that, that you knew who the son was?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I presume there was no doubt about it, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Why was Mr. Carter using the cryptic language employed there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. You would have to ask Mr. Carter that.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you continue reading, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

He also confirmed what I suspected, that the father likes to do his own writing. I am, however, prepared in 2 or 3 days to send the draft to him, with as strong and tactful a letter as I can write on the off chance that he might be willing to do something.

There is just one section of your draft that I question slightly, and this is at the bottom of page 3 and top of page 4.

Is that the same 3 and 4 that is on this mimeographed copy?

This possibility is precisely what your critics are always advancing. They say that the Soviet Union is definitely going to annex Manchuria, et cetera, while you put it in reverse.

I would hate to have your critics pounce on this and announce that even Lattimore admits that Manchuria is to become a part of the Soviet Union. Do you see any way of avoiding this?

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

P. S.—May I make one more suggestion, that is, that you add a final paragraph in which the author puts in a plea for a strong, united, independent China, a China which would inspire confidence of the American people in general, and a China which would give confidence to those American businessmen who seek mutually advantageous trade between the United States and China?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, I show you that original of the draft again, and the paragraph questioned about, the paragraph Mr. Sourwine questioned you about.

It does appear at the bottom of page 3 and the top of page 4.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Of the original?

Mr. MORRIS. Of the one that we have been discussing.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Does not that appear to be the same paragraph?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right, yes. That is page 3 of the mimeographed copy.

Mr. MORRIS. And, Mr. Chairman, to complete this episode, I would like to put into the record the answer of Mr. Thomas Lamont, which he wrote on July 5, 1945, wherein he declined the invitation of Mr. Carter to publish the draft over his signature in the New York Times.

Mr. Mandel, will you identify that document?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostatic copy of a letter dated July 5, 1945, addressed to Edward C. Carter from Thomas W. Lamont, on his letterhead.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you receive that into the record, Mr. Chairman?  
The CHAIRMAN. It is a part of the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Senator FERGUSON. Could the whole letter be read into the record?

Mr. MORRIS. It reads as follows:

(EXHIBIT No. 528)

Many thanks for yours of June 29. You are too flattering about my casual letters to the New York Times. I, too, have been concerned over the steady drip against Russia by various commentators. Max Eastman has always been a weather cock, veering from pro-Trotsky to bitter anti-Soviet. Powell I had thought better of.

I have read the Reader's Digest article and have gone over with care your memorandum. In effect I think you are suggesting that I write to the Times a letter urging our Government to alter its apparent present policy, and to make available lend-lease supplies to the so-called Communist armies in north-west China. Quite aside from any question of transport to such a remote region, the principle involved seems to be that I should assume knowledge of the situation, and of the proper policy to be drawn from same, more adequate than our Government has.

Of course, I have no such knowledge and could not justify myself in attempting to correct the policy adopted. My way would always be first to seek information from the department at Washington. As a matter of fact, even in my letters to the Times when any possible question of current policy was involved, I have first shown the letters to the Department of State, not for approval, but for clearance as to any question of crossing wires.

You know your China better than I do, for my stay there was hardly more than a month or two. But we both realize how exceedingly complicated the situation is and is bound to be. Chiang's government now loosely rules all eastern and southern China (subject to Japanese occupation). The area includes all the great cities. Now, if Chiang has his doubts as to the effectiveness of the Chinese Communist armies against the Japanese, and such question has been many times raised, and if Chiang is fearful that once Japan is ousted, then those northern armies will turn on him, perhaps he is justified in feeling that the meager supplies available for China should be furnished for his armies, and not for the other boys. In your memorandum you point out that Russia has been scrupulous to send supplies to Chiang alone. Well, if that be true, why is that not additional argument for us to do the same?

I am really discussing things about which I have no first-hand information. And in reading your memorandum I may well have just been stupid. Am I all wrong?

With personal regards.

Sincerely yours,

T. W. LAMONT.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted into the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 528," and was read in full.)

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, after hearing that read do you now say that the Institute of Pacific Relations was not trying to influence public opinion?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I do not say that.

I say that I had been, I and others had been, attacked in a grossly distorted article in the Reader's Digest, that I had tried to get space for a reply and had been refused.

Senator FERGUSON. Who refused you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The editors of the Reader's Digest, to whom I wrote directly.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you copies of those letters?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I haven't found them, but I remember the incident very clearly.

Mr. Carter then, as an individual, suggested to me that there might be a way of finding publications somewhere else. He suggested that I write a letter myself as is clear here from his letter to me of June 14.

My feeling was that I was disgusted with the whole business, and that if the Reader's Digest wouldn't allow me space for reply, I didn't want to go to the New York Times individually, but if Mr. Carter thought that there was an individual or possibly a group of individuals who would put forward the view, or part of the view that I shared, I would not mind making a draft of material.

That is a question of individual action and not a question of the action of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator FERGUSON. Was the Institute of Pacific Relations attacked in any way in the article in the Reader's Digest?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That I don't recall.

Senator FERGUSON. Was not your book, *Solution in Asia*, which the testimony in this record now shows from one witness, used as Communist propaganda, for the line here in America by the Communist Party?

Is that not a fact?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir, Senator. I believe you are in error. I believe there has been testimony here that Communist bookshops sold my book along with other non-Communist books as background reading.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not the question.

Senator FERGUSON. That is not my question. You heard the testimony read here of the witness who said that it was used as the background for Communist line in America, and that book was being attacked in this article in the Reader's Digest. Is that not a fact?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I don't believe that the record shows that anybody testified that it was being used as a background for the Communist-line propaganda.

I believe the testimony shows that it was sold as background reading. The book was also criticized in Communist publications.

The CHAIRMAN. You distinguish between background reading and background what?

Senator FERGUSON. For the Communist line?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Certainly I do.

Senator FERGUSON. What is the difference? What is the difference between background reading for a Communist and Communist-line reading?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The difference in this case is that my book was sold in a great many bookshops besides Communist bookshops, and that Communist publications criticized by views.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I read testimony at this point into the record?

Senator FERGUSON. I wish you would read what the witness said about the Communist line.

Mr. MORRIS. This is the testimony of Mr. Matusow taken in executive session on February 13, 1952. Mr. Mandel is interrogating Mr. Matusow [reading]:

Mr. MANDEL. Did the bookshop—

that is, the Communist bookshop—

ever promote any of the publications of Owen Lattimore?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes, it did.

Mr. MANDEL. Will you tell us about that?

Mr. MATUSOW. The book, *Solution in Asia*, by Owen Lattimore, published by Little Brown & Co.—

Mr. MANDEL. What year?

Mr. MATUSOW. 1945—it was one of the books used in the bookshop and suggested reading for a background of the party line, the Communist Party line, in Asia.

Mr. MANDEL. What do you mean by suggested reading?

Mr. MATUSOW. You see, this was the Jefferson School Book Shop, and there were many courses conducted.

During this period, as I said, the war in China, the Communist revolution in China, was taking place, and many people professed a great interest in that, and the party, the Communist Party, line, as disseminated had not caught up with the tide of events, we might say. The party had been caught for a while flat-footed in the terms of the actual literature put out by the Communist Party international publishers.

Things were moving too fast for them. The State education committee got together and decided which books would be good background material, and which supported the Communist Party line.

They came out with a decision that *Solution in Asia* was one of those books which could give a Communist Party member a correct line, a Communist line, on the Asiatic situation in China and China specifically.

That is the end of the pertinent testimony.

Senator FERGUSON. Was the IPR concerned with this dispute in the Reader's Digest?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Then what did Mr. Carter have to do with it? Why did you not defend yourself instead of using the ruse of having Lamont, as if it was something for the IPR to be concerned with?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I attempted to put my point of view before the editors of the Reader's Digest and was refused an opportunity.

Mr. Carter then took the initiative in suggesting that some other way be found of publishing the view which I and many others held at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you an employee of the Government of the United States at the time this was going on?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe so, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You gave as your address on June 20, 1945, the OWI here in Washington. If you were not a member what were you doing in the OWI?

Mr. LATTIMORE. June 20, 1945?

Senator FERGUSON. I will get the exact date here. On June 20, 1945, you wrote a letter to Matthew Connelly, the secretary of the President, and you gave telephone OWI, Washington, REpublic 7500, Extension 72228.

If you were not an employee, what were you doing in the OWI?

Mr. LATTIMORE. At that time I was an occasional consultant to the OWI, and if I had been in Washington on any day which Mr. Connelly telephoned me at my home in Ruxton and couldn't find me, he could have very likely have found me at OWI.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you were an employee of the United States Government?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was an occasional consultant, which meant that I was an employee on any day that I actually worked there to act as consultant.

Senator FERGUSON. How much did you receive a day as being a consultant.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall. The records will show, doubtlessly.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you or were you not on the payroll of the United States Government while this was going on with Mr. Lamont?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I was an independent citizen who was occasionally consulted and on the days when I was consulted I received a consultant's fee, or whatever you like to call it, from the United States Government.

It had absolutely no limiting effect on my expressing my own views as a citizen.

Senator FERGUSON. How much did you draw from the United States Treasury in 1945?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know, sir. I am sure that the records would show.

Senator FERGUSON. We will get that and put it in the record, if it is not one of those matters that is a secret and we cannot obtain it.

It may be the question that your employment was that way, as you indicate now.

Mr. ARNOLD. If there is any question of secrecy, we will waive it, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to ask you this: I was asking you the other day about the article of Bisson, where the party line was changed in relation to China in 1943. That has been discussed quite a bit in this record.

The question came up as to changing the line and calling the Communists of China democrats, and that their government was the democracy, and that the Nationalist Government was the feudal system.

Now, I ask you whether that was not the same kind of a question that was raised in the article in the Reader's Digest, and I ask you to read, on page 15, "Deception No. 1." See whether the IPR was involved. Read it out loud.

The CHAIRMAN. What page is that, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. 15.

Mr. MORRIS. May that whole article, and it is only nine pages, go into the record at this point?

(See exhibit No. 549, p. 3498, for article.)

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator Ferguson, may I say first that I never discussed the Bisson article with anybody as a change in the Communist line; did not consider it to be anything of the kind.

Senator FERGUSON. Your memory is becoming much better on the Bisson article as we go along.

Now, will you read this "Deception No. 1"?

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

Deception 1: That Russia is a "democracy" and that China can therefore safely be left to Russian "influence."

Owen Lattimore is perhaps the most subtle evangelist of this erroneous conception. Mr. Lattimore appraised the net result of the Moscow trials and the blood purge by which Stalin secured his dictatorship in 1936-39, as a "triumph for democracy." He now urges our Government in a book called *Solution in Asia* to accept cheerfully the spread of "the Soviet form of democracy" in central Asia.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you read it so as to give the quotes out of your book, so that we can tell what is a quote and what is not a quote?

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading) :

to accept cheerfully the spread of "the Soviet form of democracy" in Central Asia. His publishers thus indicate the drift of his book on its jacket.

He [Mr. Lattimore] shows that all the Asiatic peoples are more interested in actual democratic practices, such as the ones they can see in action across the Russian border, than they are in the sign series of Anglo-Saxon democracies which come coupled with ruthless imperialism.

This deception was set going in Moscow in 1936, when a new constitution was filled with jazzed-up phrases from our Bill of Rights so that it could be advertised as more academic than ours. Instead of establishing popular government, however, it legitimized the dictatorship of the Russian Communist Party (article 126). Stalin himself, addressing the Congress which ratified the draft of the constitution, frankly stated this fact:

"I must admit that the draft of the new constitution actually leaves in force the regime of the dictatorship of the working class and preserves unchanged the present leading position of the Communist Party. In the Soviet Union only one party can exist, the party of Communists" (Pravda, November 26, 1936).

In the "elections" held under this constitution in 1937 and 1938, only one candidate's name appeared on each ballot. He had been endorsed by the party and the "voting" consisted of assenting to the party's choice. The ceremony has not been repeated and would make no difference if it had. The constitution is merely a facade for dictatorship, and anyone who protests the fact is shot or sent to a concentration camp. In Siberia full regions are given up to these concentration camps, where from 15 to 20 millions—

Footnote:

Alexander Barmine, former brigadier general in the Red army, estimates that the number is about 12 million. Boris Souvarine, French historian of Bolshevism, estimates 15 million. Victor Kravchenko, recently resigned from the Soviet Purchasing Commission in Washington, who has visited many camps and had official relations with their managements, says these estimates are low and puts the figure at 20 million.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you let me have it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I cite this as an example of an extremely unfair attack on me, which makes one brief quotation from what I wrote entirely out of context. It says that I recommended that the United States cheerfully accept something which I did not recommend that the United States cheerfully accept, then ties it in with a whole lot of extraneous matter which has no concern whatever with me.

It was against that kind of treatment that I protested to the editors of the Reader's Digest.

Senator FERGUSON. And it was this that you were trying to answer by getting Mr. Lamont, over his own signature, to write your letter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was not trying to get Mr. Lamont over his own signature to answer my own letter. I was acceding—

Senator FERGUSON. You say that this record does not show that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I do, Senator. The record shows that I was acceding to a request from Mr. Carter.

Senator FERGUSON. What did Mr. Carter have to do with it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Carter wrote to me and made some suggestions, to which I acceded.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you a copy of his letter, Carter's letter to you? Is that the one that was read?

Mr. LATTIMORE. This is the one that was read.

Senator FERGUSON. Who approached Carter first? Did he approach you, or did you approach him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My distinct recollection is that he approached me. I am sure you can check that by asking him.

Senator FERGUSON. Who else did you contact on one of the disputes, as to whether or not America should furnish aid to the Communists, direct aid to the Communist army and not through the National Government or the Government of China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember consulting anybody.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you consult anybody?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember consulting anybody.

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask you whether or not you did consult anyone. Think about it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember consulting anybody, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. This was just about the time that you were talking—what is the date on that? The 19th of June?

Mr. LATTIMORE. 14th of June and 19th of June, from Mr. Carter; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. The 10th of June was when you wrote the first letter, as I recall that letter. Did the fact that you wanted to go and see the President have anything to do with this dispute you were having?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; it had nothing whatever to do with this dispute. At that time I held certain views on China. The whole subject of China was a subject of very keen public discussion at the time.

I, like others, was reading and talking about it. I, like others, was writing or trying to write on the subject. My views were my own.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you give us some of the others that were talking along the same line that you advocated, of giving aid to the Communists in China and building them up?

The CHAIRMAN. Do you understand the question, Mr. Lattimore?

If not, we will have it read back to you.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, I understand the question, Mr. Chairman.

Are you ready, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, I am ready.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I cannot possibly recall offhand as of 1952 exactly who was writing and discussing these subjects in 1945. I would be glad to look up the record for you, if you are interested.

Senator FERGUSON. The reason I ask that question, in one of your letters—I think it was the one to Mr. Matt Connelly—you said: "The views I represent."

Whose views did you represent?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My own.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you mean, when you said the "views I represent," your views alone?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I can't recall exactly what I meant 7 or 8 years ago in writing that letter. I presume I meant my own views and possibly—don't want to quibble about it—I may have represented what I considered to be a body of views then current.

Senator FERGUSON. Whose views were they outside of yours?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know at this time. I have pointed out in the statement I prepared for this committee that these views were held by many of the American observers in China, including military.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you advocate that the Soviet Union take over and annex Manchuria?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't believe I did.

The CHAIRMAN. Can we have an answer to that? That seems to be a clear-cut question.

Mr. ARNOLD. I wish you would read the record back. I think we answered it.

The CHAIRMAN. I want an answer. Did you or did you not? He did not answer. He answered "I don't believe I did."

Mr. LATTIMORE. I will change that answer, Senator.

I am sure I didn't.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what Mr. Carter was then talking about?

There is just one section of your draft that I question slightly and this is at the bottom of page 3 and top of page 4. This possibility is precisely what your critics are always advancing. They say that the Soviet Union is definitely going to annex Manchuria and so forth, while you put it in reverse. I would hate to have your critics pounce on this and announce that even Lattimore admits that Manchuria is to become a part of the Soviet Union. Do you see any way of avoiding it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Apparently, Mr. Carter thought my wording was unclear and ought to be made clear.

Senator FERGUSON. The question is, did you discuss with Carter the question of Manchuria becoming a part of Russia?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I am certain I didn't, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you—do you know anyone else besides yourself that was advocating the sending of material, Army equipment and so forth, to the Communists in China and not have the Nationalist Government take care of the government in China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That was a view that was quite prevalent—

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know anyone else?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, the American military, or a large part of the American military in China.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you in touch with the State Department policy at this time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; not particularly.

The CHAIRMAN. In any way?

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what our policy was?

Mr. LATTIMORE. As far as it could be seen from the newspapers and so on, I knew it.

Senator FERGUSON. What was our State Department's policy as of June 10 on this question?

The CHAIRMAN. What year?

Senator FERGUSON. 1945.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Subject to an imperfect recollection, Senator, I believe that this was a period of controversy in which statements were being made by, I think, General Hurley and others, which resulted in a great deal of public discussion and a general belief that State Department policy as of that moment was unclear.

Senator FERGUSON. Prior to going to the White House, did you give any information to any Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That I was going to do so, you mean?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't believe I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you talk to any radio commentators?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not that I can recall. I frequently—no, not frequently—I occasionally saw radio commentators and newspapermen at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, I think the date of that White House matter should be in the record.

Senator FERGUSON. The date of July 3 was the date that you went to the White House?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't have the documents before me, Senator. I will accept your date.

Senator FERGUSON. Was the draft of the memorandum that you left with the President the day you were there dated July 3?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Was it?

Senator FERGUSON. The draft that you left with the President, it is dated the 3d.

Mr. LATTIMORE. It is dated the 3d, yes, the 3d of July.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that the day you were there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I presume so; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what day of the week you were there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't recall what day of the week it was.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know of anybody having knowledge, outside of the White House and you, that you were going to the White House?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall at this moment. I wouldn't have regarded—yes, I do. I know that I talked with President Bowman, of Johns Hopkins, about the whole idea of writing to the President, and asking for an opportunity to speak with him.

I quite likely talked to other people about it. There was no secrecy about the subject.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you talk to any radio commentators as to anything that you would take up with the President?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I may have. My recollection doesn't include it. The manner of your questioning, Senator, suggests that maybe you know I did.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be stricken. He says he does not recall it.

Senator FERGUSON. But I am at least fair on the question suggesting that you might.

I will be a little more explicit.

Did you have any conversation or any direct or indirect communication with Drew Pearson before you went to the White House?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe so, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that the night before you went to the White House, or at least before you went to the White House, it was announced by Drew Pearson as to one thing that you would take up at the White House?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I didn't know that.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not know that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever hear it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't think I did.

The CHAIRMAN. Pardon me, Senator.

Mr. Reporter, will you read back the last two or three questions and answers? My attention was taken away.

(Thereupon, the portion of the record referred to, as heretofore recorded, was read by the reporter.)

Mr. LATTIMORE. I may have heard later, of course.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know Drew Pearson at that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think I had ever met him. I may have, but I doubt it, at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. 1945; right before June 3?

Mr. LATTIMORE. July 3.

Senator FERGUSON. July 3. Thank you for correcting me.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't think at that time I knew Drew Pearson.

Senator FERGUSON. When you went to the White House, was there any member of the State Department present at the meeting?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir. I believe it was only the President and myself.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know David Karr, a leg man for Drew Pearson?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I don't believe I ever met him.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know any representative prior to that time of Drew Pearson?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I didn't, to the best of my recollection.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know how Drew Pearson would know that you were going to the White House?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I think a lot of people would like to know how Drew Pearson knows a lot of things.

The CHAIRMAN. That answer will be stricken. The question is did you know how he knew that you were going to the White House?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I don't believe he could possibly have known from me.

Senator FERGUSON. You quote him quite elaborately in your Ordeal by Slander, do you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. You mean that I quoted him 5 or 6 years later about something quite different, yes, I did, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, you say there was no member of the State Department present at your conversation when the President was there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. To the best of my recollection it was only the President and myself.

Senator FERGUSON. The President knew in advance what you wanted to discuss with him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In general, yes, in the letter I had written to him sometime before. The memorandums that I left with him had not been submitted to him before.

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask you whether or not, while you were in the White House, you saw any member of the State Department?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, but I had a very brief conversation with Mr. Joseph Grew, at that time, I think, Under Secretary of State or Assistant Secretary, or something of that kind, who was waiting in the anteroom to see the President, and who came over to speak to me.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, did you talk to him before you saw the President?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I forget whether it was before I saw the President, or after. I didn't really talk to him. He came over and asked me one question which I answered.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the question?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The question was whether I had ever lived in Japan for any consecutive period, and the answer was "no."

Senator FERGUSON. And what did he say?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He said, to the best of my recollection, he said, "I thought so."

Senator FERGUSON. Is that the only conversation you had with the Under Secretary?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is the only conversation.

Senator FERGUSON. And was that before you went in to the President, or after?

Mr. LATTIMORE. As I say, I forgot whether it was before or right after.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you discuss Ambassador Joseph Grew with the President?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was his name mentioned?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that Drew Pearson announced on the radio, I think it was the night before or a few days before, if you went in Monday morning which, I think, was the 3rd of July—I may be incorrect on that date—that Drew Pearson announced that you were going to the White House to ask the President not to appoint Ambassador Joseph Grew as an adviser in the Far East?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall that. If Mr. Pearson said that, he was completely in error, which sometimes happens with even omniscient columnists.

Senator FERGUSON. And you think he is one?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, I think it is a mark of the trade of columnists to appear to be as omniscient as possible.

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask you who you had in mind. Do you have a copy of your memorandum to the President?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, I have a copy of it here.

Senator FERGUSON. No; it is the copy of the letter.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The copy of the letter?

Senator FERGUSON. The last paragraph.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the letter to the President?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, the letter to the President dated the 10th of June 1945:

With the utmost earnestness, I venture to urge you to have America's policy toward China impartially reviewed by advisers who are not associated with either the formulation or the implementation of that policy as recently practiced.

Who were you talking about?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was talking about advisers who are not associated with the formulation or the implementation of that policy as recently practiced. I had nobody particularly in mind.

I remember quite clearly that part of the occasion of my asking for this interview was that American policy in the Far East, and particularly with regard to China, was becoming controversial in the papers, and I thought it was a good moment for an impartial review.

Senator FERGUSON. Was Joseph Grew one of the people you were talking about?

Mr. LATTIMORE. As an impartial adviser?

Senator FERGUSON. In that paragraph, is he one of the people that you were talking about?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, Mr. Grew at that time was, as I say, an associate—no; an assistant or—

The CHAIRMAN. That is susceptible of an answer of "Yes" or "No," and then you may explain, Mr. Lattimore. The question calls for an answer of "Yes" or "No."

Mr. LATTIMORE. The answer was "Yes"; Mr. Grew was one of those who were concerned with American policy in the Far East.

I don't know whether he was concerned with policy toward China. Senator FERGUSON. Was he one of the formulators?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I can't answer as to the internal structure of the formulation of policy at that time, Mr. Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he one of the implementers?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Neither can I answer that question, except that he was a high executive officer of the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. He had been in China in the Far East; had he not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He had been in Japan. I don't know about China.

Senator FERGUSON. He had been in Japan and had been the Ambassador to Japan?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Was Vincent one of the formulators?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I couldn't tell you that, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he one of the implementers?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I couldn't tell you that, except that he had a position in the State Department at that time. As I say, I don't know what the chain of command in the State Department was at that time as between policy formulation and policy implementation.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew Ballantine; did you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I knew Mr. Ballantine.

Senator FERGUSON. Is his name Joseph or Thomas?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Joseph.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he one of the formulators?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember, Senator, whether Ballantine had at that time already retired from the State Department, or not.

Senator FERGUSON. He had not at this time.

Mr. LATTIMORE. He had not at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he one of the implementers?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Again I don't know enough about the internal structure of the State Department to answer.

Senator FERGUSON. Who were you talking about here, that you were telling the President in a letter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I was not talking about who, I was talking about what. I was saying that I thought it would be a good idea to have America's policy toward China impartially reviewed.

And, as an extension of impartially reviewed, I didn't think that a policy could be impartially reviewed by those who had been recently making or practicing it.

Therefore, I suggested that outside people who had not recently been concerned be called in for such an impartial review.

The CHAIRMAN. I think the excerpt should be read again to the witness, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

With the utmost earnestness, I venture to urge you to have America's policy toward China impartially reviewed by advisers who are not associated with either the formulation or the implementation of that policy as recently practiced.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think that is quite a clear suggestion, Senator.

I should say, to anybody in Government, that would be a suggestion that a question of policy be reviewed by some kind of a board, the individual members of which had not recently been connected with the question to be reviewed.

I believe that is not unknown practice in the conduct of government.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Now, will you state, Mr. Lattimore, what the policy was that you describe as "recently practiced"?

What was the policy?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think I was somewhat unclear on the subject, Senator, or I wouldn't have suggested a review. I thought that I, myself, and a good many other people, could do with some clarification.

Senator FERGUSON. You wanted people that had nothing to do with the policy, and you now tell us that you did not know what the policy was?

The CHAIRMAN. He said he was unclear on it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I said I was unclear on it.

Senator FERGUSON. Tell us what you knew about the policy that you were objecting to, that you wanted reviewed, and you were telling the President that he ought to get people who had nothing to do with the policy.

That would indicate it was a very erroneous policy, would it not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not necessarily, Senator. I think that is quite clearly stated in the second paragraph of my letter to the President.

Senator FERGUSON. Tell us what the policy was.

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I read that?

Senator FERGUSON. I want an answer to the question as to what the policy was.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the policy to which he was objecting; is that right?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

You said that policy "as recently practiced."

The CHAIRMAN. Confine yourself to the question, will you, please, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I cannot at this moment give you an accurate statement of what I thought in 1945 the policy was.

But my letter to the President, and the second paragraph of my letter to the President, clearly shows what I thought made review and discussion desirable.

May I read that article?

Senator FERGUSON. Just a moment.

You said in the article that you wanted Lamont to write, that one of the policies was that they were not furnishing arms to the Communists, and you wanted a change in that policy, did you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I consult my own statement on that?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The Senator has just restated what he thinks was my opinion, Senator McCarran, and I should like to see what my opinion was.

The CHAIRMAN. I understood he has quoted from the Lamont letter.

Mr. LATTIMORE. He has paraphrased it.

Senator FERGUSON. I paraphrased it.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. What do you want to read from, the Lamont letter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. From the proposed draft for a letter by Mr. Lamont; yes. Following page 3 of the mimeographed copy [reading]:

As a result, American aid to China is now confined to such politically limited channels that, while we continue to aid China the nation, our aid now favors one political group against all others and is withheld from one major group, the Chinese Communists, which has armed forces in combat with the Japanese. American aid to China has thus become politically partisan at a time when the Russians are still scrupulously refraining from partisan activity. If this divergence of policy should create a strain in Russian-American relations, the blame cannot be thrown upon the Russians. On the contrary, if the Russians should in the future begin to extend direct aid to the Chinese Communists, they could justify themselves on the ground that they were merely following an American precedent.

I think this shows concern, Senator, that American policy should not furnish the Russians with a pretext for direct intervention in the internal policies of China.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you say, Mr. Lattimore, that that paragraph did not convey the idea that you were favoring aid to the Communists as well as to the Nationalists?

Mr. LATTIMORE. This paragraph, Senator, clearly shows that I believed that the Communist armies, as armies in combat with the Japanese, could be of greater use if some of the American supplies to China were used by them.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, going to your letter of June 10 to the President, do you not, in other words, say the same thing in this paragraph [reading]:

Until quite recently, great care was taken to avoid any inference that America, in aiding China as a nation, was committing itself to all-out support of one party in China's domestic affairs. There now appears to be a fundamental change. Public statements by men regarded as spokesmen for American policy encourage many Chinese to believe that America now identifies the Chinese Government with one party and only one party, commits itself to the maintenance of that party, and may in the future support that party in suppressing its rivals.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your question?

Senator FERGUSON. What is the difference between the two statements, the paragraph that you read, beginning with, "As a result American aid to China is now confined to such politically limited channels," and so forth?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The two paragraphs, Senator, state or restate, in somewhat different ways, my concern about the same primary question; namely, that our aid to China, as a nation and an ally, should not be allowed to involve us in partisan support.

It has always been my belief that one of the mistakes of American policy was to treat China in that way, differently from the way in which we treated, say Great Britain. We never in Great Britain specified aid in terms of the Conservative Party or the Labor Party.

At the end of the war, when the British had an election and the Labor government came in instead of Churchill, we did not attempt to affect that election by saying that, "Unless Churchill is reelected, we won't play."

I believe that a great deal of damage was done by creating, in fact, an impression that China was committed not to a nation, but to a party.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that your explanation as to the difference between these two paragraphs?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is my explanation as to the similarity between these two paragraphs.

Mr. SOURWINE. May I ask one question, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Go ahead.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, did you regard the Chinese Nationalists and Chinese Communists as just two competing political parties in China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I regarded them as, among other things, two competing parties in China.

Mr. SOURWINE. You would have had them treated on the basis of two competing political parties, as we treated the competing political parties in England, which you used as an example; is that right?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In terms of the war against Japan, I was in favor of using any forces that would fight the Japanese and thereby diminish American casualties.

As regards domestic politics, I was afraid that support for one party against another party in Chinese domestic politics would lead to failure rather than success.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, going now to your letter of June 10, 1945, in the first paragraph, about the policy which you were talking about in the last paragraph, you say there:

There appears now a major change in our policy. \* \* \*

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the policy, and what was the change?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The policy is stated in the first sentence of the letter:

When Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, on the recommendation of President Roosevelt, appointed me his political adviser in 1941, the policy of the United States was to support a United China. There appears now to be a major change in our policy, which may invite the danger of a political and even a territorial division of China and the further danger of conflict and rivalry between America and Russia.

I have not looked up the context of the Times in the newspapers of the day, but I believe I am correct in stating that this refers to statements that were beginning to be made in the press at the time by—I hope I am not quoting him incorrectly—General Hurley and others, indicating that there was a conflict of opinion among top American personnel on this subject.

And I thought that if there were such a conflict, it would be sound practice to have an impartial review of American policy by people not recently involved in it.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, you indicated in one of your answers that you thought I drew the wrong conclusion about that you were advocating aid to the Communists.

I want to read from the Lamont letter, in the second paragraph:

\* \* \* in effect, I think you are suggesting that I write to the Times a letter urging our Government to alter its apparent present policy and to make available lend-lease supplies to the so-called Communist armies in Northwest China.

Did not Mr. Lamont understand your article to mean that you were advocating that they send lend-lease supplies directly to the Communists, as a government?

The CHAIRMAN. Listen to the question, Mr. Lattimore.

Senator FERGUSON. Did not Mr. Lamont draw the conclusion that you were asking him to write a letter to the Times under his name, for your benefit, in a dispute that you were having with some men that wrote an article in the Reader's Digest, that you were advocating a change in America's policy of only giving lend-lease to the Nationalists of China, being the Government of China, and that you were advocating that the lend-lease goods go directly to the Communists as well as to the Nationalists?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator Ferguson, I believe that if you will read that letter as a whole, you will see that Mr. Lamont was stating a tentative opinion, which he carefully modified by saying that he had been out of touch for some time.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, had you ever used any other man or woman as you were trying to use Lamont in this letter to the New York Times?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I was not trying to use Mr. Lamont, and I don't believe that I have made it a usual practice to ask other people to write for the papers for me.

Senator FERGUSON. I did not ask you whether you made it the usual practice; I asked you whether you ever did it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall anything of the kind, Senator.

I would like to emphasize at this moment that——

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Lattimore, do you think that if you did you would recall it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I should think it would be quite likely. It would depend on how serious the matter was.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, how many memorandums did you leave with the President?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I left him 2 one-page memoranda, which are in the mimeographed exhibit here run together like one memorandum; one on Japan policy as related to China, and one on China policy.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you tell us in your statement, on page 33, where you mentioned going to the President, that you had left any memorandum with him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't think I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Why not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't see why I should have. I said that I tried to see the President, and I think it is quite the usual practice when one goes to see the President, to leave a memorandum of what the interviewer would like to talk about.

Senator FERGUSON. You say, then, that you did not feel that in this statement you should give us anything other than the fact that you had written a letter, "I wrote to the President expressing my views on China policy"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. "And the President, in response, asked me to come to see him, and I did."

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. "Our conference lasted about 3 minutes."

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. "Neither my letter nor my visit had the slightest effect on American policy."

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the policy that you tried to affect, so that we can ascertain whether or not it had any effect on the American policy?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The policy, as I have thought I saw it at the time, was to drift into a position of appearing to take sides in Chinese domestic politics, which I thought was an alarming drift.

Senator FERGUSON. It was not to furnish material to the Communists?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In my interview with the President?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. You stated it in your letter when you asked him to aid both sides.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was not thinking of that as aid to the Communists; I was thinking of that as prosecution of the American policy of not promoting a divided China and of prosecuting the war against Japan as actively as possible.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, were you not trying, at the exact time, to influence American public opinion by getting Mr. Lamont to write a letter to the New York Times so that it would be published to the world under his name, to get aid to the Communists?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Ferguson, I was not trying to get Mr. Lamont to do anything.

The CHAIRMAN. You can answer that "Yes" or "No."

Mr. LATTIMORE. The answer is "No."

I was acceding to Mr. Carter's request, suggestion to furnish some material for a letter to be signed by Mr. Lamont, which he could accept or reject, and which he finally rejected.

It was my opinion at that time that part of avoidance of a disastrous split in China, as the end of the war was approaching, was to spread American aid over all forces fighting the Japanese and avoid creating a pretext for the Russians to take a hand in Chinese internal politics.

Senator FERGUSON. Did Carter know that you were going to the White House?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I am sure he didn't.

Senator FERGUSON. So the Institute of Pacific Relations had nothing to do with this visit?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you review the policy after you had been to the White House?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. To know whether or not you had influenced it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Oh, I am speaking simply from my general recollection, which I think has been tested over a good many years, that I have never had any influence on American policy.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think that a man who had written a book entitled "Solution in Asia" might have an influence on the President if he went to see him personally and left a memorandum with him, particularly where he advocates getting a new set-up in the State Department to review the policy?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

When I asked for that interview I was not thinking of myself as the author of any particular book. I was thinking of myself as a

person who had been familiar with President Roosevelt's policy in China at the time that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek appointed me as his adviser.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever have a conversation with anyone connected with the State Department along this line, of the change in policy, or the policy?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall, unless I casually talked with State Department people as I did with newspaper people, people back from China, everybody who was interested in the subject at the time.

As I say, this was a subject of very general discussion at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. With whom would you say you had talked about it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. At this time, Senator, I couldn't possibly tell you.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not have a very long conversation with Mr. Grew about it, did you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I didn't.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Ballantine?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Dooman?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Dooman?

Senator FERGUSON. Dooman?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Is it not true that after you went to see the President, that within a short time Mr. Grew left the Department; was replaced?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I couldn't tell you today, Senator Ferguson, when Mr. Grew resigned.

Senator FERGUSON. Is it not true that shortly after you went to the White House, that Mr. Ballantine was replaced?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall the calendar of events in that connection, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you not know, as a matter of fact, that after you went to the White House, that in a short time Mr. Dooman was replaced, Eugene Dooman?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I recall that there was a change at that time. I believe that these were senior personnel who were reaching normal retirement age in any case.

Senator FERGUSON. And do you not know that after you went there, that your friend that you placed so highly in your statement here to this committee, Mr. John Carter Vincent, was promoted and took over the work of the Far East?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I remember that Mr. Vincent, after his return from China, was promoted in the State Department, which at that time I would certainly have regarded as an excellent promotion; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And do you not know that it took place after you had been at the White House?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Until I looked up these memoranda, Senator, I wouldn't have recalled which came first.

Senator FERGUSON. But is it not a fact that it did take place, that the three replacements happened after you were there, that the promotion of Mr. Vincent and the others took place after you were there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, you seem to be trying to impute to me power that—

The CHAIRMAN. Cannot you answer "Yes" or "No"?

Please answer it. Do not argue with the Senator.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, you are now saying that these promotions took place subsequently.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, the record shows it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. So you say. I haven't looked up the record.

Senator FERGUSON. That being a fact, how can you tell the world that you did not have any influence on the policy?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think I had the slightest influence on the policy, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what the Marshall mission was to China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I know that General Marshall went out to China; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know what was in his instructions?

The CHAIRMAN. The question is Did you know what was in his instructions?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I didn't know at the time, no. I know very roughly now.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, do you want to tell this committee, this Senate, that you, as a private citizen, after having this dispute with the Reader's Digest in the writing of the memorandum for Lamont and the writing of the letter to the President and the urging to the President, that you had to see him, in fact, before he went to Potsdam; that after you had been there, you failed or neglected to look into the State Department or its policies after that date and you cannot tell us what happened? Is that what you want to leave with this committee?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, Senator. What I want to leave with this committee is that this extremely brief interview with the President had no consequences whatever, as far as I ever knew.

Nobody in the White House or in the State Department called me back to consult me on any steps that were about to be taken.

Senator FERGUSON. That doesn't answer my question, Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, I don't believe that this very brief interview of mine with the President had any consequence at all.

Senator FERGUSON. We are having great difficulty in getting from you this morning what policy you wanted changed. What I want to know is why you tell this committee in your statement that what you wanted done and what you presented to the President, had not the slightest—and you use the word "slightest"—effect on American policy, and you never followed it up to know what the Marshall mission to China was.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I don't believe that my interview with the President or my letter to him or the memoranda that I left with him had the slightest effect.

Senator FERGUSON. How can you tell us whether it had the slightest?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am not telling you whether it had the slightest.

Senator FERGUSON. You did in your statement. You told the whole world that it had the slightest effect, on the top of page 34.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe it had the slightest effect.

Senator FERGUSON. Read your statement of what you told us.

Mr. LATTIMORE. "Neither my letter nor my visit had the slightest effect on American policy."

I believe that is a true statement.

Senator FERGUSON. Is not there in issue today before this committee the question as to whether or not you had any influence on our American foreign policy?

Mr. LATTIMORE. If you choose to put it that way, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Is it not in issue as to whether or not the Institute of Pacific Relations, of which you were a trustee at this time, had any influence on the foreign policy of America?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I think that my brief contact with the President on this occasion had no effect whatever on American policy, and it certainly had no connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. Again, that is not an answer to the question.

Read the question, Mr. Reporter.

(The pending question, as heretofore recorded, was read by the reporter, as follows:)

Senator FERGUSON. Is not there in issue today before this committee the question as to whether or not you had any influence on our American foreign policy?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is your statement of the issue, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, I am not willing to allow you to draw the conclusion, and have it become final, as to whether or not you had the slightest influence on American policy.

That is why I am asking these questions.

And I am sorry it is taking so long.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I am sorry. I can say that, to the best of my knowledge and belief—

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the reason why it is taking so long here. You gave us many conclusions. We discovered many of them were based purely upon hearsay and that you asked this committee to draw those conclusions with you.

I, for one, as a Senator, am not willing to take your conclusions when I think there are outstanding facts, and I want to question you about those facts.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Go ahead and question, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Let us take the memorandum that you left with the President. You say that you did not go there for the purpose of influencing him.

I would like now for you to answer why you went.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Did I say that I did not go there for the purpose of influencing him?

Senator FERGUSON. That is the inference you leave.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you go there for the purpose of influencing the President?

Senator FERGUSON. Did you go there for that purpose?

The CHAIRMAN. Answer that "Yes" or "No," now, and then make an explanation.

Did you go there for the purpose of influencing the President?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; of course, I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you write the Lamont letter with the intent that you were going to try to influence the State Department, the President, and the public?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What was its purpose?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I acceded to Mr. Carter's request to draft some material for a letter by Mr. Lamont for the specific and limited purpose of correcting gross distortions of my views which had appeared in the Reader's Digest.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you say that the Reader's Digest raised the question about your advocating the sending of lend-lease, or any other matériel, to the Chinese Communists as a government? Was that raised in the Reader's Digest issue?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have not recently read the Reader's Digest, and I can't answer for their editorial intentions. I can only speak to the point that I considered that what they published was grossly unfair to me.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they publish anything that was grossly unfair to you about your advocating the sending of lend-lease or any other matériel to the Chinese Communists?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe that they said that I advocated that. Did they?

Senator FERGUSON. No; I do not think so. I wondered why put it in the Lamont letter.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Because the Reader's Digest had misrepresented my views, and I wanted to make a statement of what my views actually were.

Senator FERGUSON. How would your views in the letter that you gave to Lamont, to be under his signature, how would they get to the public as your views? You do not say in the Lamont letter than "Owen Lattimore advocates this." You wanted Thomas Lamont to advocate it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I take a moment to look at this Lamont draft?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; I wish you would.

The CHAIRMAN. What is it that you want to look at now, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would——

Senator FERGUSON. He wants to look whether he advocated Thomas Lamont to advocate that he had advocated.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Carter had asked me to provide him with some material. My reference to——

The CHAIRMAN. What are you reading from now?

Mr. LATTIMORE. From this draft that I sent to Mr. Carter.

The CHAIRMAN. To Mr. Carter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. To Mr. Carter; yes. I didn't send it to Mr. Lamont.

Senator FERGUSON. He had a man take it to Lamont.

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

To bolster the case, the article casts doubts on the authoritativeness of several of those Americans \* \* \* including Owen Lattimore, Harrison Forman, and Edgar Snow. The publication of such an article invites a review of both American and Soviet policy in China.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the question, Senator? Do you want the question read?

Senator FERGUSON. Is that the answer?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is the answer.

Senator FERGUSON. Did the Digest article raise the question of your advocating the furnishing of this material to Communist China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The Digest article, as you will see from that extract that I recently read into the record, describes me as advocating that the American Government—I think the words were—cheerfully accept things which I did not advocate the American Government cheerfully accepting.

The CHAIRMAN. That does not answer the question of the Senator. I want that question read to the witness again.

And I ask you, Mr. Lattimore, to answer it, if you please, if you care to answer it. If you do not, you may say so.

Read the question of the Senator from Michigan.

(The pending question, as heretofore recorded, was read by the reporter, as follows:)

Senator FERGUSON. How would your views in the letter that you gave to Lamont, to be under his signature, how would they get to the public as your views? You do not say in the Lamont letter that "Owen Lattimore advocates this." You wanted Thomas Lamont to advocate it.

Mr. ARNOLD. Mr. Chairman, I submit that is responsive.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair does not think so.

Mr. ARNOLD. Well, then, try and answer it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Will you read it again?

(The pending question, as heretofore recorded, was again read by the reporter, as follows:)

How would your views in the letter that you gave to Lamont, to be under his signature, how would they get to the public as your views?

The CHAIRMAN. That is the gist of the question.

Mr. ARNOLD. I would like to have read the balance of the question.

The CHAIRMAN. Read the whole thing.

Mr. ARNOLD. I do not want to say much here.

Would you read the answer back? Because, with all due respect, I believe—

Mr. LATTIMORE. Would you read my previous answer back.

The CHAIRMAN. Read that entire portion of the record.

(The portions of the record referred to, as heretofore transcribed, were read by the reporter as follows:)

Senator FERGUSON. How would your views in the letter that you gave to Lamont, to be under his signature, how would they get to the public as your views? You do not say in the Lamont letter that "Owen Lattimore advocates this." You wanted Thomas Lamont to advocate it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I take a moment to look at this Lamont draft?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, I wish you would.

The CHAIRMAN. What is it that you want to look at now, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would—

Senator FERGUSON. He wants to look whether he advocated Thomas Lamont to advocate that he had advocated.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Carter had asked me to provide him with some material. My reference to—

The CHAIRMAN. What are you reading from now?

Mr. LATTIMORE. From this draft that I sent to Mr. Carter.

The CHAIRMAN. To Mr. Carter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. To Mr. Carter, yes. I didn't send it to Mr. Lamont.

Senator FERGUSON. He had a man take it to Lamont.

Mr. LATTIMORE. "To bolster the case, the article casts doubts on the authoritativeness of several of these Americans \* \* \* including Owen Lattimore,

Harrison Forman, and Edgar Snow. The publication of such an article invites a review of both American and Soviet Policy in China."

The CHAIRMAN. What is the question, Senator? Do you want the question read?

Senator FERGUSON. Is that the answer?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is the answer.

Senator FERGUSON. I will put another question to you along the same line.

You were asking Mr. Lamont to raise an issue in the letter to the New York Times that was not raised, you say, in the Digest article, and that issue was America's policy being changed to send ammunition, lend-lease, and military aid of any description to the Communist government in China.

Now I ask you, in your raising that new issue, as to whether or not you were asking Mr. Lamont to raise it, not in your name, but in his name; that that was his opinion, that it should be done so as to influence the President of the United States, the State Department officials, and the American public?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir. I think that is a complete misconstruction.

Senator FERGUSON. Why were you advocating it, then, in the Lamont letter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In the first place, I was not advocating a change in American policy; I was advocating a continuity of American policy of supporting united Chinese resistance as a whole to the Japanese.

Mr. Carter had suggested that I write a letter myself to the New York Times. I didn't want to do it because I was disgusted with the whole subject.

The CHAIRMAN. That has been gone over now. I do not see why we should go over it again.

Senator FERGUSON. I realize, Mr. Lattimore, that Mr. Carter twisted your arm and finally compelled you to write the memorandum to Lamont.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But let us get back about this policy.

You say that you did not advocate the change. Then I ask you why you say there in your letter that there now appears to be a fundamental change, and in the last paragraph you say:

With the utmost earnestness, I venture to urge you to have America's policy toward China impartially reviewed by advisers who are not associated with either the formulation or the implementation of that policy as recently practiced.

That indicates clearly that there was a change in the policy.

Senator SMITH. Is that the letter to the President, Senator? You did not say what letter it is.

Senator FERGUSON. The letter to the President dated June 10, 1945.

Now, do you say there never was a change?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I did not say there never was a change. I said I did not advocate a change, that I advocated the maintenance of the continuity of American policy.

Senator FERGUSON. But you indicated in the letter that America had changed its policy, and you wanted them to go back to the old policy; is that right?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir. I think that is not quite correctly stated.

I indicated in my letter to the President that a change was coming about in America policy.

I thought that such a change, if it finally took place, would raise very serious questions, and I advocated an impartial review of the whole subject. I was not myself advocating a change.

Senator FERGUSON. What you claim now you were trying to do was to prevent a change.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir. I was saying that before any change was made there should be an impartial review of policy.

Senator FERGUSON. Did we not have a policy not to furnish aid to the Communists as such?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir. I don't believe our policy was formulated in those terms.

Senator FERGUSON. What was it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Our policy was formulated in terms of aid to the nation of China and in terms of not encouraging any form of split or civil war in China while the really very desperate war for survival against Japan was going on.

Senator FERGUSON. Now let us get to the letter or memorandum that you left with the President. Is this the only memorandum that you left with the President?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is the only one.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not this memorandum was ever sent to the State Department?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I have no knowledge whatever.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know as to whether or not Mr. Vincent, who was promoted to take over the far-eastern work of the State Department, ever saw your memorandum?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I doubt it very much, indeed, but I have no personal knowledge.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever talk to him about it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Let us examine it.

Senator WATKINS. I would like to know: Is the witness undecided on that? He said. "I don't believe I did."

You would know, would you not, whether you did or did not talk on a matter as important as this?

The CHAIRMAN. We will get that answer.

Senator WATKINS. I am a little disturbed on the witness having a keen memory on so many things and how his answer is "I don't believe I did."

The CHAIRMAN. I am trying to get him to answer "Yes" or "No" for 4 days, and I still get that answer.

Mr. WATKINS. I would like to know if he answers "Yes" or "No" on that.

The CHAIRMAN. I did not know.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I can't answer "Yes" on that.

Senator WATKINS. Can you answer "No"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I can't answer "No" on that, either.

This was a period of acute and active discussion all over America at that time on questions of foreign policy. I would certainly talk to anybody whom I met in those days about my duties.

Senator WATKINS. Were you meeting Mr. Vincent?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I met him occasionally.

Senator WATKINS. Did you talk with him about our foreign policy during that period of time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator WATKINS. How can you remember that, if you cannot remember the other?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Because I remember that Mr. Vincent, like all the State Department people I know, was an extremely correct member of the Foreign Service, who would talk with people outside the Government only in extremely restricted terms of getting information from them, but not giving information to them.

Senator WATKINS. You do admit, however, during that period of time, or about that time, that you did have conversations with him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, I had conversations with him in that general period, and in those conversations I would certainly express my views, as I have always expressed my views—completely openly, whether popular or not.

But what I can't guarantee, and what I think extremely unlikely, is that I ever talked to anybody in terms of a complete repetition of the memorandum that I left with the President.

The natural course of events would be that I would talk about whatever topic seemed to me to be of interest, which would naturally overlap with the subject matter of memoranda like this.

But I can't say that I ever discussed with anybody these matters in precisely the terms or the words that I presented them to the President.

Senator WATKINS. Did you have conversation with him prior to presenting the memorandum to the President?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I certainly had conversations prior, in time, to this memorandum.

Senator WATKINS. Is it not, as a matter of fact, very likely that if you met him at all, this subject was on your mind? You felt it was so important that you wanted to take it to the President, that you would discuss it with your friends in the State Department, a man that you knew?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In terms of going to see the President, no.

Senator WATKINS. Before you went to the President, would you not discuss it with them first, before you finally went to him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In terms of my interest in the subject—

The CHAIRMAN. He did not ask you about terms of anything.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I thought he did.

Senator WATKINS. I did not ask about terms. Did you discuss it with them?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I talked of this whole topic of policy in China and controversy beginning to rise over policy in China with all and sundry.

Senator WATKINS. You were very much alarmed about it, as a matter of fact; were you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I wouldn't say, perhaps, very much alarmed. I don't want to quibble. I would say very much concerned.

Senator WATKINS. You thought it of enough importance to take it to the President; did you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Certainly I was very much concerned.

Senator WATKINS. You would not take it to the President unless you were somewhat alarmed at the drift that American policy was taking at that time; would you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I will accept your word, Senator. My own word would have been "concerned."

Senator WATKINS. What I want to find out is the basis for your statement that you do not believe you discussed it with him when you said you were discussing it with all and sundry.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, no. That I discussed the actual memorandum with him.

Senator WATKINS. You could not discuss that because it had not been prepared beforehand. I am talking about your conversations immediately prior to your going to the President.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Undoubtedly, my conversations with all and sundry touched on this general field.

Senator WATKINS. And if you talked to Mr. Vincent you probably talked to him about it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. And I probably mentioned what I thought about it, yes.

Senator WATKINS. But you say you do not believe you did not. You said awhile ago you did not believe you did not.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

I want to make it quite clear, and not to get confused by the questioning, that I am trying to distinguish between talking with State Department people and other people about the general topic of interest—which, of course, I would do at that time—but that I do not believe that I discussed with anybody a project for leaving a memorandum with the President, or the words in which I should draw up that memorandum.

The CHAIRMAN. State Department people do not come into the term "all and sundry."

Senator WATKINS. I thought they were Americans and they would come in with the rest of them.

Mr. ARNOLD. Do you think they come in with "sundry"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not all, but perhaps sundry.

Senator WATKINS. As I recall, Mr. Lattimore, you have at great length pointed out how close a friend Mr. Vincent was and other people in the State Department, particularly three of them that you felt so keenly about here a few days ago, and it seems to me that if you knew them that well, it would only be a natural thing that you would discuss with them, if they were available at all, this thing you had in mind, this thing you felt was really dangerous to the country and it would be to the best interests of the country if you had a change in that policy.

That is what I wanted to know: If you did not discuss with them, prior to going to the President, the very project you had in going there and leaving that memo with him.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I did not discuss that very project.

And I want again, Senator Watkins, if I may, to make very clear my admiration of the training and discipline which enables State Department men, when talking with members of the general public, always to restrict their contribution to the conversation to such matters as are generally known in the press, so that they don't reveal the inside workings of the State Department while, at the same time, as good State Department men should, they acquire a knowledge of

both the factual knowledge and the opinions of others. That is exactly the way the certain State Department——

Senator WATKINS. If you did talk with them, you did not get any sympathy from them, any support or encouragement; did you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I never got from them any inside dope.

Senator WATKINS. But shortly after you had been there, at least one of those men was appointed to a very important position: Mr. Vincent?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Which I think, Senator, was clearly in the cards at the time, in terms of his special knowledge, seniority, regular process of people going up.

Senator WATKINS. You say it was in the cards. Did you not have in mind when you went to the President——

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator WATKINS. To get such a change?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In my memorandum to the President, I pointed out——

The CHAIRMAN. The question is, Did you not have that in mind?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I wanted to show what I did have in mind, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, could I interrupt just a moment?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. These letters and memorandum were made part of the record and not actually received in evidence.

I do not know whether or not they have been distributed. I now move that they become officially part of the record.

We have been reading from them, and I move they be distributed because I know it is difficult for the press to follow this. It is the only medium we have for the public to know what is going on.

The CHAIRMAN. I will have to have them designated.

Senator FERGUSON. I will designate them as follows:

They refer to his testimony, pages 33 and 34.

The first is the letter dated June 10, 1945, from Owen Lattimore to the President, and was marked "Exhibit No. 473."

The second is a copy of a letter from the White House, the President, on June 14, 1945, to Mr. Lattimore.

The third is a Western Union wire from Matthew A. Connelly, Secretary to the President, to Mr. Owen Lattimore.

Next is a copy of a letter from Owen Lattimore to the President, dated June 20, 1945.

Next is the memorandum for the President, which was left with the President in two parts, but is now as one in this memorandum; interview of the 3d day of July 1945.

Last is a letter dated June 20, 1945, from Owen Lattimore to Matthew Connelly.

That is where I cited the OWI address.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you ask that they be inserted in the record?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, made part of the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well; they will be inserted in the record.

Mr. SOURWINE. I might say, Mr. Chairman, that these were offered for the record several days ago, subject to the Chair's determination.

The CHAIRMAN. That is correct. At that time they had not been referred to in the record.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 530-A, 530-B, 530-C, 530-D, 530-E," and are as follows:)

## EXHIBIT No. 530-A

THE WHITE HOUSE,  
Washington, June 14, 1945.

MR. OWEN LATTIMORE,  
*The Johns Hopkins University,  
Baltimore, Md.*

MY DEAR MR. LATTIMORE: I appreciate very much yours of June tenth.

The Chinese situation is developing alright. The policy has been definitely outlined to the Chinese. The Russians and the British and ourselves have reached an agreement which I think is in the best interest of China.

I would be glad to discuss it with you sometime, if you feel inclined.

Sincerely yours,

[s] HARRY TRUMAN.

## EXHIBIT No. 530-B

[Telegram]

WA21617 GOVT—WASHINGTON, D. C., 29 52 9P.

DR. OWEN LATTIMORE,  
*The Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.:*

The President will be glad to see you 11:30 a. m., Tuesday, July 3. Please confirm. Regards.

MATTHEW A. CONNELLY,  
*Secretary to the President.*

## EXHIBIT No. 530-C

JUNE 20, 1945.

HON. HARRY S. TRUMAN,  
*President of the United States,  
The White House, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I most sincerely appreciate your letter of June 14, and the opportunity you offer me for a discussion of policy in China.

If the views which I earnestly wish to place before you for your consideration should be of any value to you, they would be of more value before your forthcoming meeting with Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin.

In the hope of causing the minimum inconvenience in taking up some of your heavily burdened time, I am writing to your secretary, Mr. Connelly, asking if it will be possible to arrange an appointment soon after your return from San Francisco.

Yours very sincerely,

[s] OWEN LATTIMORE.

OL: ec.

## EXHIBIT No. 530-D

Interview of July 3, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

## JAPAN POLICY AS RELATED TO CHINA POLICY

Japan, politically, now banks everything on the hope of peace terms that will make possible a come-back and another war. The only possible come-back is as leader of an Asiatic coalition under the racial battle cry of "down with the white man." Therefore, unlike Germany, where the principal Nazi underground will be in Germany, the Japanese underground must be largely in other parts of Asia. China is the key to this problem.

Like Germany, Japan must also do its best to pit the Western Allies against Russia. China is also the key to this problem.

Therefore, in China the Japanese problem is not WHETHER they are going to be defeated, but HOW to manage the process of being defeated to their own future advantage. The Japanese have already begun to handle this problem by seeing to it that their defeat contributes to both the political and the territorial disunity of China. Where they can manage to retreat in favor of Chiang Kai-shek and not in favor of Communist guerrillas, they do so. Where there are no Communists, they try to retreat in favor of provincial, regional, or war-lord troops, instead of Chiang Kai-shek troops, so as to contribute to territorial disunity. They hope that, if China can be led into both ideological civil wars of landlords against peasants and regional civil wars of provinces against the Central Government, Japan will not be eclipsed during its years of postwar weakness.

To counteract this Japanese policy, the American policy in China must work steadily for peace, unity, and modern political forms.

At the same time Japan hopes that fear of Russia will induce Britain and America to be "soft" with "antirevolutionary" Japanese big business and to wink at the fact that big business in Japan is as militarist as the militarists.

To handle American policy in the new phase, it is necessary to make adjustments to the fact that China, rather than Japan, is now the key to Far Eastern policy as a whole. In most government agencies at the present time the tendency is to find Japan-trained men in higher policy-making posts than China-trained men, simply because Japan used to be a more important Great Power than China.

#### CHINA POLICY

There are two alternatives in China :

1. Division of the country between Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists : This would mean, for Chiang, a permanent policy of getting American support, for which he would give anything America wants ; and, for the Communists, a similar policy of getting Russian support, with similar results. The eventual consequences would almost inevitably be war between America and Russia.

2. A unified China : To unify China, there must be a settlement between Chiang and the Communists and simultaneously an agreement between America, Russia, and Britain to build up China as a whole. The Communists would have to accept minority standing as a long-term status ; but Chiang would have to give them real power within a coalition government, proportionate to their real strength, not just token representation.

In other words, we can have either a divided China, with Chiang having dictatorial power in his territory, subject to acting as an instrument of American policy ; or we can have a whole China, at the price of pretty drastic political change, including limitation of the personal power of Chiang.

Unless he is certain of American policy, Chiang would rather have unlimited power in a small China than limited power in a larger China. He still thinks that America is on the fence, but will be stampeded into jumping down on his side, against Russia, if he hits the right timing in a civil war against "the Boishhevik menace." Influential advisers tell him that America is headed for a long-term conservative trend, with Republican ascendancy, and that Henry Luce, Walter Judd, etc., have guessed the trend correctly.

The basic American interest is represented by policy No. 2. It can be successfully worked. Chiang is tenacious but has shown in the past that he knows when to give in and try a new policy. But he will only play ball if America and Russia, with British approval, make it plain that they are going to be joint umpires. America alone cannot either coax or bluff Chiang into a settlement with the Communists involving real concessions ; but, if Washington and Moscow agree, both Chungking and Yenan will carry out the agreement.

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EXHIBIT No. 530-E

JUNE 20, 1945.

Mr. MATTHEW CONNELLY,  
*Secretary to the President,*  
*The White House, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR MR. CONNELLY : On June 14 the President wrote to me that he would be glad to discuss with me some questions of policy in China which I had ventured to raise in a letter to him on June 10.

Since I am most anxious that the views which I represent should be laid before the President for his consideration before his forthcoming meeting with Prime

Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin, I hope very much that you will find it possible to arrange an appointment for me as soon as possible after the President's return from San Francisco. I can be reached through the following points:

Home address (postal) Ruxton, Md.

Telephone (home) Towson 846.

Telephone (Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore) University 0100, Ext. 72.

Telephone (OWI, Washington) Republic 7500, Ext. 72228.

Yours very sincerely,

[S] OWEN LATTIMORE.

OL: ec.

Senator FERGUSON. I had many more questions, Mr. Chairman, but I think perhaps Senator Watkins would want to continue.

Senator WATKINS. I will let it go now.

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to recess. I have no questions on the document itself.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the pleasure of the committee about reconvening?

Senator FERGUSON. Any time the Chair desires, I will come back.

I would also like to put in the record, for your information, Mr. Lattimore, the fact on the Clubb case that, as I understand, Mr. Acheson, at a press conference, now said that he did reverse the board in the Clubb case and reinstated Mr. Clubb; that his finding was opposite to the board.

That is for your information. I asked you about it, and you seemed to know nothing about it the other day.

I will put that press release in.

The CHAIRMAN. We will recess now until 1:30.

(Thereupon, at 12 noon, the committee recessed, to reconvene at 1:30 p. m., same day.)

#### AFTER RECESS

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Mr. ARNOLD. Mr. Chairman, the witness had a quotation from General Chennault's book which you said we would read later.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not know whether it is a quotation or not. There is an excerpt here which was handed to me; and, without the opportunity to present it to the committee, I withheld action on it. It presents certain phases that I should think would be for the consideration of the committee.

Mr. ARNOLD. It is very short, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. It is short.

Mr. ARNOLD. And you can strike it if you think so. Could it be read subject to being stricken?

The CHAIRMAN. No. I will submit it to the committee just as soon as I get the opportunity.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, might I proceed?

The CHAIRMAN. This presents a phase of quoting an excerpt, presumably quoting an excerpt, from a publication by a party who is not present, not subject to cross-examination or to inquiry. But those phases will be presented to the committee.

Mr. ARNOLD. I would appreciate it because many such quotations are in the record.

Senator FERGUSON. May I proceed?

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, if you will place before yourself the letter to Times by Mr. Lamont.

Mr. MORRIS. Designed for Mr. Lamont.

Senator FERGUSON. Designed; yes; written by you to be placed in the Times, if possible, by Mr. Lamont. The second paragraph is what I am interested in. I want to go back to this change.

You seem to know in these letters much about the policy, but I do not find it in the answer that you are making here. Let us take one of these quotes:

On the other hand, there is cause for uneasiness in a new trend, which is now developing toward criticism of Soviet motives and Soviet policies in Asia. We shall be well advised to consider this trend now, in advance of President Truman's first Big Three meeting with Mr. Churchill and Marshal Stalin.

What was that trend, and who was responsible for the new trend that you are talking about?

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I say that I have not looked up the newspaper record of the period. I assume that it was part of the trend toward feeling that Russia was not a country we could cooperate with, while there was also at the same time, the general period of the San Francisco conference, a very strong feeling among many people that post-war cooperation would be possible.

I thought that as much public discussion of that as possible would contribute to a well-informed public opinion.

Senator FERGUSON. And it was public opinion you were trying to sway? What you call a well-informed public, but it was public opinion that you wanted to sway?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I wanted to contribute to public opinion.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you not want to sway it any way?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I wanted to advocate my own opinions and to have them honestly discussed like anybody else's opinions, and I resented the manner in which my opinions had been misrepresented in the article in the Reader's Digest.

Senator FERGUSON. You claim to be an authority on China and the Far East, did you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I claim to be a person who has studied China and the Far East for many years. I do not and have never claimed to be an exclusive authority.

Senator FERGUSON. I did not ask you whether it was an exclusive authority. That would be another question. But were you an authority?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think that would be a question for somebody else's judgment, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Your counsel suggests that you are too modest. I could only suggest, maybe, that you are not truthful enough on it, and I want to read something for that.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, may I say that I resent it?

Senator FERGUSON. You may resent it, but let me ask you to read now, where you have not been modest, when you printed it under another man's name. Read the last paragraph.

Mr. LATTIMORE. On this page?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

An example of anticipatory alarm about Russia is to be found in the influential magazine Reader's Digest, under the title "The Fate of the World Is at Stake

in China," by Max Eastman and J. B. Powell. In this article it is suggested that there is a danger that American policy might disastrously "sell out" President Chiang Kai-shek to the Chinese Communists, and "bring under totalitarian regimentation 450,000,000 people." To bolster this case, the article casts doubts on the authoritativeness of several of those Americans who have, in fact, contributed most authoritatively to a clear American understanding of contemporary China and contemporary Russia—including Owen Lattimore, Harrison Forman, and Edgar Snow. The publication of such an article invites a review of both American and Soviet policy in China. In making such a review, we should examine American policy just as closely as Soviet policy, and make our criticisms where they are due.

Senator FERGUSON. You were perfectly willing to have Mr. Thomas Lamont call you an authority.

Mr. LATTIMORE. This was something that I had submitted to Mr. Carter at his request to be submitted to Mr. Lamont.

Senator FERGUSON. I have heard that a dozen times.

The CHAIRMAN. Answer the question.

Senator FERGUSON. We will move along quickly here if you will keep to the answer.

You were perfectly willing to have Mr. Thomas Lamont tell the public that you were an authority.

Mr. LATTIMORE. If he approved of the wording, he could do so.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you not request him to approve through your agent, Mr. Carter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I made no such request. I submitted a rough draft of a memorandum.

Senator FERGUSON. Why did you put your name in there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Because my reference was to Reader's Digest and the article in the Reader's Digest, and my name was a part of it.

Senator FERGUSON. And you did not hesitate to say that you were an authority as well as Mr. Forman and Mr. Edgar Snow?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I didn't hesitate.

Senator FERGUSON. Going to this sentence:

We have also, until quite recently, encouraged political unity in China in order to facilitate the most effective resistance to Japan.

What was the change there that you were talking about?

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I ask where that quotation is from?

Senator FERGUSON. The next paragraph after the one you completed reading, on page 2.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. I suppose the word "Under" is "Before," "Before Pearl Harbor," or is that "after"?

Yes; because the next sentence says "Since," so that word apparently, instead of "Under Pearl Harbor"—

Mr. LATTIMORE. It probably is "Until Pearl Harbor."

Senator FERGUSON. It is in that paragraph.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes. [Reading:]

Since Pearl Harbor, our policy has been to give China the maximum aid permitted by difficulties of transport and the demands of other theaters of war. We have also, until quite recently, encouraged political unity in China in order to facilitate the most effective resistance to Japan.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the change?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The change, as I recall it, in the discussion of the period—I repeat, I have not looked up the newspaper record of the time—was that it was being advocated that we should restrict

aid entirely to Chiang Kai-shek's own armies while other people believed that as we approached the coast of China, as we were nearing Japan, made direct contact with the Chinese armies on the mainland, we should also be entitled to cooperate with the Communists and Communist-led guerrillas.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, these letters and this memorandum were written prior to the end of the war between the United States and Japan?

Mr. LATTIMORE. They were written as the end of the war was rapidly approaching, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that it was rapidly approaching?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; it was the general opinion at the time because, through General MacArthur's island-hopping campaign, in combination with the United States Navy, we were getting within reach of both the home islands of Japan and the mainland of China.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew, then, that the war was about over?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I didn't know. My feeling was that the war was approaching an end.

Senator FERGUSON. Is it not true that during the war there were battles between the Chinese Communists and the Chinese Nationalists?

Mr. LATTIMORE. There were some clashes, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. How many divisions or armies did Chiang Kai-shek have to put on his border up at the Communist border to preserve the integrity of his rule?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall the figure, Senator, but I do recall that in the opinion of some of the American diplomatic and military representatives in China, some of those troops were being unnecessarily immobilized.

Senator FERGUSON. That was not my question. My question was how many did he use on the border?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he use any?

Mr. LATTIMORE. There were troops at the corner of northwest China where Chiang Kai-shek's free China and the Communist-held part of China joined.

Senator FERGUSON. But it is your contention now that they were not there to keep the Communists from moving into the Nationalist territory?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; it is my contention that many of the Americans in the field at the time considered that the blockade of the Communists was unnecessarily large and severe, immobilized an unnecessarily large number of Chiang's troops.

Senator FERGUSON. But they did immobilize some of his troops?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. And at the very time that at least Chiang Kai-shek felt that it was necessary to preserve his own army to keep the Communists back, you were advocating arms and supplies and munitions to the Communists?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; you are talking about two different situations.

Senator FERGUSON. Please do not tell me what I am talking about. I am just asking you the question.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, in my opinion, then, Senator, there were two different situations. One was during the period when the United States had no access and no hope of immediate access to the coast of China.

The second was the period when we were rapidly approaching the coast of China and when many people thought, as was discussed in the press at the time, I remember, that the Japanese would withdraw from the home islands of Japan and make a last stand in Manchuria, in which case the question of combined American-Chinese operations on the mainland against Manchuria would have been very important.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now let us go back to the question I was asking.

In June of 1945 was it not true that Chiang Kai-shek had immobilized some of his troops against Japan and in order that he may protect his army from the Chinese Communist Army?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It is true, Senator, that he had immobilized part of his army. It is also true that in the opinion of many American observers there at the time it was unnecessary.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, we are not going to get through today unless we can get the answers to these questions. I can stay over here as long as you can stay over there.

Mr. ARNOLD. Mr. Chairman, he is answering.

The CHAIRMAN. Just a minute, counsel. I told the counsel when he first commenced this hearing as to what their limitations were. When he wants advice, he can ask you for advice. You will not participate in the proceedings.

Mr. ARNOLD. I am sorry, Senator. He permitted me to read the answer to the question before, and I thought I could be helpful in the proceedings by merely striking out the last part of that answer.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I think ought to be stricken out, and if he will just stick to the answers he and I will get along.

The CHAIRMAN. You just tell the witness to answer the question, and you will give him some pretty good advice.

Mr. ARNOLD. I think he is trying, Senator.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think the trouble here, Senator Ferguson, is merely that—

Senator FERGUSON. Are you answering my question?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I cannot accept your statement of the question as if it were my opinion on the question.

Senator FERGUSON. It was a fact, therefore you would have to know. Did you or did you not know whether or not Chiang Kai-shek was demobilizing or, as you called it that, part of his troops between his part of China and the Communist part of China, to protect his part of China from the Communists?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I knew that he was immobilizing part of his troops in that area, and I also knew that many Americans in China considered that he was immobilizing in excessive number.

The CHAIRMAN. That is no part of the answer. That is another part.

Senator FERGUSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That was in June 1945?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Generally speaking in that period; yes,

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. And that was the very time that you were advocating Mr. Lamont, over his signature, to advocate that we furnish to the Communists in China munitions and arms. You can answer that question "Yes" or "No."

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think that question is susceptible to a "Yes" or "No" answer, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want to answer it "Yes" or "No," or not answer it? Just say whether you do or do not.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't want to answer it "Yes" or "No."

Senator FERGUSON. Then I will take it for granted that the two documents speak for themselves, the answer before and the documents.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I should like to explain, Senator, that I am referring to a new situation, not an old one.

The CHAIRMAN. If you say you cannot answer the question, there is no explanation, if you cannot answer it "Yes" or "No." If you cannot answer it, you cannot answer it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I not explain why I can't answer it, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. No; I did not ask you that question, to explain why.

Mr. Lattimore, we will go to the document that you wrote for the President. I will just take the China part. The Japanese part, I think, speaks for itself, at the present time [reading]:

Division of the country between Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists. This would mean, for Chiang, a permanent policy of getting American support, for which he would give anything America wants; and for the Communists, a similar policy of getting Russian support, with similar results. The eventual consequence would almost inevitably be war between American and Russia.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is prefaced, Senator, by the statement, "There are two alternatives in China."

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. That was one of them. Is that true?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That was one of them; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. What made you think that if America gave Chiang Kai-shek support, Russia would give the Communists support?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was not certain of it. I thought that this was a probability or one of the alternatives, and I so stated it. Obviously, I had no positive knowledge. I was stating a theory or opinion.

The CHAIRMAN. This is the memorandum to the President?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; the memorandum.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. This was advice to the President?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; that this is what would happen.

Mr. SOURWINE. Might I ask a question, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. SOURWINE. At that point, Mr. Lattimore, as a matter of fact, did you not then know that the Russians were supporting the Chinese Communists?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Sourwine, I did not know that they were supporting them in any sense of giving them arms, and I don't believe that at that time they were giving them arms.

We have been over that previously. I certainly considered that the Communists had the moral and political support of the Russians.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you know that Russia was supporting them? That is the question.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I know that Russia was supporting them in that sense, but not in the sense of arming them.

Senator FERGUSON. Going back to your Lamont letter, I read you this:

At the present moment, there is a danger that the parallel policy may not continue.

You are talking about the previous paragraph, where it says:

Russian and American policy in China can be made parallel, and we know from experience, not by guesswork, that the Russians are capable of contributing at the very least an equal share in making the policies of the two countries parallel.

Where did you get that information? That was from experience and not from guesswork.

Mr. LATTIMORE. From experience and from my work with Chiang Kai-shek I knew that Russia and America had followed a parallel policy in China of encouraging united resistance to the Japanese.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you cease being adviser to Chiang Kai-shek?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In 1942; at the end of 1942.

Senator FERGUSON. Going to the next paragraph:

At the present moment there is danger that the parallel policy may not continue. This danger has not yet arisen from Russian policy, but it has arisen from American policy.

What change did we make?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was referring again there, Senator, to the changes that I thought I saw coming about from statements in the press at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. The next sentence:

Whereas Russia's policy has never yet demanded the inclusion of China Communists in the benefit of Russian aid to China, American policy has recently explicitly excluded them from the benefit of American aid.

Where did you get that information?

Mr. LATTIMORE. From the press, I believe.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it a fact?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe so. Reference to the press of the time would show.

Senator FERGUSON. So up to that time Communist Russia was not asking that Communist China be included in its aid?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe that is true. That is supported by that quotation from General Chennault written after the end of the war, which I wished to read into the record.

Senator FERGUSON. I know you want to get that in, but we will get that in later.

In your statement to the President you said, "For the Communists a similar policy of getting Russia's support with similar results \* \* \*."

Why did you say that their policy would not continue to give aid to Chiang Kai-shek? Was it for the reason that they were, at that time, able to have the Yalta agreement where we were to give them certain benefits out of China, and was it that they were about to make a treaty with Chiang Kai-shek, recognizing Chiang Kai-shek as the real government of China?

Was that their reason for not stipulating or not saying that they wanted to aid the Communists in China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no means of knowing what their policy was at that time, Senator.

My paragraph clearly refers to anticipation of a future situation.

Senator FERGUSON. Your paragraph does not, if I might go back to it. "Whereas Russia's policy has never"—you are telling Mr. Lamont that the Russian policy has never yet demanded the inclusion of Communists, Chinese Communists, in the benefit of Russian aid to China.

America's policy has recently explicitly excluded them from the benefit of American aid.

Mr. LATTIMORE. On which page is that?

Senator FERGUSON. On page 3.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I undoubtedly believed that was true at the time, and I believe it is true, too.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you knew it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I say that Russian policy has never yet demanded the inclusion of the Chinese Communists, et cetera. That is obviously stated to the best of my knowledge at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. You were going to ask Mr. Lamont to put it in a statement over his signature?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I was not going to ask Mr. Lamont to put it in a statement over his signature.

Senator FERGUSON. You were just going to ask Mr. Carter, who went to Mr. Lamont's son in order that they may get it put over his signature, is that the way you want to leave it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir. I was supplying some material which could be considered, used, or rejected by Mr. Lamont, according to his judgment.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know what Mr. Lamont's son's thinking was?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you ever heard about it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I had heard about him vaguely.

Senator FERGUSON. Just vaguely?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Just vaguely.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you talk to Mr. Carter after you received his letter mentioning the son?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe I did. There was just this correspondence, and then I believe Mr. Carter sent me a copy of Mr. Lamont's letter to him, and there the matter dropped.

In other words, Mr. Lamont had exercised, according to his own judgment, exactly the option that was implied in my submitting any material at all.

Senator FERGUSON. Why did you not go to see Mr. Lamont?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I didn't know Mr. Lamont. The idea was not mine. The whole idea came from Mr. Carter.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you state to Mr. Carter to tell Mr. Lamont that you, as an authority, were writing this article for the New York Times, and to tell Mr. Lamont who was writing it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir, Mr. Carter asked me for a draft, and I gave him a draft.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether he represented it as your thinking or as Carter's thinking?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no idea.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not Lamont knew that you prepared the draft?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I do not.

Senator FERGUSON. Let us take the next statement in your China policy.

A unified China: To unify China, there must be a settlement between Chiang and the Communists and simultaneously an agreement between America, Russia, and Britain to build up China as a whole.

At that very time that you were writing to the President, you said that up to that time Russia showed no desire or requirement, let me put it that way, that there was to be a unification between the Communists and the non-Communists in China. Is that not true? That, is, to at least require her aid to be given only to the one?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. You said Russia's policy has never yet demanded——

Mr. LATTIMORE. Has never yet demanded, that was true to the best of my knowledge.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the Lamont article?

Senator FERGUSON. That is the Lamont article.

At the same time, you were telling the President this:

To unify China, there must be a settlement between Chiang and the Communists and simultaneously an agreement between America, Russia, and Britain to build up China as a whole. The Communists will have to accept minority standing as a long-term status; but Chiang would have to give them real power within a coalition government, proportionate to their real strength, not just token representation.

You wrote that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I wrote both of those, one referring to the past, and one referring to a problem that I anticipated in the future.

Senator FERGUSON. And you were then advocating to the President a coalition government?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir, I was stating to the President, as I believe, an alternative. Let me see, I supported the second alternative.

Senator FERGUSON. So you were telling the President that the Communists would have to accept a minority standing as a long-term status, but Chiang would have to give them real power within a coalition government?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. And proportionate to their real strength, not just token representation.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right. That was my assessment of the situation that I thought was coming up.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that not exactly what General Marshall went to China to do?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe that is roughly what was indicated in the directive to General Marshall, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that not what Mr. Carter gave as one of the ways of solving the problem when he got the first memorandum out on the Marshall mission? It is Vincent that I mean.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember that memorandum.

Senator FERGUSON. You have seen the Vincent testimony?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have read through it, yes. There was a great deal of it, and I don't remember every bit of it in detail.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you remember the memorandum of December 9, 1945?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't. I would like to see it to refresh my memory.

The CHAIRMAN. That is by Vincent?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, Vincent.

The CHAIRMAN. And Vincent was then in what position?

Senator FERGUSON. He had been promoted to what position, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I couldn't tell you exactly, at that time, whether he was head of the China desk or of the whole Far Eastern Division. I believe it was one or the other.

The CHAIRMAN. He was head of the Far East, was he not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am not sure, sir, when he was promoted from head of the China desk to head of the Far Eastern Division.

Mr. MORRIS. He was head of the Far Eastern Division on December 7, 1945.

Mr. LATTIMORE. He was?

Senator FERGUSON. Will you read the memorandum?

Mr. LATTIMORE. This seems to be signed "J. F. B."

Senator FERGUSON. On the other side it is "Fe: Vincent." Who is J. F. B.?

Mr. MORRIS. That is James F. Byrnes.

Senator FERGUSON. But it was written by Vincent.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Is that what the notation indicates?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, that is what it indicates. Will you read it?

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading from exhibit No. 389 of hearings before this committee):

The President and the Secretary of State are both anxious that the unification of China by peaceful, democratic methods be achieved as soon as possible.

At a public hearing before the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate on December 7, the Secretary of State said:

"During the war the immediate goal of the United States in China was to promote a military union of the several political factions in order to bring their combined power to bear upon our common enemy, Japan. Our longer-range goal, then as now, and a goal of at least equal importance, is the development of a strong, united, and democratic China.

"To achieve this longer-range goal, it is essential that the Central Government of China as well as the various dissident elements approach the settlement of their differences with a genuine willingness to compromise. We believe, as we have long believed and consistently demonstrated, that the government of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek affords the most satisfactory base for a developing democracy. But we also believe that it must be broadened to include the representatives of those large and well-organized groups who are now without any voice in the Government of China.

"This problem is not an easy one. It requires tact and discretion, patience, and restraint. It will not be solved by slogans. Its solution depends primarily upon the good will of the Chinese leaders themselves. To the extent that our influence is a factor, success will depend upon our capacity to exercise that influence in the light of shifting conditions in such a way as to encourage concessions by the Central Government, by the so-called Communists, and by the other factions."

Senator FERGUSON. Is that not just what you were saying in your second letter, that the Communists would have to accept a minority standing as a long-term status, but Chiang would have to give them

real power within a coalition government proportionate to their real strength, not just token representation?

The CHAIRMAN. That is the memorandum to the President?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That indicates close, similar thinking.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you read the next paragraph?

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

The President has asked General Marshall to go to China as his special representative for the purpose of bringing to bear in an appropriate and practicable manner the influence of the United States for the achievement of the ends set forth above.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the end of the coalition government?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Presumably. [Reading:]

Specifically, General Marshall will endeavor to influence the Chinese Government to call a national conference of representatives of the major political elements to bring about the unification of China and, concurrently, effect a cessation of hostilities, particularly in north China.

Senator FERGUSON. Would that not indicate that your second alternative, a unified China, was exactly what the State Department and the President were doing?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It indicates that my thinking was similar to that which led the State Department or the State Department and the Armed Forces in combination to that decision. I see no cause and effect relationship.

The CHAIRMAN. This memorandum had been placed before the President before General Marshall was sent abroad?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, by almost 6 months.

How can you then say, with this in mind, Mr. Vincent writing it, that you had not the slightest effect, or your memorandum did not have the slightest effect?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am convinced, Senator, that it did not have the slightest effect. I saw the President for about 3 minutes. I got a Presidential brush-off in a nice, polite way, and I went out.

I should say it is much more likely that the State Department formed its opinions from the material gathered in the field in China, where I had not been recently, from its own representatives, and from military representatives.

Senator FERGUSON. Is this the first time that you told us you had a brush-off from the President?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I had said that I had seen the President for about 3 minutes.

Senator FERGUSON. You left a memorandum with your arguments in it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think that is included in the classification of a polite brush-off.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you get for the witness a copy of the white paper?

(Document handed to witness.)

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I at this moment, Senator, read into the record the President's letter to me?

Senator FERGUSON. You mean the first letter where he stated the policy was already formed?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; you can read that.

The CHAIRMAN. It is in the record already.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, may I refer to the fact that the President had already told me that affairs in China were well in hand?

The CHAIRMAN. In the meantime, Mr. Vincent had been promoted?

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Grew was put out, Mr. Ballantine was put out, and Mr. Dooman was put out.

Mr. LATTIMORE. In the meantime of what, may I ask?

The CHAIRMAN. In the meantime between the time you left the memorandum with the President and the time Marshall was sent to Asia. Is that right?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Also in the meantime the President was telling me that affairs concerning China were well in hand.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And you in all earnestness, utmost earnestness, told him to have the American policy in China impartially reviewed by advisers "who are not associated with either formulation or implementation of the policy as recently practiced."

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, Senator, that indicates that I thought that an impartial review would be more authoritative and have results than any personal opinions of mine.

Senator FERGUSON. Let us look at page 10 of the letter of transmittal by Mr. Acheson.

By the way, what was Mr. Acheson's position with the State Department when you went to see the President?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I couldn't tell you, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. He was in the State Department, was he not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is my general recollection. I can't tell you exactly.

Senator FERGUSON. He held a high position?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I suppose so.

Senator FERGUSON. Well now, there was a letter of transmittal of the white paper, and if you will turn to page 10 of that, which is signed by Dean Acheson, you may start and read what he says on the letter of transmittal of the white paper to the public.

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

When peace came, the United States was confronted with three possible alternatives in China:

1. It could have pulled out lock, stock, and barrel.
2. It could have intervened militarily on a major scale to assist the Nationalists to destroy the Communists.
3. It could, while assisting the Nationalists to assert their authority over as much of China as possible, endeavor to avoid a civil war by working for a compromise between the two sides.

Senator FERGUSON. Right there, is that not exactly what you told the President?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That indicates similar thinking but no cause and effect.

Senator FERGUSON. No cause and effect. Would you think, then, that the only way we could get a cause and effect would be for the President to say, or have Dean Acheson say in here, "This was the policy proposed by Owen Lattimore, the authority on the far eastern affairs"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I don't.

Senator FERGUSON. How would you get it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think one of the gaps in our knowledge here is whether the President ever transmitted my memoranda to the Department of State, or whether they were ever considered or accepted. I have never heard they were.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, do you think that the President would submit your memorandum if he had any intentions of following it to the men who were responsible for that policy in the State Department, with the expression in the letter that you wanted them all taken out of the authority?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I don't know how matters were handled, matters of policy were handled, at that time between the White House and the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you read on, Mr. Lattimore, from Dean Acheson's letter, the Secretary of State. It is on page 10, continuing.

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

The first alternative would, and I believe American public opinion at the time so felt, have represented an abandonment of our international responsibilities and of our traditional policy of friendship for China before we had made a determined effort to be of assistance.

Senator FERGUSON. That is after the war and, naturally, that would not be included in your suggestion to the President because you were talking as to when the war was on. Is that not correct?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Continue reading.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was talking while the war was on, but looking forward to postwar situations.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

The second alternative policy, while it may look attractive theoretically and in retrospect, was wholly impracticable. The Nationalists had been unable to destroy the Communists during the 10 years before the war. Now, after the war, the Nationalists were, as indicated above, weakened, demoralized, and unpopular. They had quickly dissipated their popular support and prestige in the areas liberated from the Japanese by the conduct of their civil and military officials. The Communists, on the other hand, were much stronger than they had ever been, and were in control of most of North China.

Senator FERGUSON. There, if they had followed in June of 1945 your suggestion of giving arms to the Communists, they would have been even stronger than they were as Acheson found them, is that not true?

The CHAIRMAN. That is, the Communists would have been?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; not necessarily true, Senator. I was looking forward to a final phase of the war when, like many other people, I expected that there might be considerable fighting on the mainland of China for the recovery of Manchuria in case the Japanese made a last stand there, and I think it is highly hypothetical what might have come out of that one way or another. It is something that never happened and therefore one could not tell what the results would have been.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say now that they would not have been stronger if they had received the arms that you suggested?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I say I have no way of knowing.

Senator FERGUSON. I think the committee can draw that conclusion. Go on and read the next part.

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading) :

Because of the ineffectiveness of the Nationalist forces, which was later to be tragically demonstrated, the Communists probably could have been dislodged only by American arms. It is obvious that the American people would not have sanctioned such a colossal commitment of our armies in 1945 or later. We therefore came to the third alternative policy, whereunder we faced the facts of the situation and attempted to assist in working out a *modus vivendi* which would avert civil war but, nevertheless, preserve and even increase the influence of the Nationalist Government.

Senator FERGUSON. That is really what you were advocating in the unified China.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That indicates a similar line of thought, but not cause and effect.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you explain what you mean by cause and effect?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It does not indicate that the policies adopted were based on any recommendation of mine, and I submit that it was an obvious probability that the State Department based its policy on its own information and military information from the field in China.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, why are you disclaiming so vehemently that you had any influence on the State Department when their policy did follow the line that you suggested? Is there a reason?

Mr. LATTIMORE. There is a reason, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. What is it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The reason is that there was a general category of thinking along this line at the time, that I participated in it, and that I think it would be an absurd exaggeration for me to claim that I molded policy.

Senator FERGUSON. Then it is only because you would feel it would be an exaggeration?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Exaggeration is a relative word. I put before it absurd, an absurd—if you prefer, I will say an absurd invention.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. But you had in the Lamont memorandum said that you were one of the authorities on the Far East. You sought the President's audience. You took the memorandum and left it there.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you not intend to influence him as an authority?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I hoped to influence the President primarily toward an impartial review of problems of policy as they then stood.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know any way that you could have put this proposition up to the President in any stronger language or way than you did?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I stated my opinions to the President as clearly as I could, based on the best knowledge available to me at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you read now the rest of your letter. I want to ask you some questions about it, about your argument in your memorandum to the President.

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading) :

In other words, we can have either a divided China, with Chiang having dictatorial power in his territory, subject to acting as an instrument of American policy; or we can have a whole China, at the price of pretty drastic political change, including limitation of the personal power of Chiang.

Shall I go on?

Senator FERGUSON. That was part of your argument telling him that the unified China was what you were asking him for?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. And that we would have to insist upon pretty drastic political changes, including the limitation of the personal power of Chiang. That meant a coalition government, did it not, taking the Communists in?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That meant a coalition government, yes. That meant recognition of the fact that, in my opinion, the Communist-controlled part of China could not be conquered by the force available to Chiang.

Senator FERGUSON. Up until that time, had you ever known a government that had survived when it took in the Communists and made a coalition government?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall that there was a previous example, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you not think that communism was such at that time that it was impossible to have such a coalition government and have it successful, without it becoming a Communist government?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I did not think so. If I thought so, I would have made different proposals.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you read the next paragraph?

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

Unless he is certain of American policy, Chiang would rather have unlimited power in a small China than limited power in a larger China. He still thinks that America is on the fence, but will be stampeded into jumping down on his side, against Russia, if he hits the right timing in a civil war against the "Bolshevik menace." Influential advisers tell him that America is headed for a long-term conservative trend, with Republican ascendancy, and that Henry Luce, Walter Judd, et cetera, have guessed the trend correctly.

Senator FERGUSON. There you were warning the President that Chiang, if he got aid from America alone, and there was not aid going to the Communists, and there was not a coalition government, that he, in a civil war, would be against the Communists, the Bolshevik menace, and you put that in quotations, is that correct?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is correct. I mean, that is correct as far as it being in quotations. It is not correct so far as your interpretation of what I was saying.

Senator FERGUSON. Why did you put it in quotations?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know why I put it in quotations at that time, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. You must have believed that it was not quite accurate, the Bolshevik menace, or you would not have put it in quotes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; my general opinion at the time was that communism in China could be contained, so to speak, and that the Generalissimo could maintain the ascendancy.

Senator FERGUSON. Even in a coalition government?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Even in a coalition government, or, in fact, the only way he could would be through a coalition government.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you think to be the difference between the Republican policy on that and the President's policy, when you say "influential advisers tell him that America is headed for a long-term conservative trend"? What do you mean there by "conservative trend"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know exactly what I meant by conservative trend in 1945, but it is clearly here in connection with Republican ascendance and the mention of what I identified at that time as the opinions on China policy of Mr. Luce and Congressman Judd.

The CHAIRMAN. He was predicting the election of Stassen, perhaps.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was saying that that was the way that Chiang's advisers were talking to him.

Senator FERGUSON. How did you learn that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, I knew some of Chiang's advisers quite well.

Senator FERGUSON. Where did you get this information, in this country or in China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My latest information on the subject was in this country.

Senator FERGUSON. Who gave it to you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. A Chinese connected with the Chinese Government.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was he?

Mr. LATTIMORE. One man whom I recall particularly was one of Chiang's oldest and closest associates, a Mr. Tseng Yang-fu.

Senator FERGUSON. Where is he now?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know where he is now.

Senator FERGUSON. When was the last you saw of him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The last I saw of him was when he was in this country in 1945, received medical treatment at the Johns Hopkins Hospital, and then stayed with me for several days before going back to China.

Senator FERGUSON. Is he in China or Formosa?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I presume he is in Formosa.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you heard from him in Formosa?

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I ask my wife?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; you may inquire from your wife.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The last I heard of him—no, this is previous. This is just before he came here, so I don't remember when I heard from him last.

Senator FERGUSON. May we see the memorandum?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Surely. [Document handed.]

Senator FERGUSON. Read the next paragraph.

The CHAIRMAN. The next paragraph of what?

Senator FERGUSON. Of the memorandum to the President: "The basic American interest is represented by policy No. 2."

That is the one that appears to be at least the same line as was carried out in the white-paper letter of transmittal; is it not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is the one that indicates that I belong to that general school of thinking; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. "It can be successfully worked," you say. "Chiang is tenacious, but has shown in the past that he knows when to give in and try a new policy."

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

But he will only play ball if America and Russia, with British approval, make it plain that they are going to be joint umpires.

Is that right?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. What you wanted, then, was a policy where Russia and America, and with at least the consent of Britain, were to be umpires in running China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe not the umpires in running China. I believed that the situation coming up at the end of the war in China was one that the United States would not be able to control single-handed. I thought it had to be part of a general international agreement.

Senator FERGUSON. What do you mean by joint umpires?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Joint umpires in the sense that primarily, if the Communists accepted a minority position in a coalition government, it would have to be seen to that they didn't try to get away with any monkey business.

Senator FERGUSON. And you think that America should have stepped in and Russia would have stepped in, to keep the Communists in line?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I thought, as I said in the final sentence here:

America, alone, cannot either coax or bluff Chiang into a settlement with the Communists involving real concessions; but if Washington and Moscow agree, both Chungking and Yenai will carry out the agreement.

Senator FERGUSON. Is it not true that at Yenai the Communists would have had to have carried it out, if Russia had said so?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know that I could have said so authoritatively at that time, Senator, and, at the present time, the degree of independence of the Chinese Communists from the Russians is a matter of considerable debate.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you are not one of those observers that believe that the Communists in Korea today are under the control of the Communists in Moscow?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no final answer on that, Senator. All I am aware of is that there is one school of thought that believes the situation is primarily controlled by the Chinese Communists, and another school of thought that believes that the whole thing is dictated from the Kremlin.

Senator FERGUSON. What do you think about it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't have sufficient information to make a strong declaration of opinion in either direction.

Senator FERGUSON. At least you do not think they are controlled by Russia, you do not have any evidence that they are?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My opinion is that they are more allies of Russia than subordinates of Russia, and I believe that the Russians would have considerable difficulty in running China completely.

Senator FERGUSON. Then it may be that Russia could, in your opinion, act as a neutral in any truce?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir. The whole wording here does not indicate neutrality. It indicates an agreement between the great powers of America, Russia, and Britain and, therefore, an agreement between interested parties.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that in 1946 Mr. Acheson, Secretary of State—and which was just about a year after the memorandum was given—took somewhat the same line before the House Foreign Affairs Committee?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I didn't know it, Senator. I shouldn't be surprised. As I say, this was part of a general school of thought, to which I was a minor adherent, and not, I think, a shaper of that school of thought.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, at this time, I would like to make, as a part of the record here, the memorandum and the press release; that is, the memorandum to General Marshall out of the white paper that is set forth in our record, and the letter of transmittal, so that it would all be in and not be taken out of context.

I would like to have the testimony of Dean Acheson before the House Foreign Affairs Committee as of June 19, 1946, a hearing on H. R. 6795, become a part of the record.

Mr. MORRIS. That portion of the testimony relating to the subject, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, relating to the subject. I would like to have that read into the record at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be read.

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to have it read at least down to page 5, if Mr. Mandel would read it into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MANDEL. Testimony of Dean Acheson before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, June 19, 1946, hearings on H. R. 6795 [reading]:

Chairman BLOOM. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Secretary, your statement, coupled with that of Secretary Patterson and that of General Marshall, I think constitutes not only a reason, but shows the necessity for the enactment of this legislation. So I shall ask no questions.

Chairman BLOOM. Dr. Eaton.

Mr. EATON. In my judgment, I consider the association with China in the future as probably of more importance to the destiny of the Nation and the world than any other single relationship. That is why I am strongly in favor of this legislation.

I notice on page 3 of your statement, Mr. Secretary, that General Marshall arranged for the training by our American people, with the use of American equipment, of certain Communist leaders who are to become incorporated into the National army. Are those fellows now fighting the National army in Manchuria?

Mr. ACHESON. No. I think the situation is this, Mr. Eaton: I do not believe that any such training has gone on in the past, or is now going on. What General Marshall was asked to do and agreed to do, and what is necessary to be done, is that when the plan for the amalgamation of the two armies is accepted and begins to go into effect, those units of the Communist army which are going to be amalgamated with the National army will receive a period of training from 60 to 90 days before they march out to join their opposite numbers in the other army. The plan roughly contemplates that a certain number of months from the day on which it is to go into effect certain divisions of the Communist army and certain divisions of the National army will be amalgamated. When that occurs it is essential that the troops from the Communist side which go into the troops of the new Chinese Army have a minimum of the same sort of training that their compatriots have had. Some of the divisions in the present National army have been trained by United States forces. These American training forces that we are talking about will be forces that will take a Communist outfit which is to be amalgamated with the new army and put it in shape so that it can readily go into the outfit. That is the program.

Mr. EATON. The objective of General Marshall's plan is that when the Communist forces are taken into the National army, he will then have a Nationalist army, not an army composed of two parts, one Nationalist and one Communist. What guaranty have we, since history has taught us a few lessons, I hope, that that will be the actual situation?

Senator FERGUSON. Who asked that question?

Mr. MANDEL. Mr. Eaton. [Reading:]

Mr. ACHESON. You know better than anyone in the world, Dr. Eaton, there is no guaranty about anything in human affairs; but the problem they are facing in China is one, at the present time, of having two armies separated in organization, space, and everything of that sort. Now, if those armies can

be amalgamated unit by unit—not trying to take one whole army and put it with the other, but by taking separate units of each army and integrating them in one force—then the chances of division are tremendously reduced.

MRS. ROGERS. Mr. Secretary, how many Communists is it anticipated will be trained under the proposed plan?

MR. ACHESON. I think that they will try to take all the units that are going to be put into the new army immediately preceding their joining the new army and give them a 60- or 90-day schooling.

MRS. ROGERS. But, can you give us any approximate number that will be trained?

MR. ACHESON. I do not know. If the total size of the army is going to be 60 divisions, I do not know what proportion of the personnel would be Communist.

MRS. ROGERS. Could you get that proportion for us?

MR. ACHESON. The information that I have had handed me is that of the 60 divisions which are contemplated the personnel which would be equivalent to 50 divisions will come from the national army and the personnel which would be equivalent to 10 divisions will come from the Communist army.

MRS. ROGERS. That question will be asked on the floor. That is the reason I wanted to have that information.

MR. ACHESON. Five-sixths will be taken from the national army and one-sixth from the Communist army.

Chairman BLOOM. Mr. Chipfield.

MR. CHIPERFIELD. Mr. Secretary, besides the assistance this country gave to China which you have recited in your statement, did not the United States also furnish credit amounting to \$900,000,000?

MR. ACHESON. I presume you are referring to the \$500,000,000 loan made in 1942.

MR. CHIPERFIELD. There was not any particular reason for not mentioning that; it was simply because you were referring to the military assistance?

MR. ACHESON. That is correct.

MR. CHIPERFIELD. I have no questions now, Mr. Chairman.

MRS. ROGERS. Do you think that China will turn to Russia if we do not offer the assistance?

MR. ACHESON. I have no views on that subject. I am sure that we will assist China. I do not think I want to speculate on what would happen if we did not.

MRS. ROGERS. Is there any way we could have an agreement with China whereby she would not use our arms against us?

MR. ACHESON. Well, I suppose we have that in the United Nations Charter. There all the nations agree that they will not employ force against any country except in accordance with the principles and under the procedure of the Charter. Under the principles and procedure of the Charter, if anyone wished to employ force against us, I am sure that we would veto that. They will not do it. That is the technical and legal answer to your question.

I think we can rest assured that the Chinese will not do that.

MRS. ROGERS. I suppose a fight could start before that was decided, could it not?

MR. ACHESON. Do you mean that the Chinese would attack us? I do not think so.

Chairman BLOOM. The Chair thinks that we should not go into that.

MR. ACHESON. I am sure that we do not need to worry.

MRS. ROGERS. I think if there were any way to have an agreement it would be very helpful. I thought in the passage of lend-lease we should have some agreement with the nations. I find it impossible, and many other members find it impossible, to find out just exactly what is going on in lend-lease. That is all I have.

Chairman BLOOM. Mr. Gordon.

MR. GORDON. I have no questions at this time.

Chairman BLOOM. Mr. Vorys.

MR. VORYS. Mr. Secretary, sooner or later, and probably sooner, the question may arise as to whether our furnishing arms to the Republic of China is in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter, and I note in your statement you mentioned the obligations of the Charter for the preservation of peace, at various times. I think it would be very helpful if you would spell out for us who are not as familiar with the provisions as you are and our chairman and our ranking Republican member, who were there when it was drafted, just how this operates.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Chairman, I have some material from the Congressional Record here that I should like to read into this record as pertinent to my own thinking in the year 1945.

Senator FERGUSON. I am going to ask you about what Mr. Acheson was thinking in 1946. Do you know what change there was between June of 1945 and June of 1946, other than the peace, other than the stopping of the shooting? I do not mean the peace.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know about the change. General Marshall had been carrying on his mission in China, had succeeded in halting the civil war to a certain extent, and was trying to negotiate a form of settlement that would leave the dominant control of power in the hands of Chiang Kai-shek.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you recognize at the time what Mrs. Rogers apparently recognized in 1946; that is, in 1945 when you were asking for this unity, particularly the aid to the Communists, and the unification by virtue of a joint government? Such as is said here [reading]:

Mrs. ROGERS. Is there any way we could have an agreement with China whereby she would not use our arms against us?

Then Mr. Acheson said:

Mr. ACHESON. Well, I suppose we have that in the United Nations Charter. There all the nations agree that they will not employ force against any country in accordance with the principles and under the procedure of the Charter. Under the principles and procedure of the Charter, if anyone wished to employ force against us, I am sure that we would veto that. They will not do it. That is the technical and legal answer to your question.

Did you have the same view back in 1945? You talked about the Charter and the protection under the Charter, and what had happened. Did you think all we had to do to stop a war was to veto it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I don't think I referred to the Charter at all. My view was that the postwar situation in China was one that could be kept manageable only by international agreement.

Senator FERGUSON. Mrs. Rogers then said, to that answer, when he ended up by saying "I think we can rest assured that the Chinese will not do that," meaning they would not use the arms we gave them against us, Mrs. Rogers said: "I suppose a fight could start before that was decided; could it not?"

Then Mr. Acheson seems to be quite surprised at that, because he said: "Do you mean that the Chinese would attack us? I do not think so."

Had you the same idea?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I did not have the same idea. My ideas went no further in June—July 1945 than a belief that the situation in China could only be controlled by agreement between the major powers.

Senator FERGUSON. And then Chairman Bloom said:

The Chair thinks that we should not go into that.

Mr. ACHESON. I am sure that we do not need to worry.

Was that your thinking at the time: that there was no worry about bringing these Communists in and bringing Russia into this Chinese situation?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir. You are making, I think, an unjustifiable link between Mr. Acheson's worries in 1946 and the problem that I was trying to consider in 1945.

Senator FERGUSON. The only thing I can see now is the difference that we did not give the Communists arms; but, if so, there may have been some worry back in those days.

Is it not true that as soon as they did get arms we found them moving down in North Korea, down across the imaginary line that we used to divide the country; and, in November of the same year, we find the Communists in China using arms against the United States.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would not put it quite the same way, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. How would you put it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would put it that, when we supplied arms in large quantities to armies that proved incompetent to use them, they passed very rapidly into the hands of the Chinese Communists and were turned against our policy.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, was the reason for your going to the President with this letter and this memorandum the point that you felt that Ambassador Grew, Mr. Dooman, and Mr. Ballantine were opposed to your views and your philosophy?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir. My feeling was, as is shown in my letter and memoranda quite clearly, that controversial problems of American policy were arising, and that the most important thing to do was to get an impartial review.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you, directly or indirectly, contact Dean Acheson about your visit to the White House?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you surprised when you saw Ambassador Grew coming out of the President's office the morning that you called on him?

By the way, it was Tuesday morning, the 3d, instead of Monday.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; it struck me as quite natural to see—I still forget whether he was Assistant Secretary or Under Secretary of State—him in the President's anteroom.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not get the urge to say, "Ambassador Grew, I am going to talk about the Far East. Will you not come into the President's office and we will talk it over together?"

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I didn't think it was a privilege of a citizen going in to see the President to do the President's inviting for him.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you think that you were just acting as a private citizen when you took this message to the President?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I did.

Senator FERGUSON. No more?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No more.

Senator FERGUSON. And no less?

Mr. LATTIMORE. And no less.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all at the present time.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Chairman, I have some material here from the Congressional Record pertinent to the general question of discussion of the subject of China in 1945 that I should like to read into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me see it first, please.

Senator FERGUSON. I have something before he puts that in, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LATTIMORE. One is from Representative Walter Judd, and the other is from Representative Mike Mansfield.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I said that I would produce for the minutes a matter concerning the Secretary of State. I have, from the ticker, this announcement as of 11:33 this morning, 3-5, meaning today [reading]:

Secretary Acheson said today he personally had cleared Foreign Service Officer O. Edmund Clubb after the State Department's Loyalty and Security Board had decided Clubb was a security risk.

Last evening I asked Mr. Michael McDermott to furnish to me a copy of all press releases by the State Department, or any officer thereof, concerning the Clubb case. At about 1:25 he called me and said that they had not assembled them all, but that he would send them up to me. I will want to put those into this record also, because I think it is very material to the issue that we cannot get information from the officers under oath but when they desire it they can release statements to the press.

I am going to ask that the whole matter be taken up in this committee as to the Clubb case so that we may get it under sworn testimony and not only in press releases.

You will note that this says "The State Department Loyalty and Security Board has decided Clubb was a security risk."

That is under the McCarran rider to the appropriation bill and not the President's Loyalty Board, the question of security.

I believe that, under the law, he has absolute discretion to discharge a person for security risk; but, if they try the person under the loyalty and then he sets aside an order of the Loyalty Board, the Appeal Board of the Loyalty Board would have the right to post-audit.

But, if they do it under the security risk, there is no right for the Appeal Board to come into the picture at all. This would be a method of cutting off the Appeal Board. It seems significant that this is done in this way, after the Service case was reversed by the Loyalty Appeal Board. I think the record ought to show that.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me say to you, Senator, that this matter was taken up in the Appropriations Committee, incidentally, and the substance of Mr. Humelsine's statement was—and I quote the substance only—that he was precluded from giving the information to the committee.

As far as I am concerned, whether it be in this committee or in the Appropriations Committee, the matter should and must be gone into. If men, after having been considered unfit to continue in service by the Loyalty Board, are relieved of that decision so that they may become inheritors of pensions from the Government, it is time for Congress to take very decisive action.

Do you have something else that you want to say?

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I might say that last evening I had asked the State Department also, by letter, to furnish to the Appropriations Committee the number of employees that have been allowed to resign, or have resigned after a loyalty case has been started, the number of employees that have resigned or have been permitted to resign after an investigation of their loyalty was started, the amount of salary of each such employee and the amount of pension that they are now drawing.

The CHAIRMAN. I might say to you that that request was also made by Mr. Humelsine by the chairman of the subcommittee having the appropriation at hand. I understand it is being prepared.

Senator FERGUSON. I did not have the privilege of being here, and I did not have the privilege of being in the Appropriations Subcommittee, of which I am a member, and I asked that it be furnished to you. I did not know that it was going to be furnished to you, or I would not have asked.

The CHAIRMAN. The two excerpts here, assertedly from the Congressional Record, I think counsel will check with the Congressional Record; and, if they are to go in, they will go in in context, and I will reserve the ruling on the matter.

As regards this matter that was submitted to the Chair this morning, asserted to be a quotation from General Chennault, I have submitted this to the committee.

Is there any objection to its going into the record?

Senator FERGUSON. I have read it, and I have no objection.

The CHAIRMAN. If there is no objection, it will go in the record.

On the other, the ruling of the Chair will be withheld until we can check the context of the Congressional Record.

Mr. ARNOLD. May the witness read it at this point?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The quotation is from *Way of a Fighter*, by Claire Lee Chennault, published in New York, 1949. That is well after the end of the war. It is chapter 5, page 61 [reading]:

Soon after Japan attacked at Shanghai, the Chinese sent an official call for help to all the major powers. Only Russia responded. The Russians didn't pause to play partisan politics or trip over ideological folderol when their national interests were at stake in China. All of the Soviets' aid went to the Central Government of the Generalissimo. The Russians had had no love for the Generalissimo since the 1927 split when he drove the Russian-supported Chinese Communists from the Kuomintang and slaughtered them by the thousands. For nearly 20 years he fought a ruthless war of extermination against communism in China. The Russians sent their aid to the Generalissimo solely because he represented the strongest and most effective force opposing Japan, and they supported him exclusively, ignoring the Chinese Communist armies, which badly needed external support.

Mr. MORRIS. As of what time was General Chennault writing there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He is describing the early years of the war in China, before Pearl Harbor.

Mr. MORRIS. That is not apparent, however, from that article; is it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; it is apparent that this aid began when Japan was attacked at Shanghai, which would be the summer of 1937.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you first get that memorandum?

Mr. LATTIMORE. This one?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; that information.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think about 2 weeks ago. I had a moment to spare in my university office, and I noticed there was this book by General Chennault which was in the book case. I pulled it out just to look through it, to see if there might be anything pertinent, and then ran on to this passage.

Senator FERGUSON. And it backs up what part of your thinking as of that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It backs up my thinking that, while the Russians supported the Chinese Communists politically and in their world propaganda, they disregarded them during the period of the war in China in favor of assistance to China as a nation, delivered exclusively through Chiang Kai-shek.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you not think that could have been for the purpose of their getting the Yalta agreement, and also getting the agreement or the treaty with the Nationalist Government, not being quite sure that the Communists could not throw out the Nationalists?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is not my interpretation, Senator. My interpretation is that the Russians were afraid of Japan and would support anything that was against Japan.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know that General Chennault has testified before the watchdog committee of the Appropriations Committee and before the Appropriations Committee itself of the Senate in reference to that subject?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not know that. Are there any further questions?

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, if I might inquire, I have a few loose ends we can tie up here.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. SOURWINE. First, Mr. Lattimore, with regard to the letter and memoranda to the White House, which has been discussed here at some length today, do you feel that the letter itself, the letter of June 10, adequately conveyed to the President, and did you intend by it to convey to him, your belief that the Chinese Communists were then and had been since at least 1940 supported by Russia, along with what I assume was your belief stated here that "If America then identified itself with one party, Russia would be justified in following that lead in committing itself to the other major party"; namely, the Communists?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Sourwine, my letter was intended solely to indicate to the President that I would like very much to see him and lay my opinions before him.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to have the question read. It is an involved question. I would like to have it read.

(The record was read by the reporter.)

The CHAIRMAN. You use the term "letter" there. I wonder if it would be clarified to say "memoranda."

Mr. SOURWINE. No, I meant letter, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The letter was intended to convey only what was in the letter, and the matter that was in the memoranda was matter that I considered only when I sat down to write the memoranda.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you care to assert a belief, Mr. Lattimore, as to whether there is any intellectual dishonesty of this letter of June 10 to the President?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I should say, Mr. Sourwine, that I should resent any indication of intellectual dishonesty.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you intend to mislead the President in that letter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. In your letter of June 10, addressed to the President—

The CHAIRMAN. By that last question, do you mean to intend to this committee that you meant to lead him and that you presented an honest view in leading him?

MR. LATTIMORE. No, sir, I meant to imply solely that I wanted to have a chance to put some opinions before the President.

THE CHAIRMAN. It was for the purpose of leading the President, was it not? It was for the purpose of influencing his judgment, was it not? It was not just for the purpose of laying a paper before him.

MR. LATTIMORE. I certainly hoped that the President would consider my opinions. To that extent, I wanted to influence him. I did not want to influence him exclusively. I took it for granted that the President would consider the opinions of many people.

MR. SOURWINE. If you will look at your letter of June 20 to the President, June 20, 1945, the middle paragraph, the second paragraph, quoting from the letter: "Your forthcoming meeting with the Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin."

I ask you, sir, did you have any private information with regard to that forthcoming meeting?

MR. LATTIMORE. No, I didn't. My best recollection is, in looking over these memoranda, that that had not been—that that had just come out in the press and, therefore, made me feel that if anything I had to say was worth consideration at all, it was worth consideration at that time.

MR. SOURWINE. You refer, of course, by that, to the Potsdam meeting?

MR. LATTIMORE. Yes, I think that must be the Potsdam meeting.

MR. SOURWINE. Would you be surprised to learn that the public announcement of the Potsdam meeting had not yet been made on the 20th of June?

MR. LATTIMORE. I should be very much surprised. Had it not been mentioned in the press?

MR. SOURWINE. I do not know what the fact is, sir. I am just making a record as to your recollection as to whether you had any private recollection.

MR. LATTIMORE. My recollection is that I had no private recollection.

MR. SOURWINE. Looking up to the memorandum itself, sir, I have just three questions about it.

There were some things in this memorandum that were intended as recommendations, were there not, and I speak of that portion of the memorandum which is labeled as related to Japanese policy as related to China policy.

MR. LATTIMORE. Yes.

MR. SOURWINE. This paragraph, the third paragraph, to counteract this Japanese policy, the American policy in China must work steadily for peace, unity, and modern political forms, was in the nature of a recommendation; was it not?

MR. LATTIMORE. I should agree to that; yes.

MR. SOURWINE. It called for an American policy favoring unity in China?

MR. LATTIMORE. Yes; that is right.

MR. SOURWINE. And that was the American policy for some time thereafter, was it not?

MR. LATTIMORE. It was.

MR. SOURWINE. The next paragraph says, at the same time, Japan hopes that fear of Russia will induce Britain and America to be soft

with antirevolutionary Japanese big business. That was, was it not, an implicit recommendation against a soft policy with Japanese big business?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Implicitly; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, American policy was a hard policy with Japanese big business thereafter; was it not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, not particularly hard; not hard, not soft. In between.

Mr. SOURWINE. At the end of that memorandum you find this sentence [reading]:

In most Government agencies at the present time the tendency is to find Japan-trained men in higher policy-making posts than China-trained men, simply because Japan used to be a more important great power than China.

That is an implicit recommendation for more China-trained men in higher policy-making posts, is it not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; it is.

Mr. SOURWINE. And the State Department thereafter had a substantial number more of China-trained men in high-policy posts; did it not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It did.

I would say that there is no question of cause and effect here.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you name some of those China-trained men who came into power in higher policy-making posts at a period subsequent to the date of this memorandum?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think I am correct in saying that it was after this memorandum that Mr. Vincent was promoted.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I wanted to put in the record here a quotation from *The Present Situation and the Next Tasks*. It is a draft resolution of the national board, Communist Political Association, as amended and approved by the national committee on June 20, 1945.

The source is *Political Affairs*, of July 1945, pages 579 to 591, Earl Browder, Editor.

I will ask that our director, Mr. Mandel, read it into the record.

Mr. MANDEL. These are excerpts from the draft resolution of the National Board of the Communist Political Association:

Now that the war against Hitler Germany has been won, the American economic royalists, like their British Tory counterparts, are alarmed at the strengthened positions of world labor, at the democratic advances in Europe and at the upsurge of the national liberation movements in the colonial and independent countries \* \* \* They are trying to organize a new cordon sanitaire against the Soviet Union \* \* \*

That is from page 580.

Further, from page 581:

It is this reactionary position of American big business which explains why Washington, along with London, are pursuing the dangerous policy of preventing a strong, united and democratic China; why they bolster up the reactionary, incompetent Chiang Kai-shek regime and why they harbor the idea of coming to terms with the Mikado in the hope of maintaining Japan as a reactionary bulwark in the Far East. It accounts, too, for the renewed campaign of anti-Soviet slander and incitement calculated to undermine American-Soviet friendship and cooperation \* \* \*

Then on page 584: "Remove from the State Department all pro-fascist and reactionary officials \* \* \*"

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Sourwine has one more question.

Senator FERGUSON. Just a moment.

Mr. Mandel, I take, from your experience as director of this committee, that is what is known as the commie line as of that time?

Mr. MANDEL. That was a resolution presented to the Plenary meeting. That is a full meeting of the national committee of the Communist Political Association, which was held June 18 to 20, 1945, and sets the line for the coming period.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Where?

Mr. MANDEL. In the United States. That was held in New York City. It sets the line for the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was then the head of the Communist Party?

Mr. MANDEL. In this same issue of the Political Affairs, the statement of Jacques Duclos, which laid the basis for the removal of Earl Browder, is included in this issue and the resolutions included here marked the change of line of the Communist Party from one of cooperation with the United States and Great Britain to one of hostility; which was symbolized by the removal of Browder and the selection of Eugene Dennis as the executive secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Smith, do you have any questions?

Senator SMITH. I have two questions. They are very short.

Mr. Lattimore, did you know young Lamont?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In 1945?

Senator SMITH. Yes; at the time this letter was prepared, when you prepared that communication?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't think I had ever met him at that time.

Senator SMITH. Had he been active at that time in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe so.

Senator SMITH. Do you know whether or not Mr. Carter knew him at that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It is evident that Mr. Carter knew him to the extent of seeing him at that time; but how well he knew him, I don't know.

Senator SMITH. You do not know of any relations that existed between Mr. Carter and the Institute of Pacific Relations and young Mr. Lamont?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator SMITH. You had never met him then?

Mr. LATTIMORE. At that time, I don't believe I had met him.

Senator SMITH. Did you get acquainted with him shortly thereafter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not shortly thereafter, I don't think.

At sometime thereafter, after the war, he spoke at a meeting of the Foreign Policy Association in Baltimore, and I met him then.

Senator SMITH. At the time you prepared this proposed letter for Mr. Lamont, Sr., to sign, did you know then Mr. Lamont, Jr.'s political thinking on communism?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I knew nothing whatever about him, sir.

Senator SMITH. Did Mr. Carter at that time, when he proposed this plan for you to prepare the text for a letter for young Mr. Lamont to get old Mr. Lamont to sign; did Mr. Carter tell you anything at all about young Mr. Lamont's signature?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He told me no more than is in that letter.

Senator SMITH. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have one more question on the memorandum.

The memorandum on China policy starts out with: "There are two alternatives in China."

Did you intend in that memorandum to state or imply that there were two, and only two, alternatives in China, in the context?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I presume so.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, was there not a third choice very clearly indicated?

Mr. LATTIMORE. What is that?

Mr. SOURWINE. To wit, American support of Chiang Kai-shek to drive the Communists out or overcome them?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think, if you call that an alternative, it is certainly taken up here by implication; isn't it?

Mr. SOURWINE. You think it is?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You intended to have regard for that and to cover in your memorandum for the President, did you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is the way I read this memorandum.

Mr. SOURWINE. You question whether it was, in fact, an alternative.

It is, as a matter of fact, an alternative which Dean Acheson recognized; is it not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. After the end of the war; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. Is it?

I thought the third alternative that Mr. Acheson gave was withdrawal from China.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did not Mr. Acheson recognize the alternative of all-out American aid to Chiang?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Maybe he did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Let us go back to you. Did you recognize the alternative of all-out American aid to Chiang at the time you wrote this memorandum?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think the term "all-out aid" had come into use then, and I doubt if those were the terms in which I was thinking.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you, in whatever terms you thought of it, think of the alternative of American aid to Chiang against the Chinese Communists for the unification of his nation under him by eliminating the Communist forces as a revolutionary force?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think this is implied in this memorandum, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is your answer, then, that you did think of it at the time you wrote this memorandum?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I suppose I must have.

Mr. SOURWINE. You could not have implied it without having thought it, could you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I can only read this memorandum now with the interpretation I put on it in 1952.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you mean you have now no memory of whether you thought of that alternative at the time you wrote this memorandum?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The only memory I have is that I placed before the President what I thought were the two alternatives: Division of the country, or unification of the country.

And, under division of the country, I envisaged the possibility of American support for one side and Russian support for the other.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Morris has a question.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, in connection with the memorandum you prepared for Mr. Carter, do you know whether that memorandum was shown to Mr. Bisson before it was sent to Mr. Lamont?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no clear recollection on that subject, but if you have a document to refresh my memory, I should be glad to see it.

Mr. MORRIS. I just want your recollection at this time, Mr. Lattimore.

The CHAIRMAN. He says he has no recollection.

Is that right?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't believe I have.

Maybe I should have.

Was it mentioned in Mr. Carter's testimony, or something of that sort?

Mr. MORRIS. I will give you the executive session minutes of your testimony, Mr. Lattimore.

At the bottom of the page there, does that refresh your recollection?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Oh, yes [reading:]

Mr. MORRIS. Now, I would like to introduce into the record in conjunction with this, and I would like to show, first of all, to Mr. Lattimore, a memorandum from the files of the institute, "TAB from ECC," "TAB" generally standing for Mr. Bisson and "ECC" standing for Mr. Carter, dated June 20, 1945, and ask you if that means anything to you?

And I replied that I had never seen this before, it has my initials on it, but I didn't recall seeing it before.

Mr. MORRIS. Does that refresh your recollection that it was shown to Mr. Bisson?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Is your answer "that is right"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. We will stand in recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Thereupon, at 3:25 p. m., the hearing recessed, to reconvene at 10 a. m., Thursday, March 6, 1952.)



# INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

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THURSDAY, MARCH 6, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,  
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION  
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL  
SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,  
*Washington, D. C.*

The subcommittee met at 10:15 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Hon. Pat McCarran, chairman, presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran, Smith, O'Connor, Ferguson, Watkins, and Jenner.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel, and Benjamin Mandel, research director, and Senator McCarthy.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Mr. Morris, you may proceed.

## TESTIMONY OF OWEN LATTIMORE, ACCOMPANIED BY ABE FORTAS, COUNSEL—Resumed

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, did Mr. Carter ever ask you for the best possible Soviet defense of the Soviet invasion of Finland?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe I remember some correspondence on that subject; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you tell us what you remember about that?

The CHAIRMAN. The question was: Did Mr. Carter ever ask you? He said he believes he remembers some correspondence on this.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes. I should be glad to have my memory refreshed, if you have correspondence.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, let us go ahead without refreshing memories. Let us find out what the witness now knows.

The CHAIRMAN. But he does not tell you what he knows. He says he believes that he received some communication, in answer to a question, "Did Mr. Carter ever ask you?"

Senator FERGUSON. That does not take a memorandum to refresh your memory.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The best of my recollection at the moment is that I think Mr. Carter wrote to me on the subject of the Russian invasion of Finland and asked my opinion on the subject.

Senator FERGUSON. When was that, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Presumably about the time of the invasion of Finland.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know when that was?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That was the winter of 1940-41, wasn't it?

Senator FERGUSON. That was from the IPR. I mean he was representing the IPR?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I believe it was an individual inquiry on his part.

Senator FERGUSON. A personal matter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. A personal matter.

Senator FERGUSON. And he wrote you about it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe so.

Senator FERGUSON. And did you answer?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. What was your opinion? What did he want to know about the invasion of Finland?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My recollection is—and, as I say, it is not very precise—that at that time there was a great deal of discussion about the significance of the Russian invasion of Finland.

My feeling was that the invasion of Finland was an outrageous thing on the part of the Russians, but I also believed that the politics of Europe at that time had sunk to a pretty low level.

The previous betrayal of Czechoslovakia by Britain and France had created a situation in which there was a general scramble for advantage among the great powers, and the ethics of international relations were not very conspicuous.

Senator FERGUSON. So you would say, then, that if France and Britain did something, then you think that the morals were lowered so as to justify Russia in doing something like the invasion of Finland?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think that I thought—I am sure that I didn't think that the Russian invasion of Finland was justified, because I supported the local branch in Baltimore that was of some sort of organization that was collecting funds for Finland.

On the other hand, I remember that at that time there were some people who were advocating going to war with Russia on the subject of Finland, and that seemed to me to be a rather unrealistic proposition.

Senator FERGUSON. Did Carter ever ask you for a pro or a con opinion?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My recollection is that he asked me for my opinions on the subject.

I would have to see the correspondence again.

Senator FERGUSON. But did you take that he had an opinion?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember whether he had an opinion or not, or whether he was trying to form an opinion and was asking me what I thought of it.

Senator FERGUSON. And that time was he pro-Russian?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I wouldn't be able to say. No; I don't think he was particularly pro-Russian.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, wait; you "don't think." You put in the word "particularly."

Was he pro-Russian, or do you want the answer to be that he was not particularly pro-Russian?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think that he was pro-Russian.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he pro-Soviet at that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't think he was pro-Soviet.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not think so?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't think so.

Senator FERGUSON. What did Britain and France do that you thought justified Russia, or the Soviets, invading Finland?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I did not think that the British and French had done anything that justified Russia in invading Finland. At least, that is my recollection.

Senator FERGUSON. You mentioned them here this morning. What did they do to mitigate Finland's aggression?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I thought that the British and French had betrayed Czechoslovakia and had thereby contributed to creating a very nasty situation in Europe, in which everybody was engaged in a bare-faced scramble for power, and ethical considerations were being trampled underfoot.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you explain what the "betrayal" was—so the record will show it—of Britain and France, of Czechoslovakia; what you thought it was?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My recollection, without looking up the documents of the time, is that the French had a treaty of mutual defense of some kind with Czechoslovakia and the British had some kind of treaty or understanding for the support of France—and let me see—I believe the Russians also had a treaty for the support of Czechoslovakia; that the Czechoslovaks appealed to the French, but the French and British, at Munich, decided to put pressure on the Czechoslovaks to surrender their western defense system to Hitler, and that that destroyed the security system for the containment of German aggression that had been built up after the First World War.

Senator FERGUSON. And because Britain and France had failed to carry out their treaty obligation to Czechoslovakia, you felt that had something to do with a justification of the Soviets invading Finland, did you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I did not think it was justification.

Senator FERGUSON. Then why did you mention it, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think I called it a justification, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. You mentioned here this morning—what is it? Mitigation?

Senator SMITH. Are we not getting off the beam a little bit, Mr. Chairman?

Senator FERGUSON. I think this is important.

Senator SMITH. I just wonder if it is because I can understand that if it was a trail—and I am inclined to think a little bit it was—that is something about another question entirely, about the Czechoslovakian situation.

I assume that what Dr. Lattimore meant was that that so lowered the level of public morals in Europe that that was one of the reasons understanding Russian aggression in Finland.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, the morals were so lowered by the Czechoslovakian incident that anything might follow.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; that is right.

Senator SMITH. Yes. The Russians might be encouraged to do anything.

I happen to know a little bit about that, because the Russians had agreed to go to the aid of Czechoslovakia—Dr. Benes wrote me that, incidentally—if England and France had laid down on Czechoslovakia.

I want to go ahead, except I am thinking of the time we are taking.

Senator FERGUSON. I am trying to go ahead.

Now, you say that was a personal matter between you and Mr. Carter.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is the best of my recollection.

The CHAIRMAN. Wait just a minute.

Mr. Carter was then the secretary-general of the Institute of Pacific Relations, just the same as he has been all the time; is that right?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

But Finland was not connected with the Pacific or with Asia, and any correspondence between me and Mr. Carter on the subject would not have been institute correspondence, but personal correspondence.

Senator FERGUSON. If it was personal correspondence, would Mr. Field have anything to do with it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember whether Mr. Field had anything to do with it, or not.

Senator FERGUSON. Would he be consulted if it was personal correspondence?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Might be. Anybody in Mr. Carter's and my personal acquaintanceship might have been consulted.

As I remember, at that time, everybody was talking to everybody else, and a good many people were writing to a good many people about this.

Here was one of the most perplexing situations that had ever arisen in the history of Europe.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, your long answers.

Will you tell us now whether or not you felt at the time that Mr. Carter asked you about the Soviet invasion of Finland that he was pro-Soviet?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I would not say he was pro-Soviet.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Morris, do you have a letter?

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this document, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a carbon copy of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated April 26, 1940, addressed to Owen Lattimore, Esq., with the typed signature of Edward C. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, I show you that letter and ask you if you can recall having received that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. This must be the letter that I recall.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will that be received into the record?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

I want to know if that is an answer that you recall having received.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I recall having received it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, will you read that letter, please?

Mr. LATTIMORE. This is dated April 26, 1940 [reading]:

EXHIBIT No. 531

DEAR OWEN—

Senator FERGUSON. What was your address at that time? Will you give it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My address was Johns Hopkins. [Reading:]

Where in English or French or Russian has there appeared the most convincing (I mean convincing to bourgeoisie readers) statement as to the U. S. S. R.'s justification for the Finnish campaign? The Soviets clearly regard the action as a necessary defense measure. Three-fourths of the rest of the world still regards it as unprovoked aggression.

Have you yourself written or are you writing anything along this line?

Sincerely yours,

This is dated April 26, 1940.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will you receive it into the record?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, it will be admitted into the record.

(Document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 531" and was read in full beginning on p. 3422.)

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, would that indicate as to whether or not Mr. Carter was pro-Soviet?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

I would say that this indicates that Mr. Carter was trying to form an opinion on the subject and that, as a necessary part of forming an opinion on the subject, he was trying to find out whether there had been a convincing statement from the Russian point of view or of the Russian point of view?

The CHAIRMAN. He says, "Where in English or French or Russian has there appeared the most convincing"—and then in parentheses: "I mean convincing to bourgeoisie readers."

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. "Bourgeoisie readers" are non-Soviet readers; are they not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Non-Soviet, and, I should say, non-Communist.

The CHAIRMAN. And he wanted to convince the non-Soviet reader.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I do not agree that he wanted to convince a non-Soviet reader.

The CHAIRMAN. He said, "I mean convincing to bourgeoisie readers"? What does that mean?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He is obviously considering himself as a non-Soviet and non-Communist person, and, as such, he wants to know where the Russian case is stated for people like himself.

He obviously means he wants to compare it with other opinions.

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment. Read the sentence again.

So as to make it complete, leaving out the parentheses, it states:

Where in English or French or Russian has there appeared the most convincing \* \* \* statement as to the U. S. S. R.'s justification for the Finnish campaign?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what he is looking for; is it not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would say that is a reasonable step for an impartial man to take when he was trying to assemble evidence and opinions on a very complicated problem.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, was this, or was it not, an IPR matter?

Was he trying to do this personally?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I should say that that letter is clearly a personal letter and not an organizational, institutional letter.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, when we get to a case like this, do you not see anything in this letter at all to indicate that Mr. Carter was pro-Soviet in this letter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I see nothing of the kind. I see he states that: "Three-fourths of the rest of the world still regards it as unprovoked aggression."

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. But is he not asking you to give him the best possible defense for the Russians?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He is trying, it is obvious, to find that out——

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment. Let us hear the question.

Please read the question, Mr. Reporter.

I am asking you to address yourself to the question.

(Thereupon, the pending question, as above transcribed, was read by the reporter.)

The CHAIRMAN. That can be answered "Yes" or "No," then you can explain, if you wish.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Obviously, as a part of trying to inform himself on all points of view of a very complicated question, which was the subject of great political discussion at the time.

The CHAIRMAN. You have to read that into the letter, do you not, that last statement of yours?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Where do you get the idea that he wanted all points of view when he was trying to get the best for the Russians and said nothing about any other point of view at all?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He is saying: "Three-fourths of the rest of the world still regard it as unprovoked aggression."

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. And does he not also in the letter assume that you would be writing on the Soviet side when he said, "Have you yourself written, or are you writing anything along this line?"—meaning along the line of the Soviet side?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. He does not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I consider it impossible to read any such implication into the letter.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, you said that this was not an organizational letter.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Mr. Field sent a copy of that letter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know. It doesn't say here that he was.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Field, did he venture an answer to Mr. Carter's questions?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That I don't recall.

Mr. MORRIS. You cannot recall anything on that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator SMITH. May I ask you this question:

Was 129 East Fifty-Second Street the address of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, that was.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that document, please?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a memorandum from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated April 30, 1940, headed "Memorandum to: E. C. C. from F. V. F."

The CHAIRMAN. Who is ECC and who is FVF?

Mr. MORRIS. That is presumably Mr. Edward C. Carter and Frederick Vanderbilt Field.

Mr. Chairman, this letter bears on the question about which the witness is now testifying, and I would like Mr. Mandel to read this letter into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me see it.

Senator FERGUSON. It that original out of the files of the IPR?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you read that letter, please?

Mr. MANDEL. April 30, 1940: "Memorandum to: E. C. C. from F. V. F."

Mr. MORRIS. This is 4 days after the previous letter, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

EXHIBIT No. 532

I noticed, in a letter from you to Lattimore, or vice versa, which passed over my desk today, a question about good sources for the Soviet point of view on the Finnish campaign. I wonder if you have seen a booklet of 130 pages just issued by Soviet Russia Today, entitled "War and Peace in Finland—A Documented Survey." It contains most of the pertinent documents and if you are looking for an analysis which is admittedly from the Soviet point of view, this is, I think, as good as anything which has come to hand.

Mr. MORRIS. Will that be admitted into the record, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted into the record.

(Document deferred to was marked "Exhibit No. 532" and was read in full.)

Mr. FORTAS. Excuse me.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you want to ask your counsel something?

Mr. FORTAS. He said "no."

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, do you notice there in the first line that Mr. Field is looking upon you and Mr. Carter as interchangeable in connection with that particular query? He could not recall whether the letter was from Carter to Lattimore, or Lattimore to Carter.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would not say, Mr. Morris, that he regards me and Carter as interchangeable.

The CHAIRMAN. He is speaking of the language now, Mr. Lattimore.

The first line of the note reads: "I noticed, in a letter from you to Lattimore or vice versa which passed over my desk today \* \* \*."

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Morris' question is: Do I regard that as indicating that Field says that Lattimore and Carter were, or regarded Lattimore and Carter as interchangeable?

Mr. MORRIS. With respect to this query.

Mr. LATTIMORE. With respect to this query.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not the question.

Mr. LATTIMORE. My answer is "No," and I would like to explain.

Mr. FORTAS. We want the question read.

The CHAIRMAN. Reframe the question. You can get at it in another way.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, does not that first sentence indicate to you that, with respect to this particular query, namely, where to find the most convincing, to bourgeoisie readers, defense of the Soviet invasion of Finland, did he not consider in his mind that you and Carter were interchangeable with respect to being the originator of that particular query?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My answer is "No."

May I explain?

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think it is necessary for an explanation. The answer is "No." That is all there is to it.

It is a question of the construction of the language.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think I have something pertinent to say on the subject.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think there is anything pertinent. When you say "no, it is not interchangeable," then it is not interchangeable. That is your decision.

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I explain why I think the answer is "No"?

The CHAIRMAN. No. The language speaks for itself.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, it appears that Mr. Field had on his desk that particular day, which would seem to be the 30th of April, the Soviet literature, War and Peace in Finland; would it not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And that when it passed over the desk, he was not quite sure whether it was a letter from you to Carter, or Carter to you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; that is not my construction of the language.

Senator FERGUSON. That is not your construction?

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment, Senator.

If there is any more evidence of expression in the rear of the room, any more disturbance in the rear of the room, the room will be cleared. I have said that once or twice before. I hope it will not occur again.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, did you know that Soviet Russia Today was a Soviet publication?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The answer is "No, at that time." I don't believe at that time I knew the publication Soviet Russia Today at all.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know at that time that Frederick V. Field was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I didn't. To the best of my recollection, I did not believe then that he was Communist—

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment.

A moment ago, in listening to the question, I think the Chair ruled erroneously, and I want to correct my ruling. I refused to permit the witness to explain his view on the first two lines, or three lines of the letter. I think I ruled hastily and I want to correct that ruling. I want him to have that opportunity.

You may have it now.

Mr. FORTAS. We want the question and the answer read back.

The CHAIRMAN. You may have the question and the answer read back, if you want to clarify your position.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes. May I?

The Reporter (reading) :

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, does not that first sentence indicate to you that, with respect to this particular query, namely, where to find the most convincing, to bourgeoisie readers, defense of the Soviet invasion of Finland, did he not consider in his mind that you and Carter were interchangeable with respect to being the originator of that particular query?

The CHAIRMAN. The reason why I changed my ruling is that I caught the expression "in your mind" as to what was in Mr. Carter's mind.

Senator FERGUSON. And not what was in Field's mind?

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Mr. FORTAS. In Mr. Lattimore's mind.

The CHAIRMAN. It is his analysis of what might have been in the writer's mind.

Mr. FORTAS. He said Carter. I thought he said Lattimore.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right. In his analysis.

If he wants to give it after looking at the language and listening to the question again, I think the Chair was erroneous in its ruling.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I simply wanted to explain. Mr. Chairman, that it was the practice in the institute to circulate letters and copies of letters to everybody in the office and people outside the office, and my construction of this language is simply that Mr. Field remembered seeing some correspondence some days before and hadn't bothered to look up who wrote the correspondence when he sent this little note to Mr. Carter.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a fair explanation of it, if you can guess what was in the writer's mind.

He is making a guess at it, and that is all there is to it.

Let us proceed.

Senator SMITH. With that language, "vice versa," I do not quite agree with the chairman.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you ever seen before that time the publication Soviet Russia Today?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe I had.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever furnish a document to Mr. Carter in reply to his letter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I recall writing to Mr. Carter expressing some opinions. I don't recall the exact language.

Senator FERGUSON. But did you furnish a document?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Do you mean a document other than writing him a letter?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he ever ask you for any more than an answer to his letter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I can't recall that he did. I don't believe he did.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever read War and Peace in Finland?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't think I ever read it.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you endeavor to answer his question about what is most convincing to bourgeoisie readers in defense of the Soviet invasion of Finland?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I did. I believe that what I did was to express my own opinions about some of the factors involved.

Mr. MORRIS. As the most convincing defense?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. I don't recall. I don't believe that I responded to any such point, that I simply wrote down some general observations that were in my mind at the time as to what I thought about the situation.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony, Mr. Lattimore, that you did not reply to this particular query of Mr. Carter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. To the question about some source in English, French, or Russian?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe I replied to that point.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you attempt to give the best possible defense of the Soviet invasion of Finland?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir. I believe that I expressed my own opinion. My own opinion may have included some expression about what sort of case I thought the Russians could make for themselves, or something of that sort.

But I certainly did not do any research on the subject.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, do you think that the memorandum from Field to Carter indicated that Field believed Carter wanted a pro-Soviet opinion?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes. The language is: "A question about good sources for the Soviet point of view."

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Which, it seems to me, would be a reasonable point—let me repeat once more—for anybody who was trying to find out what the score was on Finland.

The CHAIRMAN. The language of this note is, again, interesting. This was a note from Frederick V. Field to the secretary general of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Mr. Carter.

He says in this note: "I notice, in a letter from you to Lattimore or vice versa, which passed over my desk today \* \* \*." In other words, the note which Carter had written to you passed over Field's desk. You said that you did not know whether or not that note was referred to Mr. Field.

It is evident, from this letter, that it had been referred to Mr. Field.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. And he says: "A question about good sources for the Soviet point of view on the Finnish campaign."

Then he refers Carter to what he considers a good source:

I wonder if you have seen a booklet of 130 pages just issued by Soviet Russia Today, entitled "War and Peace in Finland—A Documented Survey." It contains most of the pertinent documents—

This was Field giving advice to Carter, who had written you.

\* \* \* It contains most of the pertinent documents and if you are looking for an analysis which is admittedly from the Soviet point of view, this is, I think, as good as anything which has come to hand.

He was rather praising it; was he not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He was rather what?

The CHAIRMAN. Praising it. In other words, he was recommending it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. He was recommending that anybody who wanted to find out what the Soviet point of view was would find in this publication the documents which the Russians had considered it pertinent to publish.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Morris, go ahead.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say that Field's statement was pro-Soviet?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that document, please?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a photostat of a carbon copy of a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated April 29,

1940, addressed to Mr. E. C. Carter, with the typed signature of Owen Lattimore. In the upper part of the sheet we have the initials F. V. F. and K. B., presumably Frederick Vanderbilt Field and Kathleen Barnes.

Mr. MORRIS. Does K. B. stand for Kathleen Barnes?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Presumably.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you explain what you believe those initials mean on the top of that photostat?

Mr. LATTIMORE. What I believe they mean?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. My assumption would be that Mr. Carter had initialed them for circulation in the office to Kathleen Barnes and Frederick V. Field.

Senator FERGUSON. And your name being on the top would indicate that it was later to be filed, I assume, under your name?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Probably would be put in the file of Carter's correspondence with me; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. So, certainly the Institute of Pacific Relations considered it an organizational letter, did it not, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I wouldn't say so.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think it still indicates what is before you now, that this is purely a personal matter between you and Mr. Carter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. As far as I was concerned, it was a purely personal matter between me and Mr. Carter.

Senator FERGUSON. That was not the question.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, I would still say it.

Senator FERGUSON. From the evidence before you——

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. And what has been produced here in the case?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Knowing, as I do, that it was Mr. Carter's regular practice to circulate a great deal of his personal correspondence to other people.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the address of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. LATTIMORE. At that time?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. LATTIMORE. 129 East Fifty-second, I think.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the address on the letter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. 129 East Fifty-second.

The CHAIRMAN. That was the address of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

All right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, will you read the last paragraph in your letter.

Mr. Chairman, first, will it be admitted into the record?

The CHAIRMAN. It has been identified by Mr. Mandel, has it not, as having come from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted into the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 533" and is as follows:)

## EXHIBIT No. 533

300 GILMAN HALL, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY,  
Baltimore, Md., April 29, 1940.

Mr. E. C. CARTER,

*Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East Fifty-second Street,  
New York City.*

DEAR CARTER: Thanks very much for putting me wise to the correspondence and editorial comments in the Herald-Tribune. I thought your letter was perfectly justifiable, and the tone taken by the editorial writer in commenting on it rather nasty. I enclose a copy of the letter I have just written them.

With regard to the Gayer book on "American Economic Foreign Policy," am I to understand that Holland has received a review copy, or that he is merely recommending it to you? Let me know if I should write for a review copy. Off-hand, I should concur with the selection of Plumptre as reviewer.

We are so far advanced in the process of getting the June issue of Pacific Affairs through the press that it would be difficult now to get in the suggested notice of the nonparticipation committee pamphlet "Shall America Stop Arming Japan," for reasons of both time and space. What should be our future policy about matters of this kind? Would it not be making Pacific Affairs too "American" for subscribers abroad?

Your question about where to find the most convincing statement as to the Soviet justification for the Finnish campaign is one that I have been asking myself. It seems to me that everybody takes a too simple approach to this problem, the Russians from their side and everybody else from his own side. It seems to me that even if the Russians had more detailed, plausible and documented evidence of "plots" in or concerning Finland than I have yet seen, and even if they had strong justification in "realistic" terms, from the strategic point of view, they nevertheless made a political blunder in attacking Finland. On the other hand, I think there is apt to be a certain smugness in the people who either unconsciously assume or explicitly state that what Russia did, after a great war had already broken out, was much worse than what the French and British did in letting down first Spain and then Czechoslovakia. The Russians may have been feeling and hoping for years for a chance to do this very thing; but as far as the evidence goes, the Russians stood by collective security and the honoring of treaties until these principles had been violated by some of the great powers with which Russia was dealing, and betrayed by others. The moral guilt of Russia is presumably as great as that of any of the others, since if you assume that there is an absolute morality, then by definition there can be no degree of morality; but if justification be pleaded, the Russians can point out that they did not lead off in the scramble of aggression, and can claim that there is a difference between being the first to start aggression and committing what might be called an act of "self-protective aggression" after the general scramble had begun.

Yours very sincerely,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

P. S.—Who is in charge of the Pacific Council Library now that Lilienthal has left? I should like to know if you have, and if I may borrow, "League of Nations Mission of Educational Experts: The Reorganization of Education in China," Paris, 1932.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The paragraph reads:

Your question about where to find the most convincing statement as to the Soviet justification for the Finnish campaign is one that I have been asking myself. It seems to me that everybody takes a too simple approach to this problem, the Russians from their side and everybody else from his own side. It seems to me that even if the Russians had more detailed, plausible and documented evidence of "plots" in or concerning Finland than I have yet seen, and even if they had strong justification in "realistic" terms, from the strategic point of view, they nevertheless made a political blunder in attacking Finland.

On the other hand, I think there is apt to be a certain smugness in the people who either unconsciously assume or explicitly state that what Russia did, after a great war had already broken out, was much worse than what the French and British did in letting down first Spain and then Czechoslovakia. The Russians may have been feeling and hoping for years for a chance to do this very

thing, but as far as the evidence goes, the Russians stood by collective security and the honoring of treaties until these principles had been violated by some of the great powers with which Russia was dealing, and betrayed by others. The moral guilt of Russia is presumably as great as that of any of the others, since there can be no degree of morality; but if justification be pleaded, the Russians can point out that they did not lead off in the scramble of aggression, and can claim that there is a difference between being the first to start aggression and committing what might be called an act of "self-protective aggression," after the general scramble had begun.

The expression "self-protective aggression" is in quotes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, were you thereby answering Mr. Carter's query as to what was the most convincing statement as to the Soviet justification for the Finnish campaign?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I don't think I was. I was replying to Mr. Carter's letter as a whole and not to a particular point of it.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that your answer, Mr. Lattimore, or Mr. Fortas' answer?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My answer has been introduced by the phrase, "Your question about where to find the most convincing statement as to the Soviet justification for the Finnish campaign is one that I have been asking myself."

But the language shows that I had not looked up the matter.

May I add a word of explanation?

The CHAIRMAN. You were asking yourself for a justification of the Russian invasion, were you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I was not.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what you say here.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was asking where to find the most convincing statement.

The CHAIRMAN. You said it was a question that you had been asking yourself.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes. In other words, like Mr. Carter, I thought that here was an extremely complex and confusing question, and I would like to know more evidence on all sides.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, was that your answer to my question, or was that Mr. Fortas' answer to my question?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That was my answer to your question.

Mr. FORTAS. Mr. Morris, I object. I don't think that is called for.

The CHAIRMAN. I have not caught Mr. Fortas suggesting answers as yet.

Mr. FORTAS. No, sir; and you won't.

Mr. Chairman, I believe I should be given the courtesy of making a statement. I unconsciously and without deliberation commented on Mr. Morris' question, I am afraid, audibly. I said that that is not what Mr. Carter had asked Mr. Lattimore.

And the record speaks for itself.

Mr. Morris' question was whether this was the most convincing statement of the Soviet position that Mr. Carter had asked for. Now, that is not what the record shows Mr. Carter asked Mr. Lattimore for.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think you intentionally broke in.

Mr. FORTAS. I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. As long as we are all testifying, Mr. Chairman—

The CHAIRMAN. I hope that that will not occur again.

Senator, you were asking.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. I was going to ask a question on that, in line with what the Chair asked.

Your question about where to find the most convincing statement as to the Soviet justification for the Finnish campaign is one that I have been asking myself.

Mr. Lattimore, does not that clearly indicate that you stated to Carter that you had been asking yourself just what he asked you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Something to justify the Finnish campaign.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; not something to justify the Finnish campaign; a statement of the Soviet point of view as a necessary ingredient for anybody who was trying to find out what the score was on Finland.

Senator FERGUSON. What, Mr. Lattimore, was a "self-protective aggression"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I presume, in 1952——

Senator FERGUSON. No, no. In 1940.

Mr. LATTIMORE. In 1952, trying to reconstruct what I was thinking in 1940, 12 years previously, that I meant here that—what is it now——

Senator FERGUSON. "Self-protective aggression."

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; that if justification be pleaded I presume that the Russians might put up a case of saying that this was self-protective aggression after other people had started aggression.

I might add that I doubt if anywhere in the record have the Russians ever admitted to such a thing as self-protective aggression.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you had any trouble solving, in your own mind, the problem as to who was the aggressor in Korea?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The aggressor in Korea was clearly the North Korean Communists.

Senator FERGUSON. And you would not say that Russia now calls that "self-protective aggression"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would doubt very much if the Russians would admit to such a damaging formula.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Morris, go ahead.

Mr. SOURWINE. Might I ask one question, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, when you wrote that letter, did you really believe that Russia had only become a treaty breaker because Britain and France had set her a bad example?

The CHAIRMAN. Are you referring now to Mr. Lattimore's letter of April 29, 1940?

Mr. SOURWINE. That is correct.

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I have your question again, Mr. Sourwine?

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you really believe that Russia had become a treaty breaker only because she had been set a bad example by Britain and France?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember what I meant at the moment, Mr. Sourwine, beyond the language of this letter.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, I am using plain English.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The language of this letter does not support the twist that you are trying to put on it, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. What are you saying in that letter? Are you not saying in that letter that Russia really stood by her treaties until Britain and France set her a bad example, and then she became wayward?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. I am saying:

The Russians may have been feeling and hoping for years for a chance to do this very thing. But as far as the evidence goes, the Russians stood by collective security and the honoring of treaties until these principles had been violated by some of the great powers with which Russia was dealing and betrayed by others.

Mr. SOURWINE. What do you mean by that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I meant there that there were two possibilities. One was that the Russians may have been feeling and hoping for years for a chance to do this very thing.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. You underlined the "may," did you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I put that in as a possibility, and I doubt if any pro-Soviet or pro-Communist person would have allowed for that possibility.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the other?

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, you said, "as far as the evidence goes."

Mr. LATTIMORE. Then I said, "as far as the evidence goes."

Obviously, as far as the evidence known to me went at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. What I want you to do, Mr. Lattimore, is to put into different language what you meant there. You are a man very facile with language. Express your thought there another way.

Mr. FORTAS. He wants to consult with me.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

(Consultation between witness and counsel.)

The CHAIRMAN. Just before proceeding, I would like to have the record read back just a little. I think Mr. Lattimore said there were two—I do not think he called them alternatives, but he dwelt on one.

One was that Russia may have for a long time been hoping for this, or that is the substance of it.

The other was something else. He did not dwell on the other.

Mr. MORRIS. The other alternative was that the Russians had stood by collective security and the honoring of treaties until the treaty structure had been violated by others.

The CHAIRMAN. And that they had taken that as a justification; is that right?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, not that they had taken it as a justification.

But I suggested that if justification be pleaded, the Russians can point out that they did not lead off in the scramble of aggression.

Mr. SOURWINE. I accept that as an answer, Mr. Chairman. I think the witness has rephrased what he said in the letter.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it is an answer.

Do you accept that as an answer?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, do you recall making an effort, after a Soviet protest, to prevent the appearance of an article by Mr. L. M. Hubbard, in 1938, from appearing in Pacific Affairs?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Do I recall what?

Mr. MORRIS. Your making an effort to prevent an article by Mr. L. M. Hubbard from appearing in Pacific Affairs.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't remember that. If you have a document to refresh my memory, I should be glad to see it.

Mr. MORRIS. You do recall some controversy about Mr. Hubbard's article, do you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I do recall that Mr. Hubbard wrote an article. I don't recall a controversy.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is, Do you recall a controversy about Mr. Hubbard's article? It calls for a simple answer, "Yes" or "No."

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall a controversy beyond the fact that—now, wait a minue.

Mr. FORTAS. What year was this, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. In 1938. That is in the question.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you recall a controversy about Mr. Hubbard's article?

Just answer that, if your memory serves you.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I remember not exactly a controversy, but a question of whether another point of view should also be expressed.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that document?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a photostat of carbon copy of a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated February 8, 1938, addressed to Dr. V. E. Motylev, 20 Razin Street, Moscow, with the typed signature of Owen Lattimore, and the initials ECC, in the upper lefthand corner.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Mandel, what you mean, is it not, is that you have there a photostat of a document from the files of the IPR? Is that correct?

Mr. MANDEL. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. The document itself was a carbon copy of a letter.

Mr. MANDEL. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, I show you this document and ask you if you recall having sent it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't recall having sent it. But I obviously did send it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will it be received into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. That document, as I understand it, is a photostatic copy of a document in the nature of a carbon copy, found in the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. That is right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The witness says he obviously had sent it.

It will be received into the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 534" and is as follows:)

#### EXHIBIT No. 534

1795 CALIFORNIA STREET,  
San Francisco, Calif., February 8, 1938.

Dr. V. E. MOTYLEV,  
20 Razin Street, Moscow.

DEAR DR. MOTYLEV: Immediately on receipt of your letter of 15 January I cabled you requesting an article on possibilities of constructive international action, to be considered as part of a general defense against imperialist and fascist aggression; this article to be used as the leading contribution in our June number.

I hope very much that you will be able to provide such an article. Naturally, I have suggested only general terms; the particular terms are for you to decide. I may add that in the December number I tried to set a tone that would encourage such articles from all sources. The response up to date has not been too encouraging; therefore it will be all the more helpful to me if you can now supply the suggested article.

In regard to L. M. Hubbard's article, I have carefully noted your criticisms. I am sorry that I seem to have expressed myself clumsily in regard to the question of anti-Soviet articles in Pacific Affairs. The real difficulty is this: the membership of the IPR is predominantly of the "democratic nations." These nations continue to set great store by the principle of free speech. Many individual members of the IPR appeal to this principle for the purpose of criticising the USSR. If I, as editor of Pacific Affairs, prevent them from doing so, they will criticise Pacific Affairs as "an organ of Soviet propaganda" and largely destroy its usefulness.

Realization of the urgent necessity for promoting all that is really democratic in the public life of the "democratic nations," and resisting the forces that favor imperialist aggression and fascism, is only gradually spreading. In the circumstances the only wise and constructive thing for me to do is to *favor* publication of positive and constructive articles, while not *preventing* entirely the expression of negative and defeatist views. This means that whenever we find it impossible to prevent publication of such an article as this one by Hubbard we should at least make sure that in the same number there shall appear an article which deals with the true values of the same questions, and deals with them constructively.

Now as to L. M. Hubbard himself. Of course I do not propose to print his article simply because he is a brother of G. E. Hubbard of Chatham House. The reason that I find it difficult to reject his article is that he is an "expert" of the Bank of England, he has written a book on Soviet finance that is considered authoritative in Great Britain and America, and to reject his article would cause the majority group represented in the Royal Institute of International Affairs to accuse Pacific Affairs of being partisan—thus damaging its influence in Great Britain. The accident that this Hubbard is a brother of the Hubbard who is appointed by Chatham House to be in charge of communications with Pacific Affairs merely increases the difficulty of dealing with the situation.

In the circumstances, I am taking the following course of action:

(1) I am deleting from the article one of its most objectionable paragraphs. A copy of the article, thus revised, is attached to this letter.

(2) I am writing to G. E. Hubbard, of Chatham House, asking him to withdraw the article altogether, on behalf of Chatham House. If, however, he officially insists on publication of the article, I shall have to publish it, in our June number.

(3) Finally, I urge you to write, immediately, a reply to the article, to be published in the same number. This must be received in New York not later than the last week of March. It will be used only in case Chatham House insists on publication of the original article.

In concluding this letter I wish to concur with you in the sentiment that at this time of extreme crisis in the Far East, Pacific Affairs ought to find more suitable subjects for publication than anti-Soviet articles. To the best of my ability, within the limits imposed on me by the different national bodies which have a voice in the conduct of Pacific Affairs, I shall publish only material which emphasizes the true issues which the world is facing. In this, the USSR Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations can come to my aid with indispensable assistance.

Very sincerely,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

The CHAIRMAN. In going along here, we have not attempted to number or designate these documents. They should be numbered in the record when the record is put up. They should be numbered or designated so that they will have some designation.

The Chair has not attempted to do it, but it must be done.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, under a previous order of the Chair, these documents were ordered numbered consecutively as introduced. They have not been marked, however, which I think is what the Chair is referring to.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, will you read that letter commencing with paragraph 3, which is where the pertinent reference commences?

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading) :

In regard to L. M. Hubbard's article, I have carefully noted your criticisms. I am sorry that I seem to have expressed myself clumsily in regard to the question of anti-Soviet articles in Pacific Affairs. The real difficulty is this: The membership of the IPR is predominantly of the "democratic nations." \* \* \*

Mr. MORRIS. That "democratic" is in quotes, is it not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; "democratic nations" is in quotes [reading] :

\* \* \* These nations continue to set great store by the principle of free speech. Many individual members of the IPR appeal to this principle for the purpose of criticizing the U. S. S. R. If I, as editor of Pacific Affairs, prevent them from doing so, they will criticize Pacific Affairs as "an organ of Soviet propaganda" and largely destroy its usefulness.

Senator FERGUSON. That organ of Soviet propaganda is in quotes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Is in quotes, yes [reading] :

Realization of the urgent necessity for promoting all that is really democratic in the public life of the "democratic nations," and resisting the forces that favor imperialist aggression and fascism, is only gradually spreading. In the circumstances the only wise and constructive thing for me to do is to favor publication of positive and constructive articles, while not preventing entirely the expression of negative and defeatist views. This means that whenever we find it impossible to prevent publication of such an article, as this one by Hubbard, we should at least make sure that in the same number there shall appear an article which deals with the true values of the same questions, and deals with them constructively.

Now as to L. M. Hubbard himself. Of course, I do not propose to print his article simply because he is a brother of G. E. Hubbard, of Chatham House. The reason that I find it difficult to reject his article is that he is an "expert" of the Bank of England, he has written a book on Soviet finance that is considered authoritative in Great Britain and America, and to reject his article would cause the majority group represented in the Royal Institute of International Affairs to accuse Pacific Affairs of being partisan—thus damaging its influence in Great Britain. The accident that this Hubbard is a brother of the Hubbard who is appointed by Chatham House to be in charge of communications with Pacific Affairs merely increases the difficulty of dealing with the situation.

In the circumstances, I am taking the following course of action:

1. I am deleting from the article one of its most objectionable paragraphs.

\* \* \*

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what that paragraph was?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't [reading] :

\* \* \* A copy of the article, thus revised, is attached to this letter.

2. I am writing to G. E. Hubbard, of Chatham House, asking him to withdraw the article altogether, on behalf of Chatham House. If, however, he officially insists on publication of the article, I shall have to publish it, in our June number.

3. Finally, I urge you to write, immediately, a reply to the article, to be published in the same number. This must be received in New York not later than the last week of March. It will be used only in case Chatham House insists on publication of the original article.

In concluding this letter, I wish to concur with you in the sentiment that at this time of extreme crisis in the Far East, Pacific Affairs ought to find more suitable subjects for publication than anti-Soviet articles. To the best of my ability, within the limits imposed on me by the different national bodies which have a voice in the conduct of Pacific Affairs, I shall publish only material which emphasizes the true issues which the world is facing. In this, the U. S. S. R. Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations can come to my aid with indispensable assistance.

Very truly yours,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

May I comment?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. This letter begins with a paragraph not yet read into the record, showing that I had received a letter from Mr. Motylev, evidently a letter criticizing the article I was about to publish.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you submitted it to Motylev in order that he could censor it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; not for censorship.

In the course of the usual practice of Pacific Affairs, I had circulated the article in advance.

Senator FERGUSON. To whom did you circulate those that were pro-Soviet? Who in America censored them or looked them over for the pro-Soviet article?

Mr. LATTIMORE. All articles were circulated to those who might be considered most interested, in the first place. Many of them were sent additionally to people who might be considered to have no position one way or the other.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not an answer to the question.

Senator FERGUSON. That does not answer my question.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not an answer to that question at all.

Read the question, Mr. Reporter.

The question was propounded twice.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I recall only one article.

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment.

(The pending question, as heretofore recorded, was read by the reporter.)

The CHAIRMAN. I think there was more. He doubled back.

Senator FERGUSON. You say you circulated this because it was anti-Soviet. It is clear from the letter that you did that. I want to know——

Mr. LATTIMORE. In the same way——

The CHAIRMAN. Let the Senator ask his question, and answer it.

Senator FERGUSON. To whom did you submit pro-Soviet articles so that they could be censored, or, as least, criticized before they were published?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That would depend on the content of the article. Any article would be circulated——

Senator FERGUSON. Suppose it was an article criticizing Russia, written by a United States writer.

Mr. LATTIMORE. An article criticizing Russia by a United States writer would be circulated to the Russians, also to the British, Chinese, Japanese, and so on.

Senator FERGUSON. Suppose it was an article by Soviet Russia, pro-Soviet. Who criticized it for the United States?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The New York office would look after that.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Field?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know whether it would be Mr. Field, or who it would be. It would also be circulated to the Japanese, Chinese, British, et cetera.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you think that Mr. Field was a competent critic to determine whether or not an article should be changed that was a pro-Russian article?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In 1938 I thought that Mr. Field was one of the critics to whom such an article might be circulated.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?

Mr. LATTIMORE. You will remember that in the record there was an article by a Soviet contributor, which I personally disliked very much and which was finally put in because the Chinese Council said, "Oh, go ahead and print it; it is the Soviet point of view and everybody knows it is"; although the Japanese continued to object.

Mr. SOURWINE. May I inquire, Mr. Chairman?

Senator FERGUSON. Just a moment.

I cannot quite understand why you would take an article by this Britisher and send it to the Russians, which is in effect sending it to the Russian Government, for their comment on that article as to whether or not you should or should not print it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. It was part of regular practice. It was the same for all other councils.

Senator FERGUSON. And you had stricken out one anti-Soviet paragraph, at least?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Which was undoubtedly also covered in my correspondence with the British.

This is only a part of the record, and the full record would show my correspondence with the British as well.

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to see it all.

Mr. LATTIMORE. So should I, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. The question was asked now about having stricken one out; that is, the Soviet phase of it, at least.

Did you, or did you not in the letter so state?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The letter so states.

Senator FERGUSON. You said it was the most objectionable, indicating there were other objectionable ones that were anti-Soviet. But that was the most?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That was evidently my opinion at the time.

And may I add that this was undoubtedly covered in correspondence with the British, too.

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to see the article.

Mr. LATTIMORE. This was a period when all of us were leaning over backward trying to drag the Soviets into more contributions to Pacific affairs, and more participation in the Institute, and I remember clearly that the attitude taken was, "Let's get the Russians out of this business of just criticizing and stalling; let's get them to make some contributions and then make them realize that they are getting only the same treatment as other people."

You can see that this whole letter is an attempt to explain to a Russian, who is unfamiliar with the practice of free speech and criticism in democratic countries, how things worked and that Russia was not being particularly singled out as an object of anti-Soviet propaganda; that we frequently published articles unacceptable to other councils.

This was recognized practice at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. When you had a pro-Soviet article, to whom did you submit the article so that an anti-Soviet could appear in the same edition?

You were indicating here that you were going to do that on the reverse.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I referred already to the case of an article—I believe it was by Voitinsky—which attacked both the Japanese and the Chinese, and I asked both the Chinese and the Japanese to reply, which they didn't.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you send them copies of the article?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I sent them copies of the article in advance.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it not your understanding, Mr. Lattimore, that the Soviets would not permit the editing or changing of their articles?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That question was brought up in one of the conferences at Moscow, and we were still then in the frame of mind that many people had in those years——

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment. I want to get the question. I want to get the question and see whether you are answering it.

(The record was read by the reporter.)

The CHAIRMAN. The question was what was your understanding.

Mr. LATTIMORE. My understanding is that quite recently Mr. Chairman, in those memoranda——

The CHAIRMAN. The question is was it not your understanding, referring to that particular time.

Mr. LATTIMORE. My understanding was that the Russians had made that demand. My recollection was that we were still hoping to wean them away from this Soviet rigidity which has since become more familiar to all of us.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had had that made clear to you in the conferences in Moscow in 1936, that the Russians would not permit their articles to be changed or edited?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That had been made clear, that that was the Soviet attitude, and we had not accepted, from our point of view, the idea that that attitude could not be changed.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever strike out of a Soviet article a part that you thought was objectionable?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you produce that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I can't produce it, but I remember that that very question came up in the case of the article by Voitinsky.

Senator FERGUSON. Then will you produce it so that we will have it here on the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Was the article published?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The article was published.

Senator FERGUSON. The IPR would be able to do that for you.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir, I don't think they can do it. You have all of the IPR documents.

Senator FERGUSON. They can come down here and look through the papers.

The CHAIRMAN. The IPR must have it if it was published. It must be in the files of the IPR.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I remember writing to Mr. Carter my strong objections to the whole tone of that Soviet article.

Senator FERGUSON. That was not my question. Did you strike any of it out?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I struck some of it out.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you produce or have the institute produce for this record what you struck out?

The CHAIRMAN. The question is to produce the article, and I think it calls for the printed article.

Mr. FORTAS. Senator, may I inquire whether we may have access to the IPR files in your possession for the purpose of searching for that?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, you can look through them. I ask the Chair that you be permitted to do that.

Mr. FORTAS. Not for the article. The article would not show what was cut out. It would require access to the files.

The CHAIRMAN. The article, he said, was printed.

Mr. FORTAS. Yes, but it would not show what was deleted.

The CHAIRMAN. But he could designate where the deletion was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, if I might submit, I do not believe the files of the IPR would contain editorial material of Pacific Affairs. Would they, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That I couldn't tell you.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were not the Pacific Affairs files kept separately?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The Pacific Affairs files were kept separately by me, but I think in large part in duplicate in the New York office.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have made a point, sir, that, as Pacific Affairs editor, you were employed by the International Council of IPR.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. The files which this committee has are the files of the American Council of the IPR.

Can you tell the committee whether your files of Pacific Affairs were duplicated in the files of the American Council of the IPR?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know, Mr. Sourwine, whether they were kept in the files of the American IPR or in a separate file box in the New York office.

But Pacific Affairs, the handling of the printing and distribution of Pacific Affairs, was done from New York, and I sent copies of all manuscripts and correspondence in the normal course of operation to the subeditor in New York.

Mr. SOURWINE. To the American IPR did you send such manuscripts and correspondence?

Mr. LATTIMORE. To the person who was acting as the subeditor of Pacific Affairs in New York.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who was that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In those years I think it was Miss Catherine Porter.

Mr. SOURWINE. This committee is interested in the relationship between Pacific Affairs and the American Council of IPR and has touched on that subject before and understood you to say that you were making a clear distinction that you were not employed by the American Council of IPR, that you were working for the International IPR.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is quite right.

Mr. SOURWINE. If, as a matter of fact, your correspondence and records of documents and manuscripts were filed with the American Council of IPR, that is a germane and important point, and we would like to know what your best memory is on it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. My best memory is that duplicates of all correspondence and manuscripts were sent to Miss Porter in New York.

Mr. SOURWINE. What happened to the original?

The CHAIRMAN. Miss Porter was with whom or with what organization, rather?

Mr. LATTIMORE. She was with the IPR, and she may have been—I couldn't recall; the records will undoubtedly show it—she was probably working part time with the American Council and part time for the Pacific Council.

Senator WATKINS. May I ask a question, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. Was this Hubbard article actually published in Pacific Affairs?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; it was.

Senator WATKINS. Did the Russians send in a reply to it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; as usual, they didn't. This was one more case of our trying to get something out of them so that there could be equal treatment. I think that article—I may be wrong in saying it—was by Voitinsky; that article that we published was on railway questions in Manchuria by a Soviet correspondent. I believe that was the only one we ever got out of them.

Senator WATKINS. You asked them to reply and send it in early so you could publish it in the same number?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right, and they never sent it.

Senator WATKINS. Suppose they had sent in a reply, what would have been your action with respect to that reply?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It would have gone straight to Chatham House, among other councils. The top carbon copy would have gone to Chatham House.

Senator WATKINS. Would you have published that, with the others having a chance to criticize and tell what they thought about the reply article?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It would have been subject to the same sort of back-and-forth correspondence between a number of councils and individuals.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is, Would you have published it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The publication would have followed exactly the same course as in the case of the Soviet article.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator wants to know if you would have published the article.

Mr. FORTAS. Could we have the question read back?

Senator WATKINS. I did not think I asked that, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be read back.

(The record was read by the reporter.)

Senator WATKINS. Would you have published it, the reply without first submitting it to these others?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Definitely not.

Senator WATKINS. As a matter of fact, you were rushing him to get it in so you would have had it there in time. You would not have had time to do that, would you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I wanted to get it out of him as early as possible; but, if there had been a cable or a letter from the British saying that they objected to it, then it would have been held over to a later number. That kind of thing frequently happened.

Senator WATKINS. As I got from this situation, you were right up against a deadline, and you would not have time to do all of this, send it around and have it circulated around.

Mr. LATTIMORE. We always, Senator, tried to get articles as early as possible, especially from these non-English-speaking councils, because they were always falling behind deadlines, and we were usually giving them a deadline ahead of the real deadline so as to give ourselves a little margin of time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have a real deadline, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; not as a newspaper regards it, sir. With a quarterly magazine there is always—

Mr. SOURWINE. I did not mention newspaper. Did you have a real deadline, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. We had a flexible sort of a deadline.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, I think Mr. Sourwine asked a question just now that had been answered, and I think maybe we ought to clear it up now. That is to say where the files of Pacific Affairs were located, if, indeed, they were located anywhere else except at the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was not cleared up, Senator.

Senator SMITH. I can see how the editorial files might have been in Mr. Lattimore's possession or in one of the other's possession. Why not ask Mr. Lattimore specifically whether or not the files that would have contained the original articles which, when compared with the article which was printed, would have shown what was deleted, whether he has that file or whether he knows where it is.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I had that file, and I think I can tell you exactly what happened. I kept original files in the same office in which I worked at Johns Hopkins.

At that time I was considered half time with Johns Hopkins and half time with the institute. Then I left, went out to China, did various war jobs, came back to Johns Hopkins, and did not want to resume the editorship of Pacific Affairs.

I remember at that time writing to the New York office and saying: "Here I have a lot of back files of Pacific Affairs. Do you want them shipped to New York or shall I junk them?" The answer was: "We think the duplicate files here are sufficient, so you can just junk that stuff you have in Baltimore."

Mr. SOURWINE. What do you mean by the New York office, Mr. Lattimore? The New York office of what?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The New York office of IPR.

Mr. SOURWINE. The International Council or the American Council?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The two offices were together. I don't recall clearly, but on this case I would probably have written to Mr. Carter as secretary-general, therefore representing the International IPR.

Senator SMITH. Well, now, were those files actually junked, or do you still have them somewhere in your office?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; they were junked.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it your opinion, sir, as the former editor of Pacific Affairs, that the best place to look for old files of Pacific Affairs is in the files of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The best place to look would be in the storage files of Pacific Affairs. Whether they have been amalgamated with the American Council files or not is something I just don't know about.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, might I inquire?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I ceased to have any concern.

Senator FERGUSON. Who wrote the headings for the articles?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Sometimes the author; sometimes I, myself.

Senator FERGUSON. In the Hubbard article, who wrote it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what it was?

Mr. LATTIMORE. What the article was?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. The article or the heading?

Senator FERGUSON. The heading.

Mr. FORTAS. The question is the heading.

Mr. LATTIMORE. There are two articles by L. E. Hubbard; that is, the one that is being given here—it is a misprint—by L. M.

Senator FERGUSON. The one of October 1937.

Mr. LATTIMORE. One of June 1938, called A Capitalist Appraisal of the Soviet Union, and one of September 1938, The Standard of Living in the Soviet Union.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you get the article from Hubbard, the one A Capitalist Appraisal of the Soviet Union?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Published in June 1938? I don't know when I got it. Maybe several weeks ahead, maybe several months ahead.

Senator FERGUSON. The letter to Motylev is February 8, 1938, and he had apparently had the article before that. Did you not get it around October, when the man wrote?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Did he write it in October?

Senator FERGUSON. There is another footnote on it: "This article was written in October 1937."

I notice that the editor edited this even in the article. Apparently you put the heading on, "A capitalist appraisal of the Soviet Union," and your first footnote is: "This article was written in October 1937."

Your second footnote is: "In 1937 production rose to 1,000 pounds—Ed."

You were seeing that the people were advised when the article was written. He had written, in his article, 1925, 667 pounds of grain. I will read what it says:

Since Russia has always been self-sufficient in food, the average consumption per head of population must be determined by the production per head of population. The most important constituent in the total food supply is grain. Official Soviet figures show that the total quantity of wheat and rye produced per head of population since 1925 has varied as follows: 1925, 677 pounds; 1926, 731 pounds; 1927, 666 pounds; 1928, 590 pounds; 1929, 550 pounds; 1930, 696 pounds; 1931, 503 pounds; 1932, 480 pounds; 1933, 684 pounds; 1934, 672 pounds; 1935, 697 pounds. This is an average of about 632 pounds—

Now you put the "2" in and refer down to your own footnote, and you make this memorandum: "In 1937 production rose to over 1,000 pounds."

Why did you do that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Presumably because that was a recent statistic that had come to hand since the author wrote his article.

Senator FERGUSON. Where did you get it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Presumably from the New York office. We had several people there doing research on Soviet economics, and so forth.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think you may have got that from

Mr. Field to make it appear that these figures were all wrong because it was a capitalist appraisal?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I doubt it. I think it would be much more likely that we got it from somebody who was able to read economic materials.

Senator FERGUSON. On page 174 you have a footnote 3 giving different figures than he gave.

Mr. LATTIMORE. More recent figures; is that right?

Senator FERGUSON. No. You give:

Professor Prokopovich, in his Bulletin No. 104, published by the Slavonic Institute in Prague, gives the following comparison of the purchasing power of the price of a quintal of wheat and rye in 1913 and 1932.

The item that you corrected was:

There is no doubt that the purchasing power of the peasants' money income now is less than prewar.

Now, to contradict that, you publish, as an editor's note, something different.

Mr. FORTAS. Senator, may the witness see that?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; I am going to show it to him later.

Then you make a correction on page 177: "Figures for 1936 include all footwear, for previous years only leather footwear."

Then on page 184 there is a criticism, or this sentence is used:

The greater part of the collective farm peasant's income consists of a dividend in kind from the farm produce after all State requirements have been filled, and, as an individual, he has no choice in the policy of the farm nor in the work he must do.

You have carried it in "6" and you call it an editor's footnote. You put this in:

This does not agree with the account in Soviet Communism, a New Civilization, by Sidney and Beatrice Webb, second edition, London, 1937—Ed.

How do you account for that correction?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I suppose somebody had found this other statistic and put it in.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was working on this article besides you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no idea who may have worked on it in the New York office.

Senator FERGUSON. This article annoyed you to have published it, did it not; it was quite a corn to you to have to publish this article?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I was trying to avoid a break with the Soviet Union. I was trying to get them into the works and get them to participate in the give and take of the other councils.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you not do the best by these footnotes to appease the Soviets?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I would not say so.

Senator FERGUSON. You would not say so?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not think that last quote that I gave you, No. 6, was an appeasement to the Soviets?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't think so. I think it was an attempt to balance the article, and may I say that the whole such editorial changes were referred——

The CHAIRMAN. Just a minute. Strike that last from the record, Mr. Reporter. When you are asked to pause, please, Mr. Lattimore, pause.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you found anything in this record so far, and I am excluding yours now, on the part of Carter or Field that has been pro-Soviet. I do not think I have found an answer from you that anything was ever pro-Soviet.

I am asking you, can you point out anything that you have heard in the record by Field or Carter that was pro-Soviet?

The CHAIRMAN. In the record of this hearing?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; in the record of this hearing.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; not in any objectionable sense.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you qualifying it? Objectionable to you? That is the difficulty in this hearing. You want to be the sole judge.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I merely wish to be——

Senator FERGUSON. I am not asking whether it is objectionable. I am asking whether it was pro-Soviet.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; not in the sense of furthering——

The CHAIRMAN. The answer is "No"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The answer is "No."

Senator FERGUSON. Even the letter this morning?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Even the letter this morning.

Senator FERGUSON. From Carter to you, about the invasion of Finland?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That was an attempt to get all sides of a question by a man who had not yet made up his mind. I don't think that can be called pro-Soviet.

Senator WATKINS. As a matter of fact, Mr. Lattimore, you were against publishing any anti-Soviet articles, were you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I was trying to get the Soviet people to participate in the working of the institute.

Senator WATKINS. Let me read you this sentence from your letter.

In concluding this letter, I wish to concur with you in the sentiment that at this time of extreme crisis in the Far East, Pacific Affairs ought to find more suitable subjects for publication than anti-Soviet articles.

That is a part of your letter. That expressed your views.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That expressed part of what I thought was a diplomatic approach to these rigid and unbending——

The CHAIRMAN. The question is, did that express your views? Answer that question.

Mr. LATTIMORE. It expressed my attempt to be diplomatic.

Senator WATKINS. At that time, were you anti-Soviet or pro-Soviet in your own views?

Mr. LATTIMORE. As best I can recall, Senator, at that time I was not pro-Soviet, and in the workings of the institute I was trying to get the Soviet people to participate.

The CHAIRMAN. All right; let us proceed.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was certainly anti-Communist.

Senator WATKINS. I had a question there with respect to that.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was not anti-Soviet participation in the institute, certainly.

Senator WATKINS. Did you realize there was any danger from a Communist philosophy and the Communist program at that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. As for 1938 I did not consider that they were dangerous; no.

Senator WATKINS. And when you said that you agreed with this sentiment, they ought not to publish anti-Soviet articles, you would be against any kind of an anti-Soviet article that might reveal even a dangerous situation that was coming up?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I was trying to get the Soviet people into participation in the IPR, and for that purpose I was willing to limit the number of articles that were direct attacks on the Soviet until we could get them in and make them realize that they were not being given any treatment different from any other council.

Senator WATKINS. You said that you should not publish these anti-Soviet articles.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Obviously trying to placate Mr. Motylev and trying to get him to be a little more cooperative than he had been in the past, or ever was in the future.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, if I might inquire so the record will be very clear on this. If you changed the article in any way from the author, did you always say "Ed.," indicating it was editor, if there was a footnote?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, sir. I not only did that, but I also referred it back to the author himself.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you try and show us, then, the correspondence showing whether or not these footnotes all have been submitted to the author or not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. As far as the record of these documents may show them, I will certainly try to.

The CHAIRMAN. As I understand, the record of these documents and the record that he kept, let us see if I have this clear, the files that he kept have been destroyed. Am I correct in that assumption from his answers?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The files that I kept I had been told to junk because it was considered that the duplicate files in New York were sufficient.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you in fact junk them?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I did.

Senator FERGUSON. I might say that on page 174 appears "—Ed." meaning editor. On the other pages there are no "Ed." 's on them or "—Ed.," except on the last one that I read, where I read the "Ed.," on page 184.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The other notes would be the author's own notes.

Senator FERGUSON. Then will you get us the correspondence or try to find the correspondence between you and the author approving the editor's notes?

Mr. LATTIMORE. If they can be found in the files you possess, I will be glad to try.

Mr. FORTAS. Senator, so the record may be clear, do I understand that it was the first footnote and the last footnote to which you referred that have "Ed." and the other ones to which you referred do not have "Ed."?

Senator FERGUSON. I did not read "Ed." on those, either.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, if I may intrude here, I am interested in the witness' suggestion that the first place to start looking for

these is the files that the committee has. I asked the witness earlier if he felt that the best place to look was in these files, and I understood his answer to imply that he did not think so.

I would like to ask again, sir, do you think that the most likely place to find remaining files of Pacific Affairs is in the files of the American Council of IPR, which this committee now possesses?

MR. LATTIMORE. I assume that you had all of the files, all of the back files, and that they might include international files as well as American council files.

MR. SOURWINE. If we do not have international files, do you still feel that the best place to look would be in the files of the American council, which this committee has?

MR. LATTIMORE. As I said, Mr. Sourwine, I don't know anywhere else to look.

MR. SOURWINE. Do you have any resources for attempting to determine what became of those carbons which you were told were adequate records?

MR. LATTIMORE. None whatever.

MR. SOURWINE. There is no one you could ask what became of them?

MR. LATTIMORE. I could ask the IPR people if they had amalgamated the international files with the American council files. May I explain why I think so?

My understanding is that those back files had been moved up to Mr. Carter's barn, partly because of lack of space in the New York office——

MR. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, pardon the interruption.

THE CHAIRMAN. That is not an explanation.

MR. SOURWINE. Did you not testify here, sir, that you had no knowledge about those files being in the barn, or where they were, until you read in the newspaper that this committee had seized the files?

MR. LATTIMORE. That is right. But I don't think that alters the explanation I was just giving.

THE CHAIRMAN. That is not an explanation of anything, because you do not know.

MR. LATTIMORE. I think there is a——

THE CHAIRMAN. Just a moment. I am not going to argue with the witness, and I do not want the witness arguing with the Chair.

MR. LATTIMORE. I thought the record showed that I had a pertinent point, Mr. Chairman.

SENATOR SMITH. I thought Mr. Lattimore answered a question I asked him if he had been in the barn, and I thought he said "Yes."

Was that before or after the documents were in there?

MR. LATTIMORE. I couldn't even tell you that. I don't know which year they were moved up there.

SENATOR SMITH. Do you know how many times you were in the barn?

MR. LATTIMORE. Maybe four or five times.

SENATOR SMITH. Did you ever have any conferences or meetings there with Mr. Carter or anybody else in the barn?

MR. LATTIMORE. Yes. Part of the barn was fitted up as a sort of conference room.

SENATOR SMITH. That was with respect to IPR matters?

MR. LATTIMORE. That was with respect to IPR matters, and I believe that the only occasions that I was there were on matters of the

International IPR, the Pacific council, rather than the American council.

Senator SMITH. You never saw any of the IPR records in that barn, the question Mr. Sourwine just referred to?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, I remember there were file cases there, but I don't know what was in which ones. I know that Mr. Carter was planning to write a history of the IPR, and, therefore, he would have legitimate reason to have Pacific council files there as well as American council files.

Senator SMITH. He sort of took over that job?

Mr. LATTIMORE. After he retired he was going to spend some time on writing a history of the IPR.

The CHAIRMAN. Who has a question?

Mr. SOURWINE. I have one, Mr. Chairman, if I might ask it.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. SOURWINE. You destroyed the files of Pacific Affairs, is that right, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I junked them.

Mr. SOURWINE. What do you mean by junked them?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I told my secretary that we didn't want these files any more, and would she have the janitor take them out.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where was this at the time, over at Johns Hopkins?

Mr. LATTIMORE. At Johns Hopkins.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you do this?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think in 1945 or 1946, after I had returned to the Hopkins from my war jobs.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it your testimony that you had none of the files of Pacific Affairs in your possession or under your control after 1946?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. When these files were junked, as you say, were they taken out by the janitor?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The next time I came into my office they weren't there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what was done with them?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I haven't the faintest idea.

Mr. SOURWINE. You know we had a case over in an investigation before the other body where a witness initially testified that he put certain papers in the wastebasket and later on he said, "They didn't ask me what I did with the wastebasket."

Mr. FORTAS. Mr. Chairman, could we have a few minutes' recess?

The CHAIRMAN. We will recess at 12. Is that all right?

Mr. FORTAS. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, did you consider this article by L. E. Hubbard an anti-Soviet article?

If you have difficulty answering that question, I call your attention to the last paragraph of the letter we have been discussing.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think, Mr. Morris, at that time I was competent to judge an economic article on the economics of Soviet Russia. I considered it an article that the Russians considered anti-Soviet.

Mr. MORRIS. I am just using your expression of anti-Soviet there in the last paragraph.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Read the last paragraph. Read the first sentence of the last paragraph.

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading) :

In concluding this letter, I wish to concur with you in the sentiment that at this time of extreme crisis in the Far East, Pacific Affairs ought to find more suitable subjects for publication than anti-Soviet articles.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you consider this article an anti-Soviet article?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I considered it an article that the Russians considered anti-Soviet.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is did you consider it an anti-Soviet article. It is asking for your own consideration.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I consider that I was incompetent to judge on the subject. Maybe if I looked over the correspondence——

The CHAIRMAN. That is the answer.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, what did you mean in paragraph 3 of that letter, that criticism of Pacific Affairs as an organ of Soviet propaganda would largely destroy its usefulness?

Mr. FORTAS. That is not quite the quote.

Mr. MORRIS. What did you mean by that?

Mr. FORTAS. That is not quite the quote.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I said:

If I, as editor of Pacific Affairs, prevent them from doing so—that is, prevent people from criticizing the U. S. S. R.—

they will criticize Pacific Affairs as “an organ of Soviet propaganda” and largely destroy its usefulness.

You wanted to know what I meant by that?

Mr. MORRIS. What did you mean by that, yes?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I meant to try to educate the Russians to an understanding of the practice in democratic countries that if you publish pro and con articles you are not necessarily engaged in a campaign against some one particular country, something that we never got them to understand.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that next letter?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, evidently a photostat of a carbon from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated February 10, 1938, addressed to a Miss Harriet Moore, American-Russian Institute, 56 West Forty-fifth Street, New York, N. Y. It is unsigned.

Mr. MORRIS. What is the address of the letter, the mailing address?

Mr. MANDEL. It comes from 129 East Fifty-second Street, New York.

Mr. MORRIS. Is this the address of the Institute of Pacific Relations at that time?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment now. I want Mr. Mandel to testify. Is this a photostatic copy of a paper found in the files of the Pacific Relations, the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The reason I raise that question is that you say “evidently.” I want to clear it as to whether it is or is not. It is; is that right?

Mr. MANDEL. It is.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will you receive that into the record inasmuch as the first paragraph in this letter relates to the controversy that we have now been taking testimony on?

The CHAIRMAN. Let me look at it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, it is an unsigned letter, but it did emanate from the office of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. It is addressed to Miss Harriet Moore, American-Russian Institute, 56 West Forty-fifth Street, New York. Very well, it will be received in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 535" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 535

129 EAST FIFTY-SECOND STREET,  
New York City, February 10, 1938.

Miss HARRIET MOORE,

*American-Russian Institute,*

*56 West Forty-fifth Street, New York, N. Y.*

DEAR HARRIET: Has Owen Lattimore written you about Motylev's protest over the Hubbard article? In any event, here is a copy. Lattimore feels that our relations with London necessitate our publishing Hubbard's article, but we are asking Motylev to write for the same issue a rejoinder. Now, Motylev will probably refuse to do this, so Lattimore and I are considering getting both you and Gradjansev to collaborate in the most penetrating and masterly rejoinder that can possibly be produced.

Before starting in on it, however, I should like to talk with you so as to get your reaction to the proposal.

Tuesday afternoon, your father and mother put on a swell cocktail party for me (or rather for the IPR) at the Casino. It was delightful to see them both and to see your brother. You will probably hear from the family as to who attended. The only academic people were Sam Harper and Hazard. Howard Vincent O'Brien of the Daily News was there, and Mrs. T. Kenneth Boyd. As for the rest, I'll have to get the list from your family as I just couldn't remember the names of everyone that I met. After the meeting was over, Harper and Hazard endorsed an aside that I made with reference to your competency.

At luncheon yesterday with Sewell Avery, I took the same line.

I wonder whether you can spare a little time to see me on, say, Monday afternoon, the 14th?

Sincerely yours,

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, will you read the first paragraph, please?

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

DEAR HARRIET: Has Owen Lattimore written to you about Motylev's protest over the Hubbard article? In any event, here is a copy. Lattimore feels that our relations with London necessitate our publishing Hubbard's article, but we are asking Motylev to write for the same issue a rejoinder. Now, Motylev will probably refuse to do this, so Lattimore and I are considering getting both you and Gradjansev to collaborate in the most penetrating and masterly rejoinder that can possibly be produced.

Before starting in on it, I should like to talk with you so as to get your reaction to the proposal.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, at that time, did you know that Harriet Moore was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I did not, and I did not consider her a Communist.

Senator FERGUSON. Who would you say wrote this letter, Mr. Lattimore, from its text?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no way of knowing.

The CHAIRMAN. It is associated with your correspondence with Mr. Carter, is it not?

Senator FERGUSON. Did you strike out enough of it to have it appealing to the Russians, with your editor's notes?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think the editor's notes were appealing to the Russians, but apart from that——

Mr. FORTAS. What is the question?

Senator FERGUSON. The question is, did they ever write this masterly, penetrating, penetrating and masterly, rejoinder and take the sting out of this capitalist article?

The CHAIRMAN. That can be answered yes or no.

Mr. FORTAS. Senator, I do not think so.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you ever write, yes or no?

Mr. FORTAS. Did you ever write, yes or no, but not with that addendum.

Senator FERGUSON. I am going to frame the questions, Mr. Fortas, not you.

The CHAIRMAN. You are not going to pass on these questions, Mr. Fortas.

Senator FERGUSON. What is the answer to my question, Mr. Lattimore?

The CHAIRMAN. Read the question to the witness.

(The record was read by the reporter.)

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe any masterly rejoinder was ever written, but we did publish, in June 1938, an article called The Rate of Growth in the Soviet Union, which might be considered as an article balancing the Hubbard article. That article is listed by A. W. Canniff, and recently, when I was looking through copies of Pacific Affairs, I noticed that A. W. Canniff was described as a pseudonym.

That may have been the result of this—this pseudonym may represent the article which is suggested in this letter. But my recollection is not at all clear on the subject.

Senator FERGUSON. Who wrote the article?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Who wrote the Canniff article?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was trying to recall that, and I haven't been able to recall it. When I saw that it was a pseudonym, I searched my memory to see if I could remember who it was.

Senator FERGUSON. Why would it be written by an alias?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is what I couldn't imagine at the time I saw it. Now, from this letter here——

The CHAIRMAN. Which letter do you refer to now, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am referring to this unsigned letter to Miss Harriet Moore of February 10, that it may have been a joint research article done by Miss Harriet Moore and Mr. Gradjansev, and that for purposes of simplification they wrote it under a pseudonym instead of a joint name. This is pure speculation on my part.

Senator FERGUSON. But it appears that at least Miss Moore has refused to answer whether or not, when she was working on this job, she was a Communist, and her ground assigned was that it would tend to incriminate her.

I think you have indicated that that was sufficient proof to you to prove that she was a Communist.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That would certainly raise that presumption in my mind. But as I have also said quite recently, in 1938 I had no reason whatever to consider Miss Moore a Communist.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was the gentleman there, Gradjansev?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The other was Mr. Gradjansev, who was a White Russian.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know whether that is the same Mr. Gradjansev who was dismissed from General MacArthur's headquarters for left-wing activity?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I did not know that he was dismissed for left-wing activity. I know he worked for a while under SCAP.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know he was dismissed?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I knew he was dismissed.

Mr. MORRIS. What reason did you believe was the cause of his dismissal?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The reason I heard was that he had given some cigarettes to some Japanese. He was a man who didn't smoke, and he used his cigarette ration to give to some Japanese who were doing some economic work for him, and this was considered, I believe, to be black-marketeering.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, did you know that the American-Russian Institute was affiliated with the Soviet organization Voks?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have been asked that question before, and I did not know it.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know it was cited by the Attorney General as a subversive organization, the American-Russian Institute?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I had heard that, and then I heard that that decision had been revoked.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this next document, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated February 24, 1938, addressed to Owen Lattimore, with a typed signature of G. E. Hubbard. It is a photostat of a carbon from the files of the institute.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, I offer you this document, and ask if you can recall having received that letter.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall having received it, but obviously I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, will you read that letter, please?

Mr. FORTAS. May we have a copy?

Mr. MORRIS. I am sorry, we do not have copies of that.

Mr. LATTIMORE. You want me to read the full letter?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. This is dated February 24, 1938 [reading]:

EXHIBIT No. 536

DEAR LATTIMORE: I have received your letter of February 8 about the articles by my brother (whose initials by the way are L. E. not L. M.).

It is my first sight of the article as I sent the only copy I had to your New York office as I explained at the time. As it now stands after your pruning, I confess I can't quite understand why the trouble has arisen. Barring the last two paragraphs, which verge on politics, it seems to me a thoroughly unemotional, well-documented and slightly overstatistical, statement of economic conditions in Russia. Whether the picture it gives is one-sided only a very well informed person can tell; knowing my brother I am perfectly certain that there is absolutely no intentional distortion. Any criticism of the Soviet system by a

writer brought up in the capitalist school, and vice versa, is, I should imagine, likely to be regarded as prejudiced by the other side, but I find it hard to understand why the present piece of work should be classed as "anti-Soviet."

I should have thought that this was a clear case for a "correcting" article from the IPR Soviet Council if they disagree with the writer's factual statements, his interpretation of the figures, or his description of the working of the collectivist system. If Mr. Motylev had contended that the article contained definite misrepresentations, and was in a position to show that this is so, the same question of principle would arise which we considered in connection with the Asiaticus article in the June 1936 issue of Pacific Affairs; but it would almost seem from the quotations you give from his letter that his objection is much more general and such as would extend to any critical review of economic conditions in the U. S. S. R. if we were not favorable to the system. If so, the question of excluding such contributions from Pacific Affairs is, as you say, one of policy. But surely one of policy for the IPR as a whole, rather than for Chatham House. As regards Chatham House responsibility our view would be that the contribution was an individual one, the fact that it went through me being merely the result of my attempt to fulfill your request for grist for Pacific Affairs and in such circumstances I am sure that Chatham House would not wish to accept responsibility. Macadam and I feel that the question of risk which publication would imply for relations with the Soviet Council can only be estimated by Carter and yourself and that a decision on this point could not very well be asked of our committee.

I really think that it comes back after all to the question of editorial principle, and of editorial decision. Obviously no one would want to see the relations of the Soviet with the IPR torn by the publication of anything appearing in Pacific Affairs, and if Mr. Motylev is not prepared to accept the article as an honest attempt at analysis by an informed foreign observer, written without political *arrière-pensée* although from an admittedly capitalist viewpoint, and to counter it by a rejoinder written from the Bolshevik standpoint, it may be wiser, as a matter of principle, to close Pacific Affairs to the discussion of Russian internal affairs and so to exclude the present article. I should hope, however, that Mr. Motylev would consent to see the matter in that light and to meet criticism of things in his own country just as we had to meet what was, I submit, much less objective criticism of ourselves in the Asiaticus article.

I am not referring to my brother as he is really not concerned with IPR internal politics, so will you deal with him direct as and when necessary? I am afraid that he was not warned that his manuscript would have to pass the fire of Moscow criticism. I ought no doubt to have remembered your practice and told him.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) G. E. HUBBARD.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that be received for the record?

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted.

(The document previously read by the witness was marked "Exhibit No. 536" and was read in full.)

Senator FERGUSON. May I ask one question?

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the name of the man or the writer that wrote the counter-article for June?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Canniff.

Senator FERGUSON. You put a note on that. You seemed to know who Andrew W. Canniff was, because you said this, and you have the article follow the Hubbard article:

Readers of Pacific Affairs are accustomed to our policy of printing articles that express different and sometimes opposite points of view. We do this for something more than the interest of good debate, a more important aim of our editorial policy is to let our readers know as far as we possibly can what is really happening in all the subjects that are of interest to the Institute of Pacific Relations. We, accordingly, print the following article by an author who uses almost exactly the same figures as Mr. Hubbard, but comes to an entirely different conclusion. Mr. Canniff has recently been studying the agricultural economics of both the Soviet Union and Manchuria—Ed.

You said that you knew this man. He had been studying it. You did not say he was writing under an alias.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, I did, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. In this?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It is in the list of authors at the beginning of the——

Senator FERGUSON. In this note you did not.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not in the note, no. It was in the description of authors at the beginning.

The CHAIRMAN. My recollection is that you said this morning you did not know who this was.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I said that I didn't recall.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I should say from that description of somebody who had been studying agricultural economics in both Russia and Manchuria, that it was probably Mr. Gradjansev.

Senator FERGUSON. And he was the man who was mentioned in the article with Harriet Moore to write the masterly piece?

The CHAIRMAN. Is that right?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is somebody else's language.

Senator FERGUSON. To prepare the masterly rejoinder?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is somebody else's language, not my language.

The CHAIRMAN. We will recess until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12 noon, the hearing was recessed to reconvene at 2 p. m., the same day.)

#### AFTERNOON SESSION

The subcommittee reconvened at 2 p. m., upon the expiration of the recess.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

You may proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, did you in 1945 recommend Frederick V. Field as a person to work with the Defense Advisory Commission of the United States?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't believe I did, Mr. Morris. I have seen some reference to that possibility in the transcript, but I don't recollect doing so.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that document, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, on the letterhead of Pacific Affairs, Telephone: University 0100, extension 48, appearing in upper right hand corner, and Please Address Reply to: 300 Gilman Hall, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md., appearing under letterhead of Pacific Affairs, dated September 10, 1940, addressed to Mr. Frederick V. Field, signed Owen Lattimore.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, I offer you that letter and ask if you recall having written it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't recall having written this.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that your signature?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is my signature. I must have written it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, will you read that letter, please?

Mr. LATTIMORE. This is to Frederick V. Field.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the date of it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Dated September 10, 1940. [Reading:]

EXHIBIT No. 537

DEAR FRED: This morning a Mr. S. Taylor Ostrander, of room 303, 1424 K Street, Washington, D. C., rang me up to ask where to get hold of an economist competent to deal with Japanese wartime fiscal policies. I at once gave him your name and told him that on account of getting the new edition of the Economic Handbook ready for publication, you would be in touch with the right people.

He said that he already had you on his list to ring up, and went on to ask about other people. I think I forgot to say at the beginning of this letter that he is connected with one or another branch or subdivision of the Defense Advisory Commission. I then gave him Grajdanzev's name, as being both a trained economist and currently working in original Japanese material. I pointed out that for his purposes the fact that Grajdanzev does not yet have his citizenship might be a barrier, but he told me that in some cases they proceed by appointing someone to a general job, with salary allowances for taking on assistants for such purposes at this.

Yours very sincerely,

[S] OWEN LATTIMORE.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may it be received into the record?

The CHAIRMAN. It may be received into the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 537" and was read in full.)

The CHAIRMAN. What is that other name there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Grajdanzev.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was he?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He was the man referred to this morning, a White Russian, who was at that time in New York. And I think he was doing some work, maybe part time or for the IPR.

Mr. MORRIS. Was what you wrote to Mr. Field there the truth, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Why, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that document for the record?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, on the letterhead of the Institute of Pacific Relations, headed "E. C. C. from A. G.—copies to O. L. and M. F." It is undated.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may be this be read into the record?

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to have the initials identified.

Is anyone competent to identify them?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, on the basis of your experience with the Institute of Pacific Relations, could you tell us who used the initials E. C. C.?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. E. C. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. A. G.?

Mr. LATTIMORE. A. G. would be Andrew Grajdanzev, I think.

Mr. MORRIS. O. L.?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Myself.

Mr. MORRIS. M. F.?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Miriam Farley, I think.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, could I ask on this recommendation of Field, of September 10, 1940?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. We have had some difficulty in getting an answer, Mr. Lattimore, as to just when you came to the conclusion

that Field was a Communist. You said in your statement that it was in the forties.

Did you withdraw any of these recommendations after you came to the conclusion that he was a Communist, or did you let them stand?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Excuse me, Senator, this is not a recommendation of Mr. Field for an intelligence job.

Senator FERGUSON. You are writing to Field:

I at once gave him your name and told him that on account of getting the new edition of the *Economic Handbook* for publication, you would be in touch with the right people.

You mean for somebody else to——

Mr. LATTIMORE. I thought that Field would know better than I would who was competent to work with Japanese wartime fiscal policy.

Senator FERGUSON. And then did you think that Field at that time, as a Communist, would be a proper person to get them in touch with the Communists?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe that on September 10, 1940, I thought Mr. Field was a Communist.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you give us the date when you did come to that conclusion?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir. I can only come to the conclusion on the basis of my present knowledge and recollections that Mr. Field probably became a Communist in the 1940's sometime.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, you came to the conclusion in the forties, I think you stated in your statement—see if I quote you correctly——

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't think so, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you come to the conclusion?

I think this question has been asked and answered two or three times. When did you come to the conclusion that Mr. Field was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am now of the conclusion that he became a Communist probably sometime in the 1940's, but I don't know when I first came to that conclusion.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you no way of telling this committee when you came to that conclusion?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator FERGUSON. Let me see the Harriet Moore letter of this morning.

Mr. Lattimore, this was the same man that you had recommended, you had recommended Grajdanzev's name, and he was the one who was being recommended to "prepare the most penetrating and masterly rejoinder that can possibly be produced to the anti-Communist article by Hubbard." And it was put in your magazine in June of 1938; is that correct?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The recommendation and the wording are not mine, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not the question now. Listen to the question.

Senator FERGUSON. But he is the same man who was recommended for that job and did write the pro-Soviet article.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I cannot accept your characterization of that article as pro-Soviet, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. I realize that you have said that you see nothing, you have not seen anything pro-Soviet.

But is not that what you were telling Molotov, that if that article went in, in effect you would try and get, allow him to write an article?

And then the facts come out here that someone is writing Harriet Moore, who turns out to be a Communist, and to get Harriet Moore to get this gentleman to write "the most penetrating and masterly rejoinder that can possibly be produced."

And you put the headline on this article by Hubbard that was a capitalist article, and you followed it with this article that was supposed to carry out what you had in mind with the Soviets, of having a counterarticle.

Would not that make it pro-Soviet?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The answer is no.

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I explain?

I asked the Soviet Council to put in an article of their own, which would obviously have been pro-Soviet. Failing that, I wanted to get an article that would present another treatment of the same material used by Mr. Hubbard, and, as far as my intentions were concerned, they were not to produce an article that would be Soviet propaganda, or anything of the kind.

I had at that time no reason whatever to suppose that Harriet Moore was Communist, and I had no reason whatever to suppose that Grajdanzev was Communist, or pro-Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I revert back—I do not like to do this—to previous testimony?

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. But on Friday, a letter written by Mr. Field to Mr. Lattimore, dated October 3, 1939, was presented to Mr. Lattimore on the general bearing of whether he knew at that particular time that Field was a member of the Communist Party, or connected with the Communist movement ideologically.

Mr. Lattimore read Mr. Field's letter, which contained the following paragraphs:

If I were to try and work out my own thoughts on Soviet policy I think I should start by attempting to compare the conditions of the present war, the second imperialist war, with those of the first imperialist war. I should first say that both wars were similar in that they were imperialist wars, in the Marxist sense of the word. I should immediately add, however, that they contained an essential difference, the difference being the concrete existence of the Soviet Union with 21 or 22 years of revolutionary experience now as contrasted with its nonexistence during the first war.

The next step would be, I believe, to recall the slogans of revolutionary groups during the first war; namely, to transfer the imperialist war into a civil war or into a series of civil wars. This object came off only in Czarist Russia during the last war, though pretty substantial attempts were made in a number of other countries. I judge that the slogan of the present war is exactly the same, but that again the concrete existence of the Soviet Union makes its application in the present war something quite different than in 1914-18. The problem today from a revolutionary point of view is the same as it was in 1914; the British must get rid of their Chamberlains, the Germans of their Hitlers, the French of their Daladiers. But this time the Soviet Union operates as a powerful and concrete force to aid in these civil war efforts.

The CHAIRMAN. Whose letter is that?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Field to Mr. Lattimore, Mr. Chairman.

At the time, as I recall, we presented this letter to Mr. Lattimore.

He conceded that his memory was wrong by several years in his estimate that Field was a Communist.

Mr. FORTAS. Mr. Chairman, may we see that transcript?

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment, Mr. Fortas.

Mr. Fortas, the Chair and you got along pretty well for about 7 or 8 days. We hope we will get along for the rest of this time.

Mr. FORTAS. I join you in that hope, Mr. Chairman.

Just a moment, Mr. Lattimore. I think Mr. Morris sent for the transcript.

Mr. MORRIS. I think we can get on while we are waiting for that, Mr. Chairman, to save time.

The CHAIRMAN. The transcript should be here and his answer should be read back to him.

Mr. MORRIS. The question is on page 5149 of the transcript.

Mr. Lattimore, perhaps you will read it, commencing with the question put to you by Mr. Morris.

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading) :

Mr. Lattimore, when you received that letter—

Mr. MORRIS. That is the letter that I had just read, is it not, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right [reading]—

did you consider that that was evidence that Mr. Field had vigorous Communist sympathies?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember receiving the letter, and my recollection has been that I began to think that Mr. Field was a close fellow traveler of the Russians at the time of the American Peace Mobilization, which I think was 1941. Wasn't it? But judging from this letter, my memory was in error by about 2 years.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, you knew he had these vigorous pro-Communist sympathies in 1939?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is what I said at that time, Mr. Morris. I thought the matter over subsequently, and it seems to me that I ought not to go too far in characterizing my very vague recollections of that time years ago.

It seems to me that, reading again this letter of Mr. Field's to me, that an equally possible explanation is that I might have thought at the time that this was just another example of an American intellectual interested in Russian problems indulging in the kind of amateur interpretation of ideology that has since become such a prevalent habit.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, Mr. Lattimore, you want to change your testimony of last Friday; is that right?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I should like to amend my testimony to that extent, to say that my recollection of what I thought at the time is not at all clear.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Lattimore, we have been in these hearings now some 7 or 8 days. You realize that during all of that time and now you are under oath?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, Senator, I do.

I also realize that many pieces of evidence have been presented to me in many ways with other people's phrasings and wordings, and that under the pressure of cross-examining, I may at times have admitted to using other people's words and saying things that I didn't quite mean myself, or that I would have said if I had had time for mature consideration, or if I had been less fatigued.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, that brings us to the question that you expect this body to pass upon the question and, with this statement, how are we going to tell whether you are telling the truth, or not, either from fatigue or a willful intent not to tell it?

What are we going to do? Are we going to sit here for 8 days and now have you tell us that you are not responsible for what you have told us? Is that what you want to tell us now?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, Senator. I am merely saying that after many days of interrogation about matters that happened many years ago, I am not at all surprised that I should have become somewhat confused in my recollections, and I don't wish to make too strong a claim that my recollection of periods so long ago is accurate.

The CHAIRMAN. You have no doubt that Field is a Communist now, have you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe he probably is, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you come to that conclusion? Now let us go backward.

Mr. LATTIMORE. As I said, I don't remember exactly when I came to that conclusion.

The CHAIRMAN. Then the date that you gave us in your first answer may be just as correct as that which you are giving us now; is not that right?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think I would like to stand on my statement in the record, Senator, in my prepared statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Which statement do you wish to stand on?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In my prepared statement, page 14, that I have no doubt he became one during the 1940's.

The CHAIRMAN. Which statement do you wish to stand on? The one that you gave last Friday, which you read back, or the one that you gave today?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The one that I read back was an admission that my memory might have been in error by a couple of years. It may have been in error by a couple of years, or it may have been in error by more than that.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, is it that you want to change your testimony because you are confronted with this letter of recommending—

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; this letter is not a letter recommending Mr. Field. This is a letter stating that Mr. Field—

Senator FERGUSON. Wait a minute. Recommending that they get in touch with Mr. Field to get someone to work on the Defense Advisory Commission?

You would not say, would you, that a Communist was a proper person to recommend someone in 1940 to work on the Defense Advisory Commission?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I would think—I don't know what I thought at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you say now?

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think it now?

The CHAIRMAN. What do you say now? That is the question.

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I state rather carefully what I think now?

Senator FERGUSON. I hope everything you say is stated carefully.

Mr. LATTIMORE. What I think now is that the intelligence services of the United States are entitled to make use of any individual, any

source of information that they may think valuable to themselves under such conditions of security as the intelligence services may devise, which an outsider like myself cannot lay down.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you continue to read the document?

Mr. MANDEL. I am reading from the document marked "E. C. C. from A. G., copies to O. L. and M. F."

(EXHIBIT No. 538)

(International Secretariat)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS,  
1 East 54th Street, New York 22, N. Y.

The following telegram appeared in the Soviet newspaper Trud, but probably appeared also in Pravda and Izvestia (we do not have the numbers of these two from August 29) :

[Trud, August 29, p. 4]

#### LATTIMORE ON THE NATIONAL POLICY OF THE SOVIET UNION

NEW YORK, August 27 (TASS)—In the magazine Far Eastern Survey there appeared an article by Lattimore, the Director of the School of International Relations, who accompanied Wallace during his recent trip to the Soviet Union and China, on the basis of his personal observations Lattimore regards highly the Soviet national policy (policy in respect to the nationalities), observing that from the moment of the establishment of the Soviet regime all nationalities of the Middle Asia and other regions, formerly oppressed, received an opportunity to develop widely their economy, national culture, language, and so on. Lattimore describes the present prosperity of the so-called backward peoples prosecuted pitilessly under Czarism.

Lattimore points out that his knowledge of the Russian and Mongolian languages permitted him to talk with Many Kazakhs, Buriato-Mongols, Turkomans, and representatives of other nationalities, and from these conversations he obtained valuable information that shows welfare and prosperity of these peoples freed by the Soviet Constitution.

Lattimore compares the position of the national minorities in the Middle Asia in the Czarist time and under the present regime. As an example, Lattimore gives the fact that Kazakhstan, a country populated formerly by the nomads, now became an industrialized country which has its own industry, own engineers, and a large percentage of the Stakanovites among the workers.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, what role did Mr. Grajdanzev play in this kind of transaction? Did he read the Soviet press and find favorable references to you and passed them on to you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would like to see this, but there is no hurry about it.

I have very little knowledge of what Mr. Grajdanzev's work was at that time. My general recollection is that he was working on such Russian language materials as the IPR had available.

Mr. MORRIS. Was it a practice of his to notify you of any such favorable references in the Soviet press?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Certainly not a practice. I presume that, as a friend of mine, if he ran across something that would interest me he would send it to me.

I should like very much to ask for the text of my original article in Far Eastern Survey, because, from my hearing—and I have not yet read it—of that Soviet extract there, I should say that it is obviously not a straight quotation from what I wrote, but partial quotations interwoven with phrases put in by the Soviet writer.

Mr. MORRIS. And, Mr. Lattimore, you would like your article to go into the record with this Soviet interpretation?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I certainly should.

This Soviet interpretation or misinterpretation.

The CHAIRMAN. Where is the article?

Mr. MORRIS. We can obtain it and put into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. I think it should go in with an exhibit, if you are going to introduce the exhibit.

Senator FERGUSON. What is the date of this?

Mr. MORRIS. It is probably 1944, Senator, in connection with the mention of the "recent trip." He accompanied Mr. Wallace on a "recent" trip.

Senator FERGUSON. Maybe you can help us with the date, Mr. Lattimore. You look at that.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have a document here, Senator, which my wife is looking for now, which I should like to enter into the record as pertinent to this question of Soviet nationality.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like the article to which this document refers and to which you have testified. We want that first.

Mr. LATTIMORE. This one here?

The CHAIRMAN. You have referred to a document that you wrote.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; in the Far Eastern Survey.

The CHAIRMAN. We want that first, if you please.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't have that with me.

Mr. FORTAS. Is your staff sending for that, Senator?

Mr. SOURWINE. They are looking for it, Mr. Fortas.

Mr. FORTAS. Do you want Mr. Lattimore to wait until you find it?

The CHAIRMAN. If you want to go into some questions, as an insertion in the record—

Mr. SOURWINE. Here is a copy of the Far Eastern Survey, 1944, sir, the bound volume. Perhaps you can find that article.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, does this amount about to what would be classed as someone sending you a newspaper clipping?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; roughly.

Senator FERGUSON. And did you save it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't think I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you protest it was wrong?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you write back and say, "This is wrong"? Did you get in touch with the papers that printed it and say, "I deny this"? Did you do that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. I might interpret this as being either a digest of a newspaper quotation or a newspaper article or it might be a newspaper article [reading]:

The following telegram appeared in the Soviet newspaper Trud, but probably it appeared also in Pravda and Izvestia (we do not have the numbers of these two from August 29).

Then in what appeared to be headlines, caps, appears:

Lattimore on the National Policy of the Soviet Union—

which might be construed as being a —

Senator FERGUSON. Copy of a clipping.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Otherwise, I do not know what it is.

Mr. LATTIMORE. This appears to be the article: "Minorities in the Soviet Far East," by Owen Lattimore, in the Far Eastern Survey of August 23, 1944.

It is not very long. May I read it into the record?

Mr. MORRIS. Put it into the record, Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is two printed pages or more, is it not, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Almost exactly two printed pages.

The CHAIRMAN. I want something to be done with this photostatic copy that we are passing around here.

Do you offer this for the record? If so, what is its authenticity? Where does it come from?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel identified it, sir, as a letter having been taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not a letter. It shows on its face that it is not a letter.

Mr. MORRIS. It is a memorandum.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you swear now that you never saw this document, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no recollection of seeing it.

Senator FERGUSON. It appears to have been sent to you with your initials on it. Is that correct?

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I have a look?

It is headed E. C. C. from A. G., copies to O. L. and M. F.

The CHAIRMAN. From that, Mr. Lattimore, would you say it was evidently a communication of some sort from E. C. C. to the other parties?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; from Mr. Grajdanzev, to Mr. Carter, with copies to myself and Miss Farley.

The CHAIRMAN. A communication from.

Mr. LATTIMORE. A communication from, yes.

I have no recollection of ever seeing it before. The point is immaterial, however. It was obviously intended for me to see.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

With it should go the article.

Mr. MORRIS. May it be placed in the record, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. The article will be placed in the record.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 538," which was read in full by Mr. Mandel, and "539," as follows:)

#### EXHIBIT No. 539

[Source: Far Eastern Survey, August 23, 1944, pp. 156, 157, and 158]

#### MINORITIES IN THE SOVIET FAR EAST<sup>1</sup>

(By Owen Lattimore)

On many occasions during a brief recent journey through the Soviet Far East and Central Asia I was struck by the obvious success of the Soviet policy toward its minority peoples, and by the international importance of this policy. The essentials of the Soviet method are simple. The Russians work by removing legal, social, and economic obstacles to the progress of minority peoples and "backward" peoples. These peoples are then free to work out their own progress according to their own capacities. The method is anything but paternalistic. Because the people work out their own progress, they feel that everything which they accomplish is their own, not something charitably bestowed on them.

<sup>1</sup> Mr. Lattimore, Director of the Page School of International Relations and coauthor of *The Making of Modern China*, accompanied Vice President Henry Wallace on his recent trip to the Far East.

The chief obstacle removed by Soviet action was, of course, the "old order" of Tsarism, with its legal discriminations and its policy of favoring privileged groups among non-Russian minorities, in order to use them as instruments for ruling the unprivileged. For this reason the minority peoples, who feel that their local self-government is their own, also feel that the Soviet State as a whole is their own. This accounts for an outstanding difference in the psychology of minorities in the Soviet Union and in America. With us, minority rights are largely identified with the right to nonconformity. Consequently Americans sometimes ask, "What would happen if one of these Soviet minorities were to try to use its minority rights to attempt to set up laws, institutions, and practices conflicting with Marxist doctrines and Soviet orthodoxy?" The answer appears to be that this would be the last thing that would occur to their minds, not the first. All of them have a long history of oppression. Since, in all their long history, only the Soviet Government ever freed them from discrimination and gave them the opportunity of progress, they identify their own interest with the Soviet interest, and in everything which they do to advance their own particular interest their instinct is also to advance the general Soviet interest, not to encroach upon it, because the general Soviet interest is the primary safeguard of their own particular interest.

Within the framework of the Soviet economic order and state structure, Soviet policy has been to encourage the national pride and sense of cultural or community identity of minority groups. In Soviet Asia, this includes peoples like the Buryat Mongols, Kirghiz, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, and the Tungusic tribes, whose languages, traditions, and way of life are very different from those of the Russians. They encourage these peoples to go ahead and assert their independence in all cultural forms—costume, theater, art, and so forth—and to work out their own adaptation to the general structure of the Soviet Union.

Although many of the places visited were new to me, some of the peoples were not new, as I had known Mongol, Kazakh, and Kirghiz nomads, Turkish-speaking oasis dwellers, and Tungusic forest tribes on the southern side of the Russo-Chinese border in Sinkiang, Mongolia, and Manchuria. Familiarity with several of the cultures which are spread on both sides of the border, and an ability to speak Mongol and a certain amount of Russian, made it possible for me to get some valuable indications, even in a very short time, as to how contented and prosperous these people are as members of the complicated Soviet system of peoples, republics, and autonomous communities—uniform in some respects and variegated in others.

#### SOVIET POLICY IS FLEXIBLE

The actual way in which Soviet policy works is naturally not uniform in all places and among all groups. The Yakuts, for instance, seemed to me to have integrated themselves with the Soviet order less than such peoples as the Buryats. This is not surprising because the Yakuts are a tough-fibered people who have long been noted more for their ability to extend their own culture to other sub-Arctic peoples than for their absorption of Russian culture. Moreover, they live in small, widely scattered and isolated communities in which the spread of education in schools, by radio, and so forth, is less uniform than it is in more closely settled regions.

Among people who are few in numbers, also, it is difficult to preserve a separate culture. The Khakass near Minusinsk, for instance, are so minor a minority that they tend to merge with the Russians rather than to preserve their own way of life.

In Buryat Mongolia, on the other hand, there is no doubt whatever that the Buryats are running their own show. This is also true in Uzbekistan and in Kazakhstan.

In the great Kazakh Republic, which extends from the Chinese frontier to the Caspian Sea, the national autonomy policy is most successful. Among the Kazakhs before the revolution there had been a long tradition of hostility to the Russians and the Tsarist Russians had never attempted to recruit Kazakhs as troops. An attempt to conscript them into labor battalions led to rebellions in 1916, even before the Russian Revolution of 1917. In the present war, however, Kazakhs have supplied whole divisions of cavalry to the Soviet army. Since few of them speak Russian they are brigaded in their own units under their own officers. The Russians speak admiringly of the battle record of these Kazakhs.

While Kazakh nomadic herding is flourishing, the Kazakhs—like most no-

mads—also show a marked aptitude for machines and industry. At Karaganda, in the Kazakh Republic, there are some of the largest open-cut coal mines in the world. About a third of the miners are Kazakhs. Kazakh engineers and technicians are being trained there, and there is a high percentage of Stakhanovites whose output is higher than the norms on which wage rates are based. The head of the mines is a third-generation miner from the Don. When I asked him if he planned to stay on after the war, he replied, "No, I shall go back to the Don. The Kazakhs will want to run their own mines."

One detail of policy interested me as being particularly significant. Primary education is in the language of the people and in general Russian is not taught in their primary schools. In high schools Russian is taught as a second language for a few hours each week. In the universities, where they are advanced enough to have their own universities, Russian is compulsory. Conversely, when Russians are living as a minority group in an area that is overwhelming Kazakh or Mongol, the Russians have the same privilege of having their own primary schools; but for Russian children the Kazakh or Mongol language is compulsory. Thus the cultural autonomy of these various minorities within the bounds of Soviet Asia is maintained, and the minority languages are given a prestige value.

All of this is important because it will have repercussions far beyond the Russian frontier. There has been a steady movement of attraction toward Russia set up among a number of Central Asian peoples. The Russians do not need to propagandize among them. These peoples are attracted toward Russia because of the success and prosperity of their cousins on the Russian side of the frontier and there are bound to be some important international consequences of this tendency.

#### MOBILITY IN BORDER REGIONS

Along most of the Soviet border the political frontiers are artificial, and identical or closely similar peoples live on both sides of the line. This is true not only along the Chinese but along the Iran and Afghanistan frontiers as well. In the 19th century political development in that part of the world was in abeyance. Central Asia was in suspended animation except for the superficial conquests by Tsarist Russia. If there was oppression on one side of the line there was a tendency for some of the people to skip over to the other side; but such movements did not express a choice between the two different systems of government.

The general impression today among their neighbors is that the people on the Soviet side of the border are well off. They are envied for the law, order, and security which they enjoy and for their individual and community prosperity. If there is turmoil in Chinese Turkistan or Iran or Afghanistan, many people will want to move to get away from the trouble and Soviet territory is the nearest area which looks safe and untroubled. This is a comparatively recent development. During the Soviet revolution there was a bad time of turmoil, and elements which were opposed to the revolution moved to the Chinese side and into Iranian and Afghan territory; but that period is now over.

The situation is one which requires adjustment of American thinking. We still tend to assume, whenever Soviet influence is noticeable in an Asiatic community, that ignorant people have been "misled by Communist propaganda." To think in this way is to mislead ourselves. The Soviet prestige in Asia today has little to do with propaganda. It is noteworthy that Soviet prestige is highest among those who are nearest to the Soviet frontier and influenced primarily by what they know, and by the practical comparisons which they are able to make. Among such people the Soviets are rated highly not because of promises of what they might do for others, but because of the impressive evidence of what they have actually done in raising their own standards.

Everywhere in the Soviet Far East there is a noteworthy age uniformity among those who are running local affairs. Whether Russian, Buryat Mongol, or Kazakh, the average age of people in high positions seems to be between 30 and 35. They are a postrevolutionary generation, old enough to have had the new education and young enough to be free of the old social cleavages. To them the present order is right, inevitable, and, above all, their own.

The implications of the Russian policy are evident. China and the Soviet Union have a common frontier in Mongolia, Chinese Turkistan (Sinkiang), and Manchuria, and along this frontier minority populations occupy large and strategically important areas. Anywhere along the frontier, except in Manchuria, you could move the line 800 miles south, and still affect the personal destinies of no Russians and very few Chinese. This situation gives these minorities a great deal of bargaining power. Therefore, their political importance is

great. They have more option than weak minority populations usually have. They can get what they want by taking sides. This is true to some extent even as far as Iran and Afghanistan.

The war in Far East is being won largely by air and naval power in the Pacific. Yet in spite of these victories at sea and in the air, the political situation which will develop inland on the continent is likely to be largely out of reach of naval power and carrier-based aircraft. The possibility of a political outcome of this kind has not entered into the political thinking of America to the degree that it should have.

Mr. LATTIMORE. And I should like in the record also my competent statement, before reading my own article, that this citation from the Soviet press is a typical piece of Soviet propaganda; namely, taking isolated phrases from my article and adding phrases of their own.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, did you make an effort to get a yearly review of Pacific Affairs into the *New Masses*?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I did. But if you have a document to refresh my memory, I should be glad to see it.

The CHAIRMAN. That answer does not seem to carry cogency, "I don't believe I did, but if you have a document." You certainly know whether you did, or not. That was a publication.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I don't. I have no recollection of it at all.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want to say that you do not know that you tried to get these documents in?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want to say "No" to the question as propounded to you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The question is "No; I do not remember doing any such thing."

The CHAIRMAN. The answer is "No," you mean?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The answer is "No."

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a memorandum from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated July 10, 1937, headed "Memo: F. V. F. from C. P."

F. V. F. presumably is Frederick V. Field, and C. P. is presumably Catherine Porter.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that be received into the record?

The CHAIRMAN. Just a minute, now.

Frederick V. Field is an established character here in this hearing. How about the other one? Who is the other one?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, do you know whose initials C. P. are?

Mr. LATTIMORE. C. P., I think, is Catherine Porter, who was the New York subeditor of *Pacific Affairs*.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the content of this memorandum bears on the questions put to the witness.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you read that, please?

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

Owen has raised the question of our getting yearly reviews of *Pacific Affairs* into the *New Masses*, the *Nation*, the *New Republic*, and so on. He wanted me to ask you about this. His suggestion was that we might have such reviews start in August when the conference is on. Do you think there is any possibility of wangling a thing like this in so short a time?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that be inserted in the record?

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record for the purpose stated by Mr. Morris.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 540" and was read in full.)

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, did Mary van Kleeck write for Pacific Affairs an article on the Moscow trials?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know whether Mary van Kleeck was at that time a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Did Mr. William Henry Chamberlin subsequently write an article in Pacific Affairs on the Moscow trials?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, he did.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your reaction to having received that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. At that time, I can't recall, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Chamberlin's article published in Pacific Affairs?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, it was.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you at the same time write an answering article to Mr. Chamberlin's letter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir. I wrote an article which was my own comment on the whole question of the trials.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that letter please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a document taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated July 5, 1938, headed "ECC from CP."

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the contents of the memorandum identified by Mr. Mandel bear on the last question addressed to the witness.

Mr. Mandel, will you read it, please?

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

#### EXHIBIT No. 541

JULY 5, 1938.

ECC from CP: Here is a copy of a letter from Chamberlin (June 13) intended for publication in Pacific Affairs. I have air mailed a copy to Owen and have sent a copy to Harriet Moore requesting her to write Owen by air.

Have you any comments to be passed on to Owen? Do you think at this point Miss van Kleeck should see Chamberlin's letter, or shall we wait?

Mr. MORRIS. May it be received into the record, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. It may be received into the record.

(Documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 541" which was in full above and "Exhibit No. 541A" which appears as follows:)

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#### EXHIBIT No. 541-A

#### COMMENT AND CORRESPONDENCE

[Pacific Affairs, vol. IX, No. 3, September 1938, pp. 370-372]

Mr. Chamberlin's successor as Moscow correspondent of the Christian Science Monitor, Demaree Bess, has published in the Saturday Evening Post, which is hardly a pro-Soviet organ, the story of an American engineer working for the Soviet Government. This foreigner, though not "called as an independent expert witness," describes how his work was hampered by men who were later convicted of sabotage.

Why should Mr. Chamberlin be surprised that no letters, memoranda, or minutes of meetings of the conspirators were adduced in evidence? The testi-

mony makes it clear by inference that the work of all the conspirators interlocked so closely with that of loyal citizens that, if they had risked much in writing, they would have been caught much sooner.<sup>1</sup> As for the suggestion that the new head of the secret service is likely to abuse his power just as Yagoda did, it is obvious that the publicity given in the Soviet Union itself to Yagoda's turpitude is a safeguard against any such thing.

Mr. Chamberlin's remarks about the "striking contrast between the magnitude of the confessions and the meagerness of the results" are too rhetorical. The verbatim records of the trials are entirely credible in the way they describe the descent from grandiose ideas to futile deeds. The ideas were so grandiose that they could not have been carried out except with enthusiastic popular backing. It requires no adroit casuistry to conclude that, apart altogether from disputes over theory, the majority of the people in the Soviet Union are unwilling to risk the improved life which they are beginning to enjoy, after the sufferings first of the revolution and then of the "undeclared civil war" of the Five-Year Plan. The authorities are beginning to make good on the promises of reward held out for the sacrifices necessary to establish Socialism in a country with unorganized resources. Those rewards, though not yet dazzlingly great, are so widely distributed that no general revolt in the face of visibly growing success could possibly be expected except by emotionally biased antagonists like Trotsky.

The "gross discrepancies" in evidence to which Mr. Chamberlin refers appear to be subjective. Where conspirators within a country are in only intermittent and furtive contact with exiles abroad, it is hardly a "gross discrepancy" to count on the future aid of exile accomplices whom you do not yet know to be dead. Nor am I emotionally disturbed by the fact that the Norwegian authorities denied the inconvenient airplane that came to Oslo. This seems to me a not very hair-raising example of diplomatic usage. In much more acutely uncomfortable circumstances, it may be recalled, the British Government was unable even to imagine what submarines could be torpedoing British ships off the ports of Spain.

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[Pacific Affairs, September 1938, pp. 370-372]

Then we come to the well-known phenomena of "sinister pressure" and "groveling repentance." In reading the verbatim reports of the trials, I naturally went over most closely the testimony and confessions of the only two of the accused whom I had ever met personally, because these were men whom I could to some extent visualize. They were Radek and Rakovsky. I think that the distinguished personage of the IPR in whose company I called on Radek, and the British diplomat in whose house I met Rakovsky, would both agree that there was nothing out of character in the testimony of either man. Both of them not only gave perfectly coherent evidence, but psychologically convincing accounts of the way in which they were enmeshed.

The real point, of course, for those who live in democratic countries, is whether the discovery of the conspiracies was a triumph for democracy or not. I think that this can easily be determined. The accounts of the most widely read Moscow correspondents all emphasize that since the close scrutiny of every person in a responsible position, following the trials, a great many abuses have been discovered and rectified. A lot depends on whether you emphasize the discovery of the abuse or the rectification of it: but habitual rectification can hardly do anything but give the ordinary citizen more courage to protest, loudly, whenever in future he finds himself being victimized by "someone in the Party" or "someone in the Government." That sounds to me like democracy.

O. L.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to offer for the record the article referred to in this testimony, signed "O. L." in the Pacific Affairs of September 1938, which commences on page 370, together with the preceding article, which is signed William Henry Chamberlain, Tokyo, June 1938, which ends on page 370.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you properly connected the article with the excerpt that has just been inserted in the record?

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<sup>1</sup> See review (p. 401) by J. N. Hazard of proceedings of the Bukharin trial.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, will you testify that is the same article referred to in the memorandum?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe it is.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I read the last paragraph in Mr. Lattimore's article?

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. This is an article signed "O. L."—presumably, Mr. Lattimore, and I think the witness has identified it as such.

Have you not, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS (reading):

The real point, of course, for those who live in democratic countries, is whether the discovery of the conspiracies was a triumph for democracy or not. \* \* \*

And the reference is to the Moscow trials, Mr. Chairman.

\* \* \* I think that this can easily be determined. The accounts of the most widely read Moscow correspondents all emphasize that since the close scrutiny of every person in a responsible position, following the trials, a great many abuses have been discovered and rectified. \* \* \*

The words "and rectified" are italicized.

\* \* \* A lot depends on whether you emphasize the discovery of the abuse or the rectification of it; but habitual rectification can hardly do anything but give the ordinary citizen more courage to protest, loudly, whenever in future he finds himself being victimized by "someone in the party" or "someone in the government." That sounds to me like democracy.

The CHAIRMAN. By whom is that article?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, Mr. Chairman.

Senator FERGUSON. Would that indicate, Mr. Lattimore, that you thought these trials were democracy in action?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. It sounded like democracy.

Senator FERGUSON. It sounded like democracy in action?

Senator SMITH. Would you like to see it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I should like to see it.

It sounds to me like exactly what it says, that the consequence of people in Russia—

The CHAIRMAN. I understood it is the last paragraph.

What is the question, Mr. Morris, please?

Mr. MORRIS. The questioning on this subject has been finished, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Lattimore has requested that he see the article.

The CHAIRMAN. There is no question pending, then?

Mr. MORRIS. No question pending.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. May I continue with the next question?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The point here—replying to Senator Ferguson's question—I think it is that I said that conditions which—and here I quote:

Give the ordinary citizen more courage to protest, loudly, whenever in future he finds himself being victimized by "someone in the party" or "someone in the government." That sounds to me like democracy.

That is, that I think it is democratic when citizens can protest against things done by party members or Government members.

Senator FERGUSON. To what are you referring?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I may say that this was a disappointed hope. It didn't develop that way.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you think that the trials were such an expression?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir. I was clearly distinguishing there between the trials and the results of the trials.

Senator FERGUSON. The result of the trials was death to many of the people, is not that true?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is true.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you think that that designated democracy?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir. I thought that an atmosphere in which citizens could protest against abuses would be democracy.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think that that was a protest of the citizens, or a protest of the Government departments?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was referring to articles in the press which I had seen at that time, saying that after the trials of these people in Russia, a lot of whom were officials, these press articles said that people in Russia were beginning to act a little more independently toward their official bureaucracy, and I thought that was an encouraging sign.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, did E. Herbert Norman write for Pacific Affairs?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, sir; I believe he did.

Mr. MORRIS. Under what name did he write for Pacific Affairs?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Under the name of E. Herbert Norman, as far as I remember.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he ever use a nom de plume?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't think he did.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that document, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. The original document was a carbon copy. It is dated May 30, 1940. It is from 129 East Fifty-second Street, New York, N. Y., addressed to Owen Lattimore, with the typed signature of Edward C. Carter. And it says in the corner: "Penciled note copy to WLH."

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, I offer you that letter and ask you if you can recall having seen it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, I think I recall having seen this.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you mind reading that letter, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The letter is dated May 30, 1940.

(EXHIBIT No. 542)

DEAR OWEN: Herbert Norman was in the office about a fortnight ago on the eve of his sailing for Tokyo as language officer in the Canadian Legation. He is very eager to continue active contact with the institute and in the field of Japanese political history. He would like to do some writing on the key figures of the Meiji period.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Holland as it may be that he will see ways of using Norman on writing that might not be quite within the scope of Pacific Affairs.

I think that Norman may be able to do some writing for Pacific Affairs on contemporary matters, providing he writes under a nom de plume.

I imagine that by now you have read his Inquiry book, "Japan's Emergence as a Modern State." This is probably the most fundamental study that has yet appeared in the Inquiry Series. I am hoping that all of us may find some way of continuing Norman as a contributor to the IPR publication program in one form or another.

Sincerely yours.

The CHAIRMAN. You stated to counsel just a few minutes ago that you did not believe that that writer wrote under a nom de plume.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you wish to change your answer now?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I do not wish to change my answer. I don't believe he did.

May I say that this is quite obviously a reference to the fact that it is usual practice for diplomatic personnel of our own country and other countries to sign a non de plume rather than their own names. An outstanding example, of course, is the Mr. X article by George Kennedy in Foreign Affairs.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know, Mr. Lattimore, that Mr. Norman has been identified before the committee as having been a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have seen that reference in the transcript. I have also seen some of the Canadian press protests on the subject.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I introduce into the record at this time an excerpt from the publication China Today, which Mr. Mandel will identify?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of the magazine China Today, for March 1936, which is the official organ of the American Friends of the Chinese People.

On page 121 of this magazine we find the following:

#### CANADIAN FRIENDS OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE

It is with great pleasure and much applause that we greet our friends in Canada and congratulate those who played an active part in organizing a Canadian Friends of the Chinese People. Taking advantage of the presence in Toronto of Gen. Fang Chen-wu, Mr. A. A. MacLeod, chairman of the Canadian League Against War and Fascism, organized several outstanding meetings which resulted in the formation of the new organization. Beginning with a banquet on Saturday, February 8, with 80 present, Gen. Fang Chen-wu, with whom China Today readers are well acquainted, began a series of important meetings which included a special luncheon at the House of Commons in Ottawa and interviews with the Prime Minister and other political figures. Following a Fang Chen-wu mass meeting in Toronto held in Central Technical School on February 9 and attended by 1,500, a group of 30 met at Wymilwood, Queen's Park, and organized a Canadian Friends of the Chinese People. A provisional committee was elected and is composed of E. H. Norman (secretary), a teacher born in Japan \* \* \*.

Mr. MORRIS. I think that is enough, Mr. Chairman.

May that article go into the record?

The CHAIRMAN. What is the object? What is its significance?

Mr. MORRIS. We are questioning the witness about his association and the publication of articles by Mr. E. H. Norman. According to that article, E. H. Norman was the secretary of a Canadian subdivision of the American Friends of the Chinese People. We would like to have something in the record to show that the American Friends of the Chinese People is a Communist-front organization.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that should come along now if this is inserted in the record.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like at this point, then, to introduce the testimony of Mr. Morris L. Appelman, who was member of the Communist Party and a member of the Communist cell that ran the American Friends of the Chinese People. I would like his testimony covering that to be put into the record in its entirety.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that taken in executive session or open session?

Mr. MORRIS. In executive session, Mr. Chairman, on January 11, 1952.

The CHAIRMAN. You can read sufficient of it now to tie this in, if it can be tied in.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel is examining Mr. Appelman [reading]:

EXHIBIT No. 542A

Mr. MANDEL. Then in May 1935, you were contributing editor of China Today?

Mr. APPELMAN. I don't remember that title, but apparently I was if I was listed as such.

Mr. MANDEL. What was China Today?

Mr. APPELMAN. It was a publication of the American Friends of the Chinese People.

Senator EASTLAND. What is the American Friends of the Chinese People?

Mr. APPELMAN. A front organization of the Communist Party.

And then on page 6, Mr. Morris questioning:

In connection with the American Friends of the Chinese People, did you as a matter of fact belong to it?

Mr. APPELMAN. Yes, sir. I don't remember whether it was a dues-paying organization, but I was identified with it.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you sent there by the Communist Party?

Mr. APPELMAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Who in the party sent you?

Mr. APPELMAN. It was either Grace Maul or Esther Carroll or both, because they were my two contacts.

Mr. MORRIS. Is Grace Maul Grace Granich?

Mr. APPELMAN. The same party.

Mr. MORRIS. You have been identified with both these people?

Mr. APPELMAN. They were both definitely party members; and, so to speak, my party liaison was with them. At that time I was. At the time they first contacted me I had been expelled; I was not a party member in good standing; and they were my supervisors so to speak, in that organization.

Mr. Fortas, would you like to see that testimony?

Mr. FORTAS. No.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the relevancy of that testimony with this witness?

Mr. FORTAS. That is my point.

Mr. MORRIS. The American Friends of the Chinese People was an organization with which Mr. Norman was connected, and we are now asking Mr. Lattimore if he published articles by Mr. Norman.

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment, until the Chair rules on this.

The testimony of Mr. Appleman may be inserted in the record. Do you want it in full?

Mr. MORRIS. Just those portions that I read, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. That is in the record now.

The exhibit China Today may be inserted in the record for what it is worth at the present time.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 542 and 542A", which was read in full. No. 543 is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 543

[Source: China Today, March 1936, p. 121. Published monthly at 168 West 23d Street, New York, N. Y., by the American Friends of the Chinese People]

CANADIAN FRIENDS OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE

It is with great pleasure and much applause that we greet our friends in Canada and congratulate those who played an active part in organizing a Canadian Friends of the Chinese People. Taking advantage of the presence in Toronto of General Fang Chen-wu, Mr. A. A. MacLeod, Chairman of the Canadian League Against War and Fascism, organized several outstanding meetings which resulted

in the formation of the new organization. Beginning with a banquet on Saturday February 8th with eighty present, General Fang Chen-wu, with whom *China Today* readers are well acquainted, began a series of important meetings which included a special luncheon at the House of Commons in Ottawa and interviews with the Prime Minister and other political figures. Following a Fang Chen-wu mass meeting in Toronto held in Central Technical School on February 9th and attended by 1,500, a group of thirty met at Wymilwood, Queen's Park, and organized a Canadian Friends of the Chinese People. A provisional committee was elected and is composed of E. H. Norman (secretary), a teacher born in Japan, Professor John F. Davidson of Upper Canada College, and A. R. Menzies, a Victoria College student who was born in China. One of the important members of this group is William Arthur Deacon, Literary Editor of the *Mail and Empire* of Toronto, who wrote a splendid interview with General Fang for his paper.

We in the United States extend our heartiest greetings to our friends in Canada and we urge them to keep in close contact with us and we in turn pledge ourselves to work in close cooperation with them.

The importance of the Far East in the whole problem of war and peace is rapidly becoming a matter of common knowledge. It is therefore very significant and hopeful that groups of "Friends of the Chinese People" have been organized in several countries. America, France, England, Holland, and now Canada have joined the international front of those whose chief aim is to help the Chinese people in their struggle for national liberation, the realization of which will play a most powerful rôle for peace throughout the Far East and the whole world. We urge other countries to follow and join this rapidly forming "International Friends of the Chinese People."

Mr. FORTAS. Mr. Morris, before refusing your kind offer to show me that transcript, I assume there is no reference to Mr. Lattimore by name.

Mr. MORRIS. There is no reference to Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. FORTAS. Then I don't care to see it.

The CHAIRMAN. It has to do with the writer. That is the tie-in, I understand.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, what article did Mr. Norman write in *Pacific Affairs*?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have been looking for it, Mr. Morris, and I don't find an article listed for the period when I was editor.

Mr. MORRIS. Was there one subsequent to that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe there was one at some time; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, were you acquainted with Mr. Evans F. Carlson?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I was.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your association with Mr. Carlson?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I knew Mr. Carlson first when he was in the American Marine Guard in the Embassy in Peking, and I saw him maybe two or three times here in America.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever give him advice?

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment. I want to go back to this offer of the exhibit that the Chair has admitted in evidence as part of the record.

The question was propounded to the witness as to whether or not this writer had been a contributor to the publication while he was editor. He says "No," in substance. You cannot hold him responsible for something that was done in the publication before he was in charge of it.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, could it not be admitted as some evidence as far as the institute is concerned?

The CHAIRMAN. It may go in to that extent, but I do not want it to go to the extent of tying in this witness to any collaboration with the writer through the introduction of these exhibits.

Senator FERGUSON. I appreciate that.

The CHAIRMAN. The whole matter goes to the weight of the thing rather than to its admissibility.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, I think the observation you are making is worth while to make at this time. I think we must bear in mind that our prime investigation is of the IPR and that we are not trying Mr. Lattimore.

The CHAIRMAN. That is correct.

Senator SMITH. I notice that some of the newsmen and some of the columnists continue to refer to the fact that we are trying Mr. Lattimore. I have not felt I have been trying Mr. Lattimore, and I do not believe any of the rest of the committee have felt that way.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Lattimore came here at his own request as a witness to testify, to clear his record, apparently, of statements that have been made by witnesses who testified with reference to him. He is not on trial.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the letter read into the record previous to the introduction of these exhibits contained an offer from Mr. Carter to have Mr. Norman write for Pacific Affairs under a nom de plume; and, in view of the testimony this morning about the appearance of the nom de plume, we had no way but to ask Mr. Lattimore whether or not, as a matter of fact, Mr. Norman did write it.

The CHAIRMAN. I am admitting the exhibits, but I want to limit their significance—that is all—because they address themselves to the Institute of Pacific Relations rather than to Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, you knew Mr. Norman, did you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I knew Mr. Norman at that time very slightly. I think I had met him once or twice when I was at the office of the Institute of Pacific Relations in New York. I knew him later in Japan when I was in Japan with the Pauley reparations mission.

Mr. MORRIS. How frequently did you see Mr. Norman at that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I saw him quite frequently at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, did you give advice to Evans Carlson as to whether or not he should stay in the Navy or leave the Navy?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes. I remember very distinctly that Carlson told me that he was thinking of resigning from the Marine Corps, and I urged him not to.

Mr. MORRIS. Why did you urge him not to, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Because I thought that a man of his expert knowledge in China would be useful to the Nation in his service in the Marine Corps.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that Mr. Carlson was chairman of the Committee for Democratic Far Eastern Policy?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I didn't know that.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you not testified in executive committee that you thought that organization was a Communist organization?

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I see my testimony on that? My present recollection of it is rather blank, I am afraid.

Mr. MORRIS. That is page 91, Mr. Lattimore. You may read any part of it into the public record.

Mr. LATTIMORE. My testimony in executive session was as follows:

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know the organization Committee for Democratic Far Eastern Policy?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I do.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you ever been associated with that in any way?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. I was asked to subscribe to it, and I replied that since I was at that time writing syndicated newspaper articles as an independent commentator I did not want to subscribe to any partisan organizations of that kind. However, right at the end of the war, they were bringing out some fairly interesting information that was not readily available elsewhere, and I sent in a subscription and asked them to send me their material.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you believe that is a Communist organization?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I should say that it certainly has become a fellow-traveling organization. I don't know whether it is Communist, or not. I am not an expert on the shades of difference between fellow-travelers and Communists.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that last letter, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated March 27, 1939, addressed to Mr. E. C. Carter, with the typed signature of Owen Lattimore. It is a photostat of a carbon copy of a document, and it was previously used as exhibit No. 154.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Lattimore, will you identify that letter as having been written by you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that in our record now, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. That is exhibit 154.

Mr. Lattimore, will you read that letter, please?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The date is March 27, 1939. [Reading:]

DEAR CARTER: Thanks for sending me the copy of the letter from Carlson. If I had known about this before, I should have risked impertinence by writing to urge him not to resign. As an officer in the Marine Corps, known to have a favorable view of China's prospects in the war, and known to be restrained from giving full expression to his views by Navy Department policy, Carlson had quite a potent effect. As an officer who has resigned his commission in order to speak out he will have a momentary sensational effect, but is in danger of soon being disparaged as more sentimental than realistic. I hope very much that he has the ability to earn his way by writing and speaking, but there is no evidence to go on. As I did not see him on his brief trip east I have no recent impressions by which to gauge his possible usefulness as a "Friend of China."

I expect I shall be hearing from him direct before long and if so I shall write you again.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this letter, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated February 8, 1940, addressed to Maj. Evans F. Carlson, American Committee for Nonparticipation in Japanese Aggression. The typed signature is "Owen Lattimore." It is a carbon copy of a letter.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, do you recall having written that letter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I recall it now.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read it, please, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It is dated February 8, 1940. [Reading:]

DEAR EVANS: What a dope I am! I forgot to give you the enclosed glamorous candid portrait of yourself.

Don't give anybody else too much the idea that it is a Herculean job to make the fur fly in Baltimore. If anybody should come along all ardor and enthusiasm, why break his spirit in advance? Besides, after the swell work you did, it should be easier in the future.

Yours.

Senator FERGUSON. Let me see that letter.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will it be received in the record?

The CHAIRMAN. It will be received in the record.

(The document previously read by the witness was marked "Exhibit No. 544" and was read in full.)

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify those two documents?

MR. MANDEL. I have here a photostat of an article from the Daily Worker, of March 16, 1944, the editorial page, which is an article with the following heading: "Lieutenant Colonel Carlson's tribute to Sun Yat-sen, Chinese Communists."

Then it continues:

Following are excerpts from the address delivered by Lt. Col. Evans F. Carlson, at Sun Yat-sen Day Tribute Meeting, Sunday, March 12, Metropolitan Opera House.

MR. MORRIS. Does that appear in the Daily Worker?

MR. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

THE CHAIRMAN. What do you want to do with this one?

MR. MORRIS. Will that be received in the record, Mr. Chairman?

This is an article about Lieutenant Colonel Carlson, which appeared in the Daily Worker.

THE CHAIRMAN. "Lieutenant Colonel Carlson's tribute to Sun Yat-sen, Chinese Communists."

This is a photostat clipping from the Daily Worker, is that correct, Mr. Mandel?

MR. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

MR. MORRIS. Will that be received into the record, Mr. Chairman?

THE CHAIRMAN. It will be admitted into the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 545" and is as follows:)

#### EXHIBIT No. 545

##### LT. COL. CARLSON'S TRIBUTE TO SUN YAT-SEN, CHINESE COMMUNISTS

*Following are excerpts from the address delivered by Lt. Col. Evans F. Carlson, at Sun Yat-sen Day tribute meeting, Sunday, March 21, Metropolitan Opera House.*

Fifteen years ago this coming June it was my rare privilege to participate in the ceremonies at Nanking, China, attending the State Burial of the Father of the Chinese Republic, Doctor Sun Yat-sen. I was there as a member of the personal staff of Admiral Mark Bristol, then commanding our Asiatic Fleet.

This man of humble birth, by his unshakable confidence in the dignity of the human being, regardless of his race, creed, or color, and by his unselfish devotion to the cause of bringing to the four hundred millions of his native China the hope and freedoms of the democratic way of life, overthrew the Imperial Ching dynasty and set the pattern which gave birth to the Republic and which has enabled his countrymen to resist for nearly seven years every effort of Japan to enslave them.

We of the United States of America cannot escape our debt to Sun Yat-sen. The debt is rendered more poignant by the knowledge that we failed Doctor Sun back in 1923, in his hour of need. Failing to secure our support he turned to another great democratic people, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, who provided the financial and moral aid which enable Chiang Kai-shek to accomplish the task of uniting China under one government in 1938. Today we enjoy the benefits of this unity through the magnificent efforts of China, under Generalissimo Chiang's leadership, to contain Japan's armies in Eastern Asia as we advance against the common enemy across the Pacific.

#### HAILS SUN'S PRINCIPLES

Doctor Sun is best known for the political philosophy which he evolved, called the San Min Chu I, or Three Principles of the People. This philosophy, subscribed to by all political groups in China today regardless of their complexion, combines the best of the political doctrines of ancient China with those principles

of democratic doctrines of Britain, the U. S. S. R., and the United States which Doctor Sun felt were most suitable to the needs and temperament of the Chinese people. Some of his ideas regarding the application of these principles indicates the universal scope of his political thinking.

His principle of Nationalism relates to the fundamental need for people to be organized into a sovereign state. In China the principles had a two-fold application: (1) to induce a feeling of nationalism throughout all the people of this vast country; and (2) to regain for China the sovereign rights which had been impaired through the instrumentality of the Unequal Treaties imposed by foreign powers.

The Principle of Democracy Doctor Sun interpreted as the "People's sovereignty," or control of government by the people. He contemplated that the people's will would be exercised through suffrage, the recall, the initiative, and the referendum. For the administration of government he added to the executive, legislative, and judicial branches we know, the old Chinese institution of examination (comparable to our civil service) and censorship (most nearly akin to our supreme court). The application of these principles indicate the universal scope of his political thinking.

China is administered today under this quintuple form of government, but the people have not yet attained the right of suffrage. Instead the nation is governed by the Kuomintang party.

#### TELLS OF THREE-FOLD PROGRAM

Doctor Sun contemplated that suffrage would be attained through a three-fold program. First there was to be the Period of Military Conquest, during which China would become united under the Kuomintang Party. Then would follow the Period of Political Tutelage, during which the party would govern while the people were being politically educated. Finally, suffrage would be conferred on the people and the nation would enter the final period of Representative Government. The Period of Political Tutelage has prevailed since 1928.

The most discussed and least understood of the Three Principles is that of the People's Livelihood. In effect, Doctor Sun's conception of this principle boils down to state socialism. He aimed to improve the livelihood of all the people, and he proposed to do this through social and economic reform, nationalization of transportation and communication, direct taxation and socialized distribution through cooperative societies.

While, as I said a few moments ago, all political groups within China subscribe to his Three Principles of the People, all groups do not interpret the principles in the same way, and emphasis in the application of the various principles differs with the groups. The Kuomintang, under the aegis of Chiang Kai-shek, has brought Nationalism to a high peak. The Chinese Communist Party, which, from the nature of its works, I would term the Social-Democratic Party, goes in more for improving the people's livelihood and preparing them for the exercise of representative government.

You hear much about the activities of the Kuomintang Party, which constitutes the national government at Chungking. Let me say a word about the less publicized Social-Democratic group which operates mostly in the northern provinces and largely behind the lines of the Japanese army. In the early years of the Sino-Japanese war I spent a number of months with this group. I found that its military successes were due in large measure to the democratic political action of the people and to the solid integrity of its leaders.

#### HONORS COMMUNIST FIGHTERS

Recently I had a report from Professor Michael Lindsay, formerly of the faculty of Yenching University, and now present with this group, on the activities of the group up to the end of last year. Professor Lindsay tells me that the military agencies of this group, the 8th Route and New Fourth Armies, are containing about 350,000 Japanese troops. These Chinese armies operate for the most part in small mobile columns which engage the enemy daily. Activities have been extended northeast of Peiping and into southern Manchuria, where they constitute a constant threat to the Japanese lines of communication with China. These armies, with their militia units, now number about one million men.

One feature of the administration in the northern provinces that is significant is the extent of the public school system as well as of the adult education program. There are 7,500 schools operating in the Shansi-Hopei area, west of the

Peiping-Hankow railroad, and in this same area 300,000 adults had learned to read and write by the middle of 1943. People in this area, cut off from Free China by Japanese military units, not only participate in the war effort, but govern themselves through their elected representatives. Thus are the principles of Doctor Sun being brought into full realization.

One exponent of Doctor Sun's principles who merits special mention, is his widow, the former Sing Ling Soong. Madame Sun has consistently and persistently, since her husband's death in 1925, endeavored to bring about the complete realization of his aspirations. Quiet and self-effacing, she is less well-known abroad than her sister, Madame Chiang Kai-shek, but in China she has a large and loyal following.

Madame Sun places only one interpretation on the teachings of her distinguished husband: the literal application of the principles of Nationalism, Democracy, and the People's Livelihood. She understands the self-discipline and self-sacrifice which their application requires, and she begins with herself. None who has visited her can have failed to be impressed by the simplicity of her life, her love for humanity and her unrelenting effort to improve the livelihood of her fellow citizens. I have known Madame Sun for many years, and her friendship has been an unending source of inspiration.

Mr. MORRIS. What is the other one, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here the original of an article from a magazine entitled "Youth," the official organ of the American Youth for Democracy, which had been cited as subversive by the Attorney General.

This issue is evidently undated, and on page 5 of this issue we have the following article headed "We Fought For Peace; by National Committee to Win the Peace, Brig. Gen. Evans F. Carlson, USMC (Retired), Paul Robeson, cochairmen."

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Carlson has been identified before this committee as having been a member of the Communist Party.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you offering just this article for the record, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. FORTAS. Mr. Morris, we have not seen these two articles offered for the record. Is there any reference in them to Mr. Lattimore by name, in either of them?

Mr. MORRIS. No.

Senator FERGUSON. I wonder if the significance or the meaning of this letter of February 8, 1940, from Owen Lattimore to Carlson is clear, where Mr. Lattimore starts out with: "What a dope I am! I forgot to give you the enclosed glamorous candid portrait of yourself."

Was there a memorandum in the paper, or in this envelope, or do you mean what followed as being the "glamorous candid portrait?"

Mr. LATTIMORE. I should say, Senator, that it probably is a reference to a snapshot that was enclosed, a snapshot of himself, a camera snapshot.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not mean to convey that the language was the portrait?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you say: "Don't give anybody else too much the idea," and so forth. What did you mean by that?

Read it and tell us what you meant by that.

Mr. LATTIMORE [reading]:

DEAR EVANS: What a dope I am!

The CHAIRMAN. How did you spell the word "dope?"

Mr. LATTIMORE. D-o-p-e.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not use "u," did you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. I said:

What a dope I am! I forgot to give you the enclosed glamorous candid portrait of yourself.

Don't give anybody else too much the idea that it is a Herculean job to make the fur fly in Baltimore.

Senator FERGUSON. Could you stop right there now? What did you mean by that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think my recollection is probably correct, Senator, that I was referring to Colonel Carlson coming to Baltimore to speak for the American Committee for Nonparticipation in Japanese Aggression. Among other speakers we had for it were Dr. Walter Judd, now Congressman Judd, also Admiral Harry Yarnell.

\* \* \* If anybody should come along all ardor and enthusiasm, why break his spirit in advance? Besides, after the swell work you did, it should be easier in the future.

Senator FERGUSON. What "swell work" were you talking about?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Swell work in raising funds for the American Committee for Nonparticipation in Japanese Aggression.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Morris, you have an exhibit here that you have offered for the record. Up to this point, I have not been able to catch your connection to tie it in here with either the Institute of Pacific Relations or the witness on the stand.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore gave testimony today, Mr. Chairman, about his having given advice to the author of that article, that he should stay in the Navy and not resign. We had some questioning on that point.

Reference was also made to Colonel Carlson's membership in the Communist Party. That article is an article that Carlson wrote for the American Youth for Democracy publication, and that bears on Colonel Carlson's political persuasions in connection with the advice offered to him by Mr. Lattimore, who told him he should have stayed in the Navy, where he would be more potent.

Mr. FORTAS. Do you mean the article refers to it?

Mr. MORRIS. It bears on his political identity. He is writing for a Communist publication.

Mr. LATTIMORE. On his political identity at the time I gave him that advice?

The CHAIRMAN. Wait a minute.

Did I understand that this organization, of which Carlson was a member, was listed as a subversive organization by the Attorney General?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be inserted in the record.

Again I say it goes to the weight of its worthwhileness.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 546" and is as follows:)

#### EXHIBIT No. 546

#### WE FOUGHT FOR PEACE

(By National Committee to Win the Peace, Brig. Gen. Evans F. Carlson, USMCB (retired) Paul Robeson, cochairmen)

[Source: Youth, Published by American Youth for Democracy, February 1947, p. 5]

During the war, American youth carried their ideals for a postwar world into battle. Their guns spoke the hope of an era of permanent, democratic peace,

The rhythm of marching feet sounded their aspirations for an economic future quite in contrast to the homeless, black-market ridden land to which they returned.

They fought hard and they fought well in their battle against the enemy. But their enemies were not only Hans or Tayaka. Their enemies were the philosophies that held one man is better than another because of the color of his skin or the religion that he practiced; that democracy is an archaic system that must be replaced by fascism; and that the armed might of imperialism can rule the world. Side by side the democratic peoples of the world, American youth defeated the advocates of these philosophies.

The youth of America had good cause to fight as they did under the leadership of Franklin Roosevelt. They remembered well how his courageous leadership had saved the post-World War I generation from the chaos of the Hoover depression. They knew from experience how his fight for a better America had enabled many of them to finish school, to improve their living standards and to enjoy the full benefits of American democracy.

With Franklin Roosevelt, the youth of America envisaged a world free from the scourge of war. They knew that his policy of friendship and unity of all United Nations held the key to peace as well as victory. Translated into practical terms, it meant an incessant battle for economic democracy, for colonial independence, for minority rights and for the spirit of friendly cooperation among the Big Three powers.

F. D. R. did not live to see the peace he worked so hard to win. He did not live to see that peace threatened by dangerous voices in our midst who are already crying for a new war—a new and terrible conflagration that will wipe out democracy as it lashes the earth with the weapons of an atomic age.

But today, others, particularly the youth of America, are fighting along the battle lines set by F. D. R. Through the AYD, through the National Committee to Win the Peace and through every other democratic channel of people's expression, American youth are working to return our Nation to the program of F. D. R.

The future of the youth of America is inextricably woven into the pattern this country sets for itself in the immediate period to come. The voice of youth will play a major role in determining that pattern.

Together with the youth of America, the National Committee to Win the Peace will work to crystalize public opinion on a course which will enable us to live in peace with all nations of the world—on a course which will enable us to steer clear of a war which might be precipitated by forces which are inimical to the best interests of the youth and people of America.

Only if our country follows such a course will the ideals of F. D. R. and the youth of America for a better postwar world be fulfilled.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, did you ever serve as a member of the board of directors of the American-Russian Institute?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe I may have, for a year.

If you have a document to refresh my recollection, I should be glad to see it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that document, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated October 24, 1940, addressed to Miss Harriet L. Moore, the American-Russian Institute, 56 West Forty-fifth Street, New York City, with the typed signature of Owen Lattimore. The document is a photostat of a carbon copy.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, can you recall having written that letter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I recall it. And it shows that my recollection was wrong.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, he recalls it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, will you read the letter, please?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The date is October 24, 1940, to Miss Harriet L. Moore, the American-Russian Institute, 56 West Forty-fifth Street, New York City.

(EXHIBIT No. 547)

DEAR HARRIET: I am afraid that I cannot serve on the board of directors of the institute, but I think you will appreciate my reasons.

My primary interest, and the only field in which I speak with any authority, is the Far East. At the present time, of all times, I do not want to run the risk of having anything I may say about the Far East discredited by people who say "You can't trust a word he says about China, because he is interested in cultural relations with the Soviet Union."

Yours very sincerely.

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will it be received into the record?

THE CHAIRMAN. It will be received into the record.

(The document previously read in full by the witness was marked "Exhibit No. 547".)

THE CHAIRMAN. What is the next one?

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this document, please?

MR. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, headed "On board *M. V. Georgic*, en route to New York." It is dated October 19, 1937, addressed to W. L. Holland, with the typed signature of Edward C. Carter. It is a photostat of a carbon copy.

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you read the handwritten notations on the top?

MR. MANDEL. At the top are the following handwritten notes [reading]:

Copies to OL—to share with RP & ED.

CHS—to share with HM, CP, EFC, KB, CT.

THE CHAIRMAN. Can somebody interpret those initials, please, who they were, for the record? Who were the parties?

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, will you identify the parties?

MR. LATTIMORE (reading):

OL—to share with RP & ED.

THE CHAIRMAN. Is that your signature to the letter, "OL"?

MR. LATTIMORE. No; this is a circulation notation, to be sent to "OL" and for "OL" to share with "RP" and "ED."

THE CHAIRMAN. Who are they. Who is "RP"?

MR. LATTIMORE. "RP" I think was an Englishman named—I forget his name—Page or something like that, who was working for the IPR in Shanghai.

"ED," I think, is Elizabeth Downing.

Then the other initials are "CHS—to share with HM, CP, EFC, KB, CT." Presumably, that means Chen Han-seng, to share with Harriet Moore, Catherine Porter, Elsie Fairfax Cholmeley, Kathleen Barnes, Charlotte Tyler.

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the relevancy of this document is that a copy of it had been sent to Mr. Lattimore, and the questioning will bear on his knowledge of the contents of this memorandum.

MR. SOURWINE. Are you offering that for the record, Mr. Morris?

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I offer this for the record.

THE CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 548" and is as follows:)

## EXHIBIT No. 548

Copies to OI—to share with RP & ED

CHS—to share with HM, CP, EFC, KB, CT

ON BOARD "M. V. GEORGIC," EN ROUTE TO NEW YORK.

19th October, 1937.

W. L. HOLLAND, Esq.,

% Kokusai Kyokai, 12 2-chome Marunouchi, Kojimachi-ku,  
Tokyo, Japan.

DEAR BILL: The pace in and following Moscow has been such that I can only now begin a piecemeal report to you on visit and discussions. Today I will group my answers around the agenda which I prepared for a meeting of the praesidium on August 13 and August 17. To give you the trend, I will italicize the agenda which formed the basis of these two formal meetings, but there were many other conversations so that the information contained in this letter was not entirely conveyed at those two stated meetings.

# I. THANKS TO SOVIET COUNCIL FOR ARRANGING SECRETARY-GENERAL'S FAR EASTERN VISIT

Here I gave a rather full account of what I regarded as the deeper significances of the visit. V. E. M. explained the difficulties in making the arrangements but his great satisfaction that the object of the visit had been achieved, namely, better equipment of the Secretary-General for his work.

This led to a very extended discussion of possible developments in the war in China. The sketch made by V. E. M. and Y. P. B. in August has thus far been proved both fundamental and accurately prophetic. To describe it here would make this letter, which must be long anyhow, too bulky. It would also make the letter interesting.

## II. RESEARCH

### A. Letter from Holland to Bremman dated June 28, 1937.

- (1) *English or American editions of Standards of Living Reports.*
- (2) *Report on North Pacific fisheries.*

### B. Letter from Holland to Carter dated June 28, 1937.

*"The other place of research which we should like to have started in the Soviet Union is a report on Soviet foreign policy with special reference to the Far East and the countries having membership in the IPR. Each national council is being asked to prepare a similar report, necessarily presenting its own national point of view.*

*"In connection with the studies on the economic development of dependent territories in the Pacific it might be interesting for them to prepare a report on the administration and economic development of its Far Eastern territories inhabited by minor nationalities, contrasting this with the customary methods of Western Colonial administration.*

*"There is one further point. Motileff in discussing the Land Utilization studies at Yosemite spoke with some enthusiasm about securing an extensive and very illuminating report on land utilization and agricultural development in the Soviet Far East. There would be widespread interest in such a report and I hope you will take the matter up again with him and assure him of our desire to have the study done and to do whatever we can to facilitate its publication in English. Besides this Motileff spoke of supplying material for the new edition of the Economic Handbook. On this point however I assume that Miss Mitchell will be well armed with specific requests and suggestions since the preparation of the new edition has already been started under Mr. Field's direction."*

With reference to English or American editions of the Standard of Living Reports, the praesidium is hospitable to the idea in principle, but is very reluctant to have these handled on any but a commercial basis. They do not wish to have publications subsidized for this makes their work liable to attack as propaganda. If some English or American publisher will not take the studies on a commercial basis it is probable that it could be published through the English Workers Press or through International Publishers.

With reference to a report on the North-Pacific fisheries, the praesidium wants to know precisely what the objective of the Institute is for this study. There are so many approaches that the praesidium does not wish to set a lot of people to work on every aspect of Soviet Far Eastern fisheries without knowing with very great precision, what you and Alsberg want. In this connection, please see my letter to Alsberg of V. E. M. thought that the fisheries question had been better treated in the Pacific Fisherman than it had in Pacific Affairs. He had sent Miller Freeman the latest data in July. Some time when you are in Tokyo you may wish to look up Juikoff, an expert on fish, who is attached from time to time to the staff of the Soviet Embassy in Tokyo.

If the Japanese I. P. R. or the American I. P. R. set the pace in the studies of the fishery question or if you and Alsberg give a precise outline of just what the purpose of the study is, it will be very easy for the Soviet I. P. R. to make the necessary start on the study.

With reference to a report on Soviet foreign policy in the Far East, V. E. M. wonders whether you wish it treated primarily from the historical point of view or with the emphasis on contemporary manifestations of Soviet foreign policy. If the latter is what you want, the situation is a little difficult because of the lack of connection between the Soviet I. P. R. and the Foreign Office, as prescribed by I. P. R. custom. It may be helpful if you would suggest an organizing principal for all of the Councils for their monographs in this field.

With reference to your suggestions that the praesidium prepare a report on the development of the Far Eastern Territories inhabited by Minor Nationalities, for contrast with the customary methods of Western Colonial administration, I have already written you (see my letter of September 29) that it is quite impossible for the Soviet I. P. R. to prepare a report for such a purpose. The Minor Nationalities are in no sense "colonial" areas. If you want a monograph on this subject it is a legitimate request to make of the Soviet I. P. R., but only if it is completely disassociated from preparation for the Round Table on Colonial Problems.

With reference to Land Utilization there is a voluminous report on this subject for '34, '35, '36, on which someone is working. But it probably cannot be brought up to date until the second half of next year. Then someone should go to the Far East for the purpose of correcting and supplementing the statement.

With reference to the new edition of the Economic Handbook. I had nothing to say as Field had not supplied me with an outline of his proposed procedure in this matter. When a specific request is made to Motylev I think he will respond. But I didn't get the idea that he regarded this project as one to which everything else should be subordinated.

### III. PACIFIC AFFAIRS

*Lattimore's urgent desire for Soviet articles for Pacific Affairs, for example, Voitinsky's article in Tikhii Okean, which was translated and used in Amerasia, would have been ideal as a contribution to Pacific Affairs.*

This has been covered in my letter to Lattimore of September 12, a copy of which I have already sent you.

### IV. AGENDA FOR 1939 CONFERENCE

#### A. Comment of Soviet Council.

#### B. Replies from other Councils.

The Soviet Council prefers the methodology of our April proposal to that followed at Yosemite. At the same time the praesidium does not feel so strongly in this matter as to desire to have their vote weigh too decisively. They feel that as one of the newest Councils they would prefer to throw in their lot with the wishes of the majority of the older Councils. The Council favors the inclusion of the current crisis in the Far East in the agenda of the next Conference. The Soviet Council had not yet received the Kingston proposals when I was in Moscow. They had seen the Chatham House memorandum of August 3rd and Miss Harriet Moore's important contribution on methods and objectives.

### V. INTERIM MEETINGS OF PACIFIC COUNCIL AND INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH COMMITTEE, BANKING, APRIL 21-28, 1938

#### A. Agenda.

#### B. Soviet participation.

If the meetings are held in Nanking the Soviet Council will aim to be represented. The Soviet Council would have preferred a meeting in October 1937,

in England to a meeting in China in April 1938, partially because of distance, but principally because of the advantage of getting Great Britain to assume greater interest and responsibility in the I. P. R. through acting as host.

#### VI. PACIFIC COUNCIL FINANCE

I referred to Dafoe's letter of March 30th in which he referred to Lord Astor's letter stating that the Chatham House increase of its gift was defended on the ground that it would enable the Institute to get more money from the other Councils.

The praesidium was glad that Chatham House had increased its contribution to \$750, but sorry that it had not raised it to \$1,000. The U. S. S. R. will consider increasing its contribution to \$3,000.00 next year. If all the other Councils would increase, they would do likewise, but they do not feel that it is sound for them to give more than Great Britain which in reality they are already doing if you take everything into consideration. The Soviet Council is the only Council which has never taken a penny from the International Research Fund. Nearly every Council, except the American and Canadian have got more from the Research Fund than they have contributed to the General Purposes budget. Furthermore, the Soviet Council this year took care of all my expenses from the time I arrived in Vladivostok until I reached Moscow, and thus in fact added several hundred dollars to the Pacific Council's income, though this item will not show in our books. The Soviet I. P. R. is prepared to supplement its contribution to the Pacific Council by helping to meet the Ruble needs of staff members like Miss Moore and Lattimore when they travel on study tours in the U. S. S. R.

#### VII. INFORMAL REPORT ON I. P. R. DEVELOPMENTS IN JAPAN, PHILIPPINES, AND CHINA

Here I gave a survey of the difficulties and promise of the three Far Eastern Councils. I described the favorable financial outlook in Japan and China and indicated that I feared that few if any of the hoped for contributions would now actually be paid to either Council. I referred to the promises of increased financial support of the Philippine Council and the bearing this might have in ultimately creating something more substantial than that which has existed in the past. The praesidium asked very penetrating questions regarding the Institute in the three countries.

#### VIII. CRITICISMS AND COMMENTS OF THE U. S. S. R. I. P. R. REGARDING THE WORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT SINCE YOSEMITE

The praesidium was so conscious of its failure to cooperate in supplying articles for Pacific Affairs that little was said under this heading. Fears with reference to Problems of the Pacific will not it appears be realized. I saw an advance copy of the volume in London and was able to write Motylev a letter which will I think end his anxiety. The only real criticism was with reference to Cressy whom the praesidium recognized was not a representative of the I. P. R. and had only been recommended by the I. P. R. as in Class B. Motylev felt that Cressy was exceedingly conservative and in many important fields uninformed. For example, he criticized the Atlas because Manchuria and the Outer Mongolian People's Republic were not shown in the same colors as indicating an identic political status.

Motylev nevertheless, was very glad that the Atlas had been able to pay Cressy between 3,800 and 4,000 Rubles for eight days work on the Atlas, thus providing for all of his Ruble needs throughout the extensive journeys which Motylev arranged for him to different parts of the Union.

#### IX. WORK PLANS OF MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT FOR THE COMING YEARS CARTER, MITCHELL, HOLLAND, CHEN HAN-SENG, LATTIMORE, MOORE, PYKE, ETC.

Here I gave the best forecast I could of staff plans. Motylev was sorry that Mitchell had been unable to come to Moscow and that I had not applied earlier for permission for Holland to accompany me to the Far East. The position with reference to Lattimore's going to Outer Mongolia is set forth in my letter to Lattimore of September 12, a copy of which I sent you. The position with reference to Miss Moore's going to Buryat, Mongolia is set forth in my letter to her of September 12, a copy of which I have also sent you.

## X. COMMENTS BY OFFICERS OF THE U. S. S. R. I. P. R. ON PRESENT CRISIS IN THE FAR EAST

This, as indicated above, calls for a separate memorandum.

## XI. MOTYLEV'S SUGGESTIONS FOR CARTER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW (AUGUST 10, 1923)

When I reached Vladivostok, Bremman told me that Dr. Motylev hoped that it would be possible for me to take my family for a fortnight to the Crimea at the end of the Moscow visit. Motylev renewed this invitation on our arrival, but because of previous engagements in Western Europe, and the growing seriousness of the crisis in the Far East, we had to decline with thanks this very kind invitation.

Arrangements were made, however, for us to take a fascinating three-day trip in the Moscow-Volga Canal, going as far as Kalinin. We made interesting visits to the parks, to the Red Army Club, to one of the big stadiums for a soccer game between Dynamo and the Red Army, and spent all of August 18 at the great aviation field outside of Moscow watching some hundreds of airplanes celebrating the annual Civil Aviation Day.

We saw a good many of the staff of the American Embassy, although Mr. Davies was away on his yacht in the Baltic. We saw the British Ambassador, and several of his staff, had long talks with both the Chinese and Japanese Ambassadors, with Litvinova, and, of course, with several of the foreign journalists. Mr. and Mrs. Barnes extended many courtesies including a cocktail party for many of the foreign journalists the day we left. On August 21st Motylev gave a dinner, attended, among others, by Smirnov, the new head of Vox, Vinogradoff, Foreign Office referent for England and the United States, Wineberg, of the Anglo-American section of the Foreign Office, Miss -----, one of the editorial staff of *Isvestia*. Votinsky we did not see as he had not returned from his holiday. It so happened that our visit to Moscow came at a time when several members of the U. S. S. R. I. P. R. Council were away on vacation. Harondar had been borrowed for six months to assist in the Soviet Building at the Paris Exposition. We had two good talks with him in Paris.

One evening Motylev took us to the movie "Na Vostoke." This is a film version of Pavlenko's novel which has gone through edition after edition since its publication a few months ago. I am told though it is a novel, it contains a surprising amount of military information regarding the position of the Red Army in the Far East. You will remember Harriet Moore's review of this book in the September Pacific Affairs.

We had a long session at Vox at the invitation of the new president, Smirnov. Motylev, Mrs. Carter, Miss Kislova, and myself were present. Smirnov wanted to know how cooperation between Vox and the American-Russian Institute could be made more effective. He wished to get a very much fuller understanding of the work and program of the A. R. I. and hoped that more substantial cooperation could be built up in the future. I read between the lines that Vox felt that the A. R. I. gave letters of introduction to Vox to any American tourist who requested one and thus they had no basis for discrimination as to who was entitled to a lot of time and who could best be handled by Intourist. If Vox knew in advance of the specific social opinions and interests of important Americans, they could make very much better use of their limited staff. Smirnov wanted a long explanation as to why the A. R. I. still retained a certain internationally known enemy of the U. S. S. R. on its board of directors.

Just before I left, Smirnov luckily had a long letter from Osgoode Field, the President of the A. R. I., which I gather set his mind at rest at several points. The A. R. I. had recently sent a representative to Moscow who didn't seem to know very much either about the A. R. I. or about the social views of its members.

I used the occasion to explain what I thought was the membership basis of the A. R. I., namely, an interest in the U. S. S. R. I said that I thought the membership was open both to friends and critics of the Soviet Union. I added that perhaps in the long run its greatest strength might lie in its being a cross section of American public opinion.

## XII. OTHER BUSINESS

*A. Memorandum from Chatham House dated August 3rd, 1937*

This memorandum arrived after our first conversation on preparation for the next conference. On one of these occasions Motylev emphasized how eager the Soviet I. P. R. is to have the Institute deal with current controversial issues.

Unless the Institute courageously continues to face the most pressing and fundamental controversies, it cannot render its largest service.

*B. What steps will be taken to insure intelligent and significant reviews of Great Soviet World Atlas in principal countries. How secure a few advance copies with memorandum on principal points of significance*

Motylev indicated that the first edition of the Atlas would be 10,000 copies. These would be used up almost immediately. He really hoped that the first edition would not be widely reviewed because then the overseas demand for copies might exceed the number available. He would, of course, see that one copy was sent to the International Secretariat and to each National Council.

*C. Recommendation as to duration Miss Harriet Moore's visit to Buryat Mongolia*

ECC was asked to write a formal letter to Dr. Motylev a few months in advance of Miss Moore's proposed visit to Buryat Mongolia, describing the purpose of the visit and its duration. It was suggested that an application for say two months' residence in Buryat Mongolia be made. A major difficulty was, of course, the matter of military secrets. A minor difficulty might be the question of suitable living quarters as the Buryat Mongols draw no lines between the sexes.

*D. Could Bremman spend at least 3 months as a member of the International Secretariat in 1938 or 1939*

Motylev indicated that the Soviet Council must provide a Soviet staff member for the International Secretariat for a few months prior to the next Conference; but whether Bremman himself could be spared was another question. Bremman as you know is one of the Japanese experts in the Academy of Science (Institute of World Politics and Economics). He is only able to give part time to the work of the I. P. R. He is exceedingly able and would be quickly annexed by the American Council if we ever station him in New York.

*E. Procedure with reference to members of the International Secretariat and the Secretariats of the National Councils visiting the Soviet Union in the future*

This question was raised as a result of Shiman's long delay in getting a visa. The full details of this are covered in my letter to Field of August 20th, a copy of which I enclose.

In general the Soviet I. P. R. will always find it easier to get visas for senior staff members, who come for longish visits rather than for junior members who contemplate visits of only a few days. Very great regret was expressed by Motylov that Field had not notified him, in advance, of Shiman's plans.

*F. The internal situation in the Soviet Union*

The discussion of this topic by Motylov and Bremman was one of the most interesting and enlightening experiences in the whole course of my visit. But this better be covered in a separate memorandum which I hope some day to be able to prepare.

*G. Suggestions from Soviet Council to the Secretary-General regarding making the work of the International Secretariat more efficient*

The praesidium had no suggestions to make.

*H. How secure promptly several copies of the following publications of the Institute of World Politics and Economics. Provisional titles only*

(a) *Symposium on Fifth Anniversary of Japanese Invasion of Manchuria*

(b) *Guerrilla Warfare in Manchuria*

(c) *Symposium on China*

(d) *Position of and Struggle by the Peasantry for Improved Conditions in Japan*

(e) *Financial situation in Japan*

(f) *Position of the Working Class in Japan*

(g) *Dissertation on the Decay of American Imperialism by Gourivitch*

(h) *Dissertation by Levina (?) developing Lenin's idea that Capitalism is acceptable to the United States peasant because of the absence of feudal factors.*

Motylev and Bremman said that some of the foregoing titles were not phrased accurately, some are completed, and some may never be published.

Notice of publication of any of these studies will presumably appear in Tikhii Okean. Miss Moore should be asked to notify the Secretary-General when any of them are forthcoming, with a view to deciding whether translation is desirable.

*I. Other business as proposed by the officers of the U. S. S. R. I. P. R.*

There were several general conversations with reference to the attitude of other Councils to the present aggression in the Far East. Surprise was expressed that the American intelligentsia is so silent; even the interesting discussions at the annual meeting of the American Council revealed a lack of fundamental information as to the actual forces that are operating in Japan. Both Reichshauer and Warnshuis took the optimistic and inaccurate view of trends in Japan which were not refuted in a clear-cut way in the ensuing discussion. Similarly there is little evidence in the discussions of the Royal Institute in London, of a fundamental understanding of the Far Eastern situation. Is it not possible for the American and British Councils to make such a clear-cut analysis of the forces at work in the Far East as will reveal to their publics the nature and danger of the present aggression? Should not the Institute in all countries be the foremost organization in making highly fundamental analyses? Could not the American and British Councils hold special meetings and express opinions on contemporary questions while they are acute?

A special conference convened by the American Council, if adequately reported and publicized, could give a fundamental analysis of the whole Far Eastern situation which might be of the greatest importance to public opinion throughout the world. The imperialistic fallacy of men like Orchard should be dealt with in a clear-cut way by the American Council of which he is a member.

Reverting to the program for the next Conference, the Soviet I. P. R. is not deeply concerned with shipping and trade competition in the Pacific because of the Soviet's foreign-trade policy.

With reference to the two reports on Standards of Living; the first part should be completed by the end of December and the second half by the end of January. I think, however, that the first report, namely that by Krivetsky, is more certain of completion than that by Professor Kravel. I seem to remember Motylev saying that Kravel's work had been interrupted either by serious illness or by his transfer to another and more urgent job.

With reference to the symposium on the Far East; Krasavtsev stayed on in the Soviet Far East after Bremman and I left in order to see all of the authors personally and make arrangements for checking all of the manuscripts.

Both Motylev and Bremman were eager to know of developments in the I. P. R. in all of the member countries. They discussed many of the ideas put forward at Yosemite by members from the various countries. They had enjoyed the visits after Yosemite of Liu Yu-wan, of Van Walree of the Pacific Institute in Amsterdam. They were much impressed by Lattimore's statement that if the Soviet I. P. R. would only furnish a regular series of articles for Pacific Affairs it would be much easier for him to bring the editorial policy into a real focus than it is at present.

Doubtless this letter will raise many questions on which you will want further clarification. Please, therefore, write me fully after you have read it.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. I ask you now to turn to page 5 of the stencil copy, Mr. Lattimore. Will you read the paragraph commencing at the top of the page?

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I look at the document of the whole to see the relevance of the particular paragraph to the whole?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, you may, Mr. Lattimore.

(The witness examined the exhibit.)

Mr. LATTIMORE. I found here the name Pyke. That must be "R. P."

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, the questioning, you see, is about the American-Russian Institute, and you find the reference to that commences, I believe, on page 5. The whole thing will be in the record.

Mr. LATTIMORE. What is the paragraph you wanted me to read?

Mr. MORRIS. The top of page 5.

Senator FERGUSON. Before he reads that, might I inquire?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you found the reports on your visit to Moscow, that you were going to look up for me, referred to in your Ordeal by Slander?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I haven't found it yet. I haven't had an opportunity to go and look for it. I can tell you in general what its nature is.

Senator FERGUSON. No, we want to see the report.

Mr. Chairman, even though we recess Mr. Lattimore's testimony, might we hold it open until we get those reports, until we see whether they ought to go into the record?

Mr. LATTIMORE. There was no report solely on the Moscow meetings. It was my report to the committee of the Institute of Pacific Relations on my work as editor of Pacific Affairs, which included a reference to the Moscow visit. There was no separate report on the Moscow visit.

Senator FERGUSON. The report that was referred to in the record.

Mr. LATTIMORE. In the testimony, sure.

Shall I read?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

We had a long session at Vox at the invitation of the new president, Smirnov. Motylev, Mrs. Carter, Miss Kislova and myself were present. Smirnov wanted to know how cooperation between Vox and the American-Russian Institute could be made more effective. He wished to get a very much fuller understanding of the work and program of the ARI and hoped that more substantial cooperation could be built up in the future. I read between the lines—

"I" meaning Carter.

Senator FERGUSON. And "ARI" meaning what?

Mr. LATTIMORE. American-Russian Institute.

"I" and "myself" all the way through here is Carter.

I read between the lines that Vox felt that the ARI gave letters of introduction to Vox to any American tourist who requested one and thus they had no basis for discrimination as to who was entitled to a lot of time and who could best be handled by Intourist. If Vox knew in advance of the specific social opinions and interests of important Americans, they could make very much better use of their limited staff. Smirnov wanted a long explanation as to why the ARI still retained a certain internationally known enemy of the U. S. S. R. on its board of directors.

Do you want me to go on?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, please.

Mr. LATTIMORE. This is still Carter:

Just before I left Smirnov luckily had a long letter from Osgood Field, the president of the ARI, which I gather set his mind at rest at several points. The ARI had recently sent a representative to Moscow who didn't seem to know very much either about the ARI or about the social views of its members.

I used the occasion to explain what I thought was the membership basis of the ARI, namely, an interest in the U. S. S. R. I said that I thought the membership was open both to friends and critics of the Soviet Union. I added that perhaps in the long run its greatest strength might lie in its being a cross section of American opinion.

The CHAIRMAN. The "ARI" stands, again, please, for what?

Mr. LATTIMORE. American-Russian Institute.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you correct our record in connection with whether or not the American-Russian Institute is now listed as a subversive organization by the Attorney General?

Mr. MANDEL. A member of the staff called the Justice Department after this morning's session, in that regard, and was told that the present status of the American-Russian Institute of New York, which has been cited as subversive by the Attorney General on April 24, 1951,

remains the same. This was told the member of the staff by Mrs. Keene, of Mr. Foley's office.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, did you serve with the Pauley Reparations Mission in Japan?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, I did.

Mr. MORRIS. For what period of time did you so serve?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think from about maybe late October or November 1945 to late January or possibly the beginning of February 1946.

Mr. MORRIS. During that time, were you on the State Department payroll?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes. My recollection is that the staff were paid through the State Department, although they were regarded—

The CHAIRMAN. How the staff were paid makes no difference. Were you on the State Department payroll; yes or no?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would say yes and no, Senator.

May I explain?

The CHAIRMAN. Speaking of yourself, not of the staff.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Speaking of myself, my understanding was that the Pauley Mission was a White House mission, not a State Department mission, but for some reason of Government arrangements that I don't know, my pay checks came through the State Department.

The CHAIRMAN. The declaring of that whole statement is your answer that you were on the State Department payroll. So what is the use of wasting time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I should say—well, I won't quibble about it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, were you the third ranking member of that mission?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Oh, about third or fourth, I should say.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you going to read this document?

Mr. MORRIS. I am sorry, Senator. Did you want to go into that?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. I wanted to ask a question.

Who was the director who was anti-Soviet on this board, do you know?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no idea.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know in this that you read, what they mean by "social opinion" and "social views"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You have not any idea?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. It would be a matter of speculation.

Senator FERGUSON. How would you speculate?

Mr. LATTIMORE. If you want me to speculate, Senator—

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The first recollection that would come to my mind is that they wanted to know those views because they gave capitalists and anti-Communists better treatment than they did Communists. At least, so I was told when I was in Moscow, by Mr. Demaree Bess, who was then correspondent to the Christian Science Monitor, and I expressed amazement that after the hostile way they criticized my writing, they had allowed me to make a trip to Moscow to look at their Mongolian research work. And he said, "Oh, that is quite simple." He said, "If they consider a person anti-Soviet they always treat him much better."

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think the question calls for you to quote anybody else.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That was, of course, as of 1936.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any further questions, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. You do not think that the words "social views" meant Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I doubt it. But is pure speculation on my part. I don't think my speculation is very authoritative.

Senator FERGUSON. You received this at the time. It indicates that it was passed to you.

Mr. LATTIMORE. It indicates it was passed to me, yes. I don't recall reading it, and I presume I put it on one side as something that didn't have any particular concern to me.

The CHAIRMAN. That was by Mr. Carter, was it not?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, were you listed as a special consultant with the Pauley Mission staff?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe that was my rank, or title, or whatever you call it, listing.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, when you testified in executive session before this committee, we asked you if you helped draft the Pauley reparations report, and you testified "quite largely."

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that correct?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, Mr. Morris, in his opening prepared statement, it is my memory that Mr. Lattimore referred to the Pauley report as a report which "I wrote." Is that not correct, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am not sure whether I wrote or drafted, or something.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is on page 26, the fifth line from the bottom.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have it on 27.

Mr. FORTAS. You must have different pages.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Is this the reference you mean, Mr. Sourwine:

When I was in Japan with the Pauley mission at the end of 1945, I did play a major part in drafting a reparations report in close conference with Mr. Pauley.

Mr. SOURWINE. No, I am referring to this statement which is at the bottom of page 26, which is the copy I have here, and which is one of the copies you distributed on the opening day:

Mr. Dooman claimed that the Pauley report which I had written provided for turning Japan into a pasture.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think, Mr. Sourwine, that must be a reference to a statement by Mr. Dooman.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you, in fact, write the Pauley report?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I played a large part in drafting it.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, let us go on.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, by bringing together a lot of loose ends here, I believe we can finish in about an hour and a half tomorrow.

Senator FERGUSON. Why do we not recess until then?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Sourwine has a question today.

The CHAIRMAN. There was submitted to the chairman yesterday a matter of the insertion into the record of excerpts from the Con-

gressional Record. I had Mr. Sourwine and other members of the staff look up the question of context.

Mr. Sourwine, what did you find as regards those excerpts?

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, the excerpts were two in number. They are referred to on page, or beginning on page 5635 of the record of this committee of yesterday. Mr. Lattimore said:

Mr. Chairman, I have some material here from the Congressional Record pertinent to the general question of discussion of the subject of China in 1945 that I should like to read into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me see it first, please.

Senator FERGUSON. I have something before he puts that in, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LATTIMORE. One is from Representative Walter Judd and the other is from Representative Mike Mansfield.

Senator Ferguson then went forward with the matter he had, after which the chairman said:

The two excerpts here, assertedly from the Congressional Record, I think counsel will check with the Congressional Record and, if they are to go in, they will go in in context, and I will reserve the ruling on the matter.

With regard to these two excerpts, I have here the original sheet as furnished by Mr. Lattimore, and also a longer excerpt from the Congressional Record, showing the point at which each of these appeared in context. If the Chair deems it not improper, I would like to ask the witness a question or so about these and then lay the whole thing in the record, or offer it for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. I do not want to go too far in questioning the witness.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, did you prepare these excerpts?

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I see the typing? I think that would show whether I did or not.

(Documents handed to the witness.)

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't think I did this actually myself.

Mr. SOURWINE. You offered them for the record. Do you know who did prepare them?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I couldn't tell you exactly, Mr. Sourwine. Several people at the Hopkins have very kindly volunteered to help me by looking up references, and so on, and I think this must be from one of them. But I don't know which one.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you take any steps before you offered these for the record to satisfy yourself that they were not out of context?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I made no check. I accepted them as excerpts from the Congressional Record.

The CHAIRMAN. I think the Chair will hold its ruling further in the matter at this time.

Senator FERGUSON. Until the witness at least can vouch for these?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. We will stand in recess until 10:30 tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 3:37 p. m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at 10:30 a. m., Friday, March 7, 1952.)

# INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

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FRIDAY, MARCH 7, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,  
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION  
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL  
SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,  
*Washington, D. C.*

The subcommittee met at 10:35 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Hon. Pat McCarran (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senator McCarran.

Also Present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel, and Benjamin Mandel, research director.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Of the Senators belonging to the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, Senator Smith has been called hastily to his home in North Carolina on official matters. Senator O'Connor is away on official matters, and Senator Eastland has been called away.

The belief of the committee is that as many as can listen to this testimony should listen to it. For that reason, it is the conclusion of the committee that this matter goes over and is recessed now until 10:30 Monday morning.

(Whereupon, at 10:37 a. m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at 10:30 a. m., Monday, March 10, 1952.)



# INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

MONDAY, MARCH 10, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,  
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION  
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL  
SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,  
*Washington, D. C.*

The subcommittee met at 10:30 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Hon. Pat McCarran (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran, Smith, O'Connor, Ferguson, Watkins. Also present: Senator McCarthy and Senator Mundt.

Present also: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel, and Benjamin Mandel, research director.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Mr. MORRIS, you may proceed.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I have a question I would like to ask.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

TESTIMONY OF OWEN LATTIMORE, ACCOMPANIED BY ABE FORTAS,  
COUNSEL—Resumed

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, did you put into the record in the Tydings committee the memorandum that you left at the White House on July 3, 1945?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you put into the record the letter that you wrote to the President as of that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is, June 10, 1945.

Did you at all discuss the visit to the White House, before the Tydings committee?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe I was asked whether I had made such a visit, and I replied that I had.

Senator FERGUSON. But you did not give the letter or the memorandum?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I was not asked for them.

Senator FERGUSON. You were not questioned, then, about those letters at all, were you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think you did state that you had been to the White House in 1945?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe that was stated in the record; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. But nothing more than just you had visited there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, did you consider the Soviet Government a normal government, or did you consider it an international conspiracy?

Mr. LATTIMORE. When?

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask you the question when if you will tell me whether you ever did.

In your opinion, what was it? A normal government, or was it an international conspiracy?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In my opinion, the Government of Russia was the revolutionary of Russia and different from any other government.

Senator FERGUSON. So you did recognize, in the early thirties, that the Soviet Government was different than the normal government of nations?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, it was the only government of its kind.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you come to the conclusion, if you ever did, that it is a conspiracy and has in mind installing its form of government world wide?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I believe that involves questions of relations between the Russian Government, the Comintern, and the Communist Parties of various countries on which I am not versed.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is, When did you come to the conclusion?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. You said it was different than other governments; it was the only government of its kind.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you come to that conclusion? That is the question.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The answer is that I have not come to that conclusion.

May I explain?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have not come to that conclusion because I don't know how the structure of international relations is set up as between the Russian Government and the various Communist Parties.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, did you ever study the Russian language?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I have studied the Russian language.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you speak it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't speak it. I read it quite freely.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you show the exhibits that we have now on the record, of your visit to the White House, that is, the memorandum and the letter, to any member of the Tydings committee?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. FERGUSON. Or the staff?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you account, Mr. Lattimore, for not making that part of the record? Did you not think that was material on the question as to whether or not you ever had anything to do with the foreign Policy of the Far East, as far as the President or the State Department was concerned?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I did not think it was material. The question of whether the committee wanted to see it was up to them.

Senator FERGUSON. How would they know that it existed? You did not disclose it to any of them.

Mr. LATTIMORE. They knew that I had visited the White House.

Senator FERGUSON. That is your only explanation, is it, for not disclosing at that time your memorandum, your stand on the Far East, and your letter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. I would add to that, that as a citizen I would not take the initiative in revealing the details of a citizen asking to see the President of his country.

Senator FERGUSON. You disclosed at least the letter to this committee in your voluntary statement; did you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't think so. I disclosed the fact that——

Senator FERGUSON. Have you a copy of your statement? Will you read it?

The CHAIRMAN. The answer, as I understand it, then, is no.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Now I am asking him to look on the bottom of page 24.

Mr. FORTAS. It is No. 6.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Thirty-three I have here, No. 6:

In 1945, on my own initiative, I wrote to President Truman expressing my views on China policy. The President, in response, asked me to come to see him, and I did.

Senator FERGUSON. So you disclosed it to the President and to the public prior to coming into this hearing. What was the difference between this hearing and the Tydings committee hearing so that you did not want to disclose the fact that you had written to the President?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I did not say that I did not want to disclose the fact that I had written to the President. I said here that—I told the Tydings committee that I had seen the President, and in this statement I said that I had written to the President and asked if I could see him. I see no discrepancy.

Mr. FORTAS. No; that is not right.

Senator FERGUSON. Your counsel corrects you.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I wrote to President Truman expressing my views on China policy.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. You did not say that you just wrote a letter. You say in this statement that you had written a letter expressing your views on China policy. You knew that the Tydings committee was investigating a question, and one of the questions was whether or not you had been an influence on our foreign policy, or what you had to do with it.

Why did you not disclose what you did in this memorandum to us? Why did you not disclose it to the Tydings committee so that they could have gone into it?

You cite the case, do you not, that the Tydings committee has found you absolutely innocent of everything? Why did you not disclose that fact to them?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I told the Tydings committee that I saw the President.

Senator FERGUSON. Why did you not tell them that you had written a memorandum of your views on the Far East or on China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I told the Tydings committee that I had seen the President. If they wanted to know more about it, I was perfectly prepared to answer.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you tell them that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember the transcript of the Tydings committee at that point. I certainly didn't refuse to answer any questions.

Senator FERGUSON. You are aware of the fact that you were sworn at that time to give them all the facts, were you not? The truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?

Did you not think that, as part of your visit, if you left a memorandum, that that was material to the issue as well as giving your views in a letter which you expressed here? You did not even disclose to this committee that you had left a memorandum with the President, in your voluntary statement.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I understand that when I am sworn to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, that is an undertaking to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth in response to questions.

Senator FERGUSON. You came in and were sworn, and you read this statement to this committee. Will you let me see it, please?

You read this statement, No. 6, at the bottom of page 33:

In 1945, on my own initiative, I wrote to President Truman expressing my views on China policy. The President, in response, asked me to come to see him, and I did. Our conference lasted about 3 minutes.

Now, Mr. Lattimore, you produce here a letter giving your views on the matter. You swore, when you read this, that it was the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

Now I ask you, why did you not then, instead of leaving the idea that you had left nothing with the President, but talked with him for just 3 minutes, why did you not produce, as part of this memorandum—

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, may I see the relevant part of the Tydings transcript?

The CHAIRMAN. Just a minute. Let the Senator conclude his question.

Senator FERGUSON. Why did you not then give to the committee the fact that you had written the memorandum and left it with the President? How can you say that that is an accurate statement?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, may I see the relevant part of the Tydings transcript?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. But I am still asking you the question not on the Tydings transcript at all, but what you told this committee. You did not mention in this statement to the committee when you were telling them that was the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, that you had left the memorandum; you said merely that you had written a letter to him. How do you account for that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I have already said that I, as a citizen, do not believe in taking the initiative in revealing what a citizen talks about to his President when he sees him.

If the committee wants to ask for it—and this committee did—it is not in my power to refuse. But the responsibility lies with the committee. I see no obligation to volunteer anything of that kind.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the difference between your state-

ment on your views of the China policy in your letter than those in the memorandum that you left with the President? What is the difference?

MR. LATTIMORE. I am sorry. I don't understand the question.

Senator FERGUSON. You said that you did not want to disclose what you said to the President.

MR. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. And do you think that that is the reason for stating it this way, that you only wrote a letter and saw him for 3 minutes and did not tell us that you left the memorandum?

MR. LATTIMORE. No, sir. I see nothing wrong in that whatever.

Senator FERGUSON. I did not ask you whether you saw anything wrong. Is that a statement of the whole truth?

MR. LATTIMORE. Senator, I repeat that the question of the truth is a question of what the committee asks me.

The CHAIRMAN. You were asked, Is that a statement of the whole truth? Do you want to answer that?

Senator FERGUSON. What you said to the committee in your memorandum.

MR. LATTIMORE. Senator, it is impossible, in one memorandum, to state the whole truth of the whole range of things that the committee may be interested in, or of what has already been in the transcript.

I provided here a basis on which the committee could question me, and on which it has questioned me.

Senator FERGUSON. And is that your explanation?

MR. LATTIMORE. That is my explanation.

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to have the witness see the record now in the Tydings committee, if he wants to.

The CHAIRMAN. Is the Tydings committee record available?  
 record on which the witness asked for the Tydings committee  
 ever, but if he wants to see with the Tydings committee record what  
 Senator FERGUSON. Yes. He had asked to see it.

MR. FORTAS. Senator, you don't have the reference to this portion of the Tydings record, do you?

Senator FERGUSON. No.

MR. FORTAS. This will take some time.

Senator FERGUSON. Then we can get it later.

That is all I have at the present time.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Morris, you may proceed.

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I understand a review of the record over the week end disclosed that the article written by J. P. Powell and Max Eastman for the Reader's Digest has not been entered into the record. May it be done at this time?

The CHAIRMAN. How has that been identified? My memory does not serve me.

MR. MORRIS. The witness was testifying one day late last week that he could recall preparing a memorandum which Mr. Carter wanted Mr. Thomas Lamont to sign. That memorandum addressed itself to the article in Reader's Digest by Powell and Eastman. That had not been inserted in the record; may it be done so at this time?

The CHAIRMAN. It may be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 549" and is as follows:)

#### EXHIBIT No. 549

[Source: Reader's Digest, June 1945, article entitled "The Fate of the World Is at Stake in China," by Max Eastman and J. B. Powell (pp. 13-22, inclusive)]

#### THE FATE OF THE WORLD IS AT STAKE IN CHINA

Periodicals in Allied countries do not hesitate to publish blunt opinions when their national interest is at stake. Criticism of American policy and of individual Americans by official Russian journals, for instance, has been extreme. We can hardly expect to keep the respect of the other United Nations if our press—supposed to be the freest in the world—does not speak up just as boldly. Especially in relation to our friendly neighbor China, a plain-spoken report of the facts and a frank discussion of American policy are imperative.—THE AUTHORS.

China is a giant among nations. Larger than all Europe, its population is one-fourth of the human race. And this giant is waking up. Following the example of Japan and Russia, it is entering the industrial age.

Therefore, the question whether China goes democratic or totalitarian is the biggest political question of today. In war or peace the weight of this giant of manpower may well be decisive in settling the fate of the world.

China at present is split into three parts. Manchuria and the eastern half, including most of the seaboard, are occupied by Japan. A northwestern region not far from the Soviet border is held by the Chinese Communist Party. The rest of China is still under the Chiang Kai-shek government, which commands the loyalty of an immense majority of Chinese everywhere.

Chiang Kai-shek is the successor of Sun Yat-sen, father of the Chinese revolution and founder of the Kuomintang (People's Party), which is dedicated to these three aims: National independence, political democracy, and the people's welfare. From 1927 to 1937 Chiang defeated the war lords; crushed the attempt of the Communists, Moscow-led, to seize power; and united under the Kuomintang practically all China except the small northwest region into which his armies drove the Communists. Through popular and powerful enough to make himself permanent dictator, Chiang set a date, November 12, 1937, for a constitutional convention. Japan attacked in July of that year, and the convention had to be postponed. With victory now in sight, he has set it again—November 12, 1945—Sun Yat-sen's birthday.

Just before Japan's surrender the Communists formed a united front with the Kuomintang and promised to fight under Chiang Kai-shek. But they cooled off after the Stalin-Hitler pact and finally renounced their promise. Explaining that they were "revolutionaries, not reformers," they declared themselves and their Red Army independent. They now have their own government, coin their own money, run their own party-controlled newspapers and suppress all others. They recently declared a boycott against Chiang's effort to produce a democratic republic, denouncing his constitutional convention, 6 months before its delegates are elected, as a slaves' congress.

J. B. Powell, born not far from Hannibal, Mo., graduated from the University of Missouri and taught 4 years in the school of journalism there. He was in China throughout the period between the two world wars as editor of the *China Weekly Review*, a liberal journal known all over the world. He was at the same time correspondent for the *Manchester Guardian* and other papers and edited for several months the daily *China Press* in Shanghai. (He says he worked about 20 hours a day.)

Mr. Powell was taken prisoner by the Japanese in December 1941. The story of the inhuman treatment he received, which resulted in the loss of the greater part of both feet, appeared in the *Reader's Digest*, November 1942. Mr. Powell has just finished a new book which will be published soon by MacMillan under the title "My 25 Years in China."

Max Eastman is an outstanding American authority on Marxism and the Communist movement. He edited the Communist weeklies *the Masses* and *the Liberator* from 1913 to 1922 and thereafter lived for 2 years in Soviet Russia, where he became thoroughly disillusioned with communism in action. Speaking Russian and reading the Russian press, he has continued to follow closely the development of the Soviet regime and the Comintern.

Such is the present state of China's hope for democracy. Japan, we are now sure, will be driven out; but whether Manchuria and north China, which old

the principal makings of great industry, will fall to the Communists and thus ultimately swing the whole gigantic nation down the totalitarian road is undetermined. We Americans cannot evade our responsibility in this, for the question which social system prevails in China is identical with the question whose leadership prevails—that of democratic America or of totalitarian Russia.

American modes of influence are cultural persuasion; the example of prosperity; skilled technical assistance; capital investment; and, above all, military and economic supplies. Russia's weapons are conspiratorial organization and party-controlled propaganda, leading to seizure of power and a liquidation of all democrats and, if necessity arises, military invasion in the name of liberation. Russia cannot furnish capital, an example of prosperity, technical assistance, or supplies on a scale comparable to ours. This gives us the trump cards if we play our hand with clear understanding of the forces involved.

The Communists know this and are doing their best to cloud our understanding of these forces. A flood of books, articles, reviews, news dispatches, lectures, and radio broadcasts is pouring across our country, dedicated to the sole purpose of confusing American public opinion about the situation in China. There are four main points in this deception now being practiced upon us, all equally false and all aimed at persuading us to abandon another 450 million people to the totalitarian infection spreading from Russia.

DECEPTION 1. THAT RUSSIA IS A "DEMOCRACY" AND THAT CHINA CAN THEREFORE SAFELY BE LEFT TO RUSSIAN "INFLUENCE"

Owen Lattimore is perhaps the most subtle evangelist of this erroneous conception. Mr. Lattimore appraised the net result of the Moscow trials and the blood purge by which Stalin secured his dictatorship in 1936-39 as "a triumph for democracy." He now urges our Government, in a book called *Solution in Asia*, to accept cheerfully the spread of "the Soviet form of democracy" in central Asia. His publishers thus indicate the drift of his book on its jacket:

He [Mr. Lattimore] shows that all the Asiatic peoples are more interested in actual democratic practices, such as the ones they can see in action across the Russian border, than they are in the fine theories of Anglo-Saxon democracies which come coupled with ruthless imperialism.

This deception was set going in Moscow in 1936, when a new constitution was filled with jazzed-up phrases from our Bill of Rights so that it could be advertised as more democratic than ours. Instead of establishing popular government, however, it legitimized the dictatorship of the Russian Communist Party (art. 126). Stalin himself, addressing the congress which ratified the draft of the constitution, frankly stated this fact:

"I must admit that the draft of the new constitution actually leaves in force the regime of the dictatorship of the working class and preserves unchanged the present leading position of the Communist Party. In the Soviet Union only one party can exist, the party of Communists (Pravda, November 26, 1936)."

In the "elections" held under this constitution in 1937 and 1938, only one candidate's name appeared on each ballot. He had been endorsed by the party, and the "voting" consisted of assenting to the party's choice. The ceremony has not been repeated, and would make no difference if it had. The constitution is merely a facade for dictatorship, and anyone who protests the fact is shot or sent to a concentration camp. In Siberia whole regions are given up to these concentration camps where from 15 to 20 millions\* of Russian citizens are dying a slow death at hard labor. That is the kind of "democratic practices" the Chinese would see "across the Russian border" if they could look. But looking is not permitted by totalitarian states.

First of all, then if our policy in China is to be wise, we must hold in steady view the fact, frankly admitted by Stalin and once vigorously stated by President Roosevelt as follows: "The Soviet Union is a dictatorship as absolute as any other dictatorship in the world."

If this dictatorship spreads its tentacles across China, the cause of democracy in Asia is lost. As is well known, these tentacles need not include invading

\*Alexander Barmine, former brigadier general in the Red army, estimates that the number is about 12,000,000. Boris Souvarine, French historian of bolshevism, estimates 15,000,000. Victor Kravchenko, recently resigned from the Soviet Purchasing Commission in Washington, who has visited many camps and had official relations with their managements, says these estimates are low and puts the figure at 20,000,000.

Soviet troops, but only the native Communist parties now giving allegiance to the Soviet Union and taking their directives from Moscow. When these Communist parties get control of a neighboring state, the Moscow dictatorship and its fellow travelers call that a friendly government. It is by means of these Communist-controlled "friendly governments"—not by overt military conquest—that Russian power and totalitarian tyranny is spreading from the Soviet Union, in Asia as in Europe.

Hence, for those who cannot swallow deception No. 1, there is another. We shall quote from a recent book, *Report from Red China*, by Harrison Forman:

DECEPTION NO. 2. "THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS ARE NOT COMMUNISTS—NOT ACCORDING TO THE RUSSIAN DEFINITION OF THE TERM. I SAW NOT THE SLIGHTEST TANGIBLE CONNECTION WITH RUSSIA."

Forman is backed up by Edgar Snow, the best-known popularizer of the pro-Communist view, with the remark that the Chinese Communists and their leader Mao Tse-tung, "happen to have renounced, years ago now, any intention of establishing communism in China in the near future."

To unmask this deception, you need only go to the Daily Worker's book shop on Thirteenth Street, New York City, pay 25 cents for Mao Tse-tung's book, *China's New Democracy* (1941), published with an introduction by Earl Browder (1945), and read the book. You will find that the "Lenin of China" is a devout, orthodox, and obedient disciple of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism and gives unqualified allegiance both to Soviet Russia and the Communist world revolution.

Here are a few quotations from Mao's book:

"The world now depends of communism for its salvation, and so does China."

"We cannot separate ourselves from the assistance of the Soviet Union or from the victory of the anticapitalist struggles of the proletariat of Japan, Great Britain, the United States, France, and Germany."

"No matter whom you follow, so long as you are anti-Communist you are traitors."

Mao explains learnedly that communism in China has two stages: First, the present stage of "New Democracy," which is but a preparation for the second stage: i. e., "proletarian revolution" and the establishment of collectivism on the Soviet model. Mao excoriates those who do not understand this, and insists that "the second stage must follow the first closely, not permitting a capitalist dictatorship to be inserted between them." ("Capitalist dictatorship" is Mao's term for democracy as we understand it.)

How different this is from Edgar Snow's dulcet assurance that the Chinese Communists "happen to have renounced, years ago now, any intention of establishing Communism in China in the near future."

Mr. Snow also says, "Long before it became defunct, the Comintern ceased to have much direct contact with the Chinese Communist Party." The fact is that Mao Tse-Tung was one of three Chinese members of the Executive Committee of the Comintern from 1935 to its dissolution in 1943. At the last congress of the Russian Communist Party the growth of the Chinese Party was enthusiastically reported and the Party congratulated on becoming "tempered in the fires of civil war and national war," and on "building a Soviet regime." Mao sent the congress a "flaming Bolshevik greeting" lauding the Russian Soviet system and concluding with "Long live Comrade Stalin!"

The Chinese Communist Party is the darling of Moscow and of Communists all over the world. Its national congress has actually met in Moscow. All its maneuvers, even the most "reformist," have been executed under orders from the Kremlin. A glance in the Moscow Party press is enough to prove that there has been no let-up of this intense concern with the Chinese Communist Party. Obviously, the success of the Chinese Communists in building a Red Army and establishing an independent nation just over their border—a nation whose leader declares, "We cannot be separated from the Soviet Union"—would only intensify the interest of the heads of the Soviet Union.

To complete the record of this deception: In the translation of Mao's book, Earl Browder omitted words and passages which would, if printed in America, expose his own game of playing democratic patriot in order to get his henchmen into positions of power. In the Chinese edition Mao is outspoken in advocating the "dictatorship of the proletariat," and explaining that democracies like England and the United States are "capitalist dictatorships," which "have become, or are about to become, blood-stinking military dictatorships of the capitalist class." "On the point of death," they have become "imperialist" and

will soon be replaced by "the newest Soviet-style socialist republic, a dictatorship of the proletariat."

He explains that in this respect there is no difference between the "Eastern (i. e., Japanese) imperialist" and "the s. o. b. imperialists of the West." (The Chinese epithet is fouler, but s. o. b. will do.) All this, which is of the essence of Mao's orthodox Communist position, is omitted from the American edition.

The Chinese Communist Party is more honest. Late in 1944 it passed a resolution "accepting American demands to establish military bases in the Northwest," but adding: "We are heir to the orthodoxy of Marx and Engels which calls for a class revolution of the workers and peasants. \* \* \* The cooperation of the Chinese Communist Party with the United States is a temporary strategy. \* \* \*

That disposes of the propaganda myth that the Chinese Communists are not Communists.

### DECEPTION NO. 3. THAT THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS ARE FIGHTING THE JAPS, AND THAT THE CHINESE NATIONAL ARMY IS NOT

The truth is that the Chinese Communists are fighting the Japs enough to hold their border, but not enough to make it worth while for the Japs to move in and clean them out. This can be seen by a glance at the map. The front east of Yen-an, where the Communists claim they have an army of 450,000 soldiers heroically fighting the Japs is stationary. It hasn't moved since Japan came up to the Yellow River in 1938. Although the Japanese have attacked in some areas, there have been no real battles. American military observers agree that a virtual truce has existed in several front sectors, especially along the railways supplying Japanese forces fighting American and Chungking troops in the south.

Where Chiang Kai-shek's National Army fights, the record of bloody and heroic battles has been spread on the pages of the world press for years. We all know of the great struggles in 1937 and 1938 in which the flower of Chiang Kai-shek's armies was lost together with such modern armaments as China possessed. China has received only a trickle of aid as against the flood of lend-lease sent to Russia, but Chiang's armies have fought on. There were at least 100,000 casualties in the battles they fought last year on Chinese soil, and certainly 85,000 in the furious Burma campaign which has broken the blockade by reopening the Stilwell road.

Casualties among Chiang's troops run to over four times the total number of soldiers the Communists claim to have.

The tragic fact is that while fighting the Japs a little, but never enough to menace Japanese communication lines to the war against Chiang in the south, the Communists are also waging "revolutionary war" against the Chinese National Army. When the war began, the Chinese Communists Central Committee declared: "In Chinese politics the decisive factor is military power. We must in the course of the war of resistance, expand as far as possible the military power of the Party as the basis for capturing the revolutionary leadership in the future." Since Pearl Harbor Mao naturally has been willing to let the "s. o. b. Western imperialists" finish the Japs while he concentrates on "capturing the revolutionary leadership."

This makes less astounding the statement of Lin Yutang: "For every Japanese the Communists claim to have killed they have killed at least five Chinese, for every town they have captured from the Japanese they have captured 50 towns from other Chinese." It explains Congressman Walter Judd's statement that when, last summer, the Japanese armies raided down from the north through four to six hundred miles of country the Communist claim to control, they got free passage. Not a single one of the hundreds of trains carrying Japanese soldiers and supplies was derailed. (Congressman Judd, of Minnesota, served 10 years as a medical missionary in China, and saw communism first hand. He revisited the country last September and October.)

While this process of Communist revolution is going forward according to a published schedule, such fables as the following are related by Harrison Forman and solemnly quoted in a review of his book by Edgar Snow:

"In the 7 years of war the Communists have fought over 92,000 battles. They have killed and wounded 1,100,000 \* \* \* and captured 150,000 of the enemy. \* \* \*

For the same period the Communists suffered over 400,000 casualties." Ninety-two thousand battles in 7 years is 36 battles a day, or one battle every 40 minutes. In these battles the Communists, although a good number of them were armed only with "old blunderbusses, mines, or any weapon at hand," are

alleged to have knocked off enemy troops at the rate of 20 per hour, or one every 3 minutes—this without allowing for mealtime or rest hours, night or day, for 7 years running. Besides these astronomical achievements, the deeds of our Marines at Tarawa or Guadalcanal are, of course, mere child's play.

It is doubtful if a more fantastic tale was ever told with a straight face to the American people. And we repeat: To expose it, you have only to look up the documents and use your brains.

DECEPTION NO. 4. THAT CHIANG KAI-SHEK IS A FASCIST, AND THAT HIS TOTALITARIAN REGIME IS PREVENTING THE COMMUNISTS FROM ESTABLISHING DEMOCRACY

What kind of "democracy" the Communists aim to establish we have heard from their leader: a "Soviet-style dictatorship of the proletariat." Not only Chiang Kai-shek but everyone in the world who intelligently opposed this kind of dictatorship is denounced as a fascist. This has been the Communist smear technique ever since Hitler broke his pact with Stalin.

Chiang's regime is not democratic. When he assumed power in 1926, it was the opinion of the leaders of the Kuomintang that only a military dictatorship could achieve the unity and independence of China. Until that should be achieved China, thanks as much to the Communists as to foreign intruders and war lords, could not create a democratic republic. Whether they were right or wrong, it is certain that, except for the Communists and their subservience to Moscow, Chiang has achieved both the unity and independence of China; and he is moving toward a democratic republic.

He once remarked to Ambassador Hurley: "If I become a dictator I will be forgotten, like all dictators in our history, within 48 hours of my death. But if I sincerely work to return power to the people, I will be remembered as the George Washington of China. Can there be any doubt of my choice?"

Chiang's speech of last March, in which he set the date for constitutional convention, is sensible and convincing. It concluded:

"Upon the inauguration of constitutional government, all political parties will have legal status and enjoy equality. The Government has offered to give legal recognition to the Communist Party as soon as the latter agrees to incorporate its army and local administration in the National Army and Government. The offer still stands. \* \* \*

"I am optimistic of national unification and the future of democratic government in our country."

No one, comparing Chiang's speech with the schedule of steps toward proletarian dictatorship drawn up by Mao Tse-Tung, could fail to see which of the two is on the road to democracy. Chiang has permitted the publication of a Communist daily in his capital throughout the war, while Mao will not even admit a correspondent of any Kuomintang, or non-Party, newspaper in his capital. There is a maddening press censorship under Chiang, but under Mao there is no free press to censor. That is a rough indication of how things stand.

The Chinese Communist regime is a ruthless party dictatorship, camouflaged like Russia's with ceremonial elections, but ruled with executions, purges, concentration camps. The Chinese National Government has tabulated, with name, place, date, and circumstance, the persons known to have been officially murdered by the Communists as "traitors and Trotskyites" from April 1939 to October 1944. They total 34,758, of whom 26,834 were military personnel, 3,069 government officials, 1,387 Kuomintang Party workers, and the rest civilians. This does not include the unnumbered Chinese soldiers killed by the Communists in combat action against Chiang's troops.

The fact that China under Chiang is not yet democratic is the very thing that makes the Communist danger so great. If the Chinese knew freedom and possessed it, they would be less ready victims of the totalitarian infection. Having known little but the arbitrary rule of rival war lords, and then the equally arbitrary enforcement of national unity by the Kuomintang, they are as open to this infection as the Russian peasants were who had known only the regime of the Czar. They are poised at a cross road, ready to go either way—the way of the Russian totalitarian state toward which Mao and the Chinese Communist Party are pointing, or the way of American democracy toward which Chiang and the Kuomintang are pointing. This is why the Chinese liberals, as even pro-Soviet reporters admit, while fighting for more freedom under Chiang, are not for the Communists.

What Chiang needs is our political understanding, technical assistance, loans, investments, munitions, and supplies in support of his plan to introduce con-

stitutional government and make China democratic. The two most important items on this list at the moment are supplies and understanding. Supplies our State Department has recently, to the relief of all wise men, decided to give to Chiang, and not to the Communists. But we must give understanding too.

It shows no understanding to demand of an anti-Communist government that it "unite" with Communists. An American foreign policy based on this mistake may very soon prove fatal, not only from the standpoint of democracy but of every American interest in Asia. Put yourself in the place of Chiang Kai-shek and you will see why. Chiang has fought the Communists in bloody war and desperate intrigue for 20 years. He gained his power by saving China from a Communist revolution in 1927. He knows the Communists. He knows that one word from Stalin—and no word from anywhere else in the world—could produce the "unity" some critics are so irritatingly urging him to pull out of a hat.

Chinese courtesy will survive a lot of irritation. But Chinese patriotism has a limit beyond which it will not go. And there lies behind our pressure upon Chiang for a "unity" he cannot achieve, an implication that can only infuriate Chinese patriots. The implication is that the Roosevelt-Churchill pledge at Cairo to return Manchuria to China at the end of the war may, if unity fails, be interpreted to mean turn over Manchuria to the Stalin-dominated Communist government of Yen-an.

Washington rumor, reported in the New York Times, even says that Stalin was promised a free hand in Manchuria for his help in the war against Japan. But Stalin may never have asked for Manchuria. That is not his method of expansion. All Stalin needs in order to establish his power in Manchuria is a "friendly government": a quick march in there by Mao's Red Army, followed by the usual made-to-order puppet state. Our acquiescence in that operation will be sufficient to sell out Chiang—sell out the hope of democracy in China, and the hope of a strong independent American ally in Asia.

Chiang's loyalty to the Western democracies, and to America in particular, throughout the long war for Manchuria has been inflexible. It survived our unlimited export of war materials to Japan; it survived our "defeat Hitler first" policy and the loss of Burma and Malaya, which enabled the Japanese to blockade China, and prolonged her sufferings interminably; it survived the Stilwell incident; it has survived the recent, Communist-kindled flare of anti-Chinese slander in the American press; it has even survived, so far, our ineane demand for "unity" (with armed revolutionists who are waging war against him). But it will not survive the knowledge that we propose to turn over to Stalin, through the agency of these revolutionists, the richest lands of China about which, essentially, the whole war with Japan has been fought.

Chiang, because of his belief in Western institutions, has stood like a rock against those in his party who advocate a rapprochement with Russia as against his close friendship with the United States. But should it become apparent that we intend to bargain away all North China for the sake of Russia's help in the war, will Chiang be able to resist this pressure? With what arguments can he answer those Chinese patriots who will suggest that China do her own bargaining with Russia, and renounce the policy of special trust in the United States? Only the smoke-screen of deception laid down by the Communists and their fellow travelers blinds us to this momentous question, and all it entails—for us and for world democracy.

These pro-Communists are playing the same game in Asia that succeeded so brilliantly in Eastern Europe. In Yugoslavia, for instance, on his principle of "arming anybody who will kill a Hun," Churchill sent munitions and supplies to the rebel Tito, veteran Comintern organizer and agent of Moscow, enabling him besides killing Huns to wage a civil war against our ally, the legitimate government, whose troops were commanded by General Mikhailovitch. Mikhailovitch was also killing Huns, but he had not the backing of Moscow, and he had no propaganda machine with which to counter this same four-sided lie: Russia is a democracy, Tito is not a Communist, Tito is fighting the enemy and Mikhailovitch is not, and Mikhailovitch is a "fascist."

Except for Chiang's loftier position as head of his government for 18 years, the situation in China is ominously similar. And the choice for us is inescapable: Either we face the facts and side with the growth of democracy, or we swallow the lies and endorse the totalitarian strangulation. There was never a plainer or more simple issue before a United States Government.

But there is one big difference—that is the size of China. To sell out Chiang Kai-shek to the Chinese "Tito" will not add a paltry 13 million to the totali-

tarian Colossus. It will bring under totalitarian regimentation 450 million people. This vast population, united in their policy with the Soviet totalitarian empire of some 200 million, would certainly threaten the hope for a democratic world. When Iran and India followed China, as they almost certainly would, that would mean a solid block of 1 billion people under a totalitarian regime.

Facing such a prospect, it seems obvious that as intelligent democrats we must abandon the whole policy of meek appeasement toward Communist propaganda and power in China. Even Russia will have greater respect for us if we make unmistakably clear our loyalty to those free institutions which have enabled our American nation to arm, equip, feed, and rescue from destruction a half of the planet. If we really believe in democracy, let us implement that belief with a peaceable but clear-headed, informed and resolute campaign to promote the democratic way of life throughout the earth.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, I am presenting you a list of names. I am going to ask you, in connection with that list of names, the following two questions. Perhaps we can save some time on it, if you will advert to this for just a minute.

The question will read in every case: In your dealings with the following people, did you know or did you have any reason to believe that they were Communists? That will be the question.

If you had no dealings with them, of course, you will have the opportunity to say so at the outset. So the question in connection with each one of these individuals will be:

Did you know, or did you have any reason to believe that they were Communists?

Mr. SOURWINE. That this person was Communist?

Mr. MORRIS. That this particular person was a Communist, in your dealings with that particular person.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you not include otherwise? Whether it was in his dealings with them that he knew they were Communist, or otherwise knew they were Communist?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right, or otherwise knew.

Mr. FORTAS. Mr. Morris, if you are going to ask that question about all these people, may I ask you to reframe it now?

Mr. MORRIS. All right, let us take one.

In your dealings with Solomon Adler, did you know, or did you have any reason to know, that Solomon Adler was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator SMITH. Wait a minute, Mr. Morris. Is that presupposing that he had dealings with Solomon Adler?

Mr. MORRIS. Senator Smith, I indicated that if he had no dealings with the man he would, of course, have the opportunity to so state at the time.

Senator SMITH. All right.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you understand the question, now, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think so.

Mr. FORTAS. Two questions.

Mr. MORRIS. There were two questions; that is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. May I rephrase the question, just in case there is any doubt about it? It might not do any harm to say it once more. Mr. Morris will read a name. The reading of the name presumes that Mr. Lattimore had dealings with the person. If he has had no dealings with the person, he is to say so. Otherwise, Mr. Lattimore is to indicate his answer to the question as to whether, in his dealings with

this person, or otherwise, he ever knew or had any reason to believe that the named person was a member of the Communist Party.

The CHAIRMAN. Was a Communist.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was a Communist, all right.

Mr. MORRIS. The second name is Hilda Austern.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. MORRIS. H. W. Baerensprung.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. MORRIS. How well did you know H. W. Baerensprung?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think I saw him once when he came to this country, and I knew him as a person who had been reorganizing Chiang Kai-shek's police force.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he prepare an article for Pacific Affairs?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think so.

Mr. MORRIS. Joseph F. Barnes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. FORTAS. Just a moment.

Mr. Chairman and Mr. Morris, may we have it understood, if you are going to conduct the examination this way, that by the witness answering these questions, he does not personally name any statement, or no inference is permissible as to whether he thinks or does not think that they were Communists?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right. The question is addressed to his knowledge as to whether or not he knew them to be Communists.

The CHAIRMAN. Or had reason to believe.

Mr. MORRIS. Or had reason to believe; that is right, Senator.

Kathleen Barnes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; until the question came up to her refusing to testify.

Mr. MORRIS. Joseph M. Bernstein.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know who he is and I don't believe I ever met him.

Mr. MORRIS. Charles Bidien.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know who he is and I don't believe I ever met him.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he prepare an article for Pacific Affairs while you were the editor of Pacific Affairs?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I doubt it very much. I don't believe I have ever seen that name before.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. T. A. Bisson.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Albert Blumberg.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe I ever met him, and I am not sure who is meant.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Michael Borodin.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Michael Borodin I never met. I have seen him once and I assume he is a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Louise Bransten.

Mr. FORTAS. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question of clarification?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. FORTAS. Again I understand the question is: Did you have any reason to know that they were Communists, or to believe that they were Communist at the time that you were dealing with them?

Mr. SOURWINE. No. The question is: Did you, in your dealings with them, or in any other way, know or have reason to believe that this person was a Communist?

Mr. FORTAS. At any time?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, sir.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I certainly never had any dealings with Mike Borodin.

Mr. MORRIS. You did not encounter Borodin, did you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I didn't encounter him. He was at a meeting in Moscow when I was there in 1936 with Mr. Carter and somebody afterward told me that that was Borodin.

Mr. MORRIS. Louise Bransten.

The CHAIRMAN. My understanding is that—see if my recollection is correct—that you said, in answer to the former question, that you believed he was a Communist. Am I in error on that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe that he is a Communist simply from my reading of Chinese history in the 1920's.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. Louise Bransten.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recognize that name and I don't believe I ever met any such person.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you prepare an article for the committee of the American-Russian Institute, the chairman of which was Louise R. Bransten?

Senator WATKINS. Is that Louise R. or Louise A. Bransten?

Mr. MORRIS. Louise R. Branstein is the name.

Mr. FORTAS. It is wrong on the list.

Mr. MORRIS. It is wrong on the list; that is right. Louise R. Bransten. Do you remember preparing an article for the American-Russian Institute, of which she was acting as chairman?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am not sure this is the same thing, Mr. Morris, but I remember publishing an article in the American Quarterly on the Soviet Union, or something.

Mr. MORRIS. Does that refresh your recollection?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, it doesn't. The article here appears to be an article that I published in Far Eastern Survey, and it may have been reprinted by this publication. But I don't recall ever seeing it before.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you give permission to have it republished?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not that I recall. It is quite possible.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you prepare the article?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I prepared an article for the Far Eastern Survey. The Far Eastern Survey may have consulted me on permission to have it republished elsewhere, but I don't recall it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may the article, as it appears in this particular document, be introduced into the record?

Senator SMITH. Does Mr. Lattimore identify this article?

The CHAIRMAN. He has not identified the article.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have identified the article by title. Let me look and see if it is the same article.

Yes; this is the same article. It is marked "By permission of Far Eastern Survey, American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations."

Without comparing the two articles, I would not know whether this is a complete reprint, or not.

Senator SMITH. I think we might have it understood there that Mr. Lattimore will have a chance to review that, sentence by sentence, if he wishes to.

The CHAIRMAN. I think he should be given that chance before it goes in.

Senator SMITH. It can be put in with his right to apply to it any changes he finds necessary in order to make it conform.

The CHAIRMAN. You may return to this article at a later time, after Mr. Lattimore has had a chance to look at it.

All right, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Earl Browder.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I considered him a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you meet Mr. Browder, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall what year it was, but I went down once when I was about to leave for China. I went down to the offices of the American Communist Party and called on him to see if I could get some leads to find out about the Communists in China, and I got a complete brush-off.

Mr. MORRIS. Did anyone arrange that meeting for you, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My recollection is that I just walked down there.

Mr. MORRIS. You walked in cold?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Walked in cold.

Senator SMITH. Let me ask a minute.

That was before you started for China on one occasion, was it not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator SMITH. Up to that time, had you ever met Browder before?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator SMITH. Had you ever had any dealings with him since that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. He came down and testified before the Tydings committee, but I didn't see him.

Senator SMITH. Did you ever attend a conference or meeting when he was present?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Mr. FORTAS. Will you try to place that, approximately?

Senator SMITH. I recall reading somewhere about Mr. Lattimore's conference with Mr. Browder before he left for a trip to China. I do not know what the date was.

Mr. LATTIMORE. It was before the Tydings committee I testified to that.

Senator SMITH. I do not remember where I had seen it. I believe you do refer to that in your book.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That he had a conference with Browder?

Senator SMITH. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, I wouldn't call it a conference.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you testify that took place in 1936, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It may have been in 1936.

Mr. MORRIS. Herman Budzeslawski.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe that I identified that name from an article by a woman columnist, Dorothy Thompson. She wrote an article in

the Saturday Evening Post about him. I met him once at the office of Overseas News Agency at the time when I was writing syndicated articles for them, and so was he, under a different name, which I forget.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you try to recall what that other name is, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I could try, but I am very vague on the subject. I believe it is probably in that article by Dorothy Thompson.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony that you did not know, or had no reason to believe, that he was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Norman Bethune.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I know his name only by reading. I don't believe I ever met him.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have any reason to believe that he was Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't think I have seen that stated.

Mr. MORRIS. Angus Cameron?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Angus Cameron, I have no reason to believe was a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Have your dealings with Angus Cameron been extensive, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, not at all. I met him once. I have never had any dealings with him.

Mr. MORRIS. How many books of yours has he published, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He was a member of a firm that has published several books of mine, but the handling of my books for publication by that firm was never through him.

Mr. MORRIS. Through whom was it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It was through Mr.—oh, I would have to go a long way back—wait a minute. My first two books were published by that firm at the end of the 1920's and I dealt with—I think he was the then head of the firm, whose name was Max something. He has since died. And my more recent books through that firm have all been handled through Mr. Stanley Salmen.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you spell that, please?

Mr. LATTIMORE. S-a-l-m-e-n.

Mr. MORRIS. Evans Carlson. Evans F. Carlson.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I had no reason to believe he was a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Were your dealings with him extensive?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I wouldn't say they were extensive.

Mr. MORRIS. How frequently have you met General Carlson?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, I used to see him socially quite a bit in the 1930's, when he was at the American Marine Guard at the Embassy in Peking, and I have seen him maybe three times in this country, three or four times.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you advise him at the time of his considered resignation from the Marine Corps in 1939 that he would be more effective in serving the cause of China by "staying in the Marine Corps" rather than resigning.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't think that wording is exact.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your recollection of it, Mr. Lattimore, of what is in the record. I would like to have your testimony on it.

MR. LATTIMORE. My recollection is that I thought it would be a pity for him to resign from the Marine Corps. I thought that his knowledge and experience would be of better service to this country in the Marine Corps.

MR. MORRIS. Abraham Chapman.

MR. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I have ever met him.

MR. MORRIS. Do you know he was a writer for the Institute of Pacific Relations publications?

MR. LATTIMORE. I remember some correspondence on the subject at a time when I was on the research committee of the IPR, but I never met him.

MR. MORRIS. Chen Han-seng.

MR. LATTIMORE. Chen Han-seng, at the time I knew him, I had no reason to believe was a Communist.

MR. MORRIS. Where is he now?

MR. LATTIMORE. I have heard that he is in China.

MR. MORRIS. That is Red China?

MR. LATTIMORE. Yes.

MR. MORRIS. Your dealings with Chen Han-seng were quite extensive, were they not, Mr. Lattimore?

MR. LATTIMORE. Well, I knew him when he was doing research for the IPR, and then he worked two academic years at Johns Hopkins.

MR. MORRIS. Under your sponsorship?

MR. LATTIMORE. Under my direction.

MR. MORRIS. Chew Shi Hong.

MR. LATTIMORE. I am not quite sure who is meant there by Chew Shi Hong.

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may we come back to that?

THE CHAIRMAN. All right.

MR. MORRIS. Harriet Chi.

MR. LATTIMORE. Harriet Chi, yes, I knew slightly; had no reason to believe was a Communist.

MR. MORRIS. She was your secretary at one time, was she not?

MR. LATTIMORE. She worked as my secretary for, oh, 10 days or 2 weeks, in 1936, I believe.

MR. MORRIS. She is the wife of Chao-Ting Chi, who is now an official of the Chinese Communist Government, is she?

MR. LATTIMORE. She is; or was.

MR. MORRIS. The next name; will you pronounce that next name, Mr. Lattimore?

MR. LATTIMORE. I pronounce it "Chow Moo" (Ch'Iao Mu).

MR. MORRIS. Is that a feminine or a masculine name?

MR. LATTIMORE. I couldn't tell.

MR. MORRIS. Is it your testimony you have had no dealings with that person?

MR. LATTIMORE. I don't know. It may be somebody I had met in China. I can't place the name.

MR. MORRIS. Is it your testimony you had no dealings with that person while you were acting as an adviser to the Generalissimo?

MR. LATTIMORE. No; I can't testify exactly to that. I met so many people once or twice while I was working for the Generalissimo.

MR. MORRIS. Do you know where that particular person is now?

MR. LATTIMORE. No; I don't.

Mr. MORRIS. Chu Tong.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Chu Tong I met maybe twice while he was working for the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have any reason to believe, or did you know at that time that he was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I did not consider him a Communist.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, if I might interpose:

Mr. Morris occasionally rephrases the question, and I think it should be made clear to the witness that even so, that does not change it for subsequent names. The question remains for each name, first, the assumption that the witness has had dealings with this person. If not, he is to so state.

Then the question is: Did you, in your dealings with this person, or in any other way, know or have any reason to believe that this person was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In the case of Chu Tong, there was some question of his loyalty record being reviewed by—I forget whether it was the Security Board of OWI or the Civil Service, or both of them, and the question came up whether he should be considered as a person who should be discharged for loyalty.

And I believe the record shows that the grounds were considered insufficient.

The CHAIRMAN. Back there a few names there was one to whom the witness referred as having been under him at Johns Hopkins. What name was that?

Mr. MORRIS. Chen Han-seng.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Chen Han-seng.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand he testified he is now in Red China.

Mr. LATTIMORE. So I believe. I heard that recently.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think the question embraced whether or not he knew or had reason to believe that he was a Communist.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, I think it did, Mr. Chairman. I certainly did not believe him to be a Communist at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, I offer you this copy of a civil service paper, the first line of which makes reference to Chew Sih Hong. In connection with the difficulty we had in identifying who that was, I ask you if that would refresh your recollection.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That would mean that Chew Sih Hong and Chu Tong are probably the same person. Many Chinese have two personal names, and sometimes one is used and sometimes the other. Chu would be the family name.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, was that a matter of your recollection, or was that only a statement as to what the paper that Mr. Morris handed you indicates?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The paper that Mr. Morris handed to me indicates that it was the same person.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any recollection as to whether that is true, whether they were the same person?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, not without reading the document through again. But I am willing to assume they were the same person.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think if you read the document through it would refresh your recollection?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Does the document also refer to him as Chu Tong?

Mr. FORTAS. Mr. Chairman, I call attention to the fact that the letter refers to Chew Sih Hong, the middle name appearing here as S-i-h. On this list it is S-h-i; that is, on the list that Mr. Morris supplied.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a matter that will have to be straightened out by the witness.

Mr. SOURWINE. The American spelling of Chinese names and syllables is a fearful and wonderful thing, is it not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Oh, I remember now. I was thinking of this as a Mr. Chew, which would be a common Chinese name, but I see that he is referred to here as Mr. Hong. And I remember now old Dr. Chi telling me something that I didn't know before, that the family name there is Tong, or Hong, which is pronounced one way in Fukien Province and the other way in other provinces of China.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us clear it up now.

Did you know him? Did you have dealings with him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I knew him. I saw him a couple of times at the New York office of the IPR.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you know him to be, or have reason to believe that he was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. There was this question raised by the Civil Service Commission and, as I say, my recollection is that it was decided that the evidence was insufficient.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you now recollect, sir, that the two names on this list, Chew Sih Hong and Chew Tong are the same person?

Mr. LATTIMORE. They must be the same person; yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will this document that reflected the witness' recollection on that point be introduced into the record, for that purpose?

Mr. SOURWINE. Simply as the document that was shown to the witness, and which he read?

Mr. MORRIS. Which he read.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be inserted for that purpose. I do not know what else is in here.

You are not holding him responsible for what else is in here, are you?

Mr. MORRIS. No, sir.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 550" and is as follows.)

#### EXHIBIT No. 550

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF LAW OFFICE,  
November 14, 1943.

The COMMISSION.

(Through Mr. Smith and the Executive Director and Chief Examiner.)

I am submitting herewith as a unit the cases of Chew Sih Hong and Dr. Kung Chuan Chi, employees of the Office of War Information. These cases are being submitted together because both individuals are serving in the same section, and it appears that Mr. Hong was employed at the recommendation of Dr. Chi who in turn was employed by Mr. Owen Lattimore, Director of Pacific Operations of the Office of War Information.

The case of Mr. Hong was previously before the Commission and analyses of the facts in his case were furnished by the undersigned and by Mr. Cannon. We both took the position that Hong's connections with the Chinese Hand Laundry Alliance, reputed to be an organization affiliated with the Communist Party, and the China Daily News, said to be a publication by and for Chinese Communists, and his references and associations, were such as to warrant a finding of ineligibility. The Commission transmitted to the Office of War Information a

proposed memorandum opinion in the case of Mr. Hong and under date of November 30, 1942, Mr. Elmer Davis in a letter to Commissioner Flemming stated that in view of the information which we furnished him, Hong was terminated at the close of business November 15, 1942. The Commission thereupon advised the Office of War Information under date of December 8, 1942, that the Commission has concluded that a finding of ineligibility is necessary and that the Commission's records have been noted to show that Mr. Hong's services were terminated at the close of business on November 15, 1942, as reported in the letter from Mr. Elmer Davis of November 30, 1942. Previously the Commission had approved the finding of ineligibility and this action was recorded in Minute 4 of December 4, 1942.

In a letter dated July 27, 1943, Rear Admiral R. P. McCullough referred to previous correspondence regarding Mr. Hong and stated that the letter of November 30, 1942, from the Office of War Information to the effect that Hong had been terminated at the close of business November 15, 1942, was somewhat in error because Mr. Hong had been separated from the New York office of the Office of War Information on November 15, 1942, for duty with the Army and that when he returned in the spring of 1943 he was again employed in the New York office of the Office of War Information, that office not knowing that Hong had been declared ineligible by the Civil Service Commission. Admiral McCullough accordingly requested that the Commission reconsider the case of Mr. Hong. Mr. Moyer then sent the file to the Investigations Division so that an interview might be had with Mr. Owen Lattimore, Head of the San Francisco office of the Office of War Information. Mr. Lattimore was accordingly interviewed in San Francisco and on a later date Mr. Steely interviewed Admiral McCullough and Mr. Marsh of the Office of War Information regarding Mr. Hong, Mr. Owen Lattimore being also present during this interview. Mr. Steely reported among other things that Mr. Lattimore stated that he wished to keep Mr. Hong on the job, that Mr. Lattimore had an efficient set-up in the Chinese section in the New York office of the Office of War Information and wanted to keep it that way, that he had explicit confidence in Dr. Chi, that Mr. Hong is under careful supervision and even if he were a Communist he is not in a position where he can do any damage, that the selection of suitable Chinese was a delicate matter, and it is extremely difficult to obtain a competent employee who does not have connections which might constitute leaks in the organization, that under the present set-up with Dr. Chi and Mr. Hong there have been no incidents of confidential information getting into unauthorized channels and that there had been no attempts on Mr. Hong's part to use his present position for the spreading of Communist propaganda. Mr. Lattimore also pointed out that Mr. Hong was recently used by the Army to teach Chinese to 224 officers in India. Mr. Lattimore stated that he did not know Mr. Hong but he did know Dr. Chi and is relying upon Dr. Chi's recommendation and knowledge of Mr. Hong.

During the interview in San Francisco Mr. Lattimore made an extended statement regarding Mr. Hong and Dr. Chi and also furnished the investigator with a copy of a letter which he had written to Mr. Joseph Barnes under date of June 15, 1943. The statement of Mr. Lattimore during the interview and the copy of his letter to Mr. Barnes are appropriately identified in the file. It would be a difficult thing to attempt to summarize Mr. Lattimore's lengthy statement or his letter to Mr. Barnes. However, the gist of his comments is that he does not know Hong personally but based on his knowledge of the situation, neither the Chinese Hand Laundry Alliance nor the China Daily News are Communistic. He then proceeded to give rather involved reasons for his conclusions. He said that he had known Dr. Chi, who is about 70 years of age, in China, that he was a respected and cultured man, and that his knowledge of Dr. Chi is such that he has implicit faith and confidence in his integrity and ability. He told Dr. Chi to select the person he wanted to assist him and Dr. Chi selected Mr. Hong. This was the first time that Mr. Lattimore had any knowledge of Mr. Hong at all.

Among other things Mr. Lattimore said:

"Of course, I have no concrete proof that Hong is not a Communist but in the absence of concrete proof I think there is a *prime facie* case to show that he is not a Communist. I know there is a law preventing the hiring of Communists. Personally and frankly I would not be too worried if an individual Communist were in Hong's position. This is because he would not be able to form a 'cell' and could not get away with anything. He could not commit verbal sabotage, and all of the work coming out of the New York office has to clear through me."

On a later occasion Mr. Lattimore stated to our investigator in part:

"Now I know that the various factions smear a non-Conformist by charging him with being a Communist. However, the Chinese Government dare not come out in the open and intervene in such domestic problems. I merely say this: If your people have gone to the Chinese Ambassador or any other Chinese Government representative and such Chinese representative has told you that this man Hong is suspected of being a Communist, then I say you should discount such evidence and certainly should not declare the man ineligible merely on that kind of evidence. It is true that I don't know anything about Hong personally except what I have learned from Dr. Chi. It is also true that he could be a Communist without my knowledge. It is also true that he could have hoodwinked Dr. Chi. However, until concrete evidence is presented that he is a Communist then I believe that based on Dr. Chi's standing and reputation and ability, his judgment that Hong is not a Communist is a prime facie case in favor of Hong and should not be reversed on the testimony that you may have received from anyone representing the Chinese Government or for that matter on the testimony of any Chinese."

It will be noted that the sum and substance of Mr. Lattimore's testimony is that he does not know Mr. Hong, that he does know Dr. Chi, that he has full faith in Dr. Chi and was willing to employ Hong on Dr. Chi's recommendation, that he does not know whether Hong is a Communist, but does not think he is and that even if Hong were a Communist, he would still like to retain Hong in the service because Hong could do no harm in his position.

In his letter to Mr. Barnes, Mr. Lattimore outlined the entire situation as he understood it, described the relationship between Hong and Dr. Chi, and then said:

"As long as Dr. Chi stands in the relationship of loyal friendship to me and the loyalty of an honest employee of an American government agency, there will be no difficulty with either man, no irresponsible playing with Chinese politics, and no leakage to any Chinese faction. The retention of both men is therefore a guarantee to the secrecy and security of the work of OWI as well as a guarantee of the confident fulfillment of directives. I urge you not to be high-pressured into getting rid of either man. I know that both men may be subjected to attacks. Given the time to work on it, I could undoubtedly trace such attacks to their origin and give you the full details. I doubt whether the Personnel Security Committee of OWI would be able to trace such attacks, rooted in the intricacies of Chinese factional politics, to their source; but I should not like to see us placed in a position where, after getting rid of people now attacked, we would be forced to hire people who would actually be the nominee of factions not under our control."

The foregoing letter from Mr. Lattimore to Mr. Barnes was written in strict confidence and is not to be quoted to any outside source.

The evidence before the Commission at the time unfavorable action was originally taken in the case of Mr. Hong tended to indicate rather strongly that Hong is a Communist and engaged in activities having for their purpose support of Communist party interests. The recent investigation and interviews have not changed the evidence and have, on the contrary, elicited some information tending to strengthen the position that Hong is pro-Communist. Thus it was brought out in addition to all of the other information that Hong was active in the American Student Union during his school years.

The evidence indicated that Hong is pro-Communist. The question now for determination is whether his employment should be approved because of the strong representations of Mr. Lattimore that Hong is probably not a Communist, but even if he is a Communist, Mr. Lattimore still wishes to retain him because Hong will work under close supervision and will not be able to do any harm.

On the one hand it can be argued that since we are reasonably convinced that Hong is pro-Communist, it is our responsibility to require his removal notwithstanding Mr. Lattimore's representations. On the other hand the Commission could, if it wished, take the position that since Mr. Lattimore has assumed responsibility, the Commission can afford to permit Hong's retention in the service. If the Commission takes the latter position it will be tantamount to saying that although we believe the individual is a Communist, we will be willing to rate him eligible provided the employing agency is willing to assume the responsibility. I doubt that the Commission can afford to avoid the issue in this manner. If we believe Hong is a Communist then we should rate him ineligible.

Do we believe Hong is a Communist? The Commission's original finding was based on Hong's connections with the Chinese Hand Laundry Alliance and with the China Daily News. Much of the information regarding the Communistic

nature of the Alliance and the newspaper came from Chinese, some of whom were connected with competing newspapers. We ourselves have not read the China Daily News. Mr. Lattimore states he has read some of the issues and has found nothing Communistic in them, although he admits there might have been something Communistic in the issues which he has not read. Mr. Lattimore has spent years in China and from his statement and letter to Mr. Barnes it would appear that he is thoroughly familiar with the various political factions. His conclusion is that Hong's connections, in the light of his knowledge of the situation, do not necessarily point to pro-Communism. In matters of the Chinese, Lattimore is somewhat of an expert and his opinion is entitled to considerable weight.

Since we have no direct evidence that Hong is a Communist, and since the original decision was based on the circumstances of Hong's connections and in view of Mr. Lattimore's representations, I am ready to reach the conclusion that possibly we made an error in the case of Mr. Hong; I am, therefore, ready to recommend that Mr. Hong be rated eligible for retention in his position in the Office of War Information.

In the case of Dr. Chi, I recommended in my memorandum of May 7, 1943, that he be rated eligible. Mr. Smith did not agree with me. The Commission has not yet acted on the case of Dr. Chi. For the reasons stated in my memorandum of May 7, 1943, I again recommend that Dr. Chi be rated eligible.

ALFRED KLEIN,  
*Acting Chief Law Officer.*

CX:FS:ODS.

September 17, 1943.

MR. MOYER: I do not believe I clearly understand Mr. Lattimore's point of view regarding the cases of Chi and Hong. It seems that he is, in effect, suggesting that whatever evidence we may have, short of being positive and direct, tending to show the applicants to be communistically inclined is entitled to very little weight and that his judgment, based on his personal knowledge of Chi and on Chi's appraisal of Hong, should prevail. However, as pointed out by Mr. Klein, there is no absolute proof that the applicants are Communists and in view of Lattimore's knowledge of the complicated Chinese political situation, gained through years of residence in China, I am also willing to change my previous recommendation for both applicants from ineligibility to eligibility.

FARRAR SMITH.

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Frank V. Coe.

MR. LATTIMORE. No. I knew Mr. Coe very slightly. I met him several times here in Washington when he was a Government servant.

MR. MORRIS. Did you ever attend an Institute of Pacific Relations meeting with Mr. Coe?

MR. LATTIMORE. I believe that Mr. Coe was at one of the international conferences of the IPR.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you attend that meeting?

MR. LATTIMORE. Yes; I was also there.

The CHAIRMAN. That was the question.

I was asking him to complete the answer, because the question embraced whether or not he met him.

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, do you recall attending a caucus meeting of the IPR at Hot Springs, in conjunction with Mr. Frank V. Coe?

MR. LATTIMORE. No; I don't recall it. But if you have a document to refresh my memory, it may—

MR. MORRIS. I offer you now exhibit No. 293, Mr. Lattimore.

MR. SOURWINE. Already in our record.

MR. MORRIS. Already in our public records, 293.

Senator SMITH. Which Hot Springs is it?

MR. MORRIS. That is Virginia.

The CHAIRMAN. This is with reference to Frank V. Coe, is it?

MR. MORRIS. Frank V. Coe; that is right, sir.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember ever seeing this document before.

Mr. MORRIS. Does that document recall a caucus meeting of the IPR that you attended, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, it is headed "Preliminary meeting of the American delegation."

Mr. MORRIS. Do you remember attending a preliminary meeting of the American delegation of the IPR?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't remember, but such preliminary meetings were quite a common procedure before international conferences.

Mr. MORRIS. Does not that document purport to be the minutes of that meeting, at which Mr. Jessup presided?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I must have been there, but, as I say, I do not recall the meeting.

Mr. MORRIS. Does not that document show that you spoke on several occasions?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The document indicates that I spoke on several occasions.

Mr. MORRIS. Does not that document indicate that Mr. Frank V. Coe was present?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It indicates that Mr. Coe was present.

I note also that this is not a stenographic transcript and——

The CHAIRMAN. You have not been asked about that. I have warned you on several occasions; I have tried to get you not to interject statements after the Chair's ruling.

You were asked a question as to whether or not that refreshed your recollection as to whether or not you had met Mr. Frank V. Coe.

Mr. LATTIMORE. It does not refresh my recollection that I met him there, but, quite obviously, he and I were there at the same time.

May I add that the record is not a stenographic transcript and that I don't hold myself responsible for the way in which I may be quoted here.

The CHAIRMAN. You were not asked as to that, or as to whether you were responsible.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Henry Collins, is the next name.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't place that name, and I don't believe I have met him.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you want done with this exhibit in the hands of the witness?

Mr. MORRIS. That has already been introduced as exhibit No. 293, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. Laughlin B. Currie.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The answer is "No."

Mr. MORRIS. Hugh Deane.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe I ever met him. I think he is a man who may have been a correspondent for the Christian Science Monitor, but I don't believe I have ever met him.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Len DeCaux.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Len DeCaux I have met once or twice and had no reason to believe to be a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Ellen DeJong.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I met her occasionally over some years in the IPR and had no reason to believe her a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. She was a staff member of the IPR, was she not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe she was for a short period.

Mr. MORRIS. Is she now known as Ellen Atkinson?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know what she is doing now?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't.

Mr. MORRIS. Theodore Draper?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe I have ever met him.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you have any associations with him in connection with the IPR?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I ever did. I don't recall his name as associated with the IPR at all.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Laurence Duggan.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I never met Mr. Duggan.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. James Dolsen.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is a new name to me. I can't place it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Israel Epstein.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Israel Epstein I knew slightly and did not consider him a Communist, but did believe him to be an ardent supporter of Chinese Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know where he is now?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It has been stated in the press that he has gone abroad.

Mr. MORRIS. Is he in Red China now?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that he was recently feted in Red China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I didn't.

Mr. MORRIS. Is he the husband of Elsie Fairfax Cholmeley?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, he is.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Elsie Fairfax Cholmeley a staff member of the IPR?

Mr. LATTIMORE. She was for a period, I believe, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Is she now in Red China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know.

Mr. MORRIS. Dolly Eltenton.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I met her several times in California. I believe she worked for a while for the California office of IPR. I had no reason to believe and have no reason to believe she is a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. John K. Fairbank.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Morris, could I intrude at that point?

Have you, Mr. Lattimore, given us your full recollection with regard to Mrs. Eltenton?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I believe I have. I knew her very slightly.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know her husband?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think I met him maybe once or twice at the time that she was working for the IPR.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever visit in his home?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think my wife and I may have had dinner there once.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. and Mrs. Eltenton ever visit in your home?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you just ask your wife if she recalled?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did she say she did not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. She said she did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Eltenton alone ever visit in your home?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was Mrs. Eltenton at one time secretary to Jack Oakie?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember exactly what her position was. She had some secretarial position at the California IPR.

The CHAIRMAN. Let's go back, then. The question was was she ever secretary to Jack Oakie.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I couldn't answer that.

The CHAIRMAN. Why cannot you answer it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Because all I remember is that she worked at the California office, and precisely in what capacity I don't recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did she leave IPR to go with the American-Russian Institute?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was she with the American-Russian Institute as a paid employee after she left IPR?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. At the time that there was a visit to the home of the Eltentons by you and Mrs. Lattimore, was she then with the American-Russian Institute?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My recollection is that she was with the IPR.

The CHAIRMAN. At that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. At that time.

Mr. FORTAS. Mr. Sourwine, can we have a date, a year?

Mr. SOURWINE. I would be very interested to have the date and year of the household visit.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think the only time at which we knew Mrs. Eltenton and her husband was in the first half of 1938, when they were living in Berkeley.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you told the committee all that you know about Mr. Eltenton?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have told everything that I can recall. I have a very shadowy recollection of both of them.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you acquainted with the testimony before the House Un-American Activities Committee in connection with Dolly Eltenton and her husband George Charles Eltenton?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. MORRIS. You have not read it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name on the list is John K. Fairbank.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The answer is no.

Mr. MORRIS. You do know John K. Fairbank well, do you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I know him; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know him well, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Fairly well.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he ever work for you in the Office of War Information?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. He never worked under me.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he not head of the China Division of the Office of War Information?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall that. My recollection is that he worked for the Office of War Information—no that he worked in the American Embassy in Chungking collecting documents, I believe, for colleges and universities and research work over here, and then transferred to the OWI.

But the precise dates and precise character of his service in OWI I didn't have anything to do with and I don't remember.

Mr. MORRIS. Elsie Fairfax Cholmeley.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I remember her, and I had no reason to consider her a Communist at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. Gen. Feng Y'hsiang.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Gen. Feng Y'hsiang, I met first in Chungking when he was one of the deputies to Chiang Kai-shek, and I met him afterward in this country.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he ever a guest at your home?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He stayed overnight at my house once.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever travel in the United States with him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Let me see, I think I traveled from Philadelphia to Baltimore with him once. I had gone up to Bryn Mawr, where I was requested to act as his translator in a speech he made at Bryn Mawr College.

Mr. MORRIS. And is it your testimony you did not know or had no reason to believe he was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Had no reason to believe he was a Communist. Anything but.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever introduce him to anybody as your Communist friend?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I am sure I didn't.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you persuade him to go back to Communist China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I didn't.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever discuss the prospects of his return to Communist China, with anybody?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. I believe that I may have talked in general terms about his going back to China, but I don't think it was Communist China at that time. My view of him was that he was one of the strongly democratic Chinese who had never joined the Reds and was not likely to.

The CHAIRMAN. To come back again, to whom are you referring?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Gen. Feng Y'hsian, once known as the Christian general of China.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I introduce into the record at this time two newspaper articles in connection with the last man about whom we have been interrogating Mr. Lattimore?

The CHAIRMAN. Where do they come from, and what is their background?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of the New York Times of January 15, 1948, page 14, and a photostat of another article from the New York Times, of September 6, 1948, pages 1 and 6, in reference to Feng Yu-hsiang.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you cause those photostats to be made from the original papers?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is this the date at which, or about which the witness knew this party?

Mr. FORTAS. What is the date of those photostats?

Mr. MORRIS. That is September 1948.

When did you last see Gen. Feng Yu-hsiang, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The last time I saw him was when he stayed at our house. He and, I think, a son-in-law of his stayed overnight at our house.

Mr. MORRIS. What is his son-in-law's name, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. When was that, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I can't recall the exact year. Perhaps my wife can.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you living? In Baltimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, outside of Baltimore. Ruxton.

Mr. MORRIS. It was in connection with the trip that he made to the United States, was it not, obviously, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In connection with?

Mr. MORRIS. The visit must have been at the same time he visited the United States.

Mr. LATTIMORE. At the same time, yes. He had been appointed by Gen. Chiang Kai-shek to make a study of hydroelectric enterprise in this country, and I remember his telling me that he had taken thousands of feet of motion-picture film in connection with that.

Mr. MORRIS. He met with a violent death, did he not, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He died in a fire aboard a Soviet ship, I believe, in the Mediterranean somewhere.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the basis for the introduction of these exhibits?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, one article describes the death that Gen. Feng Yu-hsiang came to, and the other was an article indicating when he arrived, which would tend to be corroborative of the time that Mr. Lattimore did meet Gen. Feng Yu-hsiang.

Mr. FORTAS. What is the date?

The CHAIRMAN. It is supposed to be September 1948.

Mr. MORRIS. Both are September 1948.

Mr. FORTAS. You say that there is a date as to the time when he arrived, which tends to corroborate the witnesses' testimony, and presumably you are referring to a date given in the story.

Mr. MORRIS. That is right.

Mr. FORTAS. I wondered if you would state that to the witness, because we haven't seen the article.

The CHAIRMAN. There is one here of the New York Times of January 15, 1948, page 14; one of the New York Times, September 6, 1948, page 1, and another from the New York Times dated September 6, 1948, page 6.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is a run-over of the former story.

Senator SMITH. Could we not clear it up, Mr. Chairman, by letting the witness and his counsel examine those right now?

The CHAIRMAN. I want to know what is the basis for the introduction of them. They do not refer to this witness, as I understand it.

Mr. MORRIS. But they do refer, Mr. Chairman, to Gen. Feng Yu-hsiang, about whom we have been interrogating this witness, and they do place the time of his visit to the United States during the time of the visit when Mr. Lattimore testified he did have Gen. Feng Yu-hsiang in his home.

The CHAIRMAN. Did it have any connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MORRIS. No, sir; not what we are putting in the record at this time, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair is going to withhold the ruling on that for the time being.

You may proceed with some other matter.

Mr. MORRIS. Julien R. Friedman.

Senator SMITH. May I ask one question before we leave that?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Lattimore, with respect to Gen. Feng Yu-hsiang, that he made several thousand feet of moving picture film—

Mr. LATTIMORE. Made or had been given.

Senator SMITH. Did you see any of those yourself?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I didn't.

Senator SMITH. You did not know whether any of them were made of just public utilities, or whether some of them might have been made of military installations. Do you have any information either way?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no information whatever.

This was in the period when there was a great deal of talk about a possible TVA on the Yangtze, and that sort of thing, and the Chinese Government was very much interested in large-scale hydroelectric enterprises.

Mr. MORRIS. Julian R. Friedman?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Is he a man who worked for the State Department at one time?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. He was an assistant to John Carter Vincent at the time he was Director of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, then, I knew him slightly and had no reason to believe him a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you meet him in Mr. Vincent's office in the State Department?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I can't recall meeting him there, no. I think whenever I met him it was socially. If he was in Mr. Vincent's office, I may well have met him.

Senator FERGUSON. I think the facts show that he had a desk in the same office with Mr. Vincent, if that will help you.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I may quite well have met him in Mr. Vincent's office, but if so it was so inconsequential that I retain no memory of it.

Mr. MORRIS. You did say whenever you did meet Mr. Friedman it was at social gatherings, Mr. Lattimore. Will you tell us about those?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, I just remember meeting him occasionally. He may have been at one or more IPR conferences, or something of that sort.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you meet him at the Hot Springs convention in 1944?

Mr. LATTIMORE. If he was there, then I must have met him there?

Mr. MORRIS. But that is the best you can testify to about your association with Julian Friedman?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Harry Gannes?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't place that name.

Mr. MORRIS. Did Chen Han-seng write a review of his book for Pacific Affairs while you were the editor of it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall. He may well have. Could you give me the year of that?

Mr. MORRIS. December 1937.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is quite possible, but my recollection of reviews in Pacific Affairs is not very good, partly because while I was editing Pacific Affairs from abroad many reviews went in without my having seen the original manuscripts.

Mr. MORRIS. So it is your testimony you did not recall Harry Gannes at all?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mark Gayn?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Mark Gayn I met at the Press Club in Tokyo, I believe, for the first time. That would be the winter of 1945-46, and I think I saw him once in this country.

Mr. MORRIS. What was that occasion?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That was just before he was going to Europe on some kind of writing assignment, so I was told.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he ever confer with you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, it certainly wasn't a conference. It was a casual meeting.

Mr. SOURWINE. Just a moment, Mr. Morris. If I may interpose, the witness has not yet answered the main question about Mr. Gayn.

The question is: In your dealings with this man, or in any other way, did you know or have any reason to believe that he was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I didn't.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Louis Gibarti?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't place that name.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony that you do not recall having a meeting with Mr. Louis Gibarti?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I certainly don't recall it. If you have a document somewhere, it might refresh my memory.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Harold Glasser?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't place that name either.

Mr. MORRIS. G-l-a-s-s-e-r.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't place that name.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you encounter him on the Pauley Reparations Mission?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He wasn't a member of the mission.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is: Did you encounter him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall it.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, on the Pauley Reparations Mission.

Mr. MORRIS. It is your testimony you did not encounter or run into Harold Glasser in connection with the Pauley Reparations Mission?

Mr. LATIMER. I don't recall it. In Tokyo?

Mr. MORRIS. At any place.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Or here? I just don't place the name.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Max Granich?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Max Granich I know from the transcript of these hearings. I have never met him, but there is in the record the

fact that I once wrote him a letter declining to join the board of China Today, which he edited.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Michael Greenberg?

Mr. SOURWINE. Just a moment, please. The witness has not yet answered the question: Did he, in his dealings with this man, know him or had any reason to believe he was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In my dealings with him, I had no reason to believe he was a Communist.

Mr. SOURWINE. The question is a little broader than that. The question is: In your dealings with him, or in any other way, did you have reason to believe or did you know him to be a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I didn't know him to be a Communist, and I didn't believe him to be a Communist. China Today at that time was not a magazine that I recognized as a Communist front.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Michael Greenberg?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Michael Greenberg I knew slightly. I think I met him at the New York office of the IPR and, of course, I know that he later became managing editor, or some such title, of Pacific Affairs after I had left. I knew him very slightly.

Mr. MORRIS. You used his services, did you not, in the IPR?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall using his services.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this document, please?

Mr. SOURWINE. If I may interrupt, please, before the document comes in. Here again we have a situation where the major question—that is, whether the witness in his dealings or in any other way knew or had reason to believe this person was a Communist—has not been answered.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I had no reason to believe he was a Communist.

Mr. SOURWINE. The question is assuming that you did have dealings with the person. There is, of course, no objection to expatiating on that, but I keep coming back to it because the main question is whether you knew or had reason to believe that the person was a Communist.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I knew him very slightly and had no reason to believe him a Communist.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Mandel.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated April 28, 1941, from 300 Gilman Hall, Johns Hopkins University, addressed to Mr. E. C. Carter, with the typed signature of Owen Lattimore. It is a photostat of a carbon copy.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, I offer you that document and ask you if you can recall having written it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't recall having written it, but I obviously did.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read the second paragraph, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. "The three points raised by Greenberg are, I think, decisive."

Mr. MORRIS. Do you remember what the three points were in connection with that paper by Greenberg?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; but the first sentence of the letter is:

Herewith I am returning the docket of papers relative to Bloch's proposal for an analysis of the Russo-Japanese Pact.

I see that I go on in the latter to object to the fact that the people in the New York office don't seem to realize that quarterly magazines have to deal in rather long terms of reference, whereas the Far Eastern Survey, which was a fortnightly publication, dealt with things that were closer to the news.

The CHAIRMAN. Now get back to the question.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that be admitted into the record?

The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 551" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 551

WLH  
ED

300 GILMAN HALL, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY,  
Baltimore, Md., April 28, 1941.

Mr. E. C. CARTER,

*Institute of Pacific Relations,*

*129 East Fifty-second Street, New York City.*

DEAR CARTER: Herewith I am returning the docket of papers relative to Bloch's proposal for an analysis of the Russo-Japanese Pact.

The three points raised by Greenberg are, I think, decisive.

There is another thing that I think should be borne in mind whenever proposals of this kind come up. Everybody at 129 East Fifty-second Street who does any writing seems to me to be dominated by the routine and rhythm of Far Eastern Survey—and to be unconscious of the fact. The old Far Eastern Survey, I should hastily add. There are already signs that the new Far Eastern Survey is doing a Moses on them and leading them out of the wilderness.

But the habit of mind to which I refer is still there and still dominant. It is the habit of thinking that the art of writing something that is a combination of profound philosophy and snap judgment on something that happened a week ago or at most two weeks ago.

This just won't do for a quarterly. You have to drop the idea that you are writing about something that happened a week or ten days ago. You have to cast your mind forward at least three months—four is safer. It is not a question of what people are guessing about the Russo-Japanese Pact now, but what they will be thinking about it in September. The essential approach involves the computing of two factors: (1) By September, what impress will remain on people's minds of the actual wording, the diplomatic and political timing, and the immediate effects of the Russo-Japanese Pact? (2) By September, what will be the general character of the consequences flowing from the Pact? I do not mean sensationally accurate prophesies of who will be sipping tea and who will be gulping vodka. I mean a broadly correct anticipation of main trends.

All of this means that you cannot deal with foreground at all. You must combine background in the most scholarly sense of that much abused word with the panorama of the future.

It is for reasons like this that I switched Anna Louise Strong off the topic of the Fourth Route Army and onto the topic of the Eighth Route Army.

Yours very sincerely,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

Mr. MORRIS. At the time, or any time, did you have any reason to believe that Michael Greenberg was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I had no reason to believe he was a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, while we are on the document, may I go out of order a minute and ask Mr. Lattimore to read the last paragraph of this letter?

The CHAIRMAN. That is on the second page.

Mr. MORRIS. It is on the second page.

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

It is for reasons like this that I switched Anna Louise Strong off the topic of the Fourth Route Army and onto the topic of the Eighth Route Army.

This is apparently for reasons of time limit.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you explain what you meant by that reference, Mr. Lattimore?

The CHAIRMAN. Read that again, Mr. Lattimore, please.

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I read the preceding sentence also?

The CHAIRMAN. Just read what you did read. I want to get that. What did you read when you were asked to read?

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

It is for reasons like this that I switched Anna Louise Strong off the topic of the Fourth Route Army and onto the topic of the Eighth Route Army.

Mr. MORRIS. Read the preceding paragraph, Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The preceding paragraph is [reading]:

All of this means that you cannot deal with foreground at all. You must combine background in the most scholarly sense of that much abused word with the panorama of the future.

Mr. MORRIS. What did you mean by the reference that you were switching Anna Louise Strong off of the topic of the Fourth Route Army and onto the topic of the Eighth Route Army?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I can only speculate on that, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Anna Louise Strong doing an assignment for you at that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall whether she was doing an assignment or had volunteered an article.

Mr. MORRIS. But is it not apparent from your reading of your own letter, Mr. Lattimore, when you say you switched her off one topic and onto another, that she was obviously working for you in some capacity?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; not necessarily. She may have volunteered an article on one topic and I suggested that she take up another topic.

Mr. MORRIS. At least to that extent she was working for you, if you could switch her from one to the other, even though she was volunteering?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I think if a correspondent is trying to place an article with a publication, that correspondent is working for himself or herself until the article is accepted.

Mr. MORRIS. Were the Fourth Route Army and the Eighth Route Army both Communist armies?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The Eighth Route Army was a Communist army. The Fourth Route Army was an army organized by Chiang Kai-shek which contained both Communists and non-Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. And it ultimately became a Communist army; did it not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Part of it did; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you explain the reference of taking Anna Louise Strong from the Fourth to the Eighth Route Army?

The CHAIRMAN. What is meant by that language?

Mr. LATTIMORE. As I say, I can only speculate on it at this distance, but in view of the fact that I was talking about the subject of a quarterly magazine not writing off the top of the news, and in view of the fact that this letter was written in 1941, it may be that the Fourth Route Army was known at that time only from recent newspaper reports, and I thought it was difficult to give a balanced long-term treatment of it, whereas the Eighth Route Army had been known for a long time, and was a subject that could be written about in the terms

of a quarterly magazine, rather than a subject for some publication that was staying close to the daily headline.

The CHAIRMAN. Did I understand you to say that the Eighth Army was a Communist army?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The Eighth Army was a Communist army.

The CHAIRMAN. And you switched her from the Fourth Route Army to the Eighth Route Army; is that right? Is that what the language says?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The language says I switched her off one topic and onto another topic, presumably in terms that she would write about one topic rather than another. The Eighth Route Army at that time was under Chiang Kai-shek's command, although it was a Communist army.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know at that time that Anna Louise Strong was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I did not.

Mr. MORRIS. Had you any reason to believe that she was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I had no reason to believe that she was.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever know that she was?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I never learned that she was.

Senator FERGUSON. That is up to this date?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is up to this date. I don't consider her a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. H. Hatem?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I can't place that name at all.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony you had no connection with Dr. Hatem?

Mr. LATTIMORE. None that I can recall. There may be something in the files about it, but I completely fail to place the name.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I just want to know if the record shows what Mr. Lattimore's definition of a Communist is in these answers. He is answering that he never knew Anna Louise Strong to be a Communist, even up to this date, and had no reasons to believe.

What is your definition in these answers of the words "a Communist"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. A Communist, I suppose, is a known Communist.

Senator FERGUSON. A known Communist? They did not ask you that, as I understood the question.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no reason to believe that Anna Louise Strong is a Communist.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not the question.

Senator FERGUSON. What I have been trying to find out now is that you have answered many questions here, and one of them was as to whether or not you ever knew or had reasons to believe that Anna Louise Strong was a Communist.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I had no reason to believe she was a Communist.

Senator FERGUSON. But I want to know what the word "Communist" means to you when you are answering these questions.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I had no reason to believe that she was a member of the Communist Party.

Senator FERGUSON. That was not the question at all, whether or not she was a member of the party. Is that what you understood all of

these other questions from No. 1 down to mean: that you knew or had reasons to believe they were members of the party?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you talking about card-carrying Communists?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I am not an expert on the subject of card-carrying Communists versus noncard-carrying Communists.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, would you include at least, in the question with relation to Anna Louise Strong, as to whether or not she was under the discipline of the Communist Party?

Mr. LATTIMORE. To the best of my knowledge of Anna Louise Strong, which is rather slight, I had no reason to believe that she was under any discipline except her own.

Mr. MORRIS. She was the editor of the Moscow Daily News, was she not, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't think she was. Was she?

Senator FERGUSON. Did you not know she was?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I didn't recall that.

Mr. MORRIS. You have reviewed her books, have you not, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have reviewed at least one book of hers.

Mr. MORRIS. That was in what year; 1935?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Possibly.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, along this line of questioning we have not been putting documents into the record for fear we would not be able to finish this up very quickly.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not have to be afraid about finishing up very quickly. We are going to go on with this hearing until it is concluded. Do not be afraid about time.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, perhaps we should define what we mean as a Communist when we ask the witness a question. That is to say, whether we are referring just to a card-carrying Communist, a member of the Communist Party, or whether we are also including in that category those persons who we know are generally classified as Communists because they follow the Communist line.

The latter would be a much broader definition. Perhaps we should say to the witness here just which of those two we mean, whether we mean strictly a card-carrying Communist or whether we mean a person that may or may not be a card-carrying Communist but yet does follow the Communist line. I think that is what Senator Ferguson is driving at.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I am driving at.

Senator SMITH. I am sure the witness would rather have it cleared that way.

Senator FERGUSON. Whether or not they were voluntarily following the line.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would this definition be acceptable: In this list of questions, when we refer to the word "Communist," the committee means a person who is, using the Senator's words, who is or has been willingly cooperative or collaborating with Communists for the furtherance of Communist purposes.

Senator FERGUSON. That is a good definition.

Mr. SOURWINE. Using that as the definition of Communist, Mr. Lattimore, are there any of the answers you have given with regard to these people that you would want to change?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am afraid, Mr. Sourwine, that those are definitions that I can't accept. I haven't been conducting a private investigation service, and all I can speak to is my personal knowledge of people or knowledge of their writings, or something like that.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want that answer to stand in reply to the question propounded by Mr. Sourwine?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you do not accept the definition given you nor the explanation given you by Mr. Sourwine or the members of this committee, is that right?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Lattimore, whether or not you accept it, if you are advised that that is what the committee means by interrogating you as to whether or not you had knowledge of whether they were Communists, do you, or do you not, stand by your previous answers that none of these individuals whom you have negatived were known to you to be Communists?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir, because phrases have been used like "generally classified as Communists," and I just don't understand exactly what that means. I don't think it is a precise enough definition.

Mr. FORTAS. Mr. Chairman, may I respectfully request that the question be repeated?

The CHAIRMAN. Just a minute, Mr. Fortas.

Senator O'CONOR. I will repeat it. My question is, and I will rephrase it, whether or not you accepted the definition as given by Mr. Sourwine. I would like to ask you whether or not any of the persons about whom you have been interrogated were known to you to be acting in furtherance of Communist objectives or of being identified with Communist undertakings.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think the answer would be "No," Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the answer? What is your answer, not what you think?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My answer, without reviewing in detail all of these names, is no. In the case of Anna Louise Strong—

Mr. SOURWINE. In order to answer that question you have to review those names.

Senator O'CONOR. Go ahead, Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. LATTIMORE. In the case of Anna Louise Strong, she was known for many years as a writer who gave sympathetic accounts of conditions in parts of Soviet Russia that she visited. Later on she was a person who wrote accounts very friendly to the Chinese Communists of what she saw in Communist China.

The question of whether doing a thing of that kind was honest reporting by the person concerned of facts as she saw them, or whether it was a question of deliberately furthering the cause or interests of the Chinese Communists or the Russian Communists, is a subjective evaluation for which I don't have the data. Therefore, I say that as far as my knowledge is concerned, she was not a Communist.

Senator O'CONOR. You have not, I think, Mr. Lattimore, answered fully. Our question is not as to whether the person's writings may, in fact, have been of aid and assistance, as well as if the person will-

fully was acting in furtherance of Communist objectives and was lending himself or herself to the furtherance of Communist objectives, to the best of your knowledge.

Mr. LATTIMORE. To the best of my knowledge, I never considered that Anna Louise Strong was willfully furthering the interests of the Chinese or Russian Communists in the dishonest sense of disregarding her own judgment.

The CHAIRMAN. Just a minute. Let me have that answer, please. That is an avoidance of the question. Read me the answer.

(The record was read by the reporter.)

The CHAIRMAN. That is a willful avoidance of the answer. It is going to be stricken.

Answer the question. Will you read the question back to the witness, please, the question of the Senator from Maryland?

(The record was read by the reporter.)

Mr. LATTIMORE. To the best of my knowledge, no.

Senator O'CONNOR. Is that applicable to all of the other individuals?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, I think it is. As I say, again, without reviewing each individual name—

Mr. SOURWINE. The witness has repeated. He says that again without reviewing these names. In order to answer that question, he must review these names, and the record should show that he has reviewed these names. Otherwise, the answer means nothing.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you review the names and answer the question, Mr. Lattimore?

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I do not think, in deference to the question answered, that we have a sufficient understanding now that there is an understanding between the committee and the witness as to what is meant by the word "Communist."

For instance, he uses expressions like "willfully" and whether a person is "dishonest." If she was a Communist, no one could say she was dishonest in her judgment. I think we ought to take a minute here and get an agreement on what we mean by the word "Communist" in these questions. I think this is very material.

The CHAIRMAN. You cannot prevent the witness from inserting a word of his own which is not used by the interrogator, and that is what he has been doing all along.

Mr. FORTAS. Mr. Chairman, I think the word "willful" was Senator O'Connor's word.

Senator FERGUSON. I had used the expression once knowingly.

Mr. FORTAS. Senator, there have been so many questions, I wonder if the committee could not rephrase the question and put it to the witness. I think this is just a case of confusion because of different terminology used by the interrogators.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator O'Connor's question was very clear and very distinct. It will be read back to the witness again if need be.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, might I ask this question of the witness: Mr. Lattimore, did you say about the handbook written by Anna Louise Strong, *This Soviet World*, as reviewed by you on pages 611-612:

Her book, as a whole, is a good confrontation of the Soviet ideas of democracy, originality and individuality and the foreign idea of regimentation.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the question, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. I asked him if he wrote that about the book that was written by Anna Louise Strong.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall writing that, but I am willing to accept this extract. I would like to see the full context.

Mr. MORRIS. What year is that, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. September 1945, Pacific Affairs.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, while we are getting that article, may we have the question redirected to Mr. Lattimore?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson's question?

Mr. MORRIS. No; Senator O'Connor's question. And may we have the witness's last answer?

The CHAIRMAN. You will have to read back to get Senator O'Connor's question.

Senator O'CONNOR. I said, Mr. Lattimore, apart from whether you accepted the definition as repeated by Mr. Sourwine, whether, in your responses to the questions concerning this list of individuals, you meant that you had no knowledge that any one of those individuals had acted in furtherance of Communist objectives or were identified with Communist undertakings?

Mr. LATTIMORE. To my knowledge?

Senator O'CONNOR. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The answer is no, to my knowledge, as far as my knowledge extends. May I add a word or two there?

When, especially in the early 1930's, I read an attempt to describe something that was going on in some part of Soviet Russia that was friendly in the sense that it didn't have in every other paragraph, "Remember these, all murderers," or something of that kind, I thought it was an honest attempt to observe and report what was going on in Russia. My assumption would not be that that was done in purpose of furthering the spread of Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, on this point may Mr. Mandel read into the record Anna Louise Strong's contributions to the Communist publications as of that time?

The CHAIRMAN. Wait a minute. What are you reading from?

Mr. MANDEL. From a record I have accumulated. The sources are all given.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel has been sworn as the research director, and he will give the sources of each individual item as he comes to it, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MANDEL. Moscow Daily News of July 2, 1933, published in Moscow for English-speaking people in the Soviet Union and throughout the world, Miss Anna Louise Strong is associate editor. She also was a writer for the following Communist publications: The Liberator of March 1923, page 24; Soviet Russia Today, December 1934, page 5; the New Masses of June 28, 1938, page 15; the Sunday Worker of December 21, 1935, page 3; the Labor Herald—that is the Communist Labor Herald—of March 1924, page 16; the Worker's Monthly of January 1925, page 108; Soviet Russia Today of March 1937, pages 14 and 15.

Mr. MORRIS. This is the article, Mr. Lattimore, that you made reference to that you reviewed. [Document handed.]

The CHAIRMAN. I understand there is some confusion as to the date. Is that right? What is the question now pending?

Mr. MORRIS. Senator Ferguson, Mr. Chairman, asked Mr. Lattimore whether or not he had made a certain statement in reviewing Anna Louise Strong's book, and he wanted to see the whole text. He has been given the text, and he now may make any change in that that is necessary.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the question, the question by Senator Ferguson?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It refers to a particular sentence which I have here.

The CHAIRMAN. I want the question, if I can get it.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you identify what I asked you in the book?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, I found it.

Senator FERGUSON. Is it accurate?

Mr. FORTAS. Would you read it back, Senator?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, I think it is accurate. The sentence is:

Her book, as a whole, is a good confrontation of the Soviet ideas of democracy, originality and individuality, and the foreign idea of "regimentation."

Did you want to ask me anything further on that, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. No, but I was troubled with your answer about Miss Strong, whether you knew she was a Communist. I attributed the difficulty to the point that you and I were not thinking about the word "Communist" in the same light. I could not understand how you could answer that you did not think she had connection with the Communist Party. That is the reason I said to the Chair that I hope now we might have an understanding as to what this word means that we have been using here in this last group of questions about these persons from Adler to where you are now.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Do you want to make a new definition?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Sourwine, you had addressed a definition to the Chair.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would the committee wish to use this definition: Communist means a person under Communist discipline, or who has voluntarily and knowingly cooperated or collaborated with Communist Party members in furtherance of Communist Party objectives.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know that to apply to any of those names that have been referred to you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would say not, subject to the times at which I knew these various people and various contributions that they submitted.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have now reviewed the list, have you, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have reviewed the list. I notice that there is, for instance, besides Anna Louise Strong—

Mr. MORRIS. This is the list down as far as Michael Greenberg. That is as far as we have gotten, Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, Dr. Hatem, I think.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, we had gone to Hatem. You are right.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, of course, there are various people to whom I have referred, like Earl Browder, knowing that he was a Communist and—what is his name—Borodin, assuming that he was a Communist. There is Israel Epstein, who I once reviewed as writing a book that was partisan on the side of the Chinese Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, but you testified that you had no reason to believe that he was a Communist while you knew him, did you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, I did not consider him at that time to be a Communist. I considered him a partisan of the Communists. How that is affected by Mr. Sourwine's definition I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. How is it affected in your mind?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, at that time, I considered him, at the time I reviewed his book, I considered that he gave a partisan statement in favor of the Chinese Communists. But as of the year that book was written, exactly what that meant in terms of Russian Communists and American Communists would be something else again.

Many people were writing extremely favorable accounts of the Chinese Communists at that time. I think perhaps I could say that, at that time, using a very loose term—which again is not really a satisfactory definition in itself—I would consider Epstein a fellow traveler of the Chinese Communists.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, if the committee accepts this definition, and I assume that is the case with regard to its question, then the question is, putting this definition in place of the word "Communist," first we assume that you had dealings with the person named, and if not, please state that, then in your dealings with this person, or in any other way, did you know or have reason to believe that this person was a person under Communist discipline or who had voluntarily and knowingly cooperated or collaborated with Communist Party members in furtherance of Communist Party objectives.

Taking that as the question, Mr. Lattimore, and looking back over these names, down as far as that of Dr. Hatem, are there any of the answers which you gave in the negative which you would like to change or qualify?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think no, with the exception of Israel Epstein, whom I mentioned here, and possibly Abraham Chapman. I can't remember exactly what the correspondence was. I never met him personally, but I seem to remember that the question was raised in the research committee of the IPR that he had done some kind of work from the Communist point of view, or as a Communist, or something of that kind. I don't recollect the exact terms.

The question was raised whether his work should be published at all, and, if so, how it should be described or presented. But as I say, I don't remember the details.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you had that in mind, did you, when you previously answered the question about him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. When I previously answered the question about him, I had in mind that I did not, of my personal knowledge, know him to be a Communist. I think so—I am not sure. I would like to have the transcript read back. I am getting a little bit confused with all of these going back and forth from one name to the other. If we go back in the transcript to the raising of the name of Abraham Chapman, perhaps I could be clearer.

Mr. SOURWINE. The transcript will speak for itself, sir. But the question is, Now that you have been somewhat more confined by the committee's definition of "Communist," what is your answer with regard to Mr. Chapman?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My answer with regard to Mr. Chapman is that I had no personal dealings with him, and therefore did not personally

know him or consider him to be a Communist. But that I believe, and without seeing the correspondence again, I can't remember exactly what it is about, that the question of his being a Communist or supporting a Communist presentation, or something of the kind, may have been raised.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you say you had reason to believe, then, that he was a Communist or a fellow traveler?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It would be impossible for me to be more precise there, Mr. Chairman, without seeing the original correspondence again and reviewing it. I don't want to be unjust to anybody.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator FERGUSON. Might I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Down to where we are on the names now, what would your answer be, and you have given us a definition of "fellow traveler," as to knowing or having reason to believe that any of these people were fellow travelers?

Mr. FORTAS. Senator, I am not sure that he has defined "fellow traveler."

The CHAIRMAN. He has used it alternately.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I used the term, and I believe I said that it was in itself a loose and unsatisfactory definition.

Senator FERGUSON. As loose and as unsatisfactory as it is to you, what do you say about my question?

Mr. SOURWINE. Let the record show the witness is examining the list.

Mr. LATTIMORE [after examining the document]. No, I don't believe I had any reason, at the time I knew any of these people, to consider that they were fellow travelers, with the exception or partial exceptions already indicated.

Mr. MORRIS. And that includes Mr. Israel Epstein, is that right?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That would include Mr. Epstein, whom I certainly considered at the time to have written a partisan book, that was partisan on the side of the Chinese Communists.

The CHAIRMAN. Before you made that last answer, you had occasion to, and did, review the list of names on which you have been interrogated. Is that right?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. What is your answer on Earl Browder? I see his name under the B's.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, I had already mentioned that I considered him to be a Communist at the time. So I understood that he was not affected by this review.

The CHAIRMAN. I think the committee will recess at this point. We will recess until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12:15 p. m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at 2 p. m. of the same day.)

#### AFTERNOON SESSION

The hearing reconvened at 2:10 p. m., upon the expiration of the recess.

TESTIMONY OF OWEN LATTIMORE, ACCOMPANIED BY THURMAN  
ARNOLD, COUNSEL—Resumed

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed now.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Chairman, over the recess, I was trying to recall as much as I know about Anna Louise Strong, who has been mentioned here, and I do believe that I recall that at one time she was working for a paper in Moscow, I don't remember in exactly what capacity, but in view of the fact, I should say that that would classify her as somebody who was knowingly working with the Russians at that time.

I may say that my memory is unclear partly because what was on the top of my memory was the newspaper stories about her being arrested in Russia and thrown out.

The CHAIRMAN. She was working with the Russians at that time, did you say?

Mr. LATTIMORE. At that time.

How conscious of that I was in the 1930's, at the time that I published material by her, is completely beyond my recollection.

The CHAIRMAN. And at the time she was working for the Russians, the Russian Government was a Communist government; is that true?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the year?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall that. I think Mr. Morris read into the record something, but I don't recall what year was mentioned.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you place about the year?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I can't. My general recollection is that she went to Russia very early after the revolution, but I don't know the details of her career.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, When Anna Louise Strong came back from Moscow after her differences with the Soviet Government there, did she stop to visit you at Baltimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; she stopped over briefly one afternoon.

Mr. MORRIS. How soon after her return from Moscow was that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know. I think it must have been within a few days after she landed in New York.

Mr. MORRIS. How long did she stay visiting you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Maybe an hour or so.

Mr. MORRIS. What did you discuss with her at that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, it really wasn't a discussion. She was telling us about being arrested and thrown out.

Mr. MORRIS. When you say "us," whom do you mean?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My wife and myself.

Mr. MORRIS. Was anybody else present?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Why did she go to see you at that time, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no idea.

The CHAIRMAN. Do we understand that she visited you at your home?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know of any further business she might have had in Baltimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't.

Senator FERGUSON. Did she express any?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you living in Ruxton at that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. All right; let us get along.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, do you know Joan Chase Hinton?

Senator FERGUSON. Just before you go to that: Did Miss Strong leave you any letters or memorandums or reports or anything?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Morris, are you getting back to this list now?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes; I am getting back to the list now.

Mr. SOURWINE. Just so that the record will be clear on this afternoon's session, and to refresh the witness' recollection of the question, the question with respect to each one of these names, the reading of the name assumes that the witness has had some dealings with the person. If not, the witness is requested to so state when the name is read.

The CHAIRMAN. Some dealing or some acquaintance.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right, sir.

Then the question is: In your dealings with his person, or in any other way, did you ever know or have reason to believe that this person is a person under Communist discipline or who had voluntarily and knowingly cooperated or collaborated with Communist Party members in furtherance of the Communist Party objectives?

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Lattimore, do you understand that as applying to each name as we go down the list.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is Joan Chase Hinton.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The answer is "No." I knew her very slightly.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know any other members of her family?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes. I know her mother.

Mr. MORRIS. Who is her mother, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Her mother is the head of a school in Vermont.

Mr. MORRIS. What is her name?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Carmelita.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you a member of the board of that school, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't think so.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you ever been a member of the board of that school?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't think I have.

Let me ask my wife.

I don't think so, no.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you ever lectured or taught there at any time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I never taught there. My son went to school there, and once or twice when I was up there I spoke at school gatherings.

Mr. MORRIS. On how many occasions?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Maybe a couple.

Mr. MORRIS. In what connection did you meet Joan Chase Hinton?

Mr. LATTIMORE. As Mrs. Hinton's daughter.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know any other members of the family?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I met her brother, who was at that time farm manager of the school.

Mr. MORRIS. What is his name?

Mr. LATTIMORE. William.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to offer for the record an article written by Joan C. Hinton, from Communist China, in September 1951.

The CHAIRMAN. I will deal with that in just a minute.

There was another matter here referred to the Chair this morning that I did not rule on, and that was the matter of the clippings from the New York paper.

Mr. MORRIS. Gen. Feng Yu-hsiang.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to have had a better foundation laid for their admission with reference to this witness.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you like me to do that now, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. If you have anything better than what you have offered, I would like to have it.

Mr. MORRIS. It is nothing better, sir. We were interrogating the witness on the time he met Gen. Feng Yu-hsiang, who was the subject of those articles. Those articles clearly placed the period that Gen. Feng Yu-hsiang was in the country as September 1948, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You are not attempting to bind this witness by anything that is in these statements, are you?

Mr. MORRIS. No.

The CHAIRMAN. You are simply using these for the purpose of trying to fix a date; is that correct?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right, sir. And the general nature of the identity of Gen. Feng Yu-hsiang.

The CHAIRMAN. They may be admitted for that purpose.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 552, 552A" and are as follows:)

#### EXHIBIT No. 552

[New York Times, January 15, 1948, p. 14]

#### FENG PROCLAIMS HIS EXILE; WILL WORK AGAINST CHIANG

[Picture of Gen. Feng Yu-hsiang]

Feng Yu-hsiang, the "Christian general" of China, who has been a prominent figure there for 30 years, formally assumed the role of a political exile yesterday.

In an interview in his apartment at 839 West End Avenue, General Feng said he pleaded guilty to the charge of disloyalty made against him last week in Nanking.

Asserting that as far as he was concerned his ties with the Chinese Government, headed by President Chiang Kai-shek, were "totally severed," the general said he would devote himself from now on to work on behalf of a new revolutionary movement founded recently in Hong Kong.

This movement, he explained, was set up by delegates of "various democratic groups" within China. It includes segments of the Nationalist Party (the Kuomintang) that disagree with President Chiang and also representatives of the Chinese Communists, he stated.

The aim of the new association for which General Feng will act as a sort of spokesman in this country, is the overthrow of President Chiang's "reactionary and dictatorial regime," he said.

## EXHIBIT No. 552A

[New York Times, September 6, 1948, pp. 1 and 6]

## FENG DEAD IN RUSSIAN SHIP FIRE; WAR LORD TO TALK TO REDS

(By the Associated Press)

Moscow, September 5.—The death of Gen. Feng Yu-hsiang, China's fabulous "Christian general," aboard a Russian ship in the Black Sea was announced in the Moscow press today. General Feng was 67 years old.

The newspapers Pravda and Izvestia said that the former war lord and a daughter perished in an accidental fire aboard the Russian motorship *Pobeda* near the end of a voyage from New York to Odessa. The news of General Feng's death came when the ship docked at Odessa.

The newspapers said that the blaze resulted from careless handling of motion-picture film. They said that there were other victims of the fire but gave no details other than to note that General Feng's daughter was killed.

(The *Pobeda* was the ship upon which Mrs. Oksana S. Kasenkina and the Samarins, Russian school teachers who defied the Soviet authorities by remaining here, were to have sailed from New York. The ship left here July 31.)

[Special to the New York Times]

LONDON, September 5.—A Tass dispatch from Odessa recorded by the Soviet monitor here tonight, said of the *Pobeda's* trip:

"At Cairo she took on board more than 2,000 Armenian repatriates who were brought to Batum. On August 31 the *Pobeda* sailed from Batum to Odessa. On the way a fire broke out on board the motorship as a result of the careless handling of cinema films, which caught fire. There are victims aboard, among them Chinese Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang and his daughter. The motorship has been brought to Odessa. An investigation is under way."

NANKING, CHINA, September 5 (AP).—Moscow reports of the death of General Feng were received with reserve by Chinese Government officials today.

The official spokesman, Hollington Tong, said there would be no immediate comment on the reported death of the former Government leader who was expelled from the Kuomintang (Government party) after leading an opposition movement in the United States to President Chiang Kai-shek.

## FENG'S RELATIVE TELLS OF HOBBY

BERKELEY, CALIF., September 5 (AP).—General Feng's daughter-in-law today raised the possibility here that he might have been the victim of his own motion-picture hobby.

She said he had taken with him some personal movies and a quantity of films of the American hydroelectric and reclamation projects that he had been studying.

Notified of the report of his death, she said she and her husband had last heard from the general in a letter postmarked in Egypt (apparently when the ship stopped there) saying merely that he would be unable to write again for some time.

The general's son Feng Hung-chi, is a mechanical engineering student at the University of California. He was so overcome by grief that his wife spoke for him.

She said that they had not known what route the general was taking to China but that all the rest of the family was with him.

This included General Feng's wife; a second son, Paul Feng; two young daughters, Mildred and Dora; and an elder daughter, Lita, with her husband, Robert Lo.

Lita was a premedical student at the College of the Pacific, Stockton, Calif., until last January, when she went to New York and was married to Mr. Lo.

The Soviet report did not make clear which of the three daughters was killed.

The general's widow is the former Li Teh-chuan, who once was a YWCA secretary in Peiping. She was known to many Americans there and in Chungking as a brilliant woman, greatly interested in her husband's stormy career.

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#### FENG A CRITIC OF CHIANG'S REGIME

In a speech in this country in December General Feng, a severe critic of the Government of President Chiang Kai-shek, said that he would not return to his native land because he would be killed if he did so.

He made the speech shortly after he had been ordered to return to Nanking. He was sent here, a year before, ostensibly to study water-conservation projects, but in reality it was as a political exile. He spent most of his time rallying support to oppose the present Chinese Government.

A well-known war lord for more than 30 years, he was described by his friends as "the Christian general" and by his enemies as a turncoat. He was a leading executive of the Chinese Government during World War II but broke completely with it in the last 2 years.

His opposition to the Nanking Government, which he charged with corruption and inefficiency, led him to cooperate with the Communists, although he always denied that he was a Communist or that he favored the Soviet Union. He accused the Chinese Government of using the Communist threat as a bogey to obtain more loans from the United States.

"The so-called Russian threat to China is being used by the Chinese Government for its own purposes," he said once. "I am not a Communist and am not for Russia. But I know of no proved evidence that the Russians are helping the Chinese Communists."

Another time he denied that Chinese Communists actually practiced communism. He said they were carrying out the principles set forth by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, founder of the Chinese Republic, under whom he fought in the revolution of 1911.

At first, however, the Chinese Communists were wary of him. They denounced him for his political program which, they said, would only eliminate President Chiang without changing the basic social and political character of the Chinese Government.

But, in April of this year, it was reported that coalition had been established between the Communists and exiled Chinese political groups, including General Feng, on the basis of a platform calling for the overthrow of President Chiang, opposition to the United States, and the setting up of a left-wing united front regime in China.

Shortly afterward, it was reported that General Feng was in Europe on his way to north China for conferences with the Communists on the formation of a rebel government. It was then said that he would travel through Russia to China. That was the last word heard about him until the reports of his death.

Soldier, poet, and politician, he had been a leading figure on the Chinese scene since 1913, when he became commander of a brigade that was one of the most formidable units of the Chinese Army.

Behind him was a background of dire poverty, common to the masses of Chinese peasantry. He was born in 1880 of coolie parents. He recalled later that in a period of more than 10 years he ate meat only once.

In some unknown manner, however, he entered military school and then the Army, rising until he became an important officer. He was baptized in the Methodist faith in 1913, converted his troops, and was said to have led them into battle singing Onward, Christian Soldiers. In an interview in New York in 1946, he denied the legend that he had baptized platoons of men by squirting water from a hose on them.

His career as a war lord had its ups and downs. Sometimes he was a power in politics; at other times he was in exile or on a farm writing poetry—he published five volumes of poetry in China.

He was an eloquent speaker, a formidable debater, and a blunt critic of the missteps of his colleagues. He was tall—six feet, three inches—and emphasized his humble origins by wearing the coarse blue gown of the peasant. His critics added that underneath he wore silk-lined furs.

Some Chinese leaders called him a noisy bumpkin, but he always exercised a great influence on the masses of Chinese people. The troops that served under

him achieved a reputation for sobriety and discipline unique in war-torn China. Smoking, gambling, and loose living were forbidden; and, it was reported, daily attendance at prayer meetings was part of his army's routine.

Despite this, some domestic and foreign critics maintained that his methods were too brutal. This, they said, was the reason he never held a prominent place in Chinese affairs for long.

In 1924 he executed a bold coup that for a time put him at the head of the Government. The cost, however, was a reputation for treachery that never was overcome. Two years later he was forced to flee from China and took refuge in Moscow.

Among the posts he later held were State Councillor of the National Government, Minister for Military Affairs, member of the National Military Council, commander in chief of the People's Allied Anti-Japanese Army in the 1930's, and a leading commander of Chinese forces in World War II. He was a member of the Kuomintang from 1918 until his expulsion on January 7 of this year.

The CHAIRMAN. It seems to me we had another article here that was not admitted.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore was going to compare this article with the original that he wrote, Mr. Chairman, and rather than take up the time, he agreed to do that later on.

The CHAIRMAN. You have not had the time to do it yet; have you, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not yet, Senator.

Senator SMITH. I understand that would be subject to any comment he wishes to make.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. We will give him a chance to go through it. All right, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, this article is entitled "Why China Wants Peace." It appears in the People's China of September 16, 1951. It is written from Communist China and bears this preliminary introduction [reading]:

Joan Chase Hinton, a young American scientist, witnessed the first atomic-bomb explosion in the New Mexican Desert. A graduate of Bennington College, Miss Hinton took up graduate studies in physics at the University of Wisconsin and at the University of Chicago. From 1943 to 1945 she was a research assistant at the atom-bomb project in Los Alamos. An active member of the Association of Atomic Scientists, Miss Hinton was opposed to the secrecy and Government control which became attached to all work on atomic research. She came to China in 1948. In 1949 she married and is now working with her American husband in an animal-breeding farm in Inner Mongolia.

With the publication of this letter, readers are given the opportunity to know the impressions of a young American scientist, living and working with the Chinese people, joining with them in their great work of peaceful construction.

May that go into the record, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted into the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 553," and is as follows:)

#### EXHIBIT No. 553

#### WHY CHINA WANTS PEACE

(By Joan C. Hinton, September 16, 1951)

Joan Chase Hinton, a young American scientist, witnessed the first atomic bomb explosion in the New Mexican desert. A graduate of Bennington College, Miss Hinton took up graduate studies in physics at the University of Wisconsin and at the University of Chicago. From 1943 to 1945 she was a research assistant at the atom bomb project at Los Alamos. An active member of the Association of Atomic Scientists, Miss Hinton was opposed to the secrecy and govern-

ment control which became attached to all work on atomic research. She came to China in 1948. In 1949 she married and is now working with her American husband in an animal breeding farm in Inner Mongolia.

With the publication of this letter, readers are given the opportunity to know the impressions of a young American scientist, living and working with the Chinese people, joining with them in their great work of peaceful construction.

FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS,

1749 L Street NW., Washington 6, D. C., U. S. A.

DEAR MR. WOLFE AND THE FAS: Yesterday I received your application for re-membership in the Federation of Scientists. As I am just now almost directly under your feet, in Suiyuan Province, Inner Mongolia—where it takes two weeks for mail to arrive by donkey from the nearest railroad—I must say I was rather surprised and pleased to receive your application, and in two months' time at that.

You asked, "What has been happening to you since you were an FAS member?" As it was just the FAS and the questions with which it deals which drove me to China, I thought I would take the opportunity to write to you, though I should have told you long ago why my dues stopped coming.

As you probably do not remember me, let me begin by telling you a bit of my history. From as early as I can remember, I was determined to become a scientist. Even in grammar school, I can especially remember forcing the teachers to let me study Faraday's The Candle instead of taking Latin. In high school I concentrated on chemistry, oblivious to all my other courses. Finally, in college, I settled on physics, building a Wilson cloud chamber in my sophomore year and spending as much time as I could getting in the way of the cyclotron boys at Cornell. From college I went to Wisconsin where I studied as a graduate student for two years. As people became more and more scarce, disappearing to secret places, I became restless too and finally ended up at Los Alamos where I worked another two years on the "W. B."

Then came the bomb and Hiroshima and the mass migration of atomic scientists to Washington. I first joined the association of Los Alamos scientists, and then spent some six weeks in Washington working for the FAS. Your pamphlet mentions the "enthusiastic if inexperienced emissaries" now flocked to Washington. I am afraid both these statements applied to me above anybody else—especially the inexperience. I will never forget my chagrin when I went to a certain Senator's office to get some information and the secretary condescendingly looked up at me asking, "Is this in connection with school work?"—me, an atomic scientist, coming to Washington to fight for scientific freedom and world peace—the very nerve of her. Well, my heart was in the right place anyway.

From Washington I went to Chicago as an assistant in the Institute for Nuclear Studies, and later as a Fellow. By 1948, I had about one more year to go for my degree. In physics I could not have dreamed of a better opportunity for studying—I loved it. I was just beginning to get the feel of quantum mechanics—as though it were a part of me instead of something strange in textbooks. I was devouring Dirac and what I could get hold of on statistical mechanics. Yet the better things became for me in physics, the more depressed I became. Ever since that morning when we sat on a hillock south of Albuquerque and felt the heat of that bomb 25 miles away, something had started to stir in me. It forced me to Washington. Then I forced it down and left for Chicago, but it refused to stay down. The Truman doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the stagnation of the Atomic Energy Commission in the U. N.—how could one just sit still in a laboratory and ponder in the depths of statistical mechanics. The memory of Hiroshima—150,000 lives. One, two, three, four, five, six \* \* \* one hundred and fifty thousand—each a living, thinking, human being with hopes and desires, failures and successes, a life of his or her own—all gone. And I had held that bomb in my hand. Could I sit and pound Dirac? What was science for? For the sake of Science? That is what I had thought before. But we all pondered over Dirac and then suddenly 150,000 people were killed. Were we to blame? We were only studying science, finding out how the world was put together. Was the government to blame—really? Do we not have any say as to what our life work is to be used for? Are we puppets or human beings? Can we not vision the world of tomorrow? Will it be a world of destruction and misery, agonising death by radiation or will it be a world where mountains are moved by atomic bombs to change the course of rivers and make rich green land out of deserts? Where is our imagination?

By 1948 I could not stand it any longer. My friends all seemed to be going back into secret work. Were they crazy? Were we who studied physics to

spend all our lives thinking up means of mass extermination? Even my fellowship money came from the Navy. We were doing nonsecret work at the time. We needed some deuterium for our accelerator. In the room where I studied there was only a little space in the corner for a desk, the rest of the room was piled with cases of heavy water right up to the ceiling for the argon. We asked for some. Nowhere in America could we get any. Finally we sent to Norway and two little bottles were sent back to us with a picture of a Viking ship and a little note saying, "I thought you had civilian control."

In Washington, a friend of mine had asked me to go to China. I had refused. I was determined to become a physicist. But the idea kept gnawing at me. It would not let me go, until finally I felt like I was being caught in a horrible trap. No matter where you turned, you were faced by war, secret work, the Navy, the Army, and madmen locked in their laboratories thinking up new and better methods of total destruction. Suddenly, I made up my mind and left. But it was not easy. The love of science and physics was pretty strong. Of all my notebooks and books I only had room for two in my trunk. I sat for a long time looking at those books, then took Joos and the handbook of physics and chemistry and set out for China alone with a terrible emptiness in my heart. I had broken away from everything I ever had desired or known. I broke away because I had to. I had to find out what was going on in the world outside of physics. What was happening to the peoples of the world—so I came to China, to see America from the outside and to understand the tremendous upheaval going on inside Asia.

#### WHAT I LEARNED IN CHINA

And what have I learned in the three years since I have been in China? Perhaps the main thing is that the people of the East do not want war. That the peoples of the East are not interested in America. They are occupied with building up their own countries, pulling them out of their centuries of feudalism, changing them as fast as possible into modern, industrialised lands with abundance for all—lands where beggars cease to exist, and slums and "Maxwell Streets" are things of the past that the children read about in history books. Everything is for peaceful production, for building, for life, for the people—and I learned something else—that these people can get along perfectly all right without America. I used to think that American aid would mean a lot to China. A country so backward—how could she develop without American help? But where there is a will there is a way and the Chinese people have a will so strong that nothing America can do will ever stop it. They will think of plenty of ways and they will develop fast. The only obstacle to their development would be a war. They are not afraid of America. If she must fight, China will show that she is made of steel—but China will never start a war, war is against her every interest.

I know that you may ask, "How do you know? They are just filling you with propaganda, you fool!" So I will not talk any more in generalities. I will only tell a few things from my experience. The first is the conditions I found in Kuomintang, China. I spent a year in Kuomintang territory, and all that time it never ceased to amaze me why we (America) should be giving millions of dollars of aid to such a stupid, corrupt, conceited, useless government as the government of the Kuomintang. Just one example will suffice (though anybody who lived in Shanghai for just a few months at that time could cite countless examples). That is, the business of the "gold yuan."

For the fun of it, I kept a logarithmic plot of the inflation and it was a fairly straight line. I have forgotten just now what the period was, but the line was pretty steep. It was steep enough so that towards the end, prices would double or even triple in a day. I remember especially how carefully I had to plan to buy a jackknife. I went to a certain place (of which kind Shanghai was teeming) early in the morning with a briefcase to cash one American dollar. The briefcase having been duly loaded full of Chinese notes, I tore as fast as I could to the store and emptied them out on the counter before the price could rise. A briefcase full of notes for a jackknife? The poor storekeepers were in a terrible fix. They had to either not count the money and get stuck short or hire several extra hands just for counting money and lose that much in wages anyway. And the banks were in an impossible state. The cost of shipping and counting money was far beyond the value of the money. In fact, it was not even worth the paper it was printed on. The clerks in the banks were peering out from behind heaps of bills piled up to the ceiling. "Money, money everywhere, but not a crumb to eat." And so, of course, in order to stay alive one had to put

one's wealth into something besides paper money: in silver dollars, American dollars or goods, and the barter system flourished.

Then the government announced its "currency reform." Under penalty of death all gold, silver, American dollars, and hoarded goods were to be turned in to the banks and exchanged for the new stable "gold yuan." Every day the paper had pictures of people being shot for disobeying their order. Houses were searched. Anybody found guilty was dragged off to prison. Thousands upon thousands of ordinary folk turned in the little bit of savings they had in return for paper "gold yuan."

For a week or two, as I remember, prices remained stable. Then whisperings began in the black market—and soon they broke—the "gold yuan" fell off its pedestal. To where? Right smack on the extrapolation of the exponential inflation curve which I had been plotting all year. What did this mean? Only that the government had previously printed this tremendous excess of notes, had held them out of circulation for a week or two until as much gold and silver, etc., as could be collected from the people was taken in, and then let go, leaving the whole population with nothing but worthless scraps of paper. Thousands upon thousands of people left without a cent of savings—the biggest, most cold-blooded mass robbery in history or ever dreamed of. And the gold and silver was pocketed by the "Big Four"—the ruling families of China and shipped to America and other safe places as fast as possible before liberation. At the time I was too stupid to realize what was happening. I naively assumed that this time maybe the government was finally really planning to do something about the inflation. It was only after that point fell so perfectly on my curve that the truth began to dawn. But even then, it took me a long time to really realise the treachery, the calculated cold-blooded intent of these criminals who called themselves a government. And it was these crooks to whom America was sending millions of dollars worth of "aid"—guns, bombs, tanks, trucks, and a trickle of powdered milk.

Enough for the Kuomintang. Perhaps the next thing I might mention is the liberation of Peking. American papers always implied that the Chinese Communists were supplied by Russia. So I rather expected to see Russian weapons as the People's Liberation Army marched past. But in the whole parade which I watched for three or four hours, I never saw a single Russian weapon. A few old Japanese guns, but mostly new American trucks, cannon, tanks, guns, and trucks with "United States Army" written on the side in white letters as plain as day. The soldiers laughed when you asked them about it and said, "Uncle Sam sends them to Chiang and Chiang sends them to us."

Then again, people told me that foreigners would never be allowed to travel alone in the liberated areas. That the Communists would keep a pretty close eye on the travellers and be sure only to let you see what they wanted you to. In the back of my mind, I thought perhaps this might be true, too. I was all prepared to have an escort wherever I might choose to go and in the beginning I was given one. I wanted to go and visit a friend of mine who was staying at a place about 100 miles away, so I was supplied with a guide and went. But on coming back, my friend explained that I was used to travelling and could find the way back by myself and without further ado. I was left to go back alone. So again, the American press was wrong. Nobody was watching me, they were only helping me. I was free to look at whatever I liked. That was the first time and it has been that way ever since. When I go to a new place, someone is always ready to help me out to find the way. Once I have become familiar with the place I am left completely free.

My first job was working in an iron factory packed away in the mountains of Shensi. What were they making there? They were melting up American-made hand grenades, shells, wings from crashed planes sent from America to Chiang, steel and aluminum of weapons sent by America to kill them and making them into cooking pots, ploughs, and hoes. They were transferring these things of destruction into useful tools to build up a new and prosperous China, making wagon wheels and pumps and gates for irrigation canals. Americans would probably not even realise it was a factory and they would laugh at it when told so—not even a lathe, nothing but the hands of the people. Everything was made by hand. But Americans might do a little thinking, too. The Chinese with their bare hands are building up a new nation, while the Americans with their tremendous industrial strength are preparing to destroy mankind. The Chinese are not afraid; they are just sorry. If America were not preparing for war—if she were not threatening China at every point—China could put even more effort into construction, into building better homes for her people, into eliminating floods, into stabilising crops, into bringing in

machinery and transforming their land from one of despair and poverty into one of prosperity, enlightenment, a nation of scientists working for the enrichment of mankind. But America seems bent on war. So China will continue her construction despite America. She will keep on putting all she has into the betterment of the living conditions of her people. But at the same time, she will never stop watching America. She will not tolerate any high-handed action against her sovereignty. She is not afraid and her people know how to fight and know what they are fighting for. Anyone who came to work at that factory could not help but learn this. The irresistible strength of New China seemed to permeate everything, even the silent walls of the caves at night, waving black shadows and crimson reflections from the furnaces outside.

Since then all of China has been liberated and she now has more regular factories day by day. Skilled mechanics and engineers are being trained. Though some places still work by hand, others are forging ahead still faster with machines while others are using machines to make machines. It will not take her long.

At present I am working on an animal-breeding farm in Inner Mongolia. Of what I have learned here I will only say the following: that I was amazed to hear Acheson—a responsible representative of the U. S. government—say that the Soviet Union was “annexing whole territories” of Northeast China and Inner Mongolia to herself. I have lived here two years. So far I have only seen one thing Russian, that is, ten Soviet stallions given to our farm for breeding purposes, along with apparatus for artificial insemination. What are we doing with these stallions? We are breeding the farmers’ horses and the Mongolian ponies, improving the horses of Mongolia. The farmers come for miles around to get their horses bred. The stallions were given to China under the Agreement signed last year—an Agreement of friendship and mutual assistance between China and the Soviet Union. The Chinese are free to use them where and as they see fit. The Soviet Union does not interfere. To the peasants here, the Soviet Union is symbolized by these stallions, sleek-haired, refined, bigger than anything they have ever seen before and with no stud fees. The silent eyes of these ten stallions tell more to the Mongolian horsemen than any amount of insinuating speeches that Acheson ever could. If this is what is meant by being annexed by the Soviet Union then they would just as soon! They are not afraid of words, they only believe in what they see. And what do they see as far as America is concerned? Again, it is not empty words of friendship which impress them. It is bombing planes, guns, and tanks given to the Kuomintang. In our farm’s cornfield are two old craters from American-made bombs. No amount of speeches from American diplomats can erase these holes and the people do not easily forget.

#### CHINA WANTS PEACE

The people of China want peace. The people of the world want peace, including the people of America. Though I supposed I have been away too long to still be considered a member of the American scientists, yet I personally still feel as though I am one of you. I have written you to let you know at least the story of one of your members. One person refusing to work on secret projects, refusing to work on war, of course, does no good. But all of you at home united together have a very special strength in your hands. I only want to say to you: Use your strength, use whatever you can to work actively for peace and against war. As long as there is war, science will never be free. Are we scientists going to spend our lives in slavery for madmen who want to destroy the world? At home one gets frightened. Listening to so much war talk one begins to believe that if we do not prepare for war the other side will and then we will be destroyed. But now I have been living on the other side for some time and know for sure that this is a lot of lies, that China wants peace and is working for peace with all she has. She will never attack America, nor will any of her allies. If you people would only believe this, if you could only see for yourselves as I am seeing, then, I am sure you would not hesitate for a minute to work for peace with every ounce of strength you have.

So long for now and remember me to whomever is there that I might know.  
Sincerely,

(Signed) JOAN HINTON, *People's China*.

June 4, 1951.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, it may be that we want to identify by Mr. Mandel the nature of the publication, *People's China*.

Mr. Lattimore, are you acquainted with that publication, People's China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I am not acquainted with it. One of two copies have been sent to my office from China, presumably in the hope of getting a subscription, but I couldn't say I am acquainted with it.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name on the list, Mr. Lattimore, is Alger Hiss.

Mr. LATTIMORE. In the terms of the question, I did not consider him to be Communist at the time I knew him.

Mr. MORRIS. That is in connection with Alger Hiss?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is Philip Jaffe.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The same answer.

Mr. MORRIS. You did not believe him to be a——

Mr. LATTIMORE. To be a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Anthony Jenkinson.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Same answer.

Mr. MORRIS. How extensive was your experience with Anthony Jenkinson?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My acquaintance with him was very slight. I met him at the Yosemite conference of 1936, of the IPR, and I believe I didn't meet him again until after the war, or toward the end of the war, when he started a publication called Allied Labor News, in New York.

Mr. MORRIS. It is your testimony you did not know or had reason to believe that the Allied Labor News was a Communist publication?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I had no reason to believe that.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, at the time you are testifying, as I understand it, your answers relate only to the time you knew them——

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Back when they were writing or had some connection with you in relation to the Institute?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, there have been a couple of names since then. I don't think I have seen Mr. Jaffe since, oh ten years or so, and all the knowledge I have of him since then is from the press.

Senator FERGUSON. We asked you if you knew or had reason to believe, and your answer would infer now that up to this time you did not know, nor did you have reason to believe that Hiss was a Communist, or that Jaffe was a Communist. Do you want that answer to stand?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes. I don't believe that I know of any evidence that Mr. Hiss is a Communist.

Senator FERGUSON. Was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Or was a Communist.

Oh, wait a minute. There was a story in the papers the other day; that is right.

Senator FERGUSON. It was under oath, was it not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe it was, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you referring to the testimony of Nathaniel Weyl?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you want to change your testimony as to Mr. Hiss now?

MR. LATTIMORE. No. I can't speak to that, Senator Ferguson. I don't know the witness or his reliability or its connection with other evidence. I don't consider myself competent to give an answer.

Senator FERGUSON. How much evidence does it take to convince you that a person is a Communist? I wonder how much evidence it takes to have you answer that you do know.

MR. LATTIMORE. Perhaps, Senator, this committee could give me a definition of how much evidence I ought to take.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to know what your answers mean. I am trying to judge this case from answers and the record.

Do I understand, then, that from all you read about Mr. Hiss, all that was in the paper or anything else, all that you heard about it, that, under the definition that we gave you, you would say you had no knowledge or reason to believe that Mr. Hiss was a Communist, or ever was a Communist?

MR. LATTIMORE. Senator, if I may elaborate on my answer, all I know about Mr. Hiss is that——

The CHAIRMAN. That is not answering the question. You are just avoiding the question.

MR. LATTIMORE. I am simply saying, Senator, that I haven't followed the news about Hiss very carefully in the press. I don't consider myself an authority on the subject.

MR. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, may I remind the witness again of precisely what the question is? He has been reminded of it time and again, and the Senator, in his question, embraced the reminder.

Senator FERGUSON. The same thing is true in relation to Mr. Jaffe, is it?

MR. LATTIMORE. I don't recall that I ever seen it testified that Mr. Jaffe was a Communist.

Senator FERGUSON. You never heard that he was?

MR. LATTIMORE. I don't recall any testimony to that effect, no. It may have been in the transcripts of this committee, but I have read such an enormous amount of them that I——

Senator FERGUSON. I am just wondering if, after reading this record, if you did not have some notion at least that Hiss and Jaffe were Communists. What is your answer to that?

MR. LATTIMORE. I would say that sworn testimony to the effect that Hiss was a Communist would come within the definition, "Reason to believe"; but I don't remember any sworn testimony in the case of Mr. Jaffe.

Senator FERGUSON. So you would say now that you do have reasons to believe that Hiss was a Communist, do you not?

MR. LATTIMORE. I would say to that extent, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. You qualified that answer by saying "to that extent," that somebody swore that he was; is that right?

MR. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. But you do not believe so.

MR. LATTIMORE. I have no personal knowledge about it.

Senator FERGUSON. But you have no reason to believe?

MR. LATTIMORE. I consider that sworn testimony is some reason to believe. But it is not the same thing as conviction, is it?

Senator FERGUSON. I am asking you. To you it is not, is it?

MR. LATTIMORE. No. To my mind, conviction is conviction, and accusation is accusation.

Senator SMITH. It might come in the middle ground of conclusion from testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, gentlemen, let us proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is Mary Jane Keeney.

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I take the two names together?

Mr. MORRIS. Mary Jane and Philip Keeney?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mary Jane and Philip Keeney.

Mr. MORRIS. You may, Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. LATTIMORE. My knowledge of them is extremely slight and I had no reason to believe that they were Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you meet Philip Keeney in Japan?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I met him, yes, when some group that he was coming out with had just arrived. I met him when I was going into a building and he was coming out. We stopped and shook hands.

Mr. MORRIS. Had you known him before?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I had met him slightly here in Washington, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. On how many occasions did you meet with him in Japan, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think that was the only occasion.

Mr. MORRIS. Robin Kinkead.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No reason to believe that he was a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. You did know him, and had dealings with him, did you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He was on the staff of OWI in San Francisco when I was there.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is Benjamin Kizer.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. MORRIS. You do know Mr. Kizer, do you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I know Mr. Kizer.

Mr. MORRIS. He is a member of the board of trustees in the Institute of Pacific Relations, is he not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Whether he still is, I don't know. He may very well be.

Mr. MORRIS. On how many occasions have you seen Mr. Kizer?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have seen Mr. Kizer off and on over a period of years.

The CHAIRMAN. Was he a member of the board?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He was a member of the board at one time, I believe.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is Sergei Kournakoff.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I can't place that name.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is Corliss Lamont.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have met Mr. Lamont, I believe, once, and have had no reason to believe him a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Olga Lang.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The same answer, no.

Mr. MORRIS. On how many occasions have you met Olga Lang?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I met her in China when she was married to Karl August Wittfogel. I don't recall whether I have ever met her since in America, or not.

Mr. MORRIS. Did she write articles for Pacific Affairs?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think she wrote an article for Pacific Affairs.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is Michael Lindsay.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I know Mr. Lindsay very slightly. I think I met him once in this country, and have no reason to believe him a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is T. B. Lowe.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't place that name.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know of anyone who used the pseudonym T. B. Lowe?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't recall that.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you and Mr. Bisson ever team up and write an article under that pseudonym?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't think so.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you sure of it, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall writing an article jointly with Mr. Bisson at all.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony you do not know the name T. B. Lowe?

Mr. LATTIMORE. T. B. Lowe? Is that meant to be T. B. Lowe?

Mr. MORRIS. No. H. Lowe is the name I am asking now.

Mr. LATTIMORE. T. B. Lowe is a new name to me.

Mr. MORRIS. That means nothing to you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. MORRIS. How about the name H. Lowe?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't place that, either.

Mr. MORRIS. Next is Duncan C. Lee.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't place that name at all.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony you have never met Duncan C. Lee?

Mr. LATTIMORE. To the best of my knowledge and recollection, I have never met him.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is Mr. William Mandel.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think this is the William Mandel who worked for a time for the Institute of Pacific Relations. I forgot whether he was an employee or whether he did a research job. He did some work on Soviet Russia, of some kind.

Mr. MORRIS. And you have done some work on his books, have you not, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think that when I was a member of the research committee, the manuscript, or part of the manuscript of one of his books was sent to me for looking over.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know whether he worked for the Hoover Library?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you not introduce Mr. Mandel to Mr. Stefanson?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't think so.

Mr. MORRIS. Selden Menefee is the next name.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I knew Mr. Menefee very slightly a good many years ago here in Washington. I haven't seen him for some years, and have no reason to believe him a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Robert T. Miller.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I can't place that name, except I believe recalling that it came up in the transcript of hearings of Mr. E. C. Carter. But I still don't place the name. I am sure I have never met him.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is P. T. Moon.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I can't place that name.

Mr. MORRIS. Harriet L. Moore.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Harriet L. Moore, I have no reason to consider a Communist at the time I knew her. Her recent refusal to answer the question whether she had ever been a Communist raises a strong presumption that she is or was at some time a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. And you have known her for many years, have you not, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. I knew her slightly in the 1930's and saw her again very occasionally afterwards.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, the record of these meetings in Moscow, that we have introduced into the record at great length, shows that she and you attended all those meetings together.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. She has also been a leader of the Institute of Pacific Relations. In fact, she acted as secretary, did she not, Mr. Lattimore, at the time that you were associated with the institute?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember. If it was, it was probably at the time when I was out of the country, because I don't recall her acting in that capacity.

Mr. MORRIS. You did have many long and extensive dealings with Miss Moore, did you not, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I would not say. Not long or extensive.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is E. Herbert Norman.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The answer is no.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you last see Mr. Norman?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In 1947, at a meeting of the Institute of Pacific Relations in Stratford, England.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you meet Mr. Norman in Japan?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I met him in Japan in the winter of 1945-1946.

Mr. MORRIS. On how many occasions did you meet him in Japan?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Fairly frequently. I don't recall.

Senator FERGUSON. Just before you pass that: Did you ever have any negotiations or know of any negotiations between yourself, Norman, General Thorpe, Emerson, and Fairbank, or any of them?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. I recall the suggestion being made that I should take a job as a civilian employee under General Thorpe, but nothing in the way of negotiations, and certainly nothing in the way of negotiations with—what was the name—Emerson.

Senator FERGUSON. Emerson, Fairbank.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Emerson, Fairbank, Norman, and Thorpe.

Senator FERGUSON. And you.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever know of the move to try to bring Japanese Communists back into Japan?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. You never knew of any?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have any conversations about it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't believe I did. I believe that, in fact, I know that at the time I was in Japan, some, at least, of the Japanese Communists who had been in China during the war, they either returned to Japan when I was there or had already returned at the time I got there. I don't know which.

Senator FERGUSON. But those that returned while you were there, did you know of any moves at all among any of those people that I have named to get the Japanese or Japanese Communists back into Japan?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. In the way of moves to get them back, I don't know a thing about it.

Senator FERGUSON. Let us say other than moves, just to get them back.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. All I know is the bare fact that several of the Japanese came back. What the arrangements were I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know of any negotiations or efforts to get them back?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever talk to General Thorpe about any of that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I didn't talk with General Thorpe on that subject at all, as I recall.

Senator FERGUSON. Nor with Norman?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Nor with Norman.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever hear any conversation between Thorpe and Norman?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is Oleta O'Connor.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't place that name at all.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this document, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a postal card announcing a meeting. It is dated March 5, 1938. The post card reads as follows:

The Interprofessional Association presents a symposium, "Is Chamberlain yielding to fascism?"

Speakers: Miss Lillian Phillips, lecturer on foreign affairs; Miss Oleta O'Connor, chairman, county committee, Communist Party; Mr. Owen Lattimore, Director, Institute of Pacific Relations, noted author, and editor of Pacific Affairs.

Chairman: John D. Barry.

Questions and discussion from the floor.

The meeting is dated Thursday March 10, at Sorosis Hall, 536 Sutter Street, San Francisco, Calif. Admission 35 cents.

Mr. SOURWINE. What year is it, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. 1938.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, can you recall speaking at such a meeting?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I can't recall any such meeting. I don't believe there was one.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, would you, under the circumstances, receive that into evidence?



The CHAIRMAN. It may be received into evidence for what it is worth.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 554" and appears on p. 3549.)

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is Hotzumi Ozaki.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I remember reading that name in connection with press stories about the Sorge case in Japan, I believe, and I believe that I also saw in the transcript of these hearings that Ozaki was at, I think, the Yosemite Conference of the IPR in 1936, but I don't believe I met him.

EXHIBIT No. 554



Mr. MORRIS. Were you at that conference?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was at that conference, but I don't recall meeting him.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is P'eng Kung.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Is that the same P'eng Kung, or Kung P'eng, that was mentioned several days ago?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right, Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe that that is the name of a secretary of Chou En-lai, whom I met in Chungking when I had one or two conversations with Chou En-lai under the instructions of Chiang Kai-shek.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony that whenever you met Kung P'eng, it was under the direction of the generalissimo?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It was within the generalissimo's directive to keep in touch with Chou En-lai on certain points.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is Mr. Fred W. Poland.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, if I might interpose, I think that the witness' statement gives rise to a fair inference with regard to the Communist connection of Kung P'eng, or P'eng Kung, but there was not a direct answer on that.

Might we have that for the record?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I see. Yes.

I assume that she was a Communist. I can't answer to that of personal knowledge, because I believe the Communists at that time were using a number of people simply because they could speak English and not necessarily members of the party.

There may be other evidence on the subject.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know where Kung P'eng is now?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is Fred W. Poland.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I remember meeting Mr. Poland once at the Mont Tremblant conference of the IPR in 1942—would that be 1943—1942, I guess.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony that is the only occasion on which you met Mr. Poland?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe I ever met him before or since.

Mr. MORRIS. He was an active member of the secretariat of the IPR, was he not, of the international IPR?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe he was. My recollection is that he was somebody who was brought along for the Canadian secretariat of that meeting. I may be wrong on that.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have any reason to believe, or do you know that he is a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I had no reason to believe.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that he was one of the defendants in the Canadian espionage case?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was just going to add I remember seeing something about that in the press. But I believe he was acquitted; wasn't he?

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is Lee Pressman.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Pressman, I have met maybe a couple of times here in Washington. At that time I had no reason to believe him a Communist, but I believe that since then—has he refused to testify, or did he testify that he was one?

Mr. MORRIS. I believe he has acknowledged, Mr. Lattimore, that he was a member of the Communist Party.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I see.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the occasion for your meeting Mr. Pressman in Washington, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Oh, a couple of times socially. I don't recall the circumstances. I had no particular conversation with him. I just remember him as a person who was there.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is Mildred Price.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe I have ever met Mildred Price. Her name has come up in these transcripts, but I don't believe I have ever met her.

Mr. MORRIS. You know she was the executive secretary of the China Aid Council, do you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. From the transcripts of these hearings, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. You belonged to the China Aid Council, did you not, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think I did. Did I? I would be glad to have my memory refreshed, but I doubt if I did.

Mr. MORRIS. You made financial contributions to it, did you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is quite likely, yes.

I made financial contributions to the pet schemes of Madame Chiang Kai-shek and her sisters, Madame Kung and Madame Sun Yat-sen.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony that you gave the contributions to the China Aid Council and yet you did not know Mildred Price, who was the executive secretary of that organization.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. You knew and you know the China Aid Council was an affiliate of the American League Against War and Fascism; is that not correct?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I didn't know that.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is Ludwig Rajchman.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I met Mr. Rajchman, or Dr. Rajchman, a number of times here in Washington when he was working with Dr. T. V. Soong, who was at that time the head of China Defense Supplies; I think, and I have met him once since the end of the war, at the United Nations.

Mr. MORRIS. He is a member of the Soviet Polish delegation, is he not, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have seen something to that effect in the press. I don't know when he became one.

At the time I saw him in the United Nations, it was my understanding that he was a member of the United Nations employee staff and not a delegate of Poland.

Mr. MORRIS. But he was sent there by Soviet Poland, was he not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am not clear on that. There are several subdivisions of the bureaucracy of the United Nations, and I don't know which one he belonged to.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is Samuel Rodman.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't place that name.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever rent an office from Samuel Rodman?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Did I ever rent an office from him?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe so.

The CHAIRMAN. Where?

Mr. MORRIS. Were you acquainted in Washington?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe so.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you acquainted with an organization called the Committee of One Thousand?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have heard that name certainly, but I can't place it today.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony you did not know that the Committee for One Thousand used the office of the Institute of Pacific Relations as its headquarters?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That certainly is my testimony; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is Lawrence K. Rosinger.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I knew Mr. Rosinger slightly over a period of years when he worked for Foreign Policy Association, and afterward Institute of Pacific Relations. I had no reason to believe him a Com-

munist until he refused to testify before this committee, which creates a strong presumption.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you last see Mr. Rosinger, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In New York, in the office of the Institute of Pacific Relations, oh, probably more than a year ago.

Senator FERGUSON. After these hearings, had started, after the records were obtained?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe it was after the hearings had started. It may have been after the seizure of the files.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you mean after the seizure of the files?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It may have been. I am not quite sure of that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you recall anything about your conference or discussion or talk with him at that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes. I think the sole topic was the question of a piece, a contribution on Mongolia and Tibet, which my wife and I were writing for a book that he partly wrote and partly edited.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is Andrew Roth.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I knew Mr. Roth very slightly in Washington about 1945 and had no reason to consider him a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. You reviewed the manuscript of his book, did you not, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I reviewed the manuscript of his book and wrote a recommendation for the publishers.

Senator FERGUSON. A few days before the arrest of Mr. Roth and Mr. Jaffe, was Mr. Roth at your residence in Baltimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He came over to Baltimore; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. The question was: Was he at your residence in Baltimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; he was.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was present at that meeting?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. John Stewart Service.

Senator FERGUSON. Anybody else? Roth, Service—

Mr. MORRIS. Was Rose Yardumian there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think she was, but I have never been sure whether she was or not.

Senator FERGUSON. Anybody else?

Mr. LATTIMORE. A couple of professors from Johns Hopkins, and their wives.

Senator FERGUSON. Who were they?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Professor Carter, of the School of Geography, and Professor Moose, of the Department of Political Science.

Senator FERGUSON. What was that occasion to have the professors there and have Service and Roth there, and possibly another?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, they were a couple of professors whom we at that time—I think they were both pretty new at the Hopkins and we knew them very slightly and thought they might be interested in meeting some people interested in the Far East, and asked them out.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew, then, that Mr. Roth and Mr. Service were coming to your home, did you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. How long before they came did you know?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Two or three days, probably.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the occasion of having Mr. Roth and Mr. Service, and possibly the other person, there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, Mr. Service I hadn't seen since he had been in Chungking, and I wanted to see him.

Mr. Roth, I think, had been asking if he could come over and show me his manuscript. So we just thought to put the two things together and asked them to come over. I think it was one Saturday or Sunday afternoon. And I think the day before, on the campus, I ran into these two professors and suggested that they might be interested to come out for a picnic lunch.

Senator FERGUSON. Did Mr. Roth bring his manuscript with him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; he brought it with him.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it in a proof form?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall whether it was—I am sure it wasn't in typed script. It might have been in either galley or page proof.

Senator FERGUSON. Galley or page proof.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

I am not at all clear on that. It might even have been in typed script.

My wife says she thinks it was in proof.

Senator FERGUSON. In proof?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In proof; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Where were you examining the proof?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Oh, I think it was in the living room. I am not sure.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever see it on the bed, laid out on the bed in the bedroom?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not that I can recall. It may have been there because when guests came in they were shown into the spare bedroom and put their coats and things there.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think it would be laid out on the bed under those circumstances.

Mr. LATTIMORE. It might very easily had if he had been carrying it loose.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not there were any papers from the State Department laying out on your bed, or a bed in your home?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am sure there weren't.

Senator FERGUSON. You are sure of it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes. At least, if there were, I didn't see them.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that one of these college professors had stated that there were papers on the bed?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe there was something of that kind in the Tydings testimony. I am sure it was wrong.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever talk to the professor about it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I didn't.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not think it was important enough to ask the professor if he did happen to see those papers there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I asked the other professor, and he recalled seeing nothing of the sort. I didn't ask the professor who gave that testimony, because I have a sort of dislike for talking with informers.

Senator SMITH. Did you regard him as an informer?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes. I don't believe he gave any testimony at all. I believe he gave information to Senator McCarthy.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, then, if I understand it correctly, if someone went to a person who had knowledge of the facts, either

some member of a committee or a staff member, if that person gave the truth as he saw it, would you class him as an informer?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would certainly say that a colleague of mine, on a university faculty, if he thought he recalled anything of the sort, should have come and checked it with me, frankly.

Senator FERGUSON. Suppose he saw it and you did not see it. Suppose he saw it and you did not see it. Suppose that Service and/or Roth did have these papers in your bedroom—

Mr. LATTIMORE. I still think that, as a matter of frank relationships between members of the same faculty, he should have come and told me about it.

Senator FERGUSON. And for that reason, you would not interview him or ascertain whether or not he did know of those facts?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Certainly not; no.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that the way you feel?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is the way I reacted to it.

Senator FERGUSON. And have you never talked to him since?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you ever spoken to him since?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is he still on the faculty?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was the other professor involved there, Mr. Lattimore?

Senator FERGUSON. Wait until I get the name of this man.

What was the name of the professor who was the "informer"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Professor Carter.

Senator FERGUSON. What branch of the school was he in?

Mr. LATTIMORE. School of geography.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he interested in the Far East?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not specially, I don't believe.

Senator FERGUSON. Then why did you invite him there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, the school of geography was the pet project of President Isaiah Bowman of the school, who regarded geography and international relations as very closely related.

I thought any intelligent member of the faculty would, as of that time, be interested in meeting somebody recently back from the Far East and somebody who was writing on problems of the Far East.

If I had met a couple of other members of the faculty, I might just as well have invited them.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you review the book or these manuscripts in the presence of Professor Carter and the other professors?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My recollection of that is not very clear. I think that I sat on a window seat by a large sort of picture window looking out on the lawn where everybody was gathered and rapidly went through the manuscript or proof.

Senator FERGUSON. How long did you spend on the proof?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Maybe half an hour or so.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say that the professor, or both professors, were sufficiently intelligent so that they would recognize what a proof was?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It would depend on how closely they had looked.

Senator FERGUSON. What kind of paper was the proof on?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember.

Senator FERGUSON. And you reviewed the book in about a half hour, then?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I went through the book very rapidly.

Senator FERGUSON. How many pages would you say it had?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Oh, I think when it was published it was about a 250-page book.

Senator FERGUSON. How long would these galley proofs be, in length?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember whether they were galley, or page proof. Galley proof usually runs, I think, about two and a half book pages per galley.

Senator FERGUSON. It would be easily recognized, would it not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I should think so.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you recall, sitting at the window, whether or not it was galley proof or page proof?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I can't recall. I have read so many proofs in my life, it is hard to remember which one I read on a specific occasion.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you really feel a man would be mistaken about seeing pages on a bed if he attended a meeting, even though they were galley proof, or page proof?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He might be.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you in the room where the gentlemen put their coats?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I may have shown them up to the room.

Senator FERGUSON. Who, would you say, came first?

The CHAIRMAN. Of the two, or of the group?

Senator FERGUSON. Of the group.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no idea.

Senator FERGUSON. You have not any idea?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No idea.

Senator FERGUSON. How long afterward was Roth arrested and Service arrested?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It was a very short time afterward. I forget exactly what. I believe—

Wait a minute. On that question of the stuff being on the bed, I seem to remember that the information, as repeated by Senator McCarthy, was that Professor Carter's wife went into the room to change a baby's diaper and told him that she had seen something on the bed, or something.

This being a room which is used partly as an office, there might have been papers of my own lying around there.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you would not say that the professor or his wife did not see papers on the bed?

Mr. LATTIMORE. They may have. I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. Even though his wife saw it and told her husband, then you thought he was an informer and you never went to ask him about them?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I certainly did think he was an informer: yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, did you read the testimony before this committee that Roth's book *Dilemma in Japan*—and, of course, the galley proofs were of that book, were they not—that that was passed by the Communist Party of the United States before it was published?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember reading that testimony. Can you tell me whose testimony that was?

MR. MORRIS. Have you read the article that appeared in the Daily Worker of June 26, 1945, which reads:

Roth's forthcoming book, *Dilemma in Japan*, dissects the State Department's past mistakes and current fallacies, and, in the author's words, it exposes Under Secretary of State Joseph Grew's predilection for Japanese Emperor Hirohito. Roth's arrest came after Little, Brown & Co., announced the book would come out in September.

Did you read that testimony, Mr. Lattimore?

MR. LATTIMORE. I believe I saw a photostat or a mimeograph of part of that excerpt from the Daily Worker. May I point out, however—

The CHAIRMAN. The question is: Did you read that testimony?

MR. LATTIMORE. I don't recall whether I read that testimony. I do recall, however, that at the time I was talking with Mr. Roth about his book, he told me that it had all been cleared in the Office of Naval Intelligence.

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, who was the other professor at that meeting that we have been discussing?

MR. LATTIMORE. Professor Moos.

MR. MORRIS. Is he related to Elizabeth Moos?

MR. LATTIMORE. What Elizabeth Moos?

MR. MORRIS. The mother of William Remington. I think she was a recent defendant in the American Peace Crusade.

MR. LATTIMORE. No, I don't believe he is any relative whatever.

MR. MORRIS. He is not?

MR. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know Mr. Remington?

MR. LATTIMORE. No.

MR. MORRIS. The next name is Paul Robeson, Mr. Lattimore.

MR. LATTIMORE. I have met Mr. Paul Robeson once. Let me see, it was in 1942—when he was out in San Francisco, and he sang, he recorded some songs to be broadcast over the radio. I believe he was also asked to do the same thing for radio to Europe from the New York office.

MR. MORRIS. Did you attend a meeting at which Mr. Paul Robeson was present, in the home of Mrs. Edith Field?

MR. LATTIMORE. Not a meeting. I went to dinner at Mrs. Field's mother's house, and Mrs. Field and Robeson were there and, I think, also Max Yergan, whose name comes down here later.

MR. MORRIS. Were they all present at that dinner party?

MR. LATTIMORE. At that dinner party; yes.

MR. MORRIS. Will you answer the question with respect to Paul Robeson?

MR. LATTIMORE. At that time I had no reason to consider Mr. Robeson a Communist; judging from what I have read about him in the press more recently, he may very likely be one.

MR. MORRIS. The next name is Kimi Kazu Saionji.

MR. LATTIMORE. I remember a K. K. Saionji—I am not sure about the personal names there—who was a member of the secretariat of the Japanese IPR.

MR. MORRIS. Was he the secretary of the Japanese Council of the IPR?

MR. LATTIMORE. I believe he was at one time; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you answer the questions with respect to Mr. Saionji?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I had no reason to believe him a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that he was a defendant in the Sorge espionage case?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe I read in the press that he was arrested at that time, but set free.

Mr. MORRIS. He was given a suspended sentence, was he not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Was he? I didn't recall that.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is Helen Schneider.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't place that name at all.

Mr. MORRIS. As a staff worker on the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. MORRIS. A staff worker in the Amerasia office?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Isidore Schneider?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is M. C. Shleesnyak.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I knew Dr. Shleesnyak when he was at the Johns Hopkins for about a year as secretary of the Arctic Institute of America.

Mr. MORRIS. How well did you know Mr. Shleesnyak?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not very well. We visited back and forth a certain amount, dined at their house and they dined at ours.

Mr. MORRIS. Did they ever stay with you at your home over night?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe they did. I don't think so.

Mr. MORRIS. Did they ever visit you in your home in Vermont?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. We may have seen them at Stefansson's, the next farm.

Mr. MORRIS. Did they stay at Stefansson's?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe they came up there. I believe that was the first time we met them. That was before they had come to Hopkins.

Mr. MORRIS. Did Mr. Shleesnyak accompany you on your trip to the Arctic?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. I would say that I accompanied him. He organized a trip up to Point Barrow for—let's see—it was on behalf of the Arctic Research Institute, which was doing some work at Point Barrow, and President Bronk of the Hopkins, was one of the trustees of that and was unable to go and asked me to go as his deputy.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know at that time that Mr. Shleesnyak had been a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I did not.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know that he was a registered Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I did not. Mr. Shleesnyak told me that he had in one election in New York voted the Communist ticket and that, under New York rules, this required his registering accordingly, but that he had never been a Communist and that the matter had been cleared with Naval Intelligence.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you intervene with Naval Intelligence on his behalf at the time the question of his security in his making a trip to the Arctic had come up?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. You did not?

MR. LATTIMORE. I didn't at that time know there was such a question of security.

MR. MORRIS. Where is Mr. Shleesnyak now?

MR. LATTIMORE. He is at the Weizmann Institute in Palestine.

MR. MORRIS. What is he doing there?

MR. LATTIMORE. He is doing some kind of research on ecology.

MR. MORRIS. To what extent have you been active in the Arctic Institute?

MR. LATTIMORE. I would say that I have not been active at all.

MR. MORRIS. You did know Mr. Shleesnyak; did you not?

MR. LATTIMORE. I knew him, and when the Arctic Institute was brought to the Johns Hopkins for a period I welcomed it. It was an extension of interest in interrelations and they used to hold seminars there, and I attended several seminars.

In fact, I believe I gave a seminar once myself.

MR. MORRIS. Was Mr. Stefansson active in the Arctic Institute?

MR. LATTIMORE. Mr. Stefansson I believe is; yes.

MR. MORRIS. Is Mr. Stefansson a close friend of yours, Mr. Lattimore?

MR. LATTIMORE. Mr. Stefansson has been a good friend of mine since, oh, 10 years or so.

MR. MORRIS. And Mr. Stefansson is closely associated with Mr. Shleesnyak, is he not, or has been in the past?

MR. LATTIMORE. I don't know how closely.

MR. MORRIS. At least, you know on one occasion he stayed overnight at Stefansson's home?

MR. LATTIMORE. That is right; yes.

MR. MORRIS. Would you tell us the physical connections between Stefansson's home in Vermont and your home in Vermont?

MR. LATTIMORE. Stefansson has a farm where he spends the summer in Vermont, and about half or three-quarters of a mile away, through the woods, there is another farm, which he detached from his holding and sold to my wife and myself.

MR. MORRIS. The next name on the list is Agnes Smedley.

MR. LATTIMORE. Agnes Smedley I knew slightly during the 1930's. I did not consider her a Communist. I did consider her a partisan of the Chinese Communists.

That, incidentally, was not in the 1930's, as I recall, but in the 1940's.

Senator FERGUSON. What do you mean by a partisan of the Chinese Communists?

MR. LATTIMORE. Wait a minute. Yes, I did know her in the thirties, because in 1937 she was up in Yen-an; that is right.

Senator FERGUSON. And did you not know that the Chinese Communists were controlled by the Russian Communists out of Moscow?

MR. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I didn't know that.

Senator FERGUSON. You never knew that?

MR. LATTIMORE. No. It is very much a disputed question among experts on the subject.

I rather inclined to the view that the Chinese Communists have, at least in the past, been more or less autonomous.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that why you say that she was a partisan, she was probably a fellow traveler of the Chinese Communists? Is that what you want to classify her as?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Subject to the extreme vagueness of the term fellow traveler; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. You have used it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I used it saying that it was a vague and unsatisfactory term.

Senator FERGUSON. But you do not think that she bordered on the definition now that we have given you as a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. From my slight acquaintance with her, she was what you might call an unruly and rebellious type that would be likely to get thrown out of any party she joined.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, do you know of any American that was, in your opinion, a Chinese Communist, that belonged to the Chinese Communist group?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Of the Russian Communists?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I suppose there have been of the Russian Communists, but I couldn't name any.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is do you know?

Senator FERGUSON. Know anybody.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Under this definition that we are now using on communism?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That were members of the Russian Communist Party?

Senator FERGUSON. I did not say members of the party. I do not want to say members of the party. I mean just affiliated with it, as we gave you the definition.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does the Senator mean using "Communist" in the sense of a person under Communist discipline, or who has voluntarily or knowingly cooperated and collaborated with Communist Party members in furtherance of Communist Party objectives?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, I suppose Anna Louise Strong, in working for a Communist-owned paper in Moscow, but——

Senator FERGUSON. Smedley?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Smedley I don't believe was ever in Russia. Was she?

Senator FERGUSON. Would that keep her from being a Communist within the definition that we have given you of Communists?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I thought you meant the other definition; I am sorry.

No. As far as I knew Agnes Smedley, which was very slightly, she had a great deal of interest in China and either not much interest in Russia or I didn't know much about it.

In China she was particularly known for her support in writing up of the new Fourth Army, which was a mixed Communist and Chiang Kai-shek army.

And, as I recall, in her book on that army, she is much more enthusiastic about the non-Communist commander of the army than she was about the Communist second in command of the army.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, you knew that she willed her property to Chu-Teh, the Chinese Communist general; did she not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I read that in the press; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And you know that Mildred Price, who was the executive secretary of the China Aid Council, was her executor under her last will and testament?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't remember reading that.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you acquainted with Earl Browder?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Only to the extent of having gone to his office once.

The CHAIRMAN. You are acquainted with him.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would not call that acquaintance; no.

The CHAIRMAN. You would not call that an acquaintance. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is Edgar Snow.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I did not and do not consider him a Communist under these definitions.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is Richard Sorge.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Richard Sorge I never met under that or any other name, as far as I know.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever receive a letter from Mr. Sorge?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I did.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is Ordway Southard.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Ordway Southard I do not know. He is a man who bought from me and the Stefanssons the farm that we had in joint ownership. I never met him and had nothing to do with the transaction and didn't know that he was or had been a Communist until it was published in the press later.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, you do know, it has been published in the press, that he was an active member of the Communist Party?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It was published in the press that he had been a candidate for Governor of Alabama on the Communist ticket, or something of that sort.

Mr. MORRIS. Would that satisfy you that he was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That would satisfy me that he was a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony, Mr. Lattimore, that you did, then, deed your property to Mr. Southard, to Mr. and Mrs. Southard?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I sold that property; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you testify in that fashion in executive session before this committee?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Did I?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I get back to this? It will just take a minute.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. I am going on to the next question. Perhaps Mr. Mandel can find that reference there.

It is your testimony you did deed your property, you and Mr. Stefansson and Mrs. Stefansson and Mrs. Lattimore, did deed the property that you held in common, to Mary and Richard Southard?

Mr. LATTIMORE. We sold it; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it Mary and Richard Southard, or Mary and Ordway Southard?

Mr. MORRIS. Mary and Ordway Southard.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is, Did you deed it to those parties named?

Mr. LATTIMORE. We sold it; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you deed it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't understand the technical term "deed."

Mr. MORRIS. Did you sign the deed?

The CHAIRMAN. Did you sign a deed or conveyance?

Mr. LATTIMORE. We signed whatever papers were necessary for the transaction; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you not know what a deed is?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir. I understand there are deeds of gift and all kinds of deeds, but, to my simple mind, I sold it.

The CHAIRMAN. Was this deed a gift?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, I offer you a document and ask if you ever have seen it.

Mr. Mandel, will you identify the document I have presented to Mr. Lattimore, please?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I have seen this. It is not my signature or my wife's signature. It must have been done by proxy, by an attorney in Bethel, Vt.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel will you identify that and these two documents, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat that I ordered made of a warranty deed No. 481, between Viljahmur Stefansson and Evelyn Stefansson and Owen Lattimore and Eleanor Lattimore.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you cause that document to be photostated?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Where is the original?

Mr. MANDEL. The original is at the Bethel town clerk's office.

The CHAIRMAN. Where?

Mr. MANDEL. In Vermont.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that a photostat of the original document on file, recorded there?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. And you caused it to be photostated?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you identify the other two documents, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a mortgage deed, No. 241, between Ordway Southard and Mary Southard, on the one hand, and Viljahmur Stefansson and Evelyn Stefansson, of Bethel, on the other, and also Owen Lattimore and Eleanor Lattimore.

Mr. MORRIS. And the third document?

Mr. MANDEL. The third is a photostat of a warranty deed No. 467, with the names of Viljahmur Stefansson, Evelyn Stefansson, and Owen Lattimore and Eleanor Lattimore.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does that come from the same source, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. It comes from the same source.

Mr. MORRIS. And the fourth one?

Mr. MANDEL. The fourth one is a mortgage deed with the names of Ordway Southard and Mary Southard and Viljahmur Stefansson and Evelyn Stefansson and Owen Lattimore and Eleanor Lattimore. The number is 241.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that taken from the original record?

Mr. MANDEL. From the same source; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to know if these are photostats of original documents on file and recorded in some official place.

Mr. MANDEL. They are photostats of documents in the files of the clerk's office at Bethel, Vt.

Senator FERGUSON. Do they file deeds in the clerk's office? Is it a town clerk, or a register of deeds, or what?

What I do not understand is how these mortgages could have typed signatures on them if they are photostats of the original papers that are on file. And the signatures on the Stefansson-Lattimore deed look to be in the same handwriting, the husband's and the wife's. The L's are identical.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know whether Mr. Stefansson signed on your behalf in this connection, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember. We gave power of attorney to somebody, either Mr. or Mrs. Stefansson, or to Mr. Bundy, of Bethel, Vt., who is an attorney.

Senator FERGUSON. They are not signed under a power of attorney.

Mr. LATTIMORE. They aren't?

Senator FERGUSON. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, do you recall testifying in executive session here on July 13, 1951, in this fashion:

Mr. MORRIS. And then when you sold that property, to whom did you sell it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I didn't sell the property. My wife and I empowered Mr. Stefansson to sell it on our behalf.

Mr. MORRIS. You gave him the power of attorney?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, and we were rather pressed for money at that time, owing to extraordinary expenses forced on us by Senator Joseph McCarthy and needed some cash and we sold the farm.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That was certainly my recollection at the time, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And yet you testified here today that you did sell the property to Mr. and Mrs. Southard.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, through somebody holding a power of attorney.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you make out a power of attorney at that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I suppose I must have.

Mr. MORRIS. It does not appear on these documents.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Morris, may I ask a question?

Mr. Lattimore, I notice that there is a certificate by Mr. and Mrs. Stefansson before someone up in Vermont. There appears to be here an acknowledgment by you and Mrs. Lattimore before Elizabeth Carroll. You will note that she certified that you and Mrs. Lattimore personally appeared. Is that right, or not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. "State of Vermont" is crossed out and "State of Maryland" put in.

Senator FERGUSON. At Baltimore.

Mr. ARNOLD. The signature is not on here. I do not understand that at all.

Senator SMITH. Yes, it is further down there.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you see the acknowledgment?

Senator SMITH. Then right below that is a certificate by the notary who says they personally appeared.

Mr. ARNOLD. And it is not a signature that appears on here.

The CHAIRMAN. Wait a minute. We ought to be able to get this straightened out. There has to be a ground made for the admission, if you are going to offer it.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I think it is clear now what happened. The clerk up there made a copy in his own handwriting, of what was in the record, and then photostated his own handwriting instead of photostating the original in the record. Then that appears to be in the same handwriting.

Senator SMITH. Do you know Elizabeth H. Carroll, the notary public?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think it must be one of the secretaries at Johns Hopkins who has a power of notary.

Senator FERGUSON. But then you did make a deed and acknowledged it before one of the secretaries in Baltimore, you and your wife; is that right?

Mr. LATTIMORE. We sold it. We didn't handle the transaction. The entire transaction was handled by the Stefanssons.

Senator FERGUSON. That was not my question.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am sorry.

Senator FERGUSON. Is it a fact that you and your wife went before a notary, or a notary came before you two and took your acknowledgement and you signed the deed to this property up in Vermont? Is that right?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I suppose that is the story; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you only get "suppose" on that? Cannot you tell us whether that is or is not a fact? It happened in 1950. In deeding your property away, you cannot give us a better answer than "suppose."

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, Senator, the correspondence on the subject was conducted primarily between my wife and the Stefanssons, and they handled the entire transaction on our behalf.

And then apparently we were assured that everything was in order and some papers were sent down to be notarized, and we got them notarized.

Senator FERGUSON. And you had to swear that it was your free act and deed. You were transferring real estate. Do you not recall that at all?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I recall that we were authorizing the Stefanssons to get jointly owned property sold. I had full confidence in the Stefanssons getting—

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Lattimore, this was done in Baltimore.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; in Baltimore.

It was not what Stefansson did, but what you did.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am sorry. I am not quite sure what you are driving at, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. I know. That is the trouble with your answers. You do not know what I am driving at. Do not try to figure out what I am driving at. I am just asking you a question.

Did you, or did you not, go before a notary and swear that that was your—

The CHAIRMAN. It is an acknowledgment.

Senator FERGUSON. Let me read it to you:

\* \* \* personally appeared and acknowledged this instrument by them, sealed and subscribed to be their free act and deed.

Did you or did you not do that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Evidently I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you want to put in the word "evidently"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. All right; I did.

I am just saying I don't remember the transaction at all, sir. I mean the details of the transaction. All I remember is that we managed to get rid of our farm.

The CHAIRMAN. Never mind the details of the transaction, Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. ARNOLD. Mr. Chairman, he said that he did. What more can he say?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; after considerable effort.

Senator SMITH. Let me ask Mr. Lattimore one question.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Senator SMITH. How many deeds have you ever signed before, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. For the sale of property?

Senator SMITH. That is what I mean, yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I can't remember any others for the sale of property. I signed papers for the purchase of property on which I built my house near Baltimore, and I am afraid I will have to tell you that I can't remember a single detail of it.

Senator SMITH. I just have in mind that I have had clients to acknowledge documents that they relied upon me as counsel, and I was just wondering what implication should be drawn from the fact that this acknowledgement was that way.

Mr. LATTIMORE. We had counsel. We had an attorney in Bethel, a Mrs. Bundy, who, together with the Stefanssons, handled the details of the transaction. And so we had full confidence that everything was being legally done and that we would get our money.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you and Mrs. Lattimore negotiating for the sale of this property for some time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Letters had passed between Mrs. Lattimore and the purchasers, or between you and the purchasers; is that right?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, none had passed between us and the purchasers.

The CHAIRMAN. I understood you to say a few minutes ago that some letters had passed, that correspondence had passed between Mrs. Lattimore and someone else for the purchase of the disposal of the property.

You knew you were going to dispose of it, did you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. When these instruments were shown to you, they were shown to you in Baltimore and you acknowledged them in Baltimore, according to the face of the instruments.

Now, do you say you did, or did not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I did acknowledge them; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you at that time, Mr. Lattimore, know to whom the property was being deeded?

Mr. LATTIMORE. We may have known that it was somebody named Southard, but we didn't know anything about them.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had the deed in front of you, did you not? You signed it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I suppose I must have known, but not knowing who Mr. Southard was, it made no particular impression on our mind.

You see, this property was not simply being sold on our behalf; it was property that we jointly owned with Mr. and Mrs. Stefansson, and since we had an attorney acting for us in Bethel, and since the Stefanssons were acting in their own interest as well as ours, we didn't consider it necessary to take any special precautions in supervising the details.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, you testified in executive session that you did not sell that property to the Southards, did you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I testified that it was sold on our behalf by the Stefanssons, I think. That was my recollection at the time.

Mr. MORRIS. But, Mr. Lattimore, there is the testimony and the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Read the record again.

Mr. MORRIS (reading):

And then when you sold that property, to whom did you sell it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I didn't sell the property. My wife and I empowered Mr. Stefansson to sell it on our behalf.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think that is a true statement, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Then that is not true testimony, is it, Mr. Lattimore, in view of the fact that this deed has been presented to you today?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think there may be a confusion here about the word "sell" perhaps. I don't know. It sounds to me like a technicality.

Mr. MORRIS. How much did you pay for that property when you bought it, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. We paid for it, according to the notes I have—this was, as I say, outlying property belonging to the Stefanssons. It had a very tumbledown farmhouse on it and—

The CHAIRMAN. How much did you pay for it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. We bought a half interest in it from the Stefanssons for \$1 and considerations. The considerations were that we were to put the house on the property in order.

Mr. MORRIS. How much did you sell it for?

Mr. LATTIMORE. We sold our share of it for \$2,000.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you hold a mortgage on that property today?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I believe it has been paid off.

Our cost in putting the property into order was something in excess of \$2,000.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name on the list is Mr. Stefansson's name.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may they be received into the record?

The CHAIRMAN. Wait a minute. I would like to have it cleared up.

I am not going to rule on that now. I am going to find out just what the context is, why they should be received. I am going to withhold ruling on that at the present time.

(For the chairman's acceptance of exhibits No. 555A, No. 555B, and No. 555C, see p. 3607. The exhibits follow.)

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is Mr. Stefansson's name, Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. What is Mr. Stefansson's first name?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Vilhjalmur.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you a close friend of Mr. Stefansson's?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have been a good friend of his for 10 years or so; yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you at any time have reason to believe that he was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is Gunther Stein.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The same answer.

I knew Mr. Stein extremely slightly; met him maybe two or three times in Chungking in 1941 and 1942, and saw him, I think, once in this country at the end of the war or after the end of the war.

Mr. MORRIS. On several occasions you have praised his writings, have you not, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. On one occasion, I believe, I wrote a review of a book of his and on another occasion I wrote to Prof. McMahon Ball in Australia, commending Stein as a good economist on Japan.

Mr. MORRIS. Therefore, you must have known something about Mr. Stein before you would so commend him; is that not correct?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I had seen some of his writings; yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, when did you first have reason to believe that Mr. Stein was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe I have ever had reason to believe he is a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that he has been identified as having been involved in the Sorge espionage case by General Willoughby?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have seen that reference.

I also understand that Stein has denied it.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you be willing to accept his denial?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Who am I to judge?

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is Sabelle Yardumian Stein.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I presume that is the name of the present Mrs. Stein, whom I met once very briefly here in Washington with her husband.

Mr. MORRIS. And she is the sister of Rose Yardumian; is she not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I understand; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And Rose Yardumian was someone who acted as your secretary for many years; was she not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; she didn't. She worked, I think, for the Washington office of the IPR at one time. She never had worked as my secretary.

Mr. MORRIS. At least you would often dictate letters, would you not, which would bear the initials at the bottom "OL:y"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I doubt it very much.

Mr. MORRIS. That was a frequent notation, was it not, on your outgoing letters?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I doubt it. I don't think I dictated—I can't remember dictating any letters in the Washington office of the IPR.

Mr. MORRIS. Then where would the notation "OL:y" come from? What would that mean, Mr. Lattimore? That notation that frequently appeared in the letters that we have before us?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That was probably my secretary in Baltimore, Mrs. Margaret Young.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you say "Margaret" Young, or "Marguerite" Young?

Mr. LATTIMORE. "Margaret."

## EXHIBIT No. 555A

WARRANTY DEED *Inter-Ad. in name of Hamps. for 4. 25. attached & cancelled* 481

Know all Men by these Presents:

[illegible]

1. The first part of the document is a list of names and dates, which appears to be a record of some kind. The names are written in a cursive script, and the dates are in a more formal, printed style. The names are: "John A. Smith", "John B. Smith", "John C. Smith", "John D. Smith", "John E. Smith", "John F. Smith", "John G. Smith", "John H. Smith", "John I. Smith", "John J. Smith", "John K. Smith", "John L. Smith", "John M. Smith", "John N. Smith", "John O. Smith", "John P. Smith", "John Q. Smith", "John R. Smith", "John S. Smith", "John T. Smith", "John U. Smith", "John V. Smith", "John W. Smith", "John X. Smith", "John Y. Smith", "John Z. Smith". The dates are: "1810", "1811", "1812", "1813", "1814", "1815", "1816", "1817", "1818", "1819", "1820", "1821", "1822", "1823", "1824", "1825", "1826", "1827", "1828", "1829", "1830", "1831", "1832", "1833", "1834", "1835", "1836", "1837", "1838", "1839", "1840", "1841", "1842", "1843", "1844", "1845", "1846", "1847", "1848", "1849", "1850", "1851", "1852", "1853", "1854", "1855", "1856", "1857", "1858", "1859", "1860", "1861", "1862", "1863", "1864", "1865", "1866", "1867", "1868", "1869", "1870", "1871", "1872", "1873", "1874", "1875", "1876", "1877", "1878", "1879", "1880", "1881", "1882", "1883", "1884", "1885", "1886", "1887", "1888", "1889", "1890", "1891", "1892", "1893", "1894", "1895", "1896", "1897", "1898", "1899", "1900".

[illegible]

1. Die ...  
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 5. ...  
 6. ...  
 7. ...  
 8. ...  
 9. ...  
 10. ...

1. The first step is to identify the problem. In this case, the problem is that the company is not meeting its sales targets. The second step is to analyze the data. The third step is to develop a plan. The fourth step is to implement the plan. The fifth step is to evaluate the results.

1998

[illegible]

... ..

*[Faint handwritten notes at the bottom of the page]*

$f(x) = x^2 + 2x - 3$

Definieren wir  $\mathcal{A}$  als die Menge aller Aussagen, die in  $\mathcal{L}$  formuliert werden können. Dann ist  $\mathcal{A}$  eine Sprache.

*[Faint handwritten notes at the bottom of the page]*

Received for record & file - March 28 Every day is a new day

Robert E. Smith Town Clerk.

Bethel Town Clerk's Office, Bethel, Vermont.      March 13, 1952.  
I, Robert E. Sundry, Town Clerk of the Town of Bethel, in the County of  
Windsor, and State of Vermont, having by law the custody of the real  
estate records of the said Town, hereby certify that the xerograph  
reflex copy on the reverse side hereof is an exact reproduction  
of a record in Book 30 page 481 of said Bethel Land Records.

Attest,

*Robert E. Sundry*  
Town Clerk

## EXHIBIT No. 555B

MORTGAGE DEED.

241

## Know all Men by these Presents:

That we, Orday Southard and Mary Southard, husband and wife,

of Bethel in the County of Windsor and State of Vermont, do hereby certify that we have for the consideration of Forty-Five Hundred and no/100 dollars paid to our full satisfaction by Vilhjalmur Stefansson and Evelyn Stefansson of Bethel in the County of Windham and State of Vermont, and Owen Lattimore and Eleanor Lattimore of Baltimore in the County of Baltimore and State of Maryland, by these presents do hereby give, grant, sell, convey and confirm unto the said Vilhjalmur Stefansson and Evelyn Stefansson, and Owen Lattimore and Eleanor Lattimore and their heirs and assigns forever, a certain parcel of land in the County of Windsor and State of Vermont, described as follows, viz:

Being eighty acres of land or more, by estimation, situated in that part of Bethel known as Olympus, together with buildings thereon and furniture therein. Said real estate is all and the same conveyed to us, the said Orday Southard and Mary Southard, by the our entry deed of said Stefanssons and Lattimores dated the 14th day of June A.D., 1930 to be found of record in Bethel land records in Book 38 page 481 to which reference is had for more detailed description.

To have and to hold said granted premises, with all the appurtenances thereof, to the said Vilhjalmur Stefansson, Evelyn Stefansson, Owen Lattimore and Eleanor Lattimore and their heirs and assigns, to their own use and behoof forever; and we, the said Orday Southard and Mary Southard, for ourselves and our heirs, agents and administrators, do covenant with the said Vilhjalmur Stefansson, Evelyn Stefansson, Owen Lattimore and Eleanor Lattimore and their heirs and assigns that said the covenants of these presents be a part of the premises, and have good right and title to convey the same in manner aforesaid; that they are free from every civil liability, and we

hereby engage to warrant and defend the same against all lawful claims whatever. Provided, however, that if we, the said Orday Southard and Mary Southard, either or the survivor, shall pay or cause to be paid according to its tenor, our certain promissory note executed of even date herewith for the principal sum of Forty-Five Hundred Dollars, payable to the said above named four mortgagages, or to Vilhjalmur Stefansson, acting under power of attorney given by the other three mortgagages, said note to be paid as follows: \$1000 or more or on before July 1, 1930; \$1000 or more on or before September 1, 1930; \$500 or more on or before July 1, 1931, and thereafter \$500 or more on the 1st of July yearly until \$4500 with interest at the rate of 5% annually has been paid in full. Also if we keep valid insurance on said buildings with policy showing interest of said mortgagages, and shall pay premiums on same and real estate taxes assessed on these premises afore said same are delinquent, then this deed shall be null and void, otherwise of full force and effect.

In Witness Whereof, we have set our hands and seals this 19 day of June A.D. 1930  
In the Presence of  
Robert E. Bundy to C.S. Orday Southard (L.S.)  
Gladys Wilson Bundy to M.S. Mary Southard (L.S.)  
Robert E. Bundy to M.S. Mary Southard (L.S.)  
Gladys Wilson Bundy (L.S.)

State of Vermont, At Bethel this 19 day of June A.D. 1930  
Windsor County, we, Orday Southard and on the 1st day of July 1930 the said Orday Southard and Mary Southard personally appeared, and acknowledged the foregoing to be their free act and deed.  
Before Me, Gladys W. Bundy  
Notary Public: J. H. H. H.

Bethel Town Clerk's Office July 1, 1930 at 10 o'clock 30 minutes P.M.  
Received for record a deed of which the foregoing is a true copy.

Attest: Robert E. Bundy Town Clerk

I hereby acknowledge satisfaction of the Mortgage Deed within and the same is indicated at this day of June 1930. A.D. 1930. L.S. in the presence of Bethel Town Clerk's Office.

Bethel Town Clerk's Office, Bethel, Vermont. March 13, 1882.  
I, Robert, Town Clerk of the Town of Bethel, in the County of  
Franklin, and State of Vermont, having by law the custody  
of the real estate records of the said Town, hereby  
certify that the Xeroxgraph reflex copy on the reverse side  
hereof is an exact reproduction of a record in Book 39,  
Page 241 of said Bethel Land Records.

Attest,

*Robert*  
Town Clerk

## EXHIBIT No. 555C

● 本報記者 王 宇 採訪 楊 雲 雲

Internal Revenue Stamp Fee \$1.65 attached and Committed

467

7

Know all Men by these Presents:

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The burg and to hold  
the national and international relations by the community,  
and the national and international relations by the community,  
and the national and international relations by the community,

1. The first thing I noticed when I stepped out of the plane was the cold air. It was a sharp contrast to the warm, humid air of the tropics. I had heard that the weather in the north was harsh, but I didn't realize just how cold it would be. The wind was biting, and the sun was a pale, distant glow in the sky.

In Chinese character, Remitted by *Peng*, *Shan* and *Hsu* 27<sup>th</sup> of September A.D. 1908

[illegible]

State of Vermont, ) ss. Charles E. Smith Clerk of said Court, A. D. 1889  
Wendell County, ss. said Charles E. Smith Clerk of said Court, do hereby certify that  
 personally appeared, and acknowledged this instrument by John A. Smith sealed and subscribing, in the last year aforesaid and dated,  
 before me.

REPORT OF \_\_\_\_\_  
 Henry Public Administration Office

Received Town Clerk's Office 10/25 10 1936 at 2 o'clock and 6 minutes A M.  
Received for record a deed of which the foregoing is a true copy  
Attest Wendy S. Bandy, Asst. Town Clerk.

Bethel Town Clerk's Office, Bethel, Vermont, March 13, 1954.  
I, Robert A. Duggan, Town Clerk of the Town of Bethel, in the  
County of Windsor, and State of Vermont, having by law the  
custody of the real estate records of the said Town, hereby  
certify that the xerograph reflex copy on the reverse side  
hereof is an exact reproduction of a record in Book 37,  
Page 467 of said Bethel Land Records.

Attest:

*Robert A. Duggan*  
Town Clerk

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know that Rose Yardumian was in Communist China last year?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I did.

Mr. MORRIS. In connection with a Chinese Communist publication?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I didn't know that.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is Andrew Steiger.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe I have ever met Mr. Steiger personally. I think that the extent of my contact with him is when he did a large part of the drafting of a book for then Vice President Wallace, the manuscript of which was sent down to me before publication.

Mr. MORRIS. But it is your testimony you never met with Mr. Steiger in that connection?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I never met with him in that connection.

Mr. MORRIS. Or in any other connection?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Or in any other connection that I can remember.

Mr. MORRIS. You did have dealings, though, to that extent, did you not, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. To that extent; yes. And I think maybe one exchange of correspondence.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is Anna Louise Strong, Mr. Chairman, and I believe we have covered that in previous questioning.

After that we have Madam Sun Yat-sen.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Madam Sun Yat-sen I knew slightly in Chungking in 1941-42, and had no reason to consider her a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you see Madam Sun Yat-sen in connection with your visit to China with Mr. Wallace?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe I did. I think some members of the mission called on her; but I don't believe I was with them.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is Daniel Thorner.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The answer is "No."

Mr. MORRIS. You do know Daniel Thorner?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, I know him. He worked under me for a year at Johns Hopkins University.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is Kyuichy Tokuda.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Could you identify him more closely? I don't identify the name Kyuichy. This may be a man named Tokuda who was regarded as one of the leaders of the Japanese Communist Party in 1945.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you deal with that gentleman?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I didn't deal with him. I had one interview in which I questioned him.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the date of the interview?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was trying to find out whether there was any difference in point of view between the Japanese Communists who had been in jail in Japan during the war and those who had been in China during the war and had come back, who were a subject of considerable speculation among Americans in Japan at that time. But I didn't succeed in seeing any of those who had come back from China. So the furthest I got was an interview in which I asked questions of Mr. Tokuda.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, there is a possibility of a typographical error in this name Kyuichy. Perhaps it should end with an "i" instead of with a "y". I would like to ask the witness if that makes any difference in his answer.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; it doesn't make any difference. Kyuichy would be his personal name, and in transcribing Japanese names a "y" in that position at the end would be unusual, but spelling it one way or the other doesn't make me remember what his first name actually was.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is Solomon Trone.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Trone I met once in India in 1949, when he was acting as a special economic and technical adviser to Prime Minister Nehru. I believe that is the only time I met him, and I had no reason to term him a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is Shigato Tsuru.

Mr. LATTIMORE. This Mr. Tsuru I met in Japan in the winter of 1945-46. I met him maybe two or three times, and I had no reason to consider him a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you meet him in company with Mr. Herbert Norman?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know whether or not he was Mr. Herbert Norman's roommate back in the United States?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That I don't know.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know whether he was connected with the publication Science and Society?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, at that point, there should be noted the possibility of a typographical error. That name is spelled on this list S-h-i-g-a-t-o. It probably should be S-h-i-g-e-t-o. Does that make any difference, Mr. Lattimore, in your answer?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I couldn't tell you which one is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know where he is now, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I presume he is in Japan.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know what he is doing in Japan?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you last hear from Mr. Tsuru?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have never heard from him.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is Mary Van Kleeck.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mary Van Kleeck I have never met. She wrote one article in Pacific Affairs in 1936 or '37, and I had no reason to consider her a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that the article that we had testimony about the other day?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. In the Moscow trials?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. The next is John Carter Vincent.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Vincent I have known since about 1930, off and on, when we happened to be in the same town. I had no reason to consider him a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is Nym Wales.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Nym Wales I knew very slightly when she was the wife of Edgar Snow, and that was in Peking in the 1930's. I don't believe I have ever seen her in this country, and I have no reason to consider her a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is Harry Dexter White.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. White I met maybe three times here in Washington in 1941-42, in connection with briefings on financial policy in China. I had no reason to consider him a Communist.

The CHAIRMAN. Is Harry Dexter White the individual connected with the Treasury Department?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He was connected with the Treasury Department; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. He was the Under Secretary of the Treasury, was he not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I forget what his exact rank was.

The CHAIRMAN. Did he fall out of the window? I believe he died a violent death.

Mr. MORRIS. He died a violent death; yes. Wait a minute, now. Excuse me, Senator. Apparently he died of a heart attack.

The next name is Ella Winter.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Ella Winter wrote one article in Pacific Affairs in about 1936 or 1937. I had never met her, and had no reason to consider her a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is Victor Yakhontoff.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Victor Yakhontoff I don't believe I have ever met. He contributed an article—maybe he contributed an article to Pacific Affairs, I am not sure.

Mr. MORRIS. Did Mr. Carter ever discuss his political feelings with you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He may have. If you have a document to refresh my memory I might be able to recall something about it. I haven't even heard of him since the middle 1930's some time.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you not deny here on last Friday, Mr. Lattimore, that you did not know that Mr. Yakhontoff was a Communist or pro-Soviet?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I certainly didn't know that he was a Communist or pro-Soviet.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that letter, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated January 25, 1943, addressed to Owen Lattimore from Edward C. Carter. It is a photostat of a carbon copy.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, I ask you if you can recall having received that letter.

Mr. ARNOLD. Do you have copies?

The CHAIRMAN. Are there copies available?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes; here you are. [Document handed.]

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't recall receiving this. I obviously did.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read it, please, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

EXHIBIT No. 556

DEAR OWEN: General Yakhontoff called to see me today to offer his services to the IPR. Someone had told him that the IPR was greatly expanding its program and he would like to be employed for any research work which we might assign to him. I had to tell him that, while we had plans for expansion, we hadn't yet found the funds and that so long as the present situation persisted I could make no proposals to him. He told me that he had recently written you offering his services. Personally, I think his record is good. He is frankly pro-Soviet but has never been and is not now a party member. He is a United States citizen. He is full of energy, lectures with very great success, and has

to his credit some fairly good books which would have probably been much better if he had had the benefit of working under your direction. He feels himself pretty competent not only on Soviet, but also on far eastern affairs. I think that if you are considering additions to your staff you may want to give some thought to the possibility of using him.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Harriet Moore in Chicago with the suggestion that if she knows any reason why you should not consider him she write you direct.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that be admitted into the record?

The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted into the record.

(The document previously read in full by the witness was marked "Exhibit No. 556".)

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is Rose Yardumian.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; she has been mentioned before. I knew her very slightly when she worked in the IPR office here in Washington temporarily some time during the war years. I had no reason to consider her a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. The last name is Max Yergan.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Max Yergan has been mentioned before, and I don't know anything more about him than what I said then.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, you remember meeting him at the dinner party at the home of Edith Field?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Once.

Mr. MORRIS. And you did not, at that time, have any reason to believe he was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Quite so.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I have some documents I would like Mr. Lattimore's identification of, and I will put them into the record without any questions.

I also have a few other questions of a miscellaneous nature to ask of the witness.

The CHAIRMAN. I think, however, that we will have to recess at this time. We do not like to put this hearing off, but it looks as though we are rather crowded with overwork. Will it be satisfactory to the members of the committee if the matter went over until the day after tomorrow at 10 o'clock or 10:30?

Senator O'CONOR. May I just ask one question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Lattimore, I was anxious, just before getting away from the list, to ask you if there was any reason for, you might say, the equivocation in regard to your reference to Paul Robeson. At the time you were asked the question as to whether you had reason to believe that he had communistic leanings or affiliations, your answer was that he may very likely be one.

You had previously indicated that you like to speak in plain English, and that you do not indulge in fancy or round-about terms.

Do you want to leave that there? Apparently everybody in America knows him to be what he is. I was wondering whether you desire to leave it in that state.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I wasn't trying to equivocate there. It is simply that I have seen in the press references that lead me to believe that he is either a Communist or a very close fellow traveler, or something of that kind. I have not made an analysis of it. I am not a student of Paul Robeson.

Senator O'CONOR. Of course, you have known of the various activities in which he has engaged, and of his statements given in various parts of the world which have been strictly anti-American and pro-Soviet?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I know of some of those in a general way. I would be hard put to cite you the exact ones. I was merely trying to come within the wording of this definition about "what do you know now," et cetera.

Senator O'CONOR. All right. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, we will recess until Wednesday morning at 10:30.

(Whereupon, at 3:44 p. m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at 10:30 a. m., Wednesday, March 12, 1952.)



# INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

FRIDAY, MARCH 14, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,  
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION  
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL  
SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,  
*Washington, D. C.*

The subcommittee met at 1:45 p. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Hon. Pat McCarran (chairman) presiding.  
Present: Senators McCarran, Eastland, Smith, and Ferguson.  
Senator Mundt.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, research director.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, might I inquire. I would like to request, Mr. Chairman, that the committee ask the State Department, and also the President, for the statement and the letter that was mailed by Mr. Lattimore to the President on the 10th of June 1945, and also the statement that was left by Mr. Lattimore at the White House on July 3. Also, if they have it on the calendar, the time that Mr. Lattimore called on the President, the length of time he was with the President.

The CHAIRMAN. The request will be made for the authorities mentioned. Let me say that the Chair ruled some days ago with reference to the filing of statements. The reorganization plan, the reorganization law, set up some years ago, provides, among other things:

The committee shall, so far as practicable, require all witnesses appearing before it to file in advance written statements of their proposed testimony at least 24 hours before hearing, and to limit their oral presentation to brief summaries of their argument. The committee staffs shall prepare digests of such statements for the use of the committee members.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I had also asked Mr. Lattimore to point out in the Tydings committee the testimony given to that committee in relation to his visit to the White House. I wondered whether he has that.

## TESTIMONY OF OWEN LATTIMORE, ACCOMPANIED BY THURMAN ARNOLD, ESQ., COUNSEL—Resumed

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I have not been able to find that, and to the best of my belief it isn't there, and I had simply forgotten about the whole business at the time of the Tydings hearings and didn't run across those papers until later. I mentioned them in my statement to this committee because they had been mentioned in previous testimony here which reminded me of it.

Senator FERGUSON. How many times had you called on the President of the United States?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Only that once, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And that is the one that you say you entirely forgot?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you had been questioned about your relations with the foreign policy of the United States, whether or not you had any influence on it; is that right?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; that is right.

Senator FERGUSON. And that is the only time that you ever saw a President about the foreign policy, and you forgot it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, Senator—

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment. Answer the question.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that true?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe that is what is true, Senator. My memory is getting more and more mixed up because of the way the questions have zigzagged across.

Senator FERGUSON. Those are not zigzag questions, and they are not mixed-up questions.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; what I mean, Senator, is the questioning as a whole has gone back and forth over a great many years, and it is getting increasingly difficult for me to remember what I remembered when.

Senator EASTLAND. Difficult to remember what you talked to the President of the United States about on your visit to him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. He visited the President once and forgot it. That is the answer.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The questioning, Senator, before the Tydings committee was entirely in the context of what Government positions I had held, and I think it is quite natural that this other occasion didn't enter into my—

The CHAIRMAN. There is no question pending.

Senator FERGUSON. One of the big questions, Mr. Lattimore, was whether or not you had ever had any influence upon the foreign policy of the United States. And you now say to this committee that the time you visited the President and left a memorandum with him, and the fact that you had written the letter with a statement as to what you thought the foreign policy was, that when you were giving the testimony in relation to your influence upon the foreign policy, you forgot the only time that you had ever been there, and you didn't give it to the Tydings committee, and you came before this committee and said that that committee had acquitted you of everything, given you a clean bill of health, and that we were to be criticized for not giving you the same on the Tydings committee hearing.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, if that interview with the President had had the slightest effect—

The CHAIRMAN. Let me get that question, please. That is an involved question.

Senator FERGUSON. That was just a summation of what I take this testimony to be. I am going to ask you some other questions and see how your memory is on those. Do you remember coming back with Mr.

Wallace and Mr. Vincent from the Far East when you made a trip with them?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. What kind of a plane had you, do you know?

Mr. LATTIMORE. A four-engined plane.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know how many people came back on that trip?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you any idea?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Let me see, there was Mr. Wallace, Mr. Vincent, Mr. Hazard, and myself, and the military personnel of the plane.

Senator FERGUSON. Pardon?

Mr. LATTIMORE. And the military personnel of the plane, I think six or seven people.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that all?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think that is all; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there anybody else on the plane? Think about it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe so.

Senator FERGUSON. Where did you land in the United States?

Mr. LATTIMORE. We landed, I think, at Fairbanks, Alaska, and then we landed in Canada, and then I think we flew straight—no; I am not sure whether we flew straight to Seattle or made an intermediate landing somewhere.

Senator FERGUSON. Were the same people on the plane the whole trip?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I think so.

Senator FERGUSON. The same people.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And no more?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe so.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you went from Seattle to where?

Mr. LATTIMORE. From Seattle straight to Washington.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you not stop anywhere?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, I remember stopping once, but I can't remember whether it was on the way from Canada to Seattle or on the way from Seattle to Washington.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you stop at Great Falls?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Great Falls, that is the name of the place.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the name?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And do you remember having your picture taken at Great Falls?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not? Do you remember the people that were on the plane having their pictures taken at Great Falls?

Mr. LATTIMORE. On the way out to China or on the way back?

Senator FERGUSON. On the way back.

Mr. LATTIMORE. A group picture?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't remember it.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you remember the photographer placing Mr. Wallace in the center of the group?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you remember that there were at least 10 Russians on that plane?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not remember that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. You would remember that if it had happened?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I should think so.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the answer?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I should think so.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know who wrote Mr. Wallace's speech that he made in Russian to some group? He made a speech in Russian, did he not; he read it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know who wrote it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He wrote it himself, I believe.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know a Boris Pregel?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Of Russia.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. You say Mr. Wallace wrote the speech himself and delivered it, read it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He wrote the speech himself, and I believe Mr. Hazard translated it into Russian for him.

Senator FERGUSON. You can't recall now of a group picture of the Russians and you and Mr. Wallace being taken at the airfield in Great Falls?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all I have at the present time.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you say that such an incident did not occur?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no recollection of it.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, just answer my question. Would you say it did not occur?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would say it didn't occur; yes; as far as my recollection, Senator. I have been asked to bring in some supplementary material.

Senator EASTLAND. I have a question. Did you know Dr. Colegrove?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Colegrove; yes.

Senator EASTLAND. How long did you know him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have known him off and on since the 1930's.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you ever offer him employment?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe I did. I remember his testifying to that effect, but I don't recall offering him employment.

Senator EASTLAND. Well, do you deny that you offered him a job when you were with OWI?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't deny it; I just don't remember it.

Senator EASTLAND. You do not remember whether you offered him the Japanese desk or not in OWI?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't remember that at all.

Senator EASTLAND. You have read his testimony before this committee?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Senator EASTLAND. He states that, at a meeting with you, you offered him a job, that you stated that the Chinese Communists "were real democrats and that they were really agrarian reformers and had no connection with Soviet Russia."

Now, was that testimony true or false?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In my opinion it is false, Senator. I don't remember meeting him at the airport, as he says, and I don't remember any such conversation, and I don't think such a conversation is likely.

Senator EASTLAND. Would you remember having dinner with him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator EASTLAND. Dr. Colegrove states that, under oath, you were advocating the murder of the Japanese Emperor and his family. Was that statement true or false?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That statement is false, Senator; and as I recall, Mr. Colegrove was referring there not to conversation but to a book that I wrote, and there is nothing of the kind in the book.

Senator EASTLAND. It was to a conversation?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. He stated that you were following the same line that the Japanese Communists had followed?

The CHAIRMAN. Is that a question, Senator?

Senator EASTLAND. Yes, sir. I asked him if that was true.

The CHAIRMAN. His attention is being taken up now with something else. Will you listen to the question, Mr. Lattimore, please?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think that is true, Senator.

Senator EASTLAND. You do not think it is true?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir. I can't tell you what the line of the Japanese Communists was on the subject.

Senator EASTLAND. Was it your opinion that the Emperor of Japan should be killed?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Morris.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Chairman, I have been requested to bring in supplementary material. May I offer it now?

The CHAIRMAN. Who made the request?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think sometimes the Chair and one request was, I remember, from Senator Ferguson.

The CHAIRMAN. You may lay it before the chairman.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, sir. Here is a publication of the Institute of Pacific Relations with my 1936 report on Pacific Affairs, which Senator Ferguson requested. Then I was also requested to bring in the letter from the Department of State, inviting me to lecture, in 1946, to the State Department personnel. I was also asked to identify in the transcript the question of the dating of General Barmine's statements about 1933 or 1935-36, and I have analyzed that with the appropriate references to the text.

May I ask, also, Senator, if the exhibits that I attached to my statement to this committee and that I asked to have entered into the record have been entered?

Mr. MORRIS. I think, Mr. Sourwine, you were going to take that matter up today. Are you?

The CHAIRMAN. That is going to be taken up at a later time.

Mr. SOURWINE. At the time that we concluded with Mr. Lattimore's testimony on the last previous occasion, when he was on the stand, we were discussing two excerpts which he had offered for the record. Our record is incomplete with regard to those. There is also here certain material under the heading of "Chinese history project" and also with regard to who wanted to recognize Red China, and I think one other item which Mr. Lattimore offered initially and on which the Chair has not yet ruled.

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I renew my request that that be entered into the record?

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will take the matter up again.

Mr. LATTIMORE. And I wish to offer some material that I prepared with respect to my book, *Solution in Asia*, in view of the testimony which the committee accepted yesterday.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that requested?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir, this is an offer of evidence.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I might say at the time, since it has come up, that the staff is prepared and does recommend with regard to this material earlier submitted by Mr. Lattimore, that the Chair admit it for printing in the appendix of the record, and order that it be footnoted back to the point in the record at which Mr. Lattimore first asked that it be introduced.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. The Chair will pass on that later on.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, will you point out in this book where your report is?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think I marked that, on 76.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. MORRIS, if you wish to proceed, you may proceed.

Mr. ARNOLD. May we have a ruling on this offer?

The CHAIRMAN. I will rule on it later on.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, in the interest of saving time, Mr. Lattimore and his attorney on the one hand and I on the other, have stipulated on the authenticity of certain letters, 18 letters, that I would like to introduce into the record as a single unit.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have a list of those?

Mr. MORRIS. I have a list, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have that list, Mr. Arnold?

Mr. ARNOLD. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. That has been presented to Mr. Lattimore and his attorney. They have gone through the list, and I would like them now to state that they appear to the witness to be copies of organizational documents that were either sent by him or to him.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, with at least one exception which is minutes of a conference or something.

Mr. MORRIS. Which was that, now?

Mr. LATTIMORE. This one here.

Mr. MORRIS. July 9, 1934.

Mr. LATTIMORE. July 9, 1934.

Mr. MORRIS. And what comment have you on that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, that also appears to be a copy of an original document, but it isn't a letter to me or from me.

Mr. MORRIS. This is a meeting at which you were present and the initialed paragraph here, "Mr. Lattimore produced the statement

showing the distribution of Pacific Affairs as of July 9, as follows." That is right?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may those documents be introduced into the record?

The CHAIRMAN. There is a stipulation, as I understand, between counsel and counsel for the witness that these are correct photostatic copies; is that right?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And that they appear or are taken from where?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel will testify—

The CHAIRMAN. Well, they are stipulated.

Mr. MORRIS. They have been taken from the files of the institute.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. They may be admitted into the record.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, so that the record may speak clearly, may I show Mr. Lattimore and Mr. Arnold this list, and ask if this is the list, physically, of the documents with respect to which the stipulation has been made.

Mr. ARNOLD. I assume it is.

Mr. SOURWINE. May we have the list you have.

This is now, what I have in my hands, the list of the documents with respect to which there is a stipulation.

Mr. ARNOLD. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then will the chairman order that these be inserted and printed.

The CHAIRMAN. They may be inserted and printed.

Mr. MORRIS. In every case the copies were sent to the witness and his attorney, except for the third item on the list, that is dated April 18, 1935, San Francisco. May we have that particular one?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Is this the one?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, that is the one.

The CHAIRMAN. What about that?

Mr. MORRIS. That is covered in the list, Mr. Chairman.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits No. 566 A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, L, M, N, P, Q, R, S" and are as follows:)

#### EXHIBIT No. 566-A

PACIFIC CENTER,  
1795 CALIFORNIA STREET,  
San Francisco, Calif., August 18, 1938.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,  
129 East Fifty-second Street,  
New York, N. Y.

DEAR CARTER: Your telegram of the sixth arrived a few days before we left camp. As you urged me "to consider resigning from Amerasia at an early date," it seemed wise both to think the matter over very carefully and to await your comment on my withdrawal of an article from the new number of Amerasia. Arriving here yesterday, I found your letters of August 8 and 10; also possible for me to attempt to balance the general nature of the problem and the particular merits of the case.

To begin with, I need hardly assure you how anxious I am to make any concession consistent with elementary ideas of dignity and propriety, that might help you in your difficult diplomatic handling of Japanese demands, and further the major interests of the Institute. This is no time at which to allow individual intrasigance to threaten the smooth working of the Institute as a whole.

At the same time, I cannot but regret that the Japanese Council should have been allowed to make a debating point of this intrinsically unimportant per-

sonal issue. It would have been easy for me to withdraw from Amerasia a few months ago; it would be easy a few months hence. To withdraw just at this moment, "under fire," would be for me personally a minor disagreeable incident; for the whole Institute, it seems to me, it would establish a dangerous precedent. There would be two regrettable consequences. In the first place, the whole matter would be regarded and reported in Japan as a "victory," however minor. In the second place, a false issue would be substituted for the real issue. For the appearance of my name on Amerasia cannot possibly be the real issue. The character of what I write in Amerasia differs in no definable respect from what I publish in a number of other journals. The "line" of Amerasia, as the organ of a group, differs in no way from the "line" which I have been steadily advocating as an individual, for over a year, in a number of other publications. Accordingly, for me to retire from Amerasia under Japanese pressure would not seriously affect my output of such personal influence as I may have, but would establish, for the whole Institute, the dangerous precedent that a single National Council is entitled to influence, for long range, the writings of staff members of the Institute in other countries.

Reviewing the whole matter afresh, it seems to me essential to reconstruct the whole "case history" in brief:

(1) Amerasia was planned and launched while I was out of America. I supposed at the time that I was being invited to join the board simply in order to make it clear that Amerasia was not intended to displace Pacific Affairs or be a rival to it. There was thus a justifiable reason for asking me to join the board.

(2) I understood that the matter had been discussed between you and Field. I had no reason to believe you disapproved.

(3) As a member of the board, I have remained throughout a figurehead. Owing to distance from America, I could not take part in editorial deliberations.

(4) As an individual contributor, what I have written for Amerasia—regardless of what Amerasia's "line" is supposed to be—does not differ in any respect from what I have written for Pacific Affairs, Atlantic Monthly, Foreign Affairs, International Affairs, Asia, and so forth. It is not as if I reserve a special brand of "anti-Japanese" utterance for Amerasia. I have never written anything that did not come under one of two categories: (a) What I know; and (b) what I think. Under either category, it is more or less an accident where I publish. In this connection, it would also be legitimate to recall to the Japanese Council that I was generally considered, a few years ago, to be on the whole a "realist" whose views could be, and were, quoted in support of Japanese policies. Any subsequent changes in these views have come about since I have been under the full influence of the IPR, with access to the material furnished by all of its national councils and research undertakings.

(5) Coming to the actual question of resignation, it seems to me that either: (a) I should have been requested not to join the board of Amerasia in the first place; or (b) I should have been requested to resign some months ago, in order to forestall Japanese criticism; or (c) I might be requested to resign a few months hence, in order to avoid the appearance of successful Japanese intervention in the affairs of an American publication catering to American readers.

(6) A graceful compromise, possibly, might be the publication of a paragraph in an early number of Amerasia, to the effect that I have been obliged, owing to pressure of work consequent upon taking up a new position at Johns Hopkins, to withdraw temporarily from the editorial board.

Would you let me know what you think of this? Bear in mind, of course, that any personal sensitiveness on my part is not to be given undue consideration. I want the particular aspects of the case to be put on record, but this does not mean that I want the particular aspects to be allowed to distort the general aspects. However, it would be a legitimate method of bringing the particular and the general into focus, I think, to ask the Japanese Council whether their proposed ban will immediately or ultimately be extended to such Pacific Council officers and International Committee chairmen as Dafoe, in his editorial capacity; Walsh, as editor of Asia, and Hubbard, as a publicist.

Passing on to the question of efforts to secure Japanese collaboration on Pacific Affairs, I am sending you such copies of correspondence as I have available here. This is all of recent date, owing to the fact that I have not had all permanent records with me since leaving Peiping. Helen Wiss, however, could furnish you with more from the New York files of copies of my correspondence. Holland should also be consulted, as he has labored incessantly to get Japanese material for us.

One minor point, in conclusion: Your reference to the article "What Korea Pays for Japanese Rule" in the June number of Pacific Affairs is worded in such a way that it implies that this article expressed my personal opinion. It did not. The article was a condensed translation from Tikhii Okean. My initials identified my responsibility as a translator, but not as a commentator. Inclusion of this material in our "Comment and Correspondence" was an attempt to remedy the lack of Russian material in Pacific Affairs which, like the lack of Japanese material, you and I and others have so often deplored.

In this connection, the comparison of the Hubbard-Canniff brace of articles with the Yanaihara-Tikhii Okean brace is pointless. Our principle has always been to provide opportunity for an answer to an attacking article. This was done in the Hubbard case. It was not necessary in the Tikhii Okean case, as we already had in hand the Yanaihara article, presenting the point of view of the country attacked.

In conclusion, I want to express once more my readiness to submit to your ruling on the whole question, not merely in formal recognition of your authority, but because of your mature and humane judgment.

Yours very sincerely,

(Signed) OWEN LATTIMORE.

EXHIBIT No. 566-B

WLH  
ED

300 GILMAN HALL, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY,  
Baltimore, Md., March 20, 1941.

Mr. E. C. CARTER,

*Institute of Pacific Relations,*

*129 East Fifty-second Street, New York City.*

DEAR CARTER: Our June issue will approximately mark the fourth anniversary of the war in China. I think it would be appropriate for me to write the leading article of the issue under some such title as "Four Years," reviewing the history and development of the war and estimating its present potentialities.

Since this issue will be the first after the passing of the Lease-Lend Bill, I think the great majority of our readers would also like an article that would cast up the reckoning on America. Where does she stand, how did she get there, where does she go from here? The average writer of such an article would key it almost exclusively to the Atlantic and Great Britain. For Pacific Affairs we need someone who has an expert knowledge of the Far East and a comprehensive understanding of the relations of China and Japan to Europe, to the United States, and to Russia. By far the best man I can think of is T. A. Bisson. Would you agree to this suggestion? If we cannot get Bisson, what would you think of Kate Mitchell: She has not the first-hand knowledge and authority that Bisson has, but she has a direct and competent mind, and she would be a new contributor to Pacific Affairs.

Enclosed I am sending you some sample photographs from the Princeton meeting. These of course are only a beginning, as I have to work slowly in broken patches of spare time. I am sorry that these pictures were taken on a cut-rate roll of cheap film on which the negatives were not separately numbered. Therefore the only way of identifying each picture is by these sample prints. So I suggest that you mark lightly on the back of each print how many copies you would like. Send them back to me, and I'll gradually fill up the complement.

Yours very sincerely,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

EXHIBIT No. 366-C

ECC

EXTRACT FROM LETTER DATED SAN FRANCISCO, APRIL 18, 1935, OWEN LATTIMORE  
TO CATHERINE PORTER

I find around here that the knowing Mr. John Thompson of the San Francisco Daily News has an explanation of the Moscow trials which is widely accepted. It is simply that Stalin is getting rid of all the people "who knew him when" so as to monopolize control of the political machine. To me this simply does not make sense because even from the little I know of the personalities of 1917, 1918,

it is clear that a number of the people who have since come to be classified as Old Bolsheviks did not properly belong to the famous closely welded core of the Communist Party. On the contrary, many of them were radicals who belonged to the fringe of the Party and many of them had already been known for years as obstinate partisans of one or another variant theory.

As a reader, I should like to find a good article on the Who's Who of the Old Bolsheviks, sorting out who was really a close follower of Lenin and who was a more or less loosely harnessed sidekick whom only Lenin's genius could keep pulling in the traces. As an editor, I don't know whether I should prompt anyone to write such an article at the present time.

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EXHIBIT No. 566-D

Initialed: "ECC."

300 GILMAN HALL, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY,  
Baltimore, Md., January 9, 1939.

Mr. L. V. HARONDAR,  
*Council of the U. S. S. R., Institute of Pacific Relations,  
20 Razin Street, Moscow, U. S. S. R.*

DEAR MR. HARONDAR: Thank you very much for the copy of your letter to Mr. Holland of December 13th. The "Bulletin of the Far Eastern Branch of the Academy of Sciences of the U. S. S. R." arrived in due course and I am arranging to have it noticed in Pacific Affairs.

Please let me know if there is any possibility at all of Soviet contributions to Pacific Affairs. We have now grown in circulation, and I think in influence, to the highest level since Pacific Affairs has been published. This makes all the more conspicuous the lack of Soviet contributions. It would greatly improve our position if we could have, from time to time, articles directly sponsored by the Soviet Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

With warm good wishes for the New Year.

Yours very sincerely,

(t) OWEN LATTIMORE.

OL: Y.

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EXHIBIT No. 566-E

PACIFIC AFFAIRS

ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS,  
10 ST. JAMES SQUARE,  
London, S. W. I., 2d November 1936.

FREDERICK V. FIELD, Esq.,  
129 East Fifty-second Street,  
New York City, U. S. A.

DEAR FRED: There is one by-product of my Canadian trip that I wished I could have talked over with you before leaving. I found both in Montreal among the high up head office executives of Canada's nearest imitation of New York, and among the civil servants and not quite head of department administrators of Ottawa, an extremely lively interest in Chinese communism and in the crisis confronting the Nanking government. When I started to talk I had a few general ideas such as the theory that the Nanking government would go on compromising up to the last desperate moment rather than risk everything on an outright resistance, and also a very strong feeling that the Communists because of their exhortation to resistance and their repeated offers of a united front have been gaining the support of ordinary democratic and patriotic nationalists as well as of Marxists. These general impressions I had not arranged in any very precise manner. As a result of questions asked, etc., I found myself gradually taking the following position, of the correctness of which I am not quite sure. I should be grateful for any criticisms, either your own or those of Chen and Chi, etc.

The people who are most active in making the position in China, are not any of the Chinese parties but the Japanese. They have worked with great skill on maxims derived from a close study of the older Chinese history and particularly of invasions from the northern frontier. Owing to the strong survival into the twentieth century of many factors that were operating in the history of China

before the nineteenth century, they have succeeded in reproducing with remarkable accuracy the familiar phenomenon of the breakup of China under barbarian invasion. They know how to strike along the lines of regional cleavage and also along the lines of cleavage between the country-landlord-scholar-gentry and the peasantry. In this way they have apparently justified the good old contention that the Chinese are an antiquated people with no cohesion or solidarity of any modern kind.

Actually this kind of thing can only be pushed up to a certain point, because in spite of the survival of old factors, there are also new factors at work which beyond a given point influence developments increasingly rather than decreasingly. What I mean is that the Japanese although using troops and armaments of a modern kind could invade China on the archaic plan of invasion, but when it comes to consolidating the conquest the old precedents fail and they find the foundations of triumph crumbling under them as in Manchuria. The archaic conquest cannot provide dividends of a modern kind.

When we consider the whole process from the side of Nanking we see more clearly the interaction of old and new factors. Nanking facing the Japanese invasion has all the regional and social weaknesses of the old order in China, but it also has other weaknesses of a different kind which are due to the fact that the Nanking government represents primarily those elements in China which correspond to Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and so on in Japan, but which are less highly developed than their Japanese counterparts. They stand for the invasion of the older China by a capitalism modeled on that of Western countries and capable of undercutting western and Japanese capitalism in open competition, but not so strong as foreign capitalism in its control of political and military auxiliaries.

The instinct of the interests represented by Nanking is to play for time in which to develop up to the Japanese level of strength. This is hopeless. The Japanese, because they have advanced further on a line of development parallel to that of the Nanking Chinese, can always prepare for invasion more rapidly than Nanking can prepare for resistance. Nanking, squeezing its eyes tightly shut and cling to the hope of a resistance always deferred to some future date, naturally compromises in various directions. Of these the most nearly practical is the line of working for foreign support on the theory that some such nation as America or England will eventually decide that it is better to support Nanking than to acquiesce in the total Japanese conquest of China.

In the circumstances the tactics of the Japanese are to keep pushing Nanking from one partial surrender to another while their strategy is to refrain from making the pressure so high as to startle any other nation into active alliance with Nanking or to stampede Nanking itself into desperate resistance. Nanking has already yielded so much that in the event of resistance leadership would pass rapidly to the Communists. This is the last thing that the Japanese want. They know that in the first set battle they could shatter the regular battalions of Nanking; but the remnants would then be raised up under Communist leadership and resistance would spread over the whole countryside. Then the Japanese would be at war with a continent and would have to disperse their armed forces over a tremendous territory. What Japan wants is to keep Nanking's armies intact in order not to have to fight the Communists. The showdown will come at a moment, which the Japanese are at present deferring as much as Nanking itself. The Japanese have involved themselves in a tremendous gamble in which their hope of success rests entirely on the possibility of edging Nanking step by step into a position in which it will appear a hopelessly bad bet for either British or American support. Then, at a moment which will have to be very carefully prepared, the Japanese will unmask their final ultimatum and risk everything on the assumption that Nanking will capitulate and not make a pseudo-Samson gesture of pulling down the pillars of the temple. They will then be able to use Nanking's armies with only a stiffening of their own troops to crush Communism, and so be able to hold their own main forces mobile and in reserve. The program may involve the elimination of Chiang K'ai Shek, which the Japanese have so frequently threatened, but obviously it is based on the assumption that they can reach a point of indirect control at which they can tip over Chiang K'ai Shek without spilling the rest of Nanking into the lap of the Communists.

In the circumstances the hope of the Communists must lie in the precipitation of a war in which Nanking will take the lead at first, only to be defeated and to let the leadership lapse for the Communists to take over. If they succeed, the situation will not be parallel to either Manchuria or Abyssinia, as many

people assume. In Manchuria the armies of Chang Hsueh-liang held together long enough to prevent general popular resistance from getting underway, and also the situation was clouded by the sham intervention of the League of Nations. In Abyssinia the quaint emperor, knowing that his position in his own country was more that of a conqueror than that of a genuine national ruler, was unable to rely on the dispersed tribal resistance that alone could have bogged down the Italians' advance, but bent every effort to the creation of a sham modern army which gave the Italians exactly what they needed: a chance to attack a fixed focus of resistance; and this resistance lasted long enough to let the Italians get so far into the country that popular and tribal resistance became hopeless.

In the present situation in China the existence of the Communists alters everything. If the resistance is begun soon enough—that is before the Japanese have got in far enough so that they can use Nanking and its armies as a shield to carry before them in fighting the Communists—Then the kind of war that would result would be more nearly parallel to the civil wars and wars of intervention in Russia. Once the formal armies of Nanking were cracked in the absurd effort to meet the Japanese on ground on which the Japanese are infinitely superior, the private soldiers and many of the noncommissioned and junior officers of the defeated armies could be raised up again and combined with the peasants and workers to build up a genuine national resistance. The Japanese would no longer be fighting bankers and factory owners, whose great wealth made them nervous and ready to compromise, but would be at war with mud huts and impoverished farms, against which the use of tanks and airplanes would involve a maximum expenditure of wealth for a minimum acquisition of wealth. In such a situation the Chinese Communists would actually be better off than the Russians were to start with; for the first Red armies were led by amateurs, while the Chinese would have from the beginning veteran military and political organizers and a nucleus of hardbitten partisan armies already inured to that kind of war.

How much of all this lucubration is approximately sound?

England is appallingly depressing. We are living in one of those incredible English suburban houses that make you feel like a furniture maggot. I start my Russian lessons on Monday and that is the only cheerful prospect in sight. I have already interviewed the man and he seems to promise an intelligent, competent and rapid approach, which will give results. For everything else I subscribe to the pronouncement of Wordsworth: "England is a fen of stagnant waters." The national fog includes the newspapers. George Taylor said in his last article for us that there is a conspiracy of silence in the press about the real issues in China. The same is true of Spain, France, Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union. The London metropolitan press no longer deserves its immense nineteenth century reputation. It is not that the news is fabricated but that it is distorted and partially suppressed in such a manner that the true significance of events does not come through.

The other night we went to an extremely interesting dinner of the Central Asian Society, the membership of which is, of course, exaggeratedly die-hard but which has more significance at the present moment than it did a few years ago. The speeches were rabid. Sir Francis Lindley, formerly Ambassador to Japan, said that the real issue in the Far East was not between the survival of China or the conquest of China by Japan, but between the conquest of China by Japan or by Communism. In such a choice the British interest must obviously lie with Japan. This noble sentiment was loudly hear-heard. It is true that Lindley is said to be disgruntled because he was not reappointed to Japan, and that the meeting was strictly private and not reported to the press, but it is also true that every one present regarded him as speaking for the ordained leaders of the British people. You will be pleased to hear that Eleanor and I were presented to this choice assemblage from the speakers' table and our names applauded. However, I had the pleasure of exchanging paralysed expressions with Dame Rachel Crowdy during the speeches.

All the best from this bedraggled company.

Yours,

(Signed) OWEN LATTIMORE.

EXHIBIT No. 566-F

(Hand-made letters: IPR)

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY,  
WALTER HINES PAGE SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,  
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR,  
Baltimore, Md., January 10, 1951.

Mr. WILLIAM L. HOLLAND,  
*Institute of Pacific Relations,  
1 East Fifty-fourth Street, New York 22, N. Y.*

DEAR BILL: Thank you for your letter of December 13, and for sending me an advance copy of the collection of documents on Soviet Far Eastern Policy compiled by William Mandel. I have not had time to go through the documents, but I read with interest the introductory chapter by Max Beloff. I noted particularly his definition of the two methods of studying Soviet relations with other countries: either setting out the Soviet record "as the Russians see it"; or attempting to give a more rounded presentation by giving something of the context in which the Russians behave as they do.

I have passed the copy over to E. H. Carr, who is a visiting lecturer here for a couple of months. I have not yet had his comments, except for the fact that when I gave him the copy, he remarked that he thought that in general Mandel was apt to be lacking in a critical approach.

From what I have seen of Beloff's work, he is a careful scholar, and I am therefore much interested in your proposal to get a later and more extended analytical study from him, together with a collection of documents.

Sincerely as ever,

(s) Owen

(t) OWEN LATTIMORE, *Director.*

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EXHIBIT No. 566-G

Pencilled in: "WLH—You will find this good reading, ECC."

300 GILMAN HALL, THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY,  
Baltimore, Md., October 11, 1938.

Mr. A. J. GRAJDANZEV,  
*San Francisco.*

DEAR ANDREW: As usual, I have let several letters from you accumulate before replying, but I hope this will not deter you from continuing to write often because I find them extremely useful and by referring to them I have formed a still higher opinion of your judgment of the course of political events all over the world.

First, however, about you and Mary. I think you are doing the right thing about trying to arrange your own application to get on the quota. It seems to me that there is a good chance that this will succeed, and if it does it may simplify the problem for Mary. I am assuming, of course, that you will let me know without any delay if there is anything whatever that I can do.

Next, about the bibliography by Nasu, published by the Japan I. P. R. In view of the fact that it simply lists titles with practically no comment on contents I think it is unnecessary for us to have a review in PACIFIC AFFAIRS.

I have been comparing your last letter with a note from Chen Han-seng, who ascribes the failure of Czechoslovakia to resist to the lack of political firmness—especially the lack of a people's front in Czechoslovakia. I assume that since you also anticipated the failure of Czechoslovakia to resist, either with or without British and French support, you must also have detected this weakness. I confess my own judgment was not so accurate. Up to the last minute it seemed to me that even the defeatist groups in Czechoslovakia itself and in France and in Great Britain had been maneuvered into a position which made "peace at any price" impossible.

Naturally I agree with you that even if one had counted on the betrayal of Czechoslovakia, it would have been impossible to predict the shameless and infamous manner of the betrayal. This being the case, it is at least a good thing that Hitler's recent speech told the British whom they may have in their government and whom they may not have. This pretty well destroys the Chamberlain

claim to "peace with honor" because it so insolently emphasizes the dishonor.

Moreover, the full extent of the British and French defeat is rapidly becoming visible, and it is a good thing that this should be realized at once. For even the Chamberlain assumption that Hitler will not be caught in a channel which leads him away from Western Europe and straight toward the Soviet Union is now being disproved. In fact, the Soviet Union is not being either encircled or isolated but both its political position and its strategic position have been undoubtedly strengthened. Politically the Soviet Union is now free of treacherous and undependable alliances. At the same time Hitler and Mussolini now have to face the choice: whether to attack a country which is unmistakably prepared to defend itself or to go on attacking Great Britain and France, which have just as unmistakably shown that they can be bullied and robbed. In the circumstances, there can hardly be a doubt. It is Britain and France which will lose, not the Soviet Union. Moreover, Great Britain and France will have to start sacrificing their own interests, as the supply of victims like Czechoslovakia and Spain is running out. (Even in Czechoslovakia and Spain, of course, it is not only the Czechs and the Spanish who lose but the British and French also.) However, it is possible that the next major encroachments will not actually be in Western Europe but in the Near East and the Far East. In China it is highly probable that the Japanese will disguise their failure to secure a sweeping victory over the Chinese by bullying the British and French out of Shanghai and Hongkong, forcing them to close the Canton and Indochina routes of military supplies to China. In this case what China loses will be nothing to what the British and French lose, for the Chinese are now in a position in which the supply of foreign munitions (always exaggerated in importance by most commentators) is day by day of less importance than the internal organization of the Chinese people itself. Lack of British and French support will force the Kuomintang wing of the United Front to take precisely those measures which have already been proved efficacious in the North and which the Kuomintang would have avoided as long as it could rely on British and French aid.

In strategic questions the Soviet Union is also strengthened. It does not have to defend the awkward salient of Czechoslovakia but can dig itself in on its own frontier, while any attack from Europe will have to move a long way from the Fascist centers of strength and pass through the doubtful areas of east Europe and the Balkans where all kinds of national and other rivalries, though perhaps driven underground by the temporary gain of Germany in strength and prestige, will continue to smolder. In the Far East, also, it is almost to be hoped that the Japanese will succeed in taking Hankow—after suitably heavy losses, of course; for this would at last demonstrate that even Hankow cannot be made a "decisive" victory by Japan but only expose the Japanese to increased perils on both flanks as popular resistance is organized south of the Yangtze and the already organized popular resistance in the north develops to even more effective forms of warfare. In this latter regard the taking of Hankow would divert all or most of the munitions received from the Soviet Union into the strategic area of the Eighth Route Army which has until now been starved of them. This means two things: A shorter distance to be traversed from the Soviet Union, and probably a more effective employment of the munitions by the Eighth Route Army than by the main armies of Chiang Kai-shek.

In short, dangerous as the situation is all over the world (including North and South America, where the results of the Munich betrayal cannot but strengthen agents of reaction) I cannot see any possibility of the simultaneous attack from east and west which alone could threaten the Soviet Union. There are certain parallels and of course many differences between the "isolation" of the Soviet Union and the "isolation" of the United States which I do not know how to assess properly.

In the meantime, we are settling down very happily here in Baltimore and looking forward to an extremely interesting winter.

Yours ever,

(t) OWEN LATTIMORE.

EXHIBIT No. 556-H

(Initials) CHS. KM.i

SUNSET FARM,

Lee, Mass., August 8, 1938.

OWEN LATTIMORE, ESQ.,  
*Institute of Pacific Relations,*  
*1795 California Street, San Francisco, Calif.*

DEAR OWEN: Needless to say Holland and I appreciated greatly your letter of the 28th, Fred will be telling you on your arrival in San Francisco of Takayanagi's visit and the serious situation which has arisen between the Japanese Council on the one hand and the Chairman of the Pacific Council and the Secretary General on the other.

Where we have made mistakes we want to rectify them. Where disagreement is due entirely to misunderstanding we want to get complete understanding. It is a fairly complicated situation because at the moment British and Dutch cooperation in the Secretariat Inquiry is partly conditioned by whether or not the Japanese Council itself cooperates.

Holland and I feel that every possible adjustment should be made that does not impair either the project or the integrity of the International Secretariat's capacity to serve all of the Councils. As Fred will have told you Takayanagi was never more friendly, clear, or sincere. He has made a very deep impression on me. He has come on a very difficult errand.

Speaking of Takayanagi, Dr. Dafoe wrote me on July 25th as follows:

"For him personally I have, of course, the highest respect. Privately I have no doubt he needs our sympathy and understanding; and to the extent that it can be done without capitulation, we must show him respect, attention and consideration."

In view of this situation and in view of the fact that it is a matter of common knowledge that Amerasia was founded to "take a line," Holland and I feel that the position of the International Secretariat will be stronger if you drop off of the board of Amerasia. I have just wired you therefore as follows:

"Many thanks for yours twenty-sixth. Holland self generally support your view on your role as expert and would not urge you seriously restrict your writing. But we both feel your official connection with Amerasia is legitimate Japanese ground for complaint and in view of present strained relations would urge you consider resigning from board at an early date and for experimental period of say three months refrain from contributing signed articles to Amerasia."

We hope that this is not making an unfair request. We do not wish you to restrict your writing except for what we feel is the expression of rather definitely provocative personal opinions as in your recent review of the Utley pamphlet.

Field will doubtless be showing you the papers he has which set forth the Japanese objections.

Borton has the theory that between the time that the Japanese Council published its acceptance of the Secretariat project in the Annual Report of the International Association, and the sending of Viscount Ishii's cable of protest to Dafoe and me, some very stiff action must have been taken against the Japanese I. P. R. either by the war office or the foreign office.

Yasuo is still optimistic and still believes that, when the Japanese Council realise that the Inquiry is not intended to name aggressors and is not intended to make findings and judgments and that we generally desire Japanese cooperation, they will cooperate.

Hoping to hear from you soon, I am

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

## EXHIBIT No. 566-I

(Initials) wlh. km. For advice.

300 GILMAN HALL, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY,  
Baltimore, Md., March 9, 1939.Mr. F. V. FIELD,  
*Institute of Pacific Relations,*  
*129 East Fifty-second Street, New York City.*

DEAR FRED: Thanks very much indeed for your note about the good old *Amerasia* question. You have put very clearly the one essential question: that my withdrawal would be an admission that *Amerasia* is an activity not in keeping with the work of the IPR or its staff. I guess I was groping toward this, but had not quite grasped it. I wish I had put it more clearly in my letter to Carter. This makes it all the more essential, I think, that you and Carter and I should talk this over altogether at the same time, a thing I do not think we have yet done.

In the meantime, however, I think that if Chi is appointed to Carter's staff, you could go ahead and withdraw my name.

(Pencilled in: Agree WLH.)

Very sincerely,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

OL:Y.

## EXHIBIT No. 566-J

(Pencilled in) "Copies: Tarr, Holland."

ROYAL YORK HOTEL,  
Toronto, November 14, 1938.OWEN LATTIMORE, Esq.,  
*300 Gilmore Hall, the Johns Hopkins University,*  
*Baltimore, Md.*

DEAR OWEN: I have been discussing with Dafoe and Tarr the whole question of freedom in writing and speaking on the part of members of the Secretariat, in view of the possibility that the whole matter may be aired at the January meeting of the Pacific Council. Tarr commented on your role as editor in the following terms. He does not favor making Pacific Affairs neutral, but rather making it more lively, fundamental, and provocative. He suggests, for example, that instead of putting your most challenging articles into *Amerasia* or elsewhere, you put them into Pacific Affairs, sending an advance manuscript to the Council that might take exception so as to permit of simultaneous publication of the ablest comment or counter statement by the Council concerned. If it is absolutely impossible to get the reply in time, provocative articles by the editor should have a conspicuous foreword indicating that the editor is aware that his views are likely to be seriously challenged by members of — Council, and that therefore an advance copy of the article has been sent to that Council with an urgent invitation for a full reply in time for publication in the next issue. Tarr thinks it is very important to make it clear to the whole I. P. R. constituency that the editor has made every effort to be inclusive and to get the fullest and ablest contributions from Japanese and from believers in the Japanese cause, so that if the Japanese do not play ball, there will be prima facie evidence that they are suffering simply through default.

Tarr and I would like to have your reaction to this proposal. You and Holland and I are in an extraordinarily difficult position as the servants and employees of eleven Councils with as disparate and antithetical views as characterize these Councils at the present time. It may be that we will have to confess one day that the I. P. R. was conceived in the Anglo-Saxon tradition of free inquiry and that it can no longer be sponsored by Councils in countries where this tradition has been repudiated. In the meantime, the actual position is that we are responsible to all eleven Councils and are obliged to do our best to give the fullest expression to the views they hold.

With reference to your note commenting on McWilliams' letter, I have a terrible feeling that I suggested that you delete the allusion to the fact that Japan and Russia have been the least responsive to your repeated appeals for cooperation. In doing so, I was by indirection proposing something which is contrary

to Tarr's present proposal that we not only continue to invite Japanese contributions, but publicize the fact that we have repeatedly sought them.

Since talking with Tarr and Dafoe, I have received this copy of your immensely interesting "hypothénuse" article with the indication that it has been submitted to Amerasia subject to my approval. I do not approve of its going to Amerasia over your signature in its present form, because I do not think it is cricket for the editor of Pacific Affairs, even in his private capacity, to indulge in ridicule of the youth of Japan who have been driven off to fight in China. The "flying trapeeze" paragraph is so gorgeous that I hate to object to it, but object I think I must.

As a means of making Tarr's suggestion concrete, I am wondering what you would consider to be the pros and cons of sending this article by the first steamer to Saionji, indicating that it is the best analysis of the situation you can make in the light of Asiatic history and present world forces. You could then state that you would like to publish in the same issue the work of whatever writer the Japanese Council feels is best qualified to put forward an able challenge to this thesis, with a view to giving the Pacific Affairs public throughout the world the soundest possible basis for making up their own minds on the question.

If you should decide to send it, there are one or two other points at which it should be edited, as at the moment it is addressed to an American and not to an international audience. My only other comment on the article, which has nothing to do with the foregoing, is whether in the light of the recent statement by R. A. Butler, Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in the House of Commons explaining that the British Government is not planning to invest in reconstruction under Japanese rule, there should not be a slight twist to the phrase you use on page 4. Of course, as you have written it, you are very cagey, for you simply say that the British are "talking about" investing. I do not for a moment believe that Butler's statement removes the possibility that they may actually do so.

Have you ever dropped in to see the immaculate Suma, Counselor of the Japanese Embassy in Washington, who was so long in Nanking and such an intimate friend of Matsumoto? He is reputed to be an exceedingly able person and has been abroad enough to know how to state things in terms intelligible to the western world. Would there be any point in interesting him in writing for Pacific Affairs, adopting the Chatham House device for Foreign Office reviewers, a *nom de plume*?

Sincerely yours,

(t) EDWARD C. CARTER.

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EXHIBIT No. 566-K

OCTOBER 26, 1936.

MR. OWEN LATTIMORE,  
*Chatham House, 10 St. James's Square,  
London, S. W. I. England.*

DEAR OWEN: Here is a clipping from yesterday's New York Times on a subject which was of interest to you sometime ago. Can't you find somebody in London who can write a first rate article on British communications with the Far East, both commercial and military.

Best regards.

Sincerely yours,

FREDERICK V. FIELD.

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EXHIBIT No. 566-L

[Telegram]

LEE, MASS., August 20.

(Initialled: L F )

OWEN LATTIMORE,  
*1795 California Street,  
San Francisco, Calif.:*

Do not understand Amerasia mix-up on Review but congratulate Amerasia for printing it. In view developments here this week desire withdraw at least temporarily suggestion you resign Amerasia Board. We can discuss that on your arrival.

E. C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 566-M

300 GILMAN HALL, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY,  
Baltimore, Md., March 8, 1939.Mr. F. V. FIELD,  
*Institute of Pacific Relations,*  
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York City.

DEAR FRED: Recently Carter wrote to me bringing up once more the question of my resigning from *Amerasia*. I have been cudgeling my brains about this and I wonder if you will agree that the following are the salient points to be considered:

Carter says that this would be a good time for me to withdraw when the Secretariat is not actually under fire from Japan; Carter adds that he is considering giving a Secretariat appointment to Chi; apparently, as Chi is a Chinese, it would not be necessary to ask him to resign from *Amerasia*; at the same time Carter thinks it would be a bit too much to have two members of the International Secretariat on the Board of *Amerasia*, and this is a further reason for asking me to resign.

Points on the other side:

Your main reason originally for asking me to join *Amerasia* was that it would indicate that there was no rivalry between the two publications. This argument still holds. In fact, if I were to withdraw now, it might be taken to mean that a strain had developed between *Amerasia* and Pacific Affairs.

As regards withdrawing from *Amerasia* while not under fire, that is a perfectly good point, but on the other hand, it seems to me that by doing so a perfectly good bargaining counter would be wasted. If the Japanese dislike my remaining on *Amerasia* as much as all that, it might turn out that there would be a quid pro quo which they would offer to get me off.

Of course, the think taken as a whole is much more psychological than anything else anyhow. I should hate being hustled off *Amerasia* by Japanese importunity when the Japanese are treating free speech and opinion the way they are in their own country. Yet I also hate the idea of neatly ducking out of the line of fire during a lull in controversy.

So much for my point of view. What about yours? I wish we could consult, but failing that I am herewith giving you authority to withdraw my name from the editorial board of *Amerasia* if Chi should be appointed to Carter's staff. If something should go wrong with that arrangement, then the whole question will not be so urgent and I may have an opportunity to discuss this with you and Carter at the same time a little later on. I am sending a copy of this letter to Carter.

Yours very sincerely,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

OL: Y.

EXHIBIT No. 566-N

PACIFIC AFFAIRS

Published Quarterly by the Institute of Pacific Relations

In pencil: note and ret. to ECC.

300 GILMAN HALL, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY,  
Baltimore, Md., March 8, 1939.Mr. E. C. CARTER,  
*Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East Fifty-second Street,*  
New York City.

DEAR CARTER: I am sorry to have taken so long replying to your letter suggesting again my resignation from *Amerasia*. I have written to Eleanor about this, and today I have written to Fred Field, as you will see from the attached carbon copy. The trouble is I am a person of excessively vacillating character, as you have already discovered, and hate having to make a decision while I am off on my own without anyone to consult. The letter to Field gives what seems to me the chief pros and cons of the question. As you see, I have authorized him to take my name off in case you should confirm your decision to appoint Chi to your staff. This ought to take care of any emergency aspects of the

question, and the other aspects I should like to be able to discuss with you and Field simultaneously, as you are both concerned in addition to myself.

Yours very sincerely,

(s) Owen Lattimore  
(t) OWEN LATTIMORE.

OL: Y.

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EXHIBIT No. 566-P

129 EAST FIFTY-SECOND STREET,  
New York City, February 15, 1939.

OWEN LATTIMORE, Esq.,  
c/o President's House, Grinnell College, Grinnell, Iowa.

DEAR OWEN: In your letter to W. Macmahon Ball of February 6, you write the following:

"I am sending a carbon copy to E. C. Carter, who may overhaul the original with a fast letter to you asking you not to publish. I am making a general practice of submitting everything I write to Carter so that he can reprove me when I say anything unbecoming a propagandist and a gentleman."

In your Pacific Affairs report to the Pacific Council at Princeton you very kindly said:

"Mr. Carter was consulted on all material that differed in the slightest from the ordinary routine; and this of course meant that his colleagues were also drawn into consultation."

Under these circumstances and in view of our earlier correspondence, I am wondering whether the time has not now come for you to withdraw from the Amerasia board. I remember that you were willing to do so last year, but that I withdrew my request because I heard that the Japanese were undertaking economic reprisals against the I. P. R. in San Francisco.

Now that relations are, for the time being at least, established once more on a basis of confidence and cooperation between the International Secretariat and the Japanese Council, I am wondering whether it would require any great self-sacrifice on your part to withdraw from the Amerasia Board.

One of the reasons for my raising this matter at this time is that I am now inviting Ch'ao-ting Chi to serve for a number of months as a member of the International Secretariat. For perfectly obvious reasons I do not wish to ask him to withdraw from the Amerasia Board. I do feel, however, that having both you and Chi publicized as on the Amerasia Board is open to question.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

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EXHIBIT No. 566-Q

129 EAST FIFTY-SECOND STREET,  
New York City, August 10, 1938.

Confidential.

OWEN LATTIMORE, Esq.,  
1795 California Street, San Francisco, Calif.

DEAR OWEN: As you will read between the lines, what I am trying to do is: (1) To make a few minor concessions so as to see whether efforts at face-saving are efficacious; (2) to clear up misunderstandings between the Secretary-General and Tokyo; (3) to apologize for any mistakes, if mistakes have been made; (4) to preserve all that is essential.

As you know, from the very start there has been a misunderstanding between Fred and me about your role on Amerasia. He thought in the very first instance that my saying that there was no objection to his talking to you about Amerasia meant that I approved of his inviting you to serve on the Amerasia board. I was surprised when I first learnt that you had accepted a position on the board. I was not only surprised but disapproved. I was reluctant to raise the issue at the time and still am. Why should I be cracking down on free speech when I am attacking more highly placed persons all over the world for doing the same thing?

I am particularly eager, if you can conscientiously do so, to have you resign from Amerasia before the circulation of the next issue which contains a flaming

article by Peffer which is likely to be the last straw for many Japanese readers of Amerasia. This is not to say that I disapprove of Peffer writing that kind of article, nor do I disapprove of Amerasia publishing it, but it is the kind of wholesale condemnatory diatribe which cannot, as I conceive it, be sponsored by a member of the International Secretariat so long as the Japanese Council is a full member of the Pacific Council. Needless to say I have not mentioned to Takayanagi the fact that before his arrival I raised with you the question of your relationship to Amerasia.

Since he has come and from letters from other visitors from Japan, I gather that some members of the Japanese Council feel that you are not quite fair in editing Pacific Affairs. I gather that some of them have noted that when Hubbard wrote his article criticizing the Soviet Union, you made it possible for an author, friendly to Russia, to print a reply in the same issue. Also in the June, 1938, issue in which the article by Yanaihara on the Problems of Japanese Administration in Korea was printed, there was your editorial comment expressing another point of view, under the title, "What Korea pays for Japanese Rule." I think the leaders of the Japanese Council imagine that articles and editorials critical of Japan have not been submitted to them since the war broke out in time for them to be able to make comments to be included in the same issue of Pacific Affairs.

If it is not too much trouble, I wish that you or Mrs. Ward would dig out of your files pertinent quotations from your letters to the Japanese Council over the past year and a half or two years, in which I know you have repeatedly asked them for articles and comments on the articles of others.

At this stage I do not wish you to write to Saionji or any other member of the Japanese Council, jumping on them for lack of cooperation, but I would like to have, for private reference, during this next highly difficult fortnight, enough of the actual record of your dealings with Tokyo to enable me to assure people like Dafoe, if Takayanagi speaks of Pacific Affairs, that you have worked harder to get participation from the Japanese Council than from any other member group.

Sincerely yours,

(t) EDWARD C. CARTER.

# EXHIBIT No. 566-R

## PUBLICATIONS MEETING

NEW YORK, July 9, 1934.

Present: Barnes  
Lattimore  
Shiman  
Carter  
Austern  
Lasker  
Mitchel

Mr. Lattimore produced the statement showing the distribution of Pacific Affairs as of July 9th, as follows:

	Paid	Members	Exchange	Complimentary		Paid	Members	Exchange	Complimentary
Foreign:					Foreign—Continued				
Australia.....	6	44	6	15	Poland.....	1			
Canada.....	44	325	5	11	Sweden.....	2		1	
China.....	65	85	20	19	Switzerland.....	4		5	7
England.....	71		15	14	Straits Settlements.....	1			
France.....	6		9	6	Spain.....	1			
Germany.....	15		11	1	U. S. S. R.....	8		9	
India.....	9		1	2	Palestine.....	1			
Japan.....	12	135	8	18	Domestic:				
Java.....	13		1	2	Hawaii.....	60	105	3	14
Netherlands.....	14		2	2	Philippine Islands.....	9	56	3	16
New Zealand.....	7	103	1	10	United States.....	407		35	10
Austria.....			1						
Denmark.....			1		Grand total, 1941 sub- scriptions.....	761	855	138	176
Brazil.....	1			1					
Fiji.....									
Hungary.....	1								
Italy.....	3		1						

When Mr. Carter congratulated Mr. Lattimore on this growing circulation, Miss Austern remarked with much feeling that subscriptions were all very well but what could be done when they weren't paid. The China Council, for example, owes over \$125 for subscriptions and won't do anything about it. The members of Chatham House, on the other hand, are extremely prompt in paying up. Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines and Japan are all in arrears in payments.

Mr. Lattimore next raised the question of Herr Hans Pfothenhauer who has been writing asking to become the exclusive agent for Pacific Affairs in Germany. While it would be very desirable to have a German agent, Mr. Lattimore felt that it would not be wise to give anyone exclusive rights. This opinion was shared by the others present.

*Advertising.*—In the matter of advertising in Pacific Affairs, Mr. Lattimore considered that it would be justifiable and desirable if it were restricted to publishers and books, on an international basis. A real service could be performed in bringing to the attention of readers in other countries such things as the publications of the Commercial Press, which gets out a great deal of material in English about which little is known. Mr. Carter said that he would approve of the plan subject to two conditions:

(1) That it was not started until it could be done on a really international basis. By this he did not mean that every country in the I. P. R. should have to be represented but that at least five major countries should be included.

(2) That the advertising be confined to really academic subjects.

*Bibliographical Section.*—Mr. Carter briefly described the present situation with regard to the preparation of bibliographical material in the Chinese, Japanese and Russian fields for use in Pacific Affairs. While in Peiping he and Holland had proposed that Nankai University and the National Library in Peiping should collaborate on the preparation of such material, with the China I. P. R. acting as coordinator. The matter had also been taken up with the Communist Academy Library in Moscow, which had agreed to furnish material in the Russian field. Mr. Holland had an assistant in Tokyo who was working on the preparation of the Japanese material. Mr. Carter had gone ahead with these arrangements on the strength of Lattimore's cable to him approving the idea of a bibliographical section.

Mr. Lattimore said that though he had cabled approval of obtaining critical bibliographical material in the Chinese, Japanese and Russian fields, he was not at all convinced that this material should go into Pacific Affairs. If a bibliographical section was to be introduced he would strongly advocate that it take form of an article analysing, criticizing and commenting on the material rather than a regulation listing of the books. His aim was to get a wider circulation for the magazine among the general reading public and he felt that it would make the magazine unbalanced, as well as scare off the kind of readers he was trying to attract, to include a large bibliographical section and continue to have only a few regular articles. A well-written article describing what had been done in the field of Chinese or Russian studies and estimating the relative importance of the books and articles would be of far greater interest and use to all except advanced scholars in the field.

Mr. Lasker suggested that it might be possible to do a series of subject bibliographies over a wider range of time, covering, say, the material appearing in the last five to ten years.

Mr. Barnes asked whether the Pacific Council could not get out the bibliographical bulletin as a regular service to Institute members and entirely separate from Pacific Affairs. This might be done from the Central Library in Honolulu. The material and the critical analysis and selection would have to be done in each country, but it could be then sent to Honolulu and all that would be necessary would be to have a librarian who was able to compile and edit the material into final form.

Mr. Carter explained that Wellington Liu was preparing a brief bibliography with the idea of its being used in Pacific Affairs and that it might be advisable to wait until it arrived and then see what kind of stuff it was and how it could best be used.

The question was dropped for the moment, to be taken up at later interviews between ECC and OL.

Mr. Lattimore then brought up the question of Mao's article which he felt should most certainly be printed in Pacific Affairs though it might cause trouble in both China and Japan. It would be necessary to condense it somewhat and he

suggested that C. C. Wang might be asked to do this. There was general agreement that the article should be printed and the ways and means were left to Mr. Lattimore to decide.

With regard to the future place of printing Pacific Affairs it was felt that in spite of the lower costs of printing in both China and Japan, the danger of censorship, the pressure of the local group, and similar factors made it more desirable to continue to print in New York and to find a managing editor to be in charge while Lattimore was away.

Before the meeting adjourned Mr. Lattimore produced a Ph. D. thesis of a young Chinese studying at Columbia which he said had aroused very favorable comment and was considered by many to embody an entirely new analysis and interpretation of China's economic development. The study is called *Key Economic Areas in Chinese History*, as revealed in the development of public works for water control. Mr. Lattimore explained that the author, Ch'ao-Ting Chi was trying hard to raise the money to have it published by the Columbia University Press, so far unsuccessfully, and suggested that possibly the I. P. R. might consider getting it published. It would have to be completely rewritten, as it was practically unintelligible in its present form. Mr. Lattimore had already started revising parts of it and was planning to use a section as an article for Pacific Affairs.

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EXHIBIT No. 566-S

MAY 16, 1944.

Dr. CH'AO-TING CHI,

*Care of Central Bank of China, Chungking.*

DEAR CHI: I have not forgotten our conversation last September about the possibility of your doing something further on your study of wartime economic developments in China. I hope that the chances of your doing this have now improved as a result of your new job in the Research Department in the Central Bank, which ought to give you more opportunity for writing. I should appreciate hearing from you on this matter. Possibly you could send your reply via Adler or George Taylor or Owen Lattimore.

Our budget situation is such that I doubt if we could put up more than \$750 for this particular work, particularly as we invested so much in the original project. At present prices I realize that \$750 amounts to very little, but I doubt if we can spare more. It will probably be necessary, therefore, to concentrate on one or two aspects of the subject instead of trying to complete the whole book. You might let me know your ideas on this.

If possible, I should like to have part of your report available as a document for the I. P. R. conference which is to be held early next January at Virginia Hot Springs. We should need to receive it by November 30 at the latest.

How are things going in your new job? I would be interested to learn something about the program of the Central Bank's Research Department and also to receive some of its publications. Hsu is still working for us, doing a good job, but we are very much hampered by the difficulty in getting materials from China. Clippings seem to be terribly delayed in arriving, probably because they are detained by the American censorship for copying. Carter and I would be glad to have your off-the-record comments on developments in the China I. P. R. Please feel free to talk quite frankly to Taylor and Lattimore about this.

Best Wishes.

Sincerely yours,

(t) W. L. HOLLAND.

Mr. Lattimore, do you recall during the hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 2 years ago, identifying a letter that you wrote to Mr. Joseph Barnes on June 15, 1943?

MR. LATTIMORE. Yes; I do.

MR. MORRIS. Has a copy of that been given to you this morning?

MR. LATTIMORE. Yes; it has.

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that go into the record? That is a copy made of the letter that was introduced before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and which was identified as a letter written by Mr. Lattimore at that time, and which he now affirms that he did write to Mr. Barnes.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well, it may be inserted into the record.  
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 567" and is as follows:)

## EXHIBIT No. 567

111 SUTTER STREET,  
San Francisco, Calif., June 15, 1943.

Mr. JOSEPH BARNES,  
Office of War Information,  
224 West Fifty-seventh Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR JOE: In your capacity as a member of our Personnel Security Committee there are certain things which you ought to know about Chinese personnel. It is a delicate matter for me to tell you about these things because of my recent official connection with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. For that reason I am marking this communication secret.

When we recently reduced the number of our Chinese staff in New York it was quite obvious that there was going to be trouble and that this trouble would take the form of accusations against the remaining personnel. The fact is that certain of the personnel with whose services we dispensed had connections outside the office. This leads directly into the main question. It is extremely important from the point of view of security that intelligence information should not leak out of our office through our Chinese personnel. It is an open secret in Washington that the security of various Chinese agencies there is deplorable. Any pipeline from our office to any of those agencies is not a pipeline but practically an open conduit.

However, it is not only a question of Chinese Government agencies. There is also a well-organized and well-financed organization among the Chinese in this country connected with Wang Ching-wei, the Japanese puppet. This can be traced back to the history of the Chinese revolution as a whole. To present it in the fewest possible words: Sun Yat-sen was largely financed for many years by Chinese living abroad. Not only Sun Yat-sen but Wang Ching-wei had close connections among the overseas Chinese. However much he is a traitor now, the fact must be recognized that Wang Ching-wei is a veteran of Chinese politics with connections which he has nourished for many years among Chinese communities abroad, including those in the United States.

Chinese in the United States come almost exclusively from a few localities on the coast of China, practically every one of which is now occupied by the Japanese. Thus these Chinese in America have both family connections and financial investments which are under the control of the Japanese, and because of his years of political organizing work Wang Ching-wei knows all of these connections and can apply pressure through them.

On the other side there is a special organization within the Kuomintang or Chinese Nationalist Party at Chungking which is charged with maintaining political and financial connections with Chinese overseas. This overseas bureau also has a detailed knowledge of the Chinese communities in America and is able to apply pressure. Thus there is a very intense conflict going on every day in every Chinatown in America between the Wang Ching-wei agents and those of the Kuomintang. It must be remembered that while the Kuomintang is able to operate in a private way as a political party among Chinese residents in America, it is also the party which "owns" the Chinese Government and is thus able to make use of Chinese Government agencies.

Thirdly, there are numerous Chinese in America who are politically unaffiliated. There are, of course, Communists but they have neither the money nor the organization of the Wang Ching-wei and Kuomintang groups. The genuinely unaffiliated Chinese are a curious compound product of Chinese politics and American environment. They tend to be intensely loyal to China as a country, without conceiving that the Kuomintang or any other political organization has a monopoly right to control of their thoughts and actions. They are like Americans; they like to give their political allegiance, not to have it demanded of them. They are reluctant to support a regimented series of causes laid down for them under orders; like Americans, they often give moral and financial support to a scattered number of causes, some of which may even conflict with each other to a certain extent.

The conflict between the Wang Ching-wei organizing group and the Kuomintang organizing group in America cannot be fought out in the open. Both sides have very good reasons for not courting publicity. Each is anxious to bring into its fold as many of the unaffiliated Chinese as possible. Each is also anxious

not to be exposed as an "un-American" organization or a foreign political group working on American soil. Both of them accordingly find it very good tactics not only to cover up themselves but to put pressure on those whom they are trying to bring under their control, to accuse unaffiliated Chinese of being Communists. This is an accusation which covers up the accuser at the same time that it puts pressure on the accused.

One of the outstanding rallying points of the unaffiliated Chinese in America is the New China Daily News in New York. This is controlled by an organization of laundrymen. I understand that the shareholders number two or three thousand and that they take an active interest in the newspaper. The essential thing about these laundrymen is that in the nature of their business they are independent small-business men. This means that they are on the one hand fairly well insured against Communist theology, since the small-business man of whatever nationality is likely to be a man who had made his way by his own initiative and enterprise and is therefore extremely suspicious of collectivist economic theories. On the other hand, these Chinese small-business proprietors are reluctant to submit themselves unquestioningly to the control of the vested interests which have grown up in China in association with the dominant Kuomintang. The New China Daily News would probably not come under much pressure if it were not for the fact that it is one of the best edited Chinese papers in America with a growing circulation. It does not need to be subsidized or supported by a patron, like many, perhaps the majority, of Chinese papers. It pays dividends on its own merits. A number of Chinese language papers in America receive subsidies from the Kuomintang. At least two, and perhaps three, receive subsidies from the Wang Ching-wei group. One or two others trace back to the group within the Kuomintang which was at one time headed by the late Hu Han-min, a leader of the right-wing faction within the Kuomintang. The Hu Han-min group, though once regarded as right-wing conservatives, are now regarded in China as "old-fashioned liberals"—liberal, so to speak, short of the New Deal. They are less bitterly involved in Chinatown politics than the Wang Ching-wei and Kuomintang groups. The two latter, which are engaged in handing out carefully colored news and doctored editorial policies, are intensely jealous of and hostile to an unaffiliated paper like the New China Daily News, which, so to speak, flaunts its sins by being so readable that the Chinese public in America buys it for its own sake.

It would be rash to say that there are no Communists connected with the New China Daily News. Here it is necessary to consider another peculiarity of the politics of Chinese living out of China. These Chinese are far from being tied to the chariot wheels of Moscow; but when it comes to resisting the trend toward totalitarian regimentation within China they are often willing to support parts of the program advocated by the Chinese Communists within China. This is so much a part of the pattern of politics of Chinese living out of China that it is not uncommon to find wealthy men, even millionaires, supporting the program of the Chinese Communists in whole or in part. This was, for instance, conspicuous in Malaya before the fall of Singapore. For such prosperous and independent Chinese it was a question either of backing their independent judgment of the steps that needed to be taken toward creating a working democracy within China, or of paying financial tribute to the Kuomintang, which sometimes tends to be autocratic, and not infrequently spurns advice from Chinese abroad at the same time that it demands their financial contributions.

In the specific setting of America, it is the independent small-business man, like the laundryman, rather than the very few wealthy merchants who most conspicuously maintain this tradition of political independence. In America, some of the most wealthy individuals are either committed to Wang Ching-wei and his puppet Japanese party or at least are hedging until they have a better idea of how the war is finally going to turn out.

In the circumstances we have to be extremely careful about our Chinese personnel. While we need to avoid recruiting any Chinese Communists we must be careful not to be frightened out of hiring people who have loosely been accused of being Communists. We have to be at least equally careful of not hiring people who are pipelines to the Wang Ching-wei or to one or other of the main factions within the Kuomintang. After all, as an American Government agency we should deal with the Chinese Government or regular agencies of the Chinese Government, but should not get in the position of committing ourselves to the Kuomintang, the political party which controls the Chinese Government, as if it were itself the Chinese Government. You will recognize the importance of this proposition and the delicacy which it requires on the operational level.

For our purposes, it is wise to recruit as many unaffiliated Chinese as we can, to pick people whose loyalty will be reasonably assured on the one hand by the salaries which we pay them and on the other hand by the fact that they do not receive salaries or subsidies from somewhere else.

Mr. Chi and Mr. Chew Hong, both of our New York office, conform excellently to these requirements. Mr. Chi I have known for many years. Until his family estates were occupied by the Japanese, he was a wealthy landlord. He was brought up in the older scholastic tradition in China, before the spread of modern western education, but at the same time he is keenly interested in the national unification of China and the orderly development of a stable political organization there. I know by long experience that he is anything but a Communist; I also know that because of his seniority, his background of independent wealth, and his superior mentality he is not a man to be pushed around by party bureaucrats. Chew Hong is a much younger man, but one whom Dr. Chi trusts and of whose integrity he is convinced. There is something in their relationship of the old Chinese standards of disciple and master. As long as Dr. Chi stands in the relationship of loyal friendship to me and the loyalty of an honest employee of an American Government agency, there will be no difficulty with either men, no irresponsible playing with Chinese politics, and no leakage to any Chinese faction.

The retention of both men is therefore a guaranty to the secrecy and security of the work of the OWI as well as a guaranty of the confident fulfillment of directives. I urge you not to be high-pressured into getting rid of either man. I know that both men may be subjected to attacks. Given time to work on it, I could undoubtedly trace such attacks to their origin and give you the full details. I doubt whether the Personnel Security Committee of OWI would be able to trace such attacks, rooted in the intricacies of Chinese factional politics, to their source; but I should not like to see us placed in a position where, after getting rid of people now attacked, we would be forced to hire people who would actually be the nominees of factions not under our control.

It is for this reason that I have written this long letter to urge you to report to our Personnel Security Committee the necessity for exercising pronounced agnosticism when any of our Chinese personnel are attacked.

In the meantime I am doing my best to check over our Chinese personnel in San Francisco.

Once more I urge you to observe the strictest confidence in acting on this letter, because in certain quarters it might be considered that I am under a moral obligation to see that OWI is staffed with Chinese who take their orders from some source other than the American Government.

Yours,

OWEN LATTIMORE,  
*Director, Pacific Operations.*

Mr. MORRIS. Was Chu Hong, who was mentioned in that letter, an employee of the OWI?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. What position did he hold?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember the classification of his position. He was an assistant translator to Dr. Chi.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know if he was also known as Chu Tong?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; that is the same man.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, that is admitted into the record is it not?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Was there a fixed policy determined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Office of War Information would not engage in any attacks upon the Emperor or his family?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe there was such a ruling. I don't remember whether it came from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever violate this directive or this ruling directly or indirectly?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever try to make use of an attack by Sun Fu on the Emperor?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I believe that was quoted in part in a broadcast from San Francisco.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you responsible for that broadcast?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was responsible as head of the San Francisco office; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Was not that an attack on the Emperor?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony that it was not an attack on the Emperor?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My testimony is that it was not. My understanding is that that ruling was that there should be no American attacks on the Japanese Emperor. This, as I remember, was criticism of some sort. I don't remember the wording of the Sun Fu article, nor do I remember what was quoted. But this was quoted as a Chinese opinion on the subject.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony, Mr. Lattimore, that you felt that the directive which forbade an attack on the Emperor was a prohibition against American attacks on the Emperor?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is my belief; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And you felt that you could use this attack by Sun Fu, inasmuch as it was not an attack by an American on the Emperor.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe it was a criticism of some sort. I am not sure I would use the word "attack."

Mr. MORRIS. You would change the word from attack to criticism of the Emperor?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, or the Emperor system or something. I would have to see the original wording to remember what it was all about.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony, Mr. Lattimore, that you interpreted the Joint Chiefs of Staff ruling that there be no attacks or criticisms of the Emperor or his family, in such a way that you felt you could use an attack originated by Sun Fu over the Office of War Information transmitters?

Mr. LATTIMORE. And I believe that that was——

The CHAIRMAN. I want an answer to that, yes, or no, before you explain it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The answer is "Yes," and I believe that that was checked with Washington at the time.

Mr. MORRIS. Did a Mr. Clay Osborne ever protest your actions in connection with this directive?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; he did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who was Clay Osborne at the time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He was head of the Japanese desk in San Francisco.

Mr. SOURWINE. Of OWI?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Of OWI; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he resign as a result of the difficulty that he had with you at that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; he did.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me get that answer and that question. Did he resign as a result of the difficulty that he had with you at that time? Your answer was "Yes, he did." Is that right?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, I wonder if you would, just for the sake of completing the record here, answer a few questions in connection with the time you spent out of the country.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. You were born in Washington, were you not, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you first leave the country, as a child?

Mr. LATTIMORE. At the age of 10 or 11 months, I believe.

Mr. MORRIS. Where did you go then?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Where or when? My parents took me to Shanghai, China.

Mr. MORRIS. How long did you remain in China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Until, I think it was 1912.

Mr. MORRIS. Then you left China and you went to what country?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Then I left China and went to Switzerland, where I was in school for 2 years.

Mr. MORRIS. That would be from 1912 until 1914.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. And you were at that time, 12 and 14 years of age.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. You were born in 1900.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you then come back to the United States?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I first came back to the United States in 1928, I would say.

Mr. MORRIS. Where were you from 1914 to 1928?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In 1914 I went to England and I remained at school in England until very near the end of 1919, and then made an attempt to go back to China via America, but owing to the postwar shipping shortage in England, I was able to get a passage via Suez before I could get one via America, so I went back to China via Suez, arriving there at the end of 1919. I remained in China until 1926, when I started on a journey overland, through Mongolia and Chinese Central Asia, into India, which I reached toward the end of 1927. My wife and I then spent the winter of 1927-28 principally in Rome, Italy. Then we returned to America through France and England.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you marry, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. 1926.

Mr. MORRIS. And you married Eleanore Holgate?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. That brings us up to what year?

Mr. LATTIMORE. 1928.

Mr. MORRIS. Where were you in 1928, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In 1928, the beginning of 1928, I was in Italy. Then I returned through France and England to this country.

Mr. MORRIS. And that was now late 1928?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I think it was the spring of 1928. May I check with my wife on that?

Mr. MORRIS. How long did you stay in the United States?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Until 1929, when I went out to China and Manchuria.

Mr. MORRIS. How long did you stay in China and Manchuria?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Until the summer of 1933.

Mr. MORRIS. And it was then that you first made arrangements to be the editor of Pacific Affairs?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; in the summer of 1933 I came back to this country and then I went up to Banff to the conference of the IPR in Canada, then in the fall we went to New York, and it was in the late fall of 1933 that Mr. Carter took up the question of my becoming editor of Pacific Affairs.

Mr. MORRIS. How long did you remain in the United States from that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In the fall of 1934 I went back to China.

Mr. MORRIS. And how long did you stay in China on that tour?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Through 1935 and until the spring of 1936, when I returned to the United States via Russia, Holland, and England.

Mr. MORRIS. During the period of 1934 to the last time, did you ever encounter a man named Thompson, an attorney who was a partner of Clarence Darrow?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I did.

Mr. MORRIS. You don't believe so?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall that name at all.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you continue with that itinerary, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Then——

The CHAIRMAN. You have him up to what, now?

Mr. LATTIMORE. 1936. In the fall of 1936 I went to London, where I stayed for between 3 and 4 months, and then at the beginning of 1937, my wife and I returned to China via the Suez, and we remained in China from the spring of 1937 until about the beginning of December 1937. We then returned to the United States.

Mr. MORRIS. You stayed in the United States until——

Mr. LATTIMORE. We stayed in the United States, let me see, I think it was almost Christmas 1937 when we arrived in San Francisco, and we remained in the United States until 1941, when I went out to China, at least I think that is right. No; 1939, I made a journey to—we spent the summer vacation in Sweden and Norway.

Mr. MORRIS. And then you stayed in the United States?

Mr. LATTIMORE. And then stayed in the United States until 1941 when I went out to China to work for Chiang Kai-shek.

Mr. MORRIS. And you say that you had booked a passage on December 7, that is December 8 across the date line, for Hong Kong?

Mr. LATTIMORE. From Hong Kong.

Mr. MORRIS. You had booked passage from Hong Kong, but at that time you were in Chungking?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was in Chungking; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever go to Hong Kong?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I didn't. I was to fly from Chungking to Hong Kong and catch the Pan American Clipper there.

Mr. MORRIS. And you say your passage from Chungking to Hong Kong was canceled?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the reason for the cancellation, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In the small hours of the morning, one of the Generalissimo's aides rang me up and told me that Pearl Harbor had been bombed and that I shouldn't go to Hong Kong.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, I offer you here a list of writings compiled by the Library of Congress, writings of yours. I ask you if you will take these. There is no need to do it now, but take these and check to see that that is a fair list and that everything purportedly written there by you actually was written by you, and then so advise the committee. Then we might like to have that, Mr. Chairman, introduced into the records as a list of Mr. Lattimore's writings.

Mr. LATTIMORE. There seems to be a Mexican edition of one of my books. I didn't know that existed.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you make the offer on that at a later time, after it is checked by Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes; I will.

The CHAIRMAN. It will have to be.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, just one other thing, you have a son David Lattimore, have you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he attend the World Youth Festival in Prague in 1947?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; he did.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you aid him in making plans to attend that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes. Well, actually, he went with a school group. And the plans were made through the school.

Mr. MORRIS. Was the World Youth Festival, as far as you know, a Communist project?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; we didn't understand it to be so at the time. There were delegations from all kinds of non-Communist countries.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you subsequently found out that it was a Communist project?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. The Communist delegations were very active at the time, but I wouldn't be able to characterize it as a Communist project.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know who accompanied David on that trip?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Several people from his own school.

Mr. MORRIS. Who were they?

Senator EASTLAND. What school was it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The school was Putney School in Vermont, and the head of the school, Mrs. Hinton, also went to Czechoslovakia that summer.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was Bertha Hinton?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Her daughter.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know whether Bertha Hinton was the one who was the identifying witness who gave the State Department, when he applied for his passport, gave him an affidavit of identification?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't know that. Bertha Hinton was a daughter-in-law of Mrs. Hinton, not a daughter.

Mr. MORRIS. How was she related to Joan Hinton?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Joan Hinton was her daughter. They were sisters-in-law.

Mr. MORRIS. I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson?

Senator FERGUSON. What did you learn about this youth meeting that your son went to?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not very much.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you try to learn something about it before your son went?

Mr. LATTIMORE. We wrote to a woman in the YWCA, in New York—wasn't it? And asked about the World Youth Congress, and she wrote back that they did not consider it Communist and they were sending a delegation from the YWCA.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the search that you made before you allowed your son to go?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. How old was your son at the time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. 1947—that would be 16.

Senator FERGUSON. Who went with your son?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He went with the school group.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know a boy by the name of Michael Sloan?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; he was a schoolmate of my son's.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he go?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; he went.

Senator FERGUSON. Had your son traveled alone before on trips like this?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He had gone on school trips.

Senator FERGUSON. Abroad?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not abroad; no.

Senator FERGUSON. This is the first time abroad?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Who paid his expenses?

Mr. LATTIMORE. We did.

Senator FERGUSON. Not the school?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not the school; no.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you investigate the meeting afterward?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. So your inquiry was to the YMCA.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. And they said it was not a Communist meeting?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. And the son went, and came back, and that is all you know about it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. ARNOLD. YWCA, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it the YWCA?

Mr. LATTIMORE. YWCA, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. How many people went from the United States?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have any idea?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, he does not know.

Senator FERGUSON. I did want you to find in this report that you handed me, on page 76, you state it starts, a report on the Moscow meeting?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, there is no—I wrote no specific report on the Moscow meeting.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not even mention it, did you? I think I went over every line.

The CHAIRMAN. You are referring to what?

Senator FERGUSON. A report that he brought in today, saying that I had requested the report that he referred to in his statement, no, it is in his book, *Ordeal by Slander*, that he obtained up at New York, from Mr. Carter.

Mr. LATTIMORE. It was before I came back from Afghanistan. My wife was given it by Mr. Carter.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, but where is the report that your wife was given by Mr. Carter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. This is it.

Senator FERGUSON. About Moscow; where is the Moscow matter in there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. This is simply a general report presented at the international meeting of the Institute of Pacific Relations in 1936, and it takes up the whole question of editorial policy, and gives the point of view of various countries.

The CHAIRMAN. You have been asked for the report of the Moscow meeting. Is it in there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; there is no report on the Moscow meeting. Mr. Carter's report is also in this volume, and he mentions it.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know when the report was printed?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In 1936, I presume.

Senator FERGUSON. When were you in Moscow?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In the spring of 1936. This was printed after the Yosemite meeting.

Senator FERGUSON. We have what purports to be minutes of the Moscow meeting, and I understood that you had a report that you had made on the Moscow meeting. Where is anything in here about the Moscow meeting?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What did you call for, Senator, when you asked him to bring in this exhibit that he has in his hands?

Senator FERGUSON. I understood that he had some minutes or he had a report that he made on the Moscow meeting.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; that is a misapprehension.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you have none on that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I never wrote one.

Senator FERGUSON. You never made one?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Never made one, no.

Senator FERGUSON. Did anybody else ever make one?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Carter here, in his report as Secretary General, to which my report as editor is appended, states:

Since the Banff conference, I have visited the Soviet Union three times, in June and December 1934, and again in April 1936. In addition to long conferences with members of the Soviet Council regarding problems of research, publication, administration, conference preparation, finance, library exchanges and participation in Pacific Affairs, the Soviet Council has arranged for me to visit the headquarters of a number of research institutions working on Far Eastern and Pacific problems—

et cetera.

Senator FERGUSON. He does not mention you being there.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; he does not mention anyone except himself.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that all he says about the Moscow meeting?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Do you remember if there is anything else there?

Mr. MORRIS. May I ask one question while we are waiting?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. I am trying to get this exhibit connected up here. The Senator from Michigan called for his writing on the Moscow meetings, as I understand it.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not understand that that is what I wanted?

The CHAIRMAN. He brought this exhibit in saying this is what the Senator called for.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Here is part of Mr. Carter's report, page 144, the heading is "Editor of Pacific Affairs." [Reading:]

During the winter following the Banff conference, Mr. Lattimore spoke before the branches of the Canadian Institute in Montreal, Ottawa, Toronto, and Hamilton and at the Empire Club in Toronto.

During 1935 he spoke before IPR groups in Honolulu; Pan-Pacific Club, Shanghai; the Rotary Club and the College of Chinese Studies, Peking.

In 1936 he spoke at the Academy of Science, Moscow, and under IPR auspices in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. He also lectured at the Royal Anthropological Institute, the Central Asian Society, and the Royal Institute of International Affairs, in London.

Senator FERGUSON. That does not give us a report on the meeting that the IPR had with the Russians in Moscow, does it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think that is covered, sir—there is simply some reference to long conferences.

Senator FERGUSON. What page was that on?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Page 23, I think.

Senator FERGUSON. I do not want to put the whole book in the record. Will you read that?

The CHAIRMAN. Does that refer to a Moscow meeting? Does your answer say that the book refers to the Moscow meeting?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, it mentions April 1936.

Senator FERGUSON. What does it say?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It is the section that I read about before.

Senator FERGUSON. You read it. All right, it is in the record.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes. And there is—

Senator FERGUSON. The correspondence in the minutes seemed to show a turning point in the activities of the IPR. Where did you ever make a report to the trustees about that turning point?

Mr. LATTIMORE. A turning point?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. You remember the testimony, where they talked about the party line.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir, it isn't the party line.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, they talked about a line.

Mr. LATTIMORE. They talked about an anti-Japanese line. They talked about mentioning Japan as an aggressor.

Senator FERGUSON. And afterward, you struck certain paragraphs, because they were critical of communism. You put editor's notes in certain articles afterward. Where did you ever report to the trustee about the change of the course that IPR was going to have?

Mr. LATTIMORE. There was no change of course, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you report to the trustees?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The only report that I recall ever writing is the one that is in this volume here.

Senator FERGUSON. And that begins on page 76.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. And there is not a word about the Russian conference in Moscow, is there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, there is a reference, however, to the different points of view about publication of controversial articles, and the question of editorial responsibility, the question of the functions and powers of national correspondence, and so on.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is, is there any word about Moscow?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever report to the trustees on the Moscow conference?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all I have.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, you were in India in 1949, were you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. While in India, did you meet with Mr. Nehru?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, I did.

Mr. MORRIS. How long was your meeting with Mr. Nehru?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I landed in New Delhi at dawn, I had lunch that day with Mr. Nehru. Then I saw him once or twice at public receptions. I also—

The CHAIRMAN. How long was your meeting with Mr. Nehru, is the question, and I think you can state that in terms of time.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, I remember having dinner with him twice, and staying for a considerable period after dinner talking. I wouldn't be able to say exactly how much in hours.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, who arranged your luncheon appointment with Mr. Nehru?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe the Indian Ambassador here, his sister, Madame Pandit, telegraphed out to him that I was coming and he was therefore notified as soon as I arrived.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you see Mr. Solomon Trone in India?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he instrumental in arranging any of the meetings with Mr. Nehru?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; he was not. On one occasion Mr. Nehru, at a reception, at his house, took me and Mr. and Mrs. Trone and his top Indian economics adviser into a small room and we sat there and talked for about maybe a half hour or an hour.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you proffer any advice to Mr. Nehru on the policy that India should take?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir. I was asked some questions about economic parallels between India and China and responded to those questions.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you leave any memoranda with Mr. Nehru?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. MORRIS. I have no more questions along those lines.

The CHAIRMAN. I sent a note down to counsel just a minute ago. Maybe he cannot read my writing. I would not blame him if he didn't.

Mr. ARNOLD. Monday would be very, very inconvenient, and I couldn't make it. It would be very inconvenient.

The CHAIRMAN. Very inconvenient?

Mr. ARNOLD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Monday is the regular meeting day of the Judiciary Committee.

Gentlemen, we will have to recess this committee at this time, on account of other matters that must be taken up. Mr. Sourwine will want to interrogate this witness for several hours on questions that he has prepared growing out of the record. We will be unable to meet on Monday, if counsel cannot be here conveniently, and just what day we can meet on account of the other committees, the Chair is not able to state at this time. But counsel will be advised in ample time so that he can be here at his convenience. We will try to meet your convenience.

Mr. ARNOLD. I appreciate that very much, Mr. Chairman, and any other day but Monday of that week—

The CHAIRMAN. We will try and work it out. This committee also has its members on appropriations and other committees and they are meeting from time to time. We have to try and straddle the time so as to get in as much time on this and wind it up as quickly as possible. Is there any suggestion as to time? I do not like to put it to the call of the Chair, because that is an indefinite time, and yet that is about the only way that I can put it at this time, in view of the fact that we can't make a date certain. Would that be satisfactory to you, Counsel?

Mr. ARNOLD. Yes, sir; there are three of us there. Mr. Fortas is in Texas. The other gentleman is before the Commission, and I have some rather important matters to study. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. The only way I can express it is that I will call you at the proper time.

Mr. ARNOLD. How about the other matter?

The CHAIRMAN. I will make a ruling on this other matter later on. We will recess subject to call.

(Whereupon, the hearing was recessed subject to call of the Chair.)

# INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

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FRIDAY, MARCH 21, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,  
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION  
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL  
SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,  
*Washington, D. C.*

The subcommittee met at 2 p. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Hon. Pat McCarran, chairman, presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran, O'Connor, Smith, and Ferguson.

Also present: Senator McCarthy.

J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel, and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in session.

Senator FERGUSON. Before we start the testimony, Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask Mr. Lattimore, do you have the quotations you mentioned in the statement you read to Freda Utley's utterances that you say she was pro-Nazi?

## TESTIMONY OF OWEN LATTIMORE, ACCOMPANIED BY HIS COUNSEL, ABE FORTAS—Resumed

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I have not completed my collection on revision of those statements yet.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you file them as part of your sworn testimony in the record?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Surely.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Sourwine, you may proceed.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, there are several loose ends which should be taken care of, I believe, before we proceed today with direct interrogation. The Chair will recall the question of certain deeds of property by Mr. Lattimore and Mrs. Lattimore and the authentication thereof. I now hold the photostats of those deeds and the authentication is on the back of each one by Mr. Robert E. Bundy, town clerk, in accordance with the form and traditional practice of the jurisdiction. I submit the Chair may at this time wish to order they now be inserted in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bundy certifies that the kodagraph reflex copy on the reverse side thereof is an accurate reproduction of a record in book 38, page 481 of said Bethel Land Records. That appears on each of the documents with that authentication. They will be admitted for the record.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits No. 555A, No. 555B, and No. 555C." See p. 3565 for exhibits.)

The CHAIRMAN. There was another matter that I think the Chair did not pass on that it seems to me might be well to have now.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I believe the Chair has reference to certain material which was offered for the record by Mr. Lattimore at an earlier date. In connection with some of that, there was mentioned earlier, but it did not go in the record at that time some material, and one of the items submitted by Mr. Lattimore was an excerpt from a speech by Representative Mike Mansfield of Montana, which, according to Mr. Lattimore's note, appears in the Congressional Record, volume 91, IV, page 4900, May 22, 1945.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair raised the question at that time as to whether or not the excerpts were taken out of context.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. It is submitted and the record will speak for itself on that question.

I request permission of the Chair to read into the record at this time a portion of the material which the staff considers to be the context in which these particular excerpts appear.

The CHAIRMAN. With the idea of admitting the excerpts?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You may do so.

Mr. SOURWINE. I will indicate to the chair when we come to the excerpt submitted by Mr. Lattimore. This is the one from the speech by Congressman Mike Mansfield:

#### EXHIBIT No. 595

The Chinese Communists or the Kungchantang—share-in-production party—are also an important factor affecting relations between the Soviet Union and China. The Chinese Communists number about 90,000,000 in the 15 autonomous areas under their control.

Now begins the excerpt offered by Mr. Lattimore:

They are, at the present time, more reformists than revolutionists and they represent the peasant revolt that has often characterized the long years of Chinese history. They have made many reforms in agricultural areas relative to the reduction of rent, taxes, and interest rates. Local democracy is practiced and many cooperatives have been organized. The Chinese Communists collect their own taxes, make their laws, and issue their paper money. They maintain a separate state economically, politically, and militarily, and they have rendered valiant service in the war against the Japanese. Possibly 16 divisions of Nationalist troops of Chiang Kai-shek, under Hu Tsangnan, have been used to blockade the Communist area. The Soviet Union does not send aid to these regions of China. However, the future policy of the Soviet toward the Chinese Communists is problematical. It may be that the divide between Kuomintang, and Communist China may have repercussions in the relations between Chiang Kai-shek and Stalin.

The question of Chinese disunity is very important to us. If China can achieve unity—and the prospects at present are doubtful—she can then be in a strong position at the final peace conference and eventually in fact as well as in theory, become a great power and thus powerful enough to maintain the peace in her part of the world.

If, on the other hand, this unity is not soon achieved, the position of China and ourselves will become extremely difficult. The U. S. S. R. will, in my opinion, enter the war against Japan. When that happens the Soviets will, as a matter of geographical propinquity, depend on and render such aid as is necessary to the Chinese Communists because they will be in a good position to attack Japanese concentrations and because there has been and will be in the future—unless Chinese unity is achieved—ideological sympathies which will draw the two together. Should this happen it is quite possible that there would exist in China two separate and distinct states in the postwar period. One would be allied to and, in a sense, dependent on Russia; the other would be, in a sense,

anti-Russian but would be dependent on itself for survival and not on any outside power. I cannot envisage, if this comes to pass, the United States maintaining more than a passive interest in Chinese affairs because to do otherwise would place us in an extremely embarrassing position.

Mr. Chairman, I recall that I did not note the point at which the excerpt offered by Mr. Lattimore ended. It ended with the words "in the war against the Japanese."

Senator O'CONNOR. That is difficult to follow. Can you read the excerpt itself?

Mr. SOURWINE. The excerpt by Mr. Lattimore is this:

They are, at the present time, more reformists than revolutionists and they represent the peasant revolt that has often characterized the long years of Chinese history. They have made many reforms in agricultural areas relative to the reduction of rents, taxes, and interest rates. Local democracy is practiced and many cooperatives have been organized. The Chinese Communists collect their own taxes, make their laws, and issue their paper money. They maintain a separate state economically, politically, and militarily, and they have rendered valiant service in the war against the Japanese.

That was the end of the excerpt offered by Mr. Lattimore.

In connection with that, I would like to ask Mr. Lattimore a couple of questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you regard Mike Mansfield as an expert on Asia or any portion of Asia?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know whether I could answer that question "Yes" at the present time, Mr. Sourwine.

My recollection is that speech of his was made just after he had returned from a visit to China, where he went for the purpose of informing himself.

Mr. SOURWINE. You offered the excerpt as an indication of what he thought at that time rather than an indication of what the fact was?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I offered it as an indication of rather widely held opinions at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. The question is on the admission of it, Mr. Chairman. It has been read in full.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted in its entirety so it will not be taken out of context.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 595" and was read in full by counsel.)

Mr. SOURWINE. The next offer that was made by Mr. Lattimore was two excerpts from a reprint of a column by Ernest Lindley in the Washington Post December 7, also a reference to Congressional Record, volume 91, part 13, page A5388.

Mr. FORTAS. The year?

Mr. SOURWINE. December 10, 1945, remarks of Walter A. Judd. It appears that Mr. Judd did make certain remarks. The two excerpts offered by Mr. Lattimore are as follows:

\* \* \* some honest American observers who cannot be accused of Comintern connections think the Chinese Communists are the best foundation on which to build a united and democratic China. \* \* \*

The real question is: Can China best be unified by unconditional support of the Central Government or by the use of American influence, with the consent of the government powers, to bring together the Central Government and the Chinese Communists and—still more important—democratic groups in China which are presently unarmed? The second choice is the better. It may not succeed. But it should be more thoroughly explored and more deftly pursued.

If the Chair would permit, I should like to read a page and a half which shows that material fully in context.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. SOURWINE. This is from the extension of remarks of the Honorable Walter A. Judd, of Minnesota, in the House of Representatives on Monday, December 10, 1945, taken from an article by Ernest Lindley, which appeared in the Washington Post on December 7, 1945, which was entitled, "How Aid China?"

#### EXHIBIT No. 596

\* \* \* The cry "Hands off" is coming, within the United States, principally from two groups: The unreconstructed isolationists and active supporters of the Chinese Communists. This is an odd alliance. The only characteristic with its two elements seem to have in common is indifference to the interests of the United States and to organization of a stable peace.

This observation must carry two qualifications.

Now we come into the quote by Mr. Lattimore:

The first is that some honest American observers who cannot be accused of Comintern connections think the Chinese Communists are the best foundation on which to build a united and democratic China. They were overruled, however, by Roosevelt, who consistently regarded Chiang Kai-shek as the better bet.

#### NEEDS DEFT HANDLING

The second qualification is, of course, that no one wants American lives expended in a civil conflict within China. It might as well be recognized that prevention of another major conflict will involve the risk of lives—only a tiny fraction, however, of those which would be lost in another great war. At the same time, every effort should be, and is being, made to keep American troops out of the lines of fire in China. Our aid should be confined to weapons and supplies followed by help in developing transportation and manufacturing.

"Hands off" is a complete negation. It is an abandonment of a historic policy at the very time it has been accepted by other major powers, and therefore has its best chance of fruition.

The real questions is: Can China best be unified by unconditional support of the Central Government or by the use of American influence, with the consent of the other great powers, to bring together the Central Government and the Chinese Communists and—still more important—democratic groups in China which are presently unarmed? The second choice is the better. It may not succeed. But it should be more thoroughly explored and more deftly pursued.

Might I ask Mr. Lattimore a couple of questions there?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was this offered for the purpose of showing a situation as it existed or showing what Mr. Lindley thought about it at the time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It was offered, Mr. Sourwine, as a sample of well-informed discussion and opinion in Washington at the time.

Mr. SOURWINE. It may be, sir; I have asked you this question before, but in your opinion were either of these excerpts offered by you taken out of context?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I thought they were sufficiently in context.

Mr. SOURWINE. That second one is before the Chair as to ruling of admissibility.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted in its entirety.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 596" and was read in full by counsel.)

Mr. SOURWINE. The Chair also has before it for consideration certain material offered by Mr. Lattimore, one, a page and a half, headed, "Who said the Chinese Communists were not real Communists?", being a quotation from Mr. Patrick J. Hurley and Freda Uteley; a

letter on the stationery of the Chinese history project, addressed "Dear Owen," another letter also addressed "Dear Owen" and signed "Karl August," apparently from Mr. Wittfogel, who appeared before this committee; a third and fourth letter also so addressed and so signed, an excerpt from a book by Alexander Barmine—

Mr. FORTAS. Was that first letter from Mr. Wittfogel?

Mr. SOURWINE. The four are from Wittfogel, letters of March 4, 1945; April 7, 1940; November 2, 1941. That one is headed, and the other one is headed, "Sunday night midnight" and has written on it in pencil "1941"; and a document consisting of three and a half pages headed "Who wanted to recognize Red China," containing what purports to be quotes from a number of sources.

The complete accuracy of quotations in that regard the staff has not had time to determine, Mr. Chairman, and they are offered by Mr. Lattimore. It is respectfully suggested that the Chair might wish to rule that this material be printed in the appendix of the record. It is not sworn testimony, but that it be printed in the appendix of the record and footnoted back to the point at which it was offered by Mr. Lattimore.

The CHAIRMAN. I think the offer should be divided. Some of it could be admitted. Wittfogel's could be admitted in all probability.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does the Chair wish to rule?

The CHAIRMAN. I think that can be divided and admitted.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 597 A, B, C, D," and are as follows: The other documents referred to were marked "Exhibits 475, 476, and 477" and appear in appendix I, pt. 10, pp. 3703 through 3706.)

#### EXHIBIT No. 497-A

Sponsors: America Council of The Institute of Pacific Relations, New York City; International Institute of Social Research, New York City. Director: Karl August Wittfogel. Advisory Committee: Homer H. Dubs, Duke University; L. Carrington Goodrich, Columbia University; Ralph Linton, Columbia University; Karl H. Menges, Columbia University; R. H. Tawney, London School of Economics; George E. Taylor, University of Washington; James R. Ware, Harvard University

### CHINESE HISTORY PROJECT

Low Memorial Library

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

NEW YORK, N. Y.

Tel. University 4-3200, Ext. 593

420 RIVERSIDE DRIVE, March 4, 1945.

DEAR OWEN: I have delayed writing my weekly Sunday letters for hours because I could not tear myself away from your Asiatic "solution." By watching my *action*, not my *words*, you can judge how great the power of attraction of your new book is. You are really an expert to end all experts. I have not read anything for a long time, that made me think so much about the various aspects of the postwar world. This is a fascinating story, one, which, I hope, will be read much and intensely, because you certainly show that the political leaders have to act quickly, wisely, and boldly, or else. \* \* \* You do not say much about world war No. III, leaving this wisely to the brass hats and brass minds. You say less about No. IV and V—in my opinion, many questions may not be decided before and during III (as the short-sighted brass brains think, who have no long historical breadth), but only before and during IV—or after, but I am sure, you are right, as *solid* a peace has to be made as *possible* in this most artfully balanced of all worlds. The breath-taking picture of a world dancing ballet on a swinging tight rope emerged clearly from your masterly pen.

This and many more questions have been stirred up by your book. Maybe, I shall have a chance once to interview you about all those things which I do not know, but would like to learn through discussion with you.

But beyond and before all this—what about the slightly more remote affairs of the Liao empire? When I discussed your preface the last time with you, you suggested 1945, when the book would be done and the conferences over. It is 1945 now, what about getting the thing done? You remember that Tawney thought the manuscripts should be studied for several weeks before an introduction could be written. This is thoroughness, but it also reflects the fact that Tawney is far from Inner Asia. You are at home, where he would be a newcomer. I am sure, you can go over the stuff much faster. How would it be, if you came here for a day or two, to see whether you can get through with it. If not, we might see, whether some part of the ms. could be sent to your home for a couple of days (we are somewhat in difficulty, and this is one of the reasons why I suggest your working over the ms. here, at least for one, or two, or three days).

I know you have many friends here with whom you might wish to stay, but I am sure you know also that you are most welcome to stay in our miserable guest room, when and if that suits you.

Again, my very warmest thanks for the book. May it shake the people from their slumber. It has the power to do so. There are, as I said before, a few questions, where I should like to ask for further explanation or where I beg to differ, but as a whole, you certainly did a marvelous job.

Yours ever,

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#### EXHIBIT No. 497B

Officers: Philip C. Jessup, Chairman; Wallace M. Alexander, Vice Chairman; Miss Ada L. Comstock, Vice Chairman; Benjamin H. Kizer, Vice Chairman; Philip W. Parker, Vice Chairman; Robert Gordon Sproul, Vice Chairman; Ray Lyman Wilbur, Vice Chairman; Frederick V. Field, Secretary; Francis S. Harmon, Treasurer; Miss Hilda Austern, Assistant Treasurer

AMERICAN COUNCIL, INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, INC.

1795 California Street, San Francisco. Telephone: TUXedo 3114; 129 East 52nd Street, New York City. Telephone: PLaza 3-4700. Cable: INPAREL

NEW YORK, April 7, 1940.

DEAR OWEN: I want to congratulate you on the new opus. It is out, I got it, it *looks* fine, it *is* fine. I have been going through it, and I have been reading many parts, some of them twice, and I must say I like it very much indeed. Although I had seen the manuscript and studied it, the book is so rich and so intelligent that it seems a new book to me with many things to learn and many more to think about. You have enriched the literature on your subject, of which I am just consuming a great deal for my Liao prefaces, very much indeed. The book has substance, style, vision. It is much more than just a synthesis of old stuff, it contains much little known material and it coordinates it under fresh and stimulating viewpoints. Congratulations again. ((pencilled note) I am sure it will be a standard work in its field.)

I have shown the copy which I got from the Society—as its member, not as your friend—I have shown it to our office, and they all seem excited about it. Dr. Goodrich hopes that you will let him have a copy, since he, as he said, read the proofs for you. If that is so, it might not be a bad idea at all to let him have a copy.

I am very busy, Owen, but I would love to see you. At that oriental meeting we read our three papers, Yu-ch'uan on the *chun* of Ch'in, Feng on the social stratification of Liao, I on the early institutions of China in the light of modern anthropology. The papers seem to have been all right.

Liao is almost finished, as far as Feng is concerned, but not as far as Karl August. I am working hard over the text and the footnotes; there is still much to be done. Han is in the making now, and so is Chin. I begin to understand more about the barbarian world of China's frontier than I did ever before. That is probably the reason why my mind is so open to the message which your new book has to give.

Love to all of you. When do we meet?

Yours cordially,

/S/ Karl August.  
/T/ KARL AUGUST.

125 RIVERSIDE DRIVE,  
BETWEEN 84 AND 85TH STREET,  
Friday, April 12, 40.

(Address and arrow pencilled)

DEAR OWEN: These are most pleasant news. I am very glad to learn that you are coming to New York next week. Do not go to a hotel. My little apartment upstairs 10-D is at your disposal, a bedroom, the study, and the bath. Unfortunately we have taken away the telephone, because I practically do not use it. If you have friends whom you want to ring you up, please give them just *our number* (downstairs): Trafalgar 7-2871.

Have any meals with us which you are free to take at home, particularly the breakfast and, whenever you can, the dinner, although it seems from your letter that the two evenings are taken. If so, that is all right. You must do whatever you have to do. Please consider our house just as a convenient lodging place with full freedom for all your movements.

I am so happy to see you soon here, so is Esther. I hope we shall have at least some chance for a little personal talk. I want you to see our Liao stuff. Chia-sheng and Yu-chuan will both be very proud to get your book.

Love to all of you.

Yours always,

[s] KARL AUGUST.

(Penned:) Do you know when you will arrive? Our office telephone is Columbia: University 4-3200, extension 593 (or just ask for K. W. the girls know my name).

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EXHIBIT No. 597-C

CHINESE HISTORY PROJECT

Low Memorial Library

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

NEW YORK CITY

NOVEMBER 2, 1941.

DEAR OWEN: It was awfully good of you to send me a copy of your new book. Many, many thanks, Owen, and my most cordial congratulations for the prompt and smooth delivery of this baby. The book looks fine, and it reads fine. I feel—and I am sure any intelligent reader feels—that a unique amount of experience and thinking has gone into these pages. There are several points which I want to include into our Liao volume, but I have to settle down for a more thorough study first, which I am going to do next weekend.

The pictures are very striking, almost as good as the text, almost. I like your stories, and the little human features which make your tales so rich.

Lots of good luck for this one too.

Yours ever,

(s) Karl August.

(t) KARL AUGUST.

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EXHIBIT No. 597D

CHINESE HISTORY PROJECT

Low Memorial Library

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

NEW YORK CITY

SUNDAY NIGHT (MIDNIGHT) 1941.

DEAR OWEN: Having thought your letter over again—and several times so—I come to the conclusion that you were more right than not. What you miss, is a detailed presentation of the first part of the analysis. This I did not give, because it would have taken me months to get into all the historical material without a more detailed analysis of the *Asiatic* oriental societies cannot be given. But since people generally agree that waterworks are the foundation of the socioeconomic structure of Egypt as well as of Babylonia, the analysis with its "illus-

trations" which I *could* not give *now*, was not so urgently needed. America was not discovered from the standpoint of the theory, and America was easier. There, no huge historical records existed. An abbreviated analysis of the anthropological material was possible. This I have attempted.

I have dreamed of a thorough analysis of the great Asiatic societies in the style of *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* Chinas. Perhaps I may be able to do it later, perhaps somebody else will undertake it in the meantime. Let us hope so. Your critical remarks touched a sore spot, a wish of my own, one which I was not able to fulfil, at least not at the time being.

The oasis section should be added. This I knew, and in this respect I had written to you. During this week end I have re-read your *Inner Asian Frontiers* and *McGovern*. The reading of the two books made it clear again to me how absolutely superior *your* analysis and presentation is not only to his—he is a dwarf—but to practically everybody who has ventured into an analysis of *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* of the oasis. Your analysis really seems definite and classic. I shall follow it for whatever I may write about the Asiatic oases. I hope to be not too stupid a disciple.

Any wish or suggestion that I might enlarge the book to a considerable extent hurt me somewhat. I was very, very, very tired, Owen. If a marathon runner is at the end of his run and just at the edge of his physical collapse, then the kind of advice of a friend "come on, run faster, run further," cannot be received with enthusiasm. I am going to explain why the *first* part gives a concentrated and condensed picture of the basic mechanism only and why within the frame of this book no *elaborate* analysis can be given (but is not needed either) and why a more detailed analysis is added for the new and relatively simple field of America. This will clarify the situation and prepare the reader to expect what he is going to get, and nothing different. This and a better Maya chapter, and Spain, and the new Bureaucracy, and a chapter on the oasis is really all I may still be able to cheat out of my nerves and brains. Then I must fall back upon the end of Liao and the Ch'in-Han double volume.

Thank you for all the good your letter gave, Owen. I did not want to write a sad letter. I just did.

Love to all who like me.

Yours cordially,

[s] Karl August

[t] KARL AUGUST.

Mr. SOURWINE. These are photostats of letters which you had in your files?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. They were received by you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. The other we can pass on. Let us go ahead.

Senator FERGUSON. Before we start, Mr. Lattimore, you had brought in a report that you had mentioned in your book *Ordeal by Slander*.

Mr. LATTIMORE. My wife mentioned it.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; in her chapter, but you had adopted it by publication of the book; is that right?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. It also stated that Mr. Carter had issued a press release that he had shown you; is that correct?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe so. Yes; that is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. I assume you read that press release in the morning when you landed. The testimony said:

Mr. Carter gave me copies of the report he and Owen had made to the Institute of Pacific Relations about the Moscow visit and also a copy of a statement about it he had released to the press the night before.

Mr. FORTAS. That is a book?

Senator FERGUSON. One was the report, but the press release apparently you saw; is that correct?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember whether I saw that press release or not.

Senator FERGUSON. You approved this statement indicating that you were approving the press release?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I simply approved the chapter as my wife wrote it.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; and you adopted it as yours?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I adopted it as a contribution to my book.

The CHAIRMAN. You adopted it as yours is the question. Did you or not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know whether legally that constitutes adopting it as mine or not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you, as a matter of fact, adopt it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I included it as a contribution by my wife to my book.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever see the press release?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall whether I did or not. I read a great deal of stuff in a great hurry at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I want to offer in evidence the press release that was issued.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 598" and is read in full below.)

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask you to read it and then I will ask you questions about it later.

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

#### EXHIBIT No. 598

McCarthy charges "baseless," Carter says, in defense of his 1936 visit to Moscow.

This is from the New York Times, Friday, March 31, 1950, page 3 columns 2 and 3 [reading]:

Edward C. Carter, provost of the New School for Social Research and former secretary-general of the Institute of Pacific Relations, declared last night that he had visited the Soviet Union in 1936, but explained that the visit had been in connection with institute matters.

In a formal statement released from his office, Mr. Carter said that he had "not seen the full text of the remarks" in which Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, Republican, of Wisconsin, was "reported to have mentioned my name" in the Senate yesterday in Washington. He termed the Senator's charges in the case, as in other cases, as "baseless." Mr. Carter formerly headed Russian War Relief, Inc.

"I was in the midst of a series of visits to national councils of the Institute of Pacific Relations in the Far East and Europe" in 1936, Mr. Carter recalled. Owen Lattimore, he added, was homeward bound after a tour as editor of Pacific Affairs, the quarterly of the organization.

"Mr. Lattimore and I," Mr. Carter continued, "accepted an invitation to address a meeting of the Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union, where we spoke of our impressions of the far-eastern situation. During our visit we conferred with a considerable number of scholars who were specializing in far-eastern studies.

"We also conveyed to officers of the American Embassy in Moscow our impressions of conditions in countries we had visited. Upon my return to the United States I discussed details of my trip and conferences at length with officials of the State Department in Washington."

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, keeping in mind the file, the reports taken out of the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations about which you were questioned, do you think that is a fair analysis of that report?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I do. I think it is a fair summary of Mr. Carter's visit to the USSR.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think it outlined the real things that were down there and the people that were conferred with?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And the policy that was to be adopted and was adopted?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, I would not say that a policy was adopted. Questions of policy were discussed.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think this fairly sets out the questions that were discussed? .

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think it is a fair summary of the visit. It is not a report on the whole conference.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not the question. Answer that question.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think it fairly sets out the conferences you had?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; for a statement of its length, I think it is perfectly fair.

Senator FERGUSON. Wait a minute. "For a statement of its length." My question is, Do you think that fairly represents to the people of the United States what took place with you and Carter and the IPR and the people in Russia?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I think it does.

Senator FERGUSON. I notice there that he conveys the idea, and you carry it out in your book, because you refer to this press release that you conveyed to the officers of the American Embassy your impressions of the conditions in the countries "we had visited" and "upon my return to the United States I discussed details of my trip and conferences at length with officials of the State Department in Washington."

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I point out that falls into two parts.

Senator FERGUSON. It is all in one quotation.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your question, Senator?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Carter states: "We discussed with officials of the American Embassy in Washington," which is quite correct, or rather, in Moscow, which is quite correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Who were the officials you discussed it with?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Ambassador Bullitt; Mr. Angus Ward, who was, I think, the No. 2 man in the Embassy; I believe Mr. Loy Henderson was there at that time, too; and Colonel Faymonville, who was military attaché.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was the Ambassador?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Bullitt.

Senator FERGUSON. You discussed it with him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you discuss all the details?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. What does it say?

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading) :

We also conveyed to officers of the American Embassy in Moscow our impressions of conditions in countries we had visited.

Senator FERGUSON. How about the the next sentence?

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading) :

Upon my return to the United States I discussed details of my trip and conferences at length with officials of the State Department in Washington.

That refers to Carter and not myself.

Senator FERGUSON. That was conveying to the American people the details; in fact, everything that was discussed in Russia was discussed with our State Department; and that is the basis of saying McCarthy's charges were false because he came back here and discussed them in detail with the State Department. Is that correct?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I can't answer, Senator, for exactly what Mr. Carter meant when he was describing his own discussions with the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. You were referring in your book *Ordeal by Slander* to a press release and thereby adopting it, that you had been slandered, and you cited the press release. That is, you referred to it; that the details of everything that went on in Russia with you and Carter were discussed by the United States State Department.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator Ferguson, I am afraid I can't answer "Yes" to that.

Senator FERGUSON. Answer it any way you want to answer it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. My wife referred to the fact that Mr. Carter had shown her his press release. That is all.

Senator FERGUSON. You want to tell us here that, in going over this the morning you got back, you did not even check up on the press release, and you used it in the book; is that correct? You referred to it in the book?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My wife referred to the book, and I saw no need for checking on the original press release.

Senator FERGUSON. Thereby you adopted it?

The CHAIRMAN. Is that correct, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know. That is a legal question, Senator. I printed it in a book as a contribution by my wife.

Senator FERGUSON. You wanted the people to rely upon the book, did you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Certainly.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. There are still a few loose ends, Mr. Chairman. After that there will be a few unrelated questions, then the concluding questions of the series.

There is in our record as exhibit 539 an article entitled "Minorities in the Soviet Far East" by Owen Lattimore which appeared in the *Far Eastern Survey*, August 23, 1944, pages 156, 157, and 158. The question arose as to whether an article entitled "Minorities in the Soviet Far East" as it appears in the magazine *Soviet Culture in Wartime*, No. 3, 1945, being a magazine or pamphlet published by the American-Russian Institute, of 101 Post Street, San Francisco, was the same article.

Inquiry was made of Mr. Lattimore's attorney, and I now have a letter from Mr. Thurman Arnold acknowledging receipt of the enclosures which we sent him to identify the article and stating that Mr. Lattimore confirms that the article by him, *Minorities in the Soviet Far East*, as it appears in the magazine *Soviet Culture in Wartime*, No. 3, 1945, is the same as the article published by him in the *Far Eastern Survey*, issued August 23, 1944, pages 156 to 158.

I would simply like to have Mr. Lattimore confirm that on the record at this time if that is the fact. I have both the Far Eastern Survey and the photostat of the other article, if you want to see them again.

MR. LATTIMORE. No. I don't need to see them again. I confirm it is the same article.

You will note the reprint states that it is by permission of Far Eastern Survey.

MR. SOURWINE. That is correct. It carries at the bottom the notation: "By permission of the Far Eastern Survey, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations."

MR. LATTIMORE. I don't recall any permission was ever asked there; that I ever knew about the reprint being made.

MR. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, may the cover, the next page about the authors, and the table of contents, as they appear in the magazine Soviet Culture in Wartime, No. 3, 1945, be inserted into the record to establish that the article, Minorities in the Soviet Far East, did appear in such a publication and that it is the same as the article published by him in the Far Eastern Survey, issued August 23, 1944, pages 156 to 158.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be inserted into the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 598A" and is as follows:.) (For the article Minorities in the Soviet Far East, as published in the Far Eastern Survey, issue August 23, 1944, pp. 156 to 158, see p. 3462.)

# SOVIET CULTURE IN WARTIME

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## About THE AUTHORS

HOLLAND ROBERTS is President of the American Russian Institute and Director of Education of the California Labor School. Until recently he was Professor of Education at Stanford University. ✓

EUGENE MEDYNSKY is Doctor of Pedagogy and Professor of the History of Education at the Lenin Pedagogical Institute in Moscow.

ERNEST J. SIMMONS is Chairman of the Department of Slavic Languages at Cornell University and directed its *Intensive Study of Contemporary Russian Civilization*. He is the author of the definitive life of Pushkin and of many other works on Soviet literature.

OWEN LATTIMORE is Director of the Page School of International Relations and co-author ✓ of *The Making of Modern China*. He is author of numerous books and magazine articles on China and the Soviet Union. He is at present Far Eastern Consultant for the O.W.I.

PETER L. KAPITSA is Academician at the head of the Institute of Physical Problems of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R.

GREGORY ZILBOORG, M.D., is a New York psychiatrist. He is the author of a *History of Medical Psychology* and of *Mind, Medicine and Man*. ✓

ALEXANDER KORNEICHUK is the author of a number of plays and a Stalin Prize Winner. He is now Chairman of the Council on Arts of the Ukrainian Republic.

LEONID LEONOV is one of the great novelists and playwrights of the Soviet Union, and also a Stalin Prize Winner. His novel *Road to the Ocean* has just been published in English. ✓



COVER ILLUSTRATION: *Leningrad, the Cradle of Russian Classical Culture—The City of Peter, of Pushkin and of Chaikovsky.*

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*Drawings by Giacomo Patri*



*Edited by the Publications Committee of the American Russian Institute*

LOUISE R. BRANSTEN, Chairman

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, an offer was made by Mr. Lattimore for the record of a statement by General Chennault, and I believe Mr. Lattimore was allowed to read the statement into the record; is that correct?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe I was.

Mr. SOURWINE. I would like to inquire whether you regard General Chennault as an authority on what was taking place in the Far East at the time he was out there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I consider that he was an authority on that subject that he was writing about in that book.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not the question. Repeat the question, Mr. Reporter.

(The question referred to was read by the reporter.)

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say you do regard him as an authority on what he was writing about in that book. What do you mean by "that book"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The book from which I quoted. It is just another way of phrasing the question, as you put it, what he was writing about at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. By "that book," do you mean Way of a Fighter, by Claire Lee Chennault?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. You think he was an expert with regard to the matters he wrote about in that book?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, because of the identification of General Chennault as in the mind of this witness being an expert on these matters, I ask permission to read at this time the first page from the foreword to this book after which I will make an offer for admission into the appendix of the record the entire foreword. I think it is significant.

#### THE UNITED STATES IS LOSING THE PACIFIC WAR

Three years after VJ-day, this country is facing the loss of everything it won during the four bloody years it took to defeat Japan.

Mr. FORTAS. Could we have the date?

The CHAIRMAN. This was the book from which the excerpts were taken?

Mr. SOURWINE. This book is copyrighted 1949 by Claire Lee Chennault.

Mr. FORTAS. Thank you.

Mr. SOURWINE (reading) :

Here are the facts:

Gen. George C. Marshall told Congress in the spring of 1948 that if Manchuria were lost to the Chinese Communists, the United States position in southern Korea would be untenable.

Manchuria has been lost to the Chinese Communists.

General Marshall also told Congress that if the Chinese Communists controlled North China the United States position in Japan would be "extremely serious."

North China has been lost to the Chinese Communists.

Gen. Douglas MacArthur warned the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the fall of 1948 that if the Chinese Communists take the lower Yangtze Valley and Shanghai the American military bastion on Okinawa will be outflanked and his position in Japan will be as exposed and untenable as it was in the Philippines during 1941.

As this is written, the Chinese Communists are fighting toward the Yangtze at Nanking. They are aiming to force a Yangtze crossing and sweep to Shanghai.

A complete Communist victory in China will channelize the undercurrents of native unrest already swirling through Burma, India, Malaya, and Indonesia into another rising tide of Communist victories. The ring of Red bases can be stretched from Siberia to Saigon. Then the stage will be set for the unannounced explosion of World War III.

I ask, Mr. Chairman, because of its pertinency, not merely in connection with the portion I read, but throughout, that this foreword be ordered printed in the appendix of the record for the reference to this point in the main body.

The CHAIRMAN. This is the book from which an excerpt was taken by Mr. Lattimore and the author of which Mr. Lattimore says was an expert on Asiatic conditions at that time; is that correct?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the title?

Mr. SOURWINE. Way of a Fighter.

The CHAIRMAN. The offer may be received and it will be inserted in the record.

(The foreword of the book referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 599A and appears in appendix I, pt. 10, p. 3706.)

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, we come to the specific excerpt which Mr. Lattimore read in the record. I would like to ask permission to read into the record the portion before and behind it, immediately preceding and immediately following it in the book so that we may have it in the record in the context in which that lay. Also the last sentence of the paragraph in which that excerpt appears, since Mr. Lattimore did not read it.

Senator O'CONOR. I wonder if you would make clear the portion Mr. Lattimore quoted.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. This is on page 61, and begins chapter 5 of the book.

While American diplomats were busy prodding American airmen out of China, the Red Air Force arrived. The Russians sent four fighter and two bomber squadrons completely staffed and equipped to fight the Japs in China. They arrived in the fall of 1937, before the fall of Nanking, and stayed for a year and a half, leaving just a few months before the European war reached the shooting stage in the fall of 1939.

Now begins the portion read by Mr. Lattimore:

Soon after Japan attacked at Shanghai, the Chinese sent an official call for help to all the major powers. Only Russia responded. The Russians didn't pause to play partisan politics or trip over ideological folderol when their national interests were at stake in China. All of the Soviets' aid went to the Central Government of the Generalissimo. The Russians had had no love for the Generalissimo since the 1927 split when he drove the Russian-supported Chinese Communists from the Kuomintang and slaughtered them by the thousands. For nearly 20 years he fought a ruthless war of extermination against communism in China. The Russians sent their aid to the Generalissimo solely because he represented the strongest and most effective force opposing Japan and they supported him exclusively, ignoring the Chinese Communist Armies, which badly needed external support.

That is the conclusion of Mr. Lattimore's excerpt.

Japan had been preparing an attack on Russia for 20 years, and unnumbered shooting rehearsals had been held along the Siberian border. The Russians were willing to help anybody who was fighting and weakening Japan.

When Japanese bombs at Pearl Harbor blasted American officialdom into more than an academic interest in China, we would have done well to study Russian policy in China. Thus the United States might have avoided many of the tragic errors that turned American policy in China into a powerful ladle stirring anew the witches' broth of Chinese disunity and civil war.

Mr. Chairman, turning to another page in this book, I would like to ask Mr. Lattimore just one question.

Do you know whether the relations between General Stilwell and Chiang were cordial or strained?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe they were cordial at one time and strained later on.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, following that up, I should like to request insertion in the record at this point one paragraph marked here on page 316 of this book and five consecutively marked paragraphs beginning on page 317 and concluding on page 318, which deal with that question. I do not want to take the time of the committee to read them here now.

The CHAIRMAN. Dealing with what question?

Mr. SOURWINE. The relationship between Chiang and General Stilwell. That question has come up in connection with this investigation, and we have here the testimony of a man Mr. Lattimore considers to be an expert on the subject.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 599" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 599

WAY OF A FIGHTER, CLAIRE LEE CHENNAULT, EDITED BY ROBERT HOTZ, G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS, NEW YORK

(Pp. 316, 317, 318)

\* \* \* Although Stilwell was not seriously concerned with military problems in China, he did not hesitate to plunge into Chinese politics to further his ends. By the fall of 1943 his relations with top Chinese leadership were so bad that his recall was seriously considered. President Roosevelt wrote a note to Marshall pointing out that Stilwell appeared to have apparently "outlived his usefulness" in China and should be replaced. Marshall replied that he had no suitable substitute, and Stilwell stayed on for another critical year.

\* \* \* \* \*  
Stilwell's worst political excursion came during the summer and early fall of 1944 when he began using the Chinese Communist government of Yen-an as a lever to move the Generalissimo. Although Stilwell was never particularly interested in Chinese intelligence, he sent an official American military mission to the Communist capital at Yen-an in May 1944 for the alleged purpose of gathering intelligence. The Chinese Communists were then on extremely thin military and economic ice. Ever since the fighting between the Communist-controlled New Fourth Army and Central Government troops along the Yangtze in 1940, the main Communist armies had been bottled up in Shensi Province between the Japanese and Central Government. There they were militarily impotent and hard pressed to provide the bare necessities of life. Much has been written by gullible correspondents, some of them with pronounced Communist sympathies, regarding the vast military effort of the Chinese Communists against the Japanese. My experience indicated that the Communist military activities were confined largely to raiding small Japanese outposts for food and arms. When the Japanese were attacking Central Government troops, the Communists were generally content to stand idly by. It was significant that during the Honan campaign in the early spring of 1944 the Communist guerrillas did not sabotage a single Japanese troop train moving south down the Pinghan Railroad to the Yellow River. These trains passed through an area thick with Red guerrillas.

The American mission to Yen-an was hardly established before Stilwell's Chungking staff began to proclaim loudly the superiority of the Communist regime over the Chungking government. Contents of secret reports from the Yen-an mission were freely discussed over Chungking dinner tables by Stilwell's staff. No secret was made of their admiration for the Communists who, they said, were really only "agrarian reformers" and more like New Dealers than Com-

munists. The hue and cry charging the Generalissimo with "hoarding lend-lease arms" to fight the Communists was raised with renewed vigor along with the claim that China's best troops were being used to blockade the Communists instead of fighting the Japanese. After Stilwell was removed, Wedemeyer conducted an exhaustive survey of all Chinese army equipment and reported that not a single American gun or bullet had gone to Chinese armies east of Yunnan with the exception of the 500 tons belatedly delivered to Kweilin and Liuchow.

The Generalissimo did keep a sizable army at Sian, the gateway to Communist territory, and they did maintain a patrol on the main communication lines to Yen-an. That they were also defending the Tungkwan Pass, one of the three vital gateways to West China, was conveniently ignored by Stilwell's staff. Late in 1944 many of these troops were withdrawn to bolster the sagging Salween offensive, and the Japanese promptly began an offensive aimed at Siam. Only a sudden and cold winter halted the Japanese short of their goal.

I do not think that Stilwell had any political motives in encouraging his Chungking staff to function as a public-relations bureau for the Yen-an Communists. It was of a piece with his earlier dalliance with the Kuomintang reactionaries. He was simply unconcerned with anything but his immediate objectives. The Yen-an Communists shrewdly tickled Stilwell's vanity with many flattering appreciations of his military prowess and clinched him as an ally by shrewdly letting it be known that they would be delighted to have him command their armies. Stilwell never gave up his hopes of commanding the Chinese Red Armies. After the end of the Okinawa campaign in the spring of 1945 Stilwell proposed to land his Tenth Army on the Kiangsu coast above Shanghai, which was controlled by the Chinese Communists. His plan was to join forces with the Reds, arm them, and turn the combined forces south for an assault on Shanghai. That this would have encouraged the Chinese Communists to open rebellion against the Central Government should have been obvious even to Stilwell. It would also have bottled the Generalissimo up in Chungking as tightly as he ever was blockaded by the Japanese.

Since it was still official American policy in the summer of 1944 to support the Chungking government, it was a common joke that Stilwell's headquarters were developing a private foreign policy with John Davies (Stilwell's political adviser) as secretary of state.

\* \* \* \* \*

MR. SOURWINE. One more question with regard to this book. Do you know whether General Stilwell's removal or replacement was at the behest or suggestion of Vice President Wallace?

MR. LATTIMORE. From reading the testimony before this committee, I believe it was.

MR. SOURWINE. Do you know that there is testimony in our record that shortly following the transmission by Vice President Wallace of the Kunming cable, word was sent by the White House to China giving Stilwell increased power?

MR. LATTIMORE. I don't have a clear recollection of that, no.

MR. SOURWINE. On this question also, Mr. Chairman, I should like to offer for the record from this book the marked paragraphs beginning at the bottom of page 320 continuing to the middle of page 322, which will speak for themselves, but for the information of the committee and in the opinion of counsel, they express General Chennault's feeling that General Stilwell had made himself persona non grata with Chiang to such an extent that his removal was inevitable.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the point?

MR. SOURWINE. The question has been raised in these things, Mr. Chairman, as to whether the recommendation made by Mr. Wallace, whatever that recommendation was, with regard to replacement of General Stilwell and/or appointment of General Wedemeyer as the President's personal representative was a recommendation anti-Communist, pro-Communist, or having any connection in that regard.

This question here does bear on the solution of that problem.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 600" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 600

WAY OF A FIGHTER, CLAIRE LEE CHENNAULT, EDITED BY ROBERT HOTZ, G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS, NEW YORK

(Pp. 320, 321, 322)

\* \* \* Allowing Sultan to leave Chungking proved to be a tactical error. Without his safety valve present, Stilwell was apparently stimulated by the obvious signs of Chinese weakness for a final joust with his old adversary, the Generalissimo. On September 19 Stilwell received a radio from President Roosevelt for delivery to the Generalissimo. One of the two or three Americans who have ever seen a copy of that message told me it sounded like a communication from Adolf Hitler to the puppet head of a conquered satellite state. In violent terms Roosevelt blamed the Generalissimo for China's present plight and presented an ultimatum to appoint Stilwell as Chinese commander. The tone of the message was totally foreign to Roosevelt's usual approach to the Generalissimo. There were strong suspicions that Stilwell had actually written the message himself; sent it "eyes alone" to Washington; and there the War Department had persuaded Roosevelt to sign it and send it back to China.

When the Roosevelt message hit Chungking, Hurley and Nelson were working with T. V. Soong drafting the final minor details of the agreement on Stilwell's command. Hurley and Nelson urged Stilwell not to deliver the message. They believed that the violent tone of the radio would upset the appellation and serve no useful purpose, since the Generalissimo had already agreed to the terms demanded.

"We've already won the ball game," Hurley told Stilwell.

Stilwell agreed to hold the message. Hurley and Nelson went back to the Generalissimo's country villa at Huang Shan outside Chungking to continue work on the agreement.

On September 21 Stilwell appeared unexpectedly at Huang Shan and interrupted the conference. Meeting Hurley and Nelson in the Generalissimo's ante-room, Stilwell explained that he had been thinking about the message and had changed his mind. He now felt he had no authority to withhold a message from President Roosevelt to the Generalissimo. Striding past the astonished emissaries Stilwell confronted the Generalissimo with the Roosevelt message. The Generalissimo listened and let Stilwell depart in stony silence. Then he called in T. V. Soong and exploded.

The Generalissimo told Soong the Roosevelt message was a challenge to China's sovereignty. He was prepared to risk anything rather than surrender China's independence. Stilwell must go even if it meant the end of all American aid to China. On this score there could be no compromise.

Stilwell felt that he had scored a tremendous personal triumph. He was happy that his "hour of vengeance" has struck and composed an ode to celebrate the occasion. In this curious poem Stilwell admitted that he had presented the message to "break the Peanut's (Stilwell's designation for the Generalissimo) face."

Stilwell's delivery of the Roosevelt message actually killed forever his chance of getting supreme command in China. In his complete misunderstanding of Chinese psychology, Stilwell stupidly pushed the Generalissimo into a corner where he had no alternative but to lash out and fight back with all his power. Only those who had extensive dealings with Stilwell could understand his peculiar tactics in this climatic encounter.

The Sino-American pact, once nearing signature, lapsed into deadlock over the Stilwell issue. For weeks no maneuvering was able to regain the lost momentum. When Stilwell realized that the Generalissimo would not back down, he frantically sought a compromise that might prevent the ax from falling on his own lean neck. One of Stilwell's Chinese military advisers, who was not aware of the Roosevelt ultimatum, suggested that perhaps Stilwell's dalliance with the Chinese Communists might be the root of the trouble. Stilwell promptly wrote a note to one of his bitterest Chinese opponents, General Ho Yin Chin, Chinese War Minister. In this note Stilwell admitted that he had planned to arm the Chinese Communists but promised to drop the plan in exchange for retaining his post in China. Stilwell had no authority to make such a promise,

and he later violently denied the existence of the note to Ho. However the full text of the note appears on page 337 of Stilwell's published diaries with the notation that it was given to Ho in both Chinese and English versions.

Even his last ditch maneuver proved futile. The Generalissimo was still willing to accept an American over-all commander in China. It could be almost anybody but Stilwell. Agreement was quickly reached on bringing Al Wedemeyer up from Ceylon to take the post. On October 19 the War Department radioed Stilwell orders to leave China and return to the United States.

\* \* \* \* \*

Mr. FORTAS. May I inquire whether there is any reference to this witness by name in those portions?

Mr. SOURWINE. No, there is not.

Mr. Lattimore, I hand you a clipping, or what purports to be a clipping from the New York Herald Tribune of June 22, 1947, apparently a review of a book, *No Peace for Asia*, written by Harold R. Isaacs, with the byline reviewed by Owen Lattimore, and I ask you if you wrote that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. I ask it be inserted.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be inserted.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 601" and is as follows:)

#### EXHIBIT No. 601

#### A PESSIMIST IN THE ORIENT

#### NO PEACE FOR ASIA

(By Harold R. Isaacs \* \* \* 295 pp. \* \* \* New York: The Macmillan Company, \$3.50)

(Reviewed by Owen Lattimore)

Some years ago Mr. Isaacs published a book called *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution*, with a preface by Leon Trotsky. No book dealing with the events of 1925-28 in China rivals it in vituperation of both the Communists—the Stalinist Communists, that is—and Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang of Chiang Kai-shek. Mr. Isaac's dislike of both Stalin and Chiang, and of the political parties associated with both of them, continues in his new book.

In addition, Mr. Isaacs does not like the colonial policies of Britain, France, and Holland. Nor does he like American policy in the Far East. Like many other writers, Mr. Isaacs believes that at the end of the war we had among the peoples of Asia an incalculable reservoir of good will. If anything good were to come of the war they looked for it to come from us. They looked to us much more than they did to Russia. "The swift dissipation of this asset right after the victory over Japan," says Mr. Isaacs, "was by the same token one of the most extravagant and prodigal examples of conspicuous waste ever recorded in the annals of the nations."

Mr. Isaacs, in short, gives an analysis of extreme pessimism, with no reservations in favor of the western democracies and even less in favor of Russia. The one country on which he really lets himself go on a note of something like romantic admiration, combined, however, with hopeless tragedy, is Indo-China. Comparing this account with his accounts of other countries, the explanation would seem to be that at the time he was there the situation was one of "pure" revolution not compromised by expedient deals or aid from anybody. The Indo-Chinese revolutionaries had not even had the advantages, which the Indonesians and others had had, of Japanese attempts to organize them and use them against their imperial rulers. They had begun their fight against the French. They continued it against the Japanese. They resumed it once more against the French and against the British supporters and American equipment of the French.

Mr. Isaacs writes well, but even in the brief time since he witnessed the beginning of the colonial wars it has begun to seem that colonial nationalism is capable of a prolonged resistance which will prevent the restoration of imperial rule in anything like as complete a form as he apparently anticipated.

An important clew to the whole situation in Asia is the kind of movement that has developed since the war in what had been the Chinese guerrilla area behind Japanese lines. These were the only important areas which Mr. Isaacs does not seem to have visited. Mr. Isaacs, referring to China, writes of "the cold embrace of Communist totalitarianism"; but, it appears from other accounts that it is in these areas that there really is a beacon of hope, because of their political condition is neither one of romantically tragic desperation nor of doctrinaire fanaticism.—Tribune, June 22, 1947.

Mr. SOURWINE. At the conclusion of this review appears this language:

Mr. Isaacs, referring to China, writes of "the cold embrace of Communist totalitarianism"; but it appears from other accounts that it is in these areas that there really is a beacon of hope, because their political condition is neither one of romantically tragic desperation nor of doctrinaire fanaticism.

Do you remember writing that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I remember it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you tell the committee briefly what you meant by it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes. That is consonant with other things that I was writing at the same time that I believed was cause for hope, especially in north China at that time, because a large part of the battle against the Japanese had been carried on by people who were neither Communists nor Kuomintang, and I regarded that as a hope for the emergence of a middle group.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you intending there to say anything favorable to the Chinese Communists?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, you furnished to the Tydings committee certain correspondence between yourself and a Mr. W. Heissig and some papers in connection therewith?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. They appear at page 1881 of the Tydings committee hearings and ending apparently on page 1892. I would simply like to ask so that they may be properly referred to in our record if these documents, as they appeared in the Tydings committee hearings, are accurate copies of what you furnished the Tydings committee? Have you had occasion to examine that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have not had occasion to examine them since, but I am sure they are accurate copies.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did furnish these documents to the Tydings committee and they were accurate and true?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want anything done about that last matter?

Mr. SOURWINE. No, Mr. Chairman. It has been identified as to the page number in a printed Senate hearing. It simply has been reaffirmed by the witness. It is available as background for the committee if they wish it.

You had occasion, in your testimony earlier, to quote from yourself, I think, with regard to your trip to Yenan, and you made some mention there of missionaries. Do you recall that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In a general way, yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. I show you the transcript of your testimony at the top of page 5379 of our mimeographed record, where you said, quoting from yourself:

Foreign visitors are welcomed and missionaries are being urged to come up and see for themselves that their premises are undamaged and the Chinese Christians left undisturbed to preach in public or pray in private as they like—and I ask you, do you remember so testifying?

Mr. LATTIMORE. This, I think, is a quotation from the article that I drafted for the London Times, but apparently was never published?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, I remember that.

Mr. SOURWINE. While you were in Yen-an, did you see any missionaries?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, we didn't. We saw some of the missionaries from Yen-an at the first town outside of the territory controlled by the Chinese Communists, and we told them this on our way back.

Mr. SOURWINE. You told them this?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Told them that the Communists were saying that missionaries could come back.

Mr. SOURWINE. What did they tell you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. They said that they were considering it, but that they didn't want to get into any political trouble as between Communists and the government.

Mr. SOURWINE. Why were they outside Yen-an? Do you know?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Had they left Yen-an?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Presumably, since they were outside.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do I understand correctly they told you after you told them the Communists had said they could come, the missionaries told you they were considering going back but they were afraid they might get into political trouble if they did?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is your testimony?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it on the basis of that experience alone that you wrote—

Missionaries are being urged to come up and see for themselves that their premises are undamaged and the Chinese Christians left undisturbed to preach in public or pray in private as they like?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not entirely. My recollection is that the Communists told us they had previously sent messages to the missionaries to the same effect.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is, missionaries of all faiths?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. The faith of the missionaries that you talked about outside Yen-an, what faith was that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Those that we talked with outside Yen-an were Protestants. I think they were all English missionaries. I had no contact with missionaries in Yen-an, but I remember telling you about speaking to some Mongols there and these Mongols said that the Catholic missionaries in their territory just north of Yen-an had not left.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did the Mongols say anything to you about whether the Catholic missionaries that you speak of had been molested in any way or disturbed?

Mr. LATTIMORE. They said they had not been molested.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I am not sure how the Chair will rule on this offer. It may be not precisely an ancient document. Let me ask one foundation question. This was what year you were in Yenan?

Mr. LATTIMORE. 1937.

Mr. SOURWINE. I hold in my hand, Mr. Chairman, original copies of press releases issued by the National Catholic Welfare Conference News Service under dates, respectively, October 5, 1936, July 5, 1937, and December 6, 1937. These news releases refer to conditions affecting missionaries in North China at that time. For whatever evidentiary value they may have I ask that they be admitted to the record at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think your foundation is quite laid.

Mr. SOURWINE. These are offered in line with what Mr. Lattimore has said he had offered something to show what was being said at that time.

I don't offer these as illustrative of the facts, but I do offer them as indicating what a reputable Catholic news-giving organization was putting out at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. That is in connection with the statement just made by Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be inserted.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 602, 603, and 604," and are read in full below.)

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I ask whether those releases refer specifically to the same area that I was in or to other areas of North China?

Mr. SOURWINE. Does the Chair wish to have these read?

The CHAIRMAN. Can you answer the question of the witness?

Mr. SOURWINE. Being much less familiar with China than Mr. Lattimore, I would prefer to read them. They do refer to North China.

(EXHIBIT No. 602)

ROME, September 28 (NCWC—Fides).—According to latest reports, four Catholic missionaries are still held captive by Communists and bandits in China and Manchukuo.

The Reverend Epiphany Pegoraro, O. F. M., and Brother Paschal Nadal, O. F. M., the first an Italian and the latter a Spaniard, were captured in May 1935 at Mosimien in the Vicariate of Tatsienlu, where they were stationed at the Leper Asylum. The latest news of them is that they are still alive and are acting as nurses to the Communists.

The Reverend Henry Kellner, of the Missionaries of the Sacred Heart of Issoudun, was captured at Shihtsien in January 1936. The Communists have demanded a ransom of \$50,000.

The Reverend Clarence Burns, of the Maryknoll Mission in Fushun, Manchukuo, was captured by bandits in February 1936. No word has been received concerning him for several months.

(EXHIBIT No. 603)

LANCHOW, KANSU, CHINA, June 28 (NCWC—Fides).—The region about Lanchow was completely cut off from communication with the outside world for several months in 1936 and 1937, all letters passing into the hands of the Reds who controlled the district. The Catholic missionaries of Lanchow received

no news except by radio. The lives of priests, brothers, and sisters were never before in such peril, and since most of them are Germans, besides being Catholic, they feared that their lot under an eventual Soviet domination would be particularly hard.

The Chinese New Year was observed with apprehension, because at that time strife had broken out between the Northeast Division of the army and the troops of the Central Government. Moreover, the rebel officials were making life hard for the people; the specter of famine had appeared on the horizon; and the Reds were scoring victory after victory over the Chinese Mohammedans of the province.

But the tide turned when Government troops arrived and defeated the Reds. The rebellious forces of the Northeast Army were ordered to leave Lanchow, and the Government troops took command.

The cities of Liangchow, Kanchow, and farther to the west, Kaotai, were still in the hands of the Reds, but a band of Tungans (Chinese Mohammedans) made a surprise attack on Kaotai and killed all the Reds and, unfortunately, many of the innocent town's folk too. The Mohammedans unwittingly set fire to the new Catholic church, which was burned to the ground.

The ranks of the Reds have been thinned by a number of terrible battles. Hundreds of them, together with their hangers-on, have been brought to Kanchow where they met their end in a big pit prepared for their bodies outside the east gate. It was revenge of the Tungans who have the reputation of taking no prisoners.

Many of the poor wretches were baptized by Catholic missionaries before they reached the pit. Approximately 2,000 wounded were cared for by missionaries. Brother Philotheus Guggemoss, of the Catholic mission staff, took sick and died while nursing the sick and wounded.

The Red invasion of the Vicariate of Lanchow during the past year has brought a loss of \$30,000 (Mexican) to the Catholic mission.

(EXHIBIT No. 604)

THE HAGUE, November 29.—Word has been received here that the Most Reverend Hubert Francis Schraven, Vicar Apostolic of Chengtingfu, China, has been murdered by bandits in that country. Bishop Schraven, who was a member of the Congregation of the Mission, was born in Lottum, in this country, October 13, 1873.

The report from China also said that seven other Catholic missionaries were killed at the time Bishop Schraven met his death. Two of these other missionaries were from the Netherlands, three were from France, one from Poland, and one from Czechoslovakia. Bishop Schraven had labored in China for 40 years.

MR. LATTIMORE. May the record show all of the places mentioned in those reports, with the exception of one which I don't immediately identify, namely, Shihtsien, are many hundred miles from any part of China I visited in that year.

MR. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, do you remember a previous occasion during your testimony here when a point arose as to whether you said or had meant to say that Manchuria was going to be taken over or had been taken over by the Reds?

MR. LATTIMORE. No, I don't remember that.

MR. SOURWINE. Have you ever stated or argued that Manchuria would be taken over or had been taken over by the Reds?

MR. LATTIMORE. I don't recall writing about that.

MR. SOURWINE. Have you ever written or stated to the contrary that Manchuria was an independent nation and not a puppet state?

MR. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I have.

MR. SOURWINE. Have you ever attempted to convince anyone Manchuria or Manchukuo was an independent state?

MR. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I have.

MR. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, Mr. Morris was questioning you toward the end of a previous session about your itinerary and I believe it covered up to 1941, at which time you went out to China as adviser

to Chaing Kai-shek. Could we go on from there and bring it up to date as rapidly as possible?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Surely.

Senator FERGUSON. That was the question.

Mr. SOURWINE. I meant that as a question. Going on from 1941 I mean. You had told us from 1920 to 1933 you were in China in Manchuria; in 1933 you went to the Banff Conference of the IPR; in 1935 you went to China and returned by way of Russia, Holland, and England, arriving in 1936.

In 1936 you went to London for 3 or 4 months. You returned by way of Suez and in 1937 you went out to China, returned about Christmas time, 1937; remained in the United States until 1939, and then a summer vacation in Sweden and Norway of that year. In 1941 again you went out to China as adviser to Chiang.

Is that substantially the substance of your testimony?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes. Do you want me to go on with times when I was out of this country and which countries I visited?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, sir.

Mr. LATTIMORE. In 1942, I returned from China via Burma, India, and South America.

In the fall of 1942 I went back to China via the same route.

At the end of 1942, I returned from China with Mme. Chiang Kai-shek also by the same route—India and South America. In 194—I am not sure; maybe it was toward the end of 1942, I went to the Mont Tremblant conference of the IPR. That could easily be checked. I think that must have been the fall of 1942. That was in Canada.

In 1943, I did not leave this country. In 1944, I flew to Hawaii to set up OWI work under Admiral Nimitz and on to Australia to set up OWI work under General MacArthur; then returned to this country by the same route.

In the summer of 1944, I flew via Alaska to Siberia and China with Vice President Wallace, returned by way of Outer Mongolia, Siberia, Alaska, and a stop in Canada, to this country.

In 1945, I spent the summer vacation in Mexico. In 1946, I spent the summer vacation in Nova Scotia. In 1947, I spent the summer vacation in Europe, principally France, Czechoslovakia, and England, attending an IPR conference in England before returning to this country.

My wife reminds me that I have forgotten going to Japan in the fall of 1945, with the American Reparations Mission under Ambassador Pauley, returning early in 1946.

In 1948, I don't believe I was out of the country. In 1949 I went to a Joint American and Indian Conference at New Delhi in India, and stopped briefly in Pakistan on the way back.

In 1950, in the spring of 1950, I went to Afghanistan via Pakistan on a mission for the United Nations.

In 1951, I was, at the very end of 1951, a day or two after Christmas—my wife and I flew to England, where we remained for about 3 weeks, returning toward the end of January this year.

I think that is the complete catalog.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, when you left China in 1936, what route did you take to Moscow? Will you tell us that in as much detail as you can, please?

Mr. LATTIMORE. From Peking to Manchuria, which was then under Japanese control, to Siberia, then via the Trans-Siberian Railroad to

Moscow. I made a side trip to Leningrad and then back to Moscow. Then by train from Moscow to Poland, passing through Poland without a stop-over, and through Germany without a stop-over; then staying in Holland—I am not sure; perhaps a week—and in England for what?—2 weeks? Something like that. And back to the United States.

Mr. SOURWINE. In all, how many times have you been in Moscow, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Once.

Mr. SOURWINE. And that was the occasion when you had your conference with the Soviet IPR officials, the officials of the Soviet council?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Concerning which there has been substantial testimony here, has there not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Considerable, yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, will you tell us on what other occasions did you have conferences of a similar nature with other councils of the IPR, other national councils?

The CHAIRMAN. Of the IPR?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, I had considerable talk with the Dutch that same year in—let's see. Where was it now? Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and one other place where the Dutch had centers. I talked with the man who was acting as Dutch editor and correspondent for the IPR.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you will pardon me, sir, the way you answered that question indicates you didn't grasp what I was trying to get at. Because you wouldn't have had a similar conference to the one you held in Moscow at several places in Holland. The one you had in Moscow was a conference, was it not, with the top officials of the Soviet Council? And you were discussing particularly their views with regard to what should go into Pacific Affairs. Isn't that correct?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. I want to know on what other occasions, if any, you had conferences with the top officials of IPR councils from other countries.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, I had similar conferences with the Dutch in Amsterdam, as far as they could be similar, since I was alone there and not with Mr. Carter, who was the secretary general. But I did talk with the top board of the Dutch IPR and also visited their local boards in a couple of other towns.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was in Amsterdam in what year?

Mr. LATTIMORE. '36.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, sir?

Mr. LATTIMORE. And I had similar conferences with the British at Chatham House, again with the modification that Mr. Carter was not present, so it was simply a conference of the editor of Pacific Affairs, not including the secretary general of the institute.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know of any others?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In 1934, on the way out from America to China, and again in 1937, on the way back from China to America, I had similar conferences with the Japanese IPR in Japan, again with the exception that this was myself having the conferences, and without the presence of the secretary general.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall any more?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I also had similar conferences with the top people of the Chinese IPR in Shanghai and Peking, but not all at the same time, because their representation was rather split up geographically.

Mr. SOURWINE. Any more?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I again had conferences with the British at Chatham House in the winter of '36-'37, when I was staying in London for about 3 months on the way back to China.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were those conferences of the same nature that we are talking about, that is, a top level conference with the national head of an IPR council with regard to the question of what went into the magazine of which you were editor?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, as far as the magazine was concerned. They didn't concern general IPR research, et cetera, such as was taken up by Mr. Carter, or by Mr. Holland, when he was traveling.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are there any more?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is all I can recall at the moment.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then would you say that the only conference that you recall at which the general secretary was present and at which these general questions of policy as well as the question of what went into the magazine were taken up, was the one in Moscow in 1936?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. At the summer conference of the IPR at Yosemite in 1936, there was a more general conference of a special committee on Pacific Affairs, with top delegates from a group of national councils.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was not quite the same thing; was it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; not quite the same thing.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then get back to my original question. Would you say or would you deny that the conference in Moscow about which there has been so much testimony here was the only conference of that nature at which the general secretary of IPR was present?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I believe so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you recall?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, do you recall having testified here with regard to whether you ever suggested in any of your writings that Soviet Russia might be reaching out for Mongolia or might be planning to take over Mongolia?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't recall that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall whether you ever did suggest?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; not offhand.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever take the opposite tack, that Mongolia was independent, and that there was no threat of Soviet domination?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think I have frequently written that Outer Mongolia is an independent state in the sense of never having been incorporated in Russia; but I have also qualified that by describing it as a satellite state.

Mr. SOURWINE. You think now it is a satellite state?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Very much so.

Mr. SOURWINE. How long have you held that opinion?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That would be hard to say. I think it would be hard to say particularly, because the expression "satellite" is a post-war expression.

Mr. SOURWINE. When would you say you first expressed the opinion that Outer Mongolia was a satellite state, if you did ever express it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Probably about 1945.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, prior to that time, did you take the view or hold to the view that Outer Mongolia was an independent state free of Russian influence?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not free of Russian influence. I think in the terminology of that time, before people were using the word "satellite" I would have referred to it more as a Russian protectorate or a state under Russian protection, or something of that kind.

Mr. SOURWINE. Let me rephrase the question, or perhaps I should ask a different question.

Did you ever take the position or argue that Outer Mongolia was an independent state free of Russian domination?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I think I did, before the war, describe it as free of domination.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have changed your view since then?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think the situation has changed since then.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is: Have you changed your view?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have changed my view, in line with what I consider to be a changing situation.

Mr. SOURWINE. When do you think the situation changed? Can you give an approximate date?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. I should say some time after the war, if I had been able to get to Outer Mongolia, I might have a more sharp opinion on that, but it is very difficult to determine from outside.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is: When do you think the situation changed? If you do not know, you can say so.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know. Some time after the war.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you first reach the conclusion that Outer Mongolia was an independent state and free of Russian domination? Do you know?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Some time in the 1930's.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know when you first argued that or first expressed that view publicly?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you tell us now when, in fact, Outer Mongolia did become an independent state and free of Russian domination?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, I would say that—I forget the exact year; 1920 or '21 or somewhere along in there, the Mongols who had previously declared their independence of China, came into close relations with Communist Russia, and certainly the Russian influence from that time on was very strong. But my impression was that it was primarily at the request of the Mongols themselves.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say the Russian influence was very strong from about 1920 or 1921 on?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, if I understood you correctly, you said a moment ago that the situation changed after the war. What war did you mean? The First World War?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; the Second World War.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did it change? Did the Russian domination become stronger after the First World War?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. I would roughly characterize the 1920's and 1930's as a period when the close relations between Russia and Outer Mongolia could hardly be described as Russian domination, because it was largely or chiefly at the instance of the Mongol Government itself.

Mr. SOURWINE. There was, however, during that time, a large measure of Russian influence. Is that your testimony?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Surely.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you recognized that at the time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Oh, surely.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you never argued to the contrary; is that your testimony?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe so.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right, sir. Another loose end, quite unconnected with what we have been discussing: You remember testifying here earlier, I believe on the last day before this one, when you were on the stand, concerning a YWCA worker who told you in 1947 that the World Youth Festival was non-Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In her opinion; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, will you give us the name of that YWCA worker?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My wife says she believes we have the letter at home, and we can furnish you with the letter.

Mr. MORRIS. Was it Talitha Gerlach, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. It is not a personal letter, is it? It is in relation to the conference?

Mr. LATTIMORE. There is no reason why we shouldn't turn in the letter. You can have the whole letter.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, have you ever used a nom de plume in your writing?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe I ever have.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you answer that more definitely, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. To the best of my recollection, I never have.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, does the phrase "Pivot of Asia" mean anything to you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It is the title of a book that I wrote in collaboration with others at the Page School at the Johns Hopkins, which was published in 1950?

Mr. SOURWINE. With whom did you collaborate?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Let's see. There were about six or eight people. Let's see if I can remember them all. Dr. John De Francis.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you spell that for the reporter, please?

Mr. LATTIMORE. D-e F-r-a-n-c-i-s.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you identify him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He is professor at the Johns Hopkins.

Mr. SOURWINE. And the next?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Dr. Daniel Thorner, T-h-o-r-n-e-r.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you identify him, please?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Who is now at the University of Pennsylvania.

Mr. SOURWINE. And the next?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Dr. Chen Han-seng, C-h-e-n H-a-n-S-e-n-g, who is now in China.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you identify him, please?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, he had previously worked for the IPR.

Mr. SOURWINE. He is the same Chen Han-seng that has been discussed in previous testimony here?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That's right.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Cheng Chih-yi, C-h-e-n-g C-h-i-h-y-i.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you identify him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He was a former member of the Academia Sinica, which was the Chinese Government Research Institute. And he worked with me at Johns Hopkins for 2 years. I believe he is back in China now.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where in China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In Red China, I think. The last I heard of him he went back to Hong Kong, but he may be in Red China now. Let me see.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, when you said he was connected with China, did you mean the Nationalist Government?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That was under the Nationalist Government, yes.

Prof. Karl H. Menges, K-a-r-l H. M-e-n-g-e-s.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you identify him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Of Columbia University. Oh, there was also a chapter contributed by Mrs. Thorner, the wife of Prof. Daniel Thorner.

Is that the lot?

Mr. SOURWINE. To whom are you addressing that question?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was asking my wife. My wife assisted in the editing of the book.

Prof. Tom Weiner, W-e-i-n-e-r, or Thomas Weiner, of Duke University.

I think that is all. Do you remember any others?

Mr. SOURWINE. At the time you collaborated with those persons, did you know or have any reason to believe that any of them was or had been a person under Communist discipline, or who had voluntarily and knowingly cooperated or collaborated with Communist Party members in furtherance of Communist Party objectives?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I didn't believe so.

Senator FERGUSON. Just a minute. I don't know whether he answered the question.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I did not know or believe.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did the Rockefeller Institution have anything to do with the financing of the writing of this book?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. The Carnegie Foundation made a grant-in-aid.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know how much that was?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Do I remember how much it was? I don't remember offhand. I could get the figure for you.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know when that grant was made?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think probably in 1947. I think probably for the academic year 1947-48.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who was head of the Carnegie Foundation at that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know who was head of it. The member of the foundation with whom I dealt was Mr. John Gardner.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was Mr. Alger Hiss ever connected with that foundation?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir. He was connected, as I recall, with the Carnegie Endowment, which is a different set-up.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right. And it is your testimony that the Rockefeller Foundation had nothing to do with any donation or endowment or gift in connection with the preparation of this book?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe they had anything to do with it.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. May I ask a question, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you ever approached or talked to Mr. Hiss about money to write any books or pamphlets or papers?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. FORTAS. Mr. Sourwine, do you want that figure? I am not clear.

The CHAIRMAN. The what?

Mr. FORTAS. The figure, about the amount of money.

Mr. SOURWINE. We would like to have it for the record, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, how many times have you been in Mongolia?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am afraid I have lost count.

The CHAIRMAN. If you can, give us an approximation.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I first traveled in Mongolia in 1926. This was in Inner Mongolia. And I visited Inner Mongolia very frequently from then until 1937, when I left China.

I was in Outer Mongolia once, in 1944, for a brief stop-over on the way back from China.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, when you left China in 1935 to go to Moscow, did you go through Inner Mongolia?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; neither Inner nor Outer.

Senator FERGUSON. Might I inquire, while you were on that same point: When you left China, did you know you were going to stop in Moscow?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In 1936?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. That was a planned trip?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That was at the request of Mr. Carter, C-a-r-t-e-r, as secretary general.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; and paid for by the institute?

Mr. LATTIMORE. And paid for by the institute.

The CHAIRMAN. That was a planned trip, was one question.

Senator FERGUSON. I thought he answered that "Yes"; that it was a planned trip.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I answered that; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, have you seen an article entitled "Lattimore Whose Ordeal—," appearing in the New Leader of March 17, 1952?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Which contains a statement that Ambassador Hu Shih was not given information about your appointment to Chiang Kai-shek until some time after your conference with Ambassador Oumansky.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have not seen that article; no.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any knowledge as to when the Chinese Ambassador received information or intelligence with regard to your appointment as aide to Chiang Kai-shek, adviser to Chiang Kai-shek?

Mr. LATTIMORE. None whatever. The handling on the Chinese side was through Dr. T. V. Soong rather than through the Chinese Embassy.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, the question came up, and a member of the committee asked the staff about it. The staff has wired Dr. Hu Shih and has a telegram, which I will not offer for the record, because it is not evidence, which states that he received word only 2 days before Mr. Lattimore left. I bring it up now for the committee's consideration of a future time as to whether Dr. Hu Shih should be called as a witness on that point, if it is considered important to the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. That was 2 days before the official announcement was made?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Two days before the official announcement was made. I stand corrected.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, did you know they were not going through the Embassy in relation to your appointment?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I didn't know whether Dr. T. V. Soong was clearing with the Embassy or not.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you talked to Dr. Soong?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I had.

Senator FERGUSON. Prior to your appointment?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Where was that conversation?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Wait. I want to be sure of that. It was prior to the appointment. I am not sure whether it was prior to the recommendation or not.

Senator FERGUSON. What was his official position?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He was head of China Defense Supplies, which was an organization set up in this country for the handling of supplies from the United States to China.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he connected with the Embassy?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know what the formal connection was between the Embassy and China Defense Supplies.

Senator FERGUSON. Where did you see him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. At his residence here in Washington.

Senator FERGUSON. Here in Washington? Then you do not dispute this telegram, as I understand it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't dispute it. I just don't know about it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, may I resume?

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, you have testified here with regard to your opinion as to whether your conference with President Truman and the memoranda you left with him and the letter you sent him had any influence on him. Do you know whether, as a matter of fact, he gave any consideration to that matter in the days subsequent to your leaving of the memoranda with him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no knowledge of that whatever.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was on July 3, was it not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Mandel, I ask you if that paper which I now hand you carries a paragraph which you had copied from the book, Mr. President.

Senator FERGUSON. Here is the book. It may be read from the book.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I ask that this paragraph, which appears on page 122 of the book, may be read into the record at this point. May I read it?

The CHAIRMAN. This is from the book presumably coming under the authorship of the President of the United States, entitled, "Mr. President"? Very well. Read it from the book.

Mr. SOURWINE. This purports to be an entry, a diary entry, by the President [reading]:

July 4, 1945—

Now, that was the date following your visit to see the President.

Down Potomac on the Potomac with Vinson, Snyder, Rosenman, George Allen, Steve Early, Charlie Ross, and Matt Connelly. Discussed Russia and Japanese war, government for Germany, food, fuel, and transportation for Europe, sterling bloc. Do not feel happy over situation.

Mr. Lattimore, did you ever see a letter from Betty Ussashevsky to Marguerite Stewart of the American Council of the IPR?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Professor who?

Mr. SOURWINE. Betty Ussashevsky. Do you know who she was?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever see a letter from Betty Ussashevsky to Marguerite Stewart of the American Council of the IPR, expressing the fear that IPR was going to be investigated?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think I have seen a reference to that in the testimony before this committee.

Mr. SOURWINE. The question was: Did you ever see the letter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I am sure I didn't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss such a letter with your wife?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I am sure I didn't.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are aware of that letter as it appears in our record?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know that that letter was transmitted to your wife by Mrs. Stewart with the expressed hope that she would discuss it with Bill and John Carter Vincent and any other trusted friends who might be in the know on these things?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have seen that reference in the testimony.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you didn't discuss it with your wife?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't think I remember discussing it at all. My wife says she believes I was abroad at the time.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were abroad at the time you read it in the testimony?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; at the time that this letter was sent.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, you have stated that you didn't see it at that time. You also said you saw it in the testimony.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you see it in the testimony after you got back to the United States?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; this is referring to 1945, isn't it?

Mr. SOURWINE. I am referring now to our testimony. You said you saw this letter in our testimony.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; within the last few weeks.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, after you saw that letter in our testimony and knew what it said about transmittal of the letter to Mrs. Lattimore, are you testifying here that you didn't discuss it with Mrs. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I haven't discussed it with her.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether Mrs. Lattimore did, in fact, discuss that letter with Mr. John Carter Vincent?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would have to ask her.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am asking you whether you know.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether, in fact, she did discuss it with anyone else?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, you remember there has been testimony here about a meeting at the Aldo Cafe in Washington, D. C., following the testimony before this committee of Mr. Carter, which was attended by Mr. Carter, you, Mrs. Lattimore, and a fourth party?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you been able to remember yet who that fourth party was?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; it was a graduate student at Johns Hopkins, named Mr. Catesby, C-a-t-e-s-b-y, Jones.

Mr. SOURWINE. Catesby Jones?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Catesby Jones; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you describe Mr. Jones, for the benefit of this committee, please?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Jones is a student in the School of Geography at Johns Hopkins.

Mr. SOURWINE. No, I meant physically. Is he tall, or short? Does he have a beard?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He doesn't have a beard. He has a mustache. He is fair in color, and taller than I am.

Mr. SOURWINE. Slender?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, not slender, I should say.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you talked with Mrs. Lattimore about that occasion since you testified about it here previously?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I have.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is this your own recollection you are testifying from now, as refreshed?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; it is not my recollection at all. It is that she reminded me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you now know that it is true that it was Mr. Catesby who was there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I assume my wife's recollection is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you now know that that is true?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't know that it is true. I am assuming that it is true.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't actually recollect who the fourth man was?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't actually remember it at all.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Mr. Catesby?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I do.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or Mr. Catesby Jones.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Catesby Jones. Yes; I do.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, having your recollection, as you say, refreshed by your wife, and still not being able to remember it yourself, did you have any thought of checking with Mr. Catesby Jones to see whether he was in fact with you there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I haven't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was there any other person with you there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Catesby Jones have any connection with the IPR, or has he had any?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does he have any connection with Mr. Carter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I am sure he doesn't.

Mr. SOURWINE. What connection does he have with you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He is a graduate student at the Johns Hopkins University, and I am one of the supervisors of his thesis work.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he come over to Washington from Johns Hopkins with you on that day?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe he did. I believe we must have run into him here.

[To Mrs. Lattimore] Do you remember that?

Mr. SOURWINE. I am just trying to find out what you know, Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't remember at all.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know how he happened to be invited to that meeting?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. I presume we just ran into each other and went to dinner together.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not just run into Mr. Carter, did you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I came over to see Mr. Carter, as I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was by prearrangement that you had dinner with Mr. Carter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't think it was by prearrangement. I think my wife and I came over to see him, and it got along toward dinner time, and we said, "Let's go and get something to eat."

Mr. SOURWINE. You knew he was testifying before this committee on that day; didn't you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you came over to see him after he finished his testimony?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think it was after he finished his testimony; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall what time he finished his testimony?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't. It was some time in the late afternoon, I think.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know how long it was between the time he finished his testimony and the time you went over there to dinner?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think it was long enough for a casual meeting and then just a suggestion to go eat?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I should think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know where you casually met?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, we went to the hotel that Mr. Carter was staying at. Where we met Mr. Jones, I don't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. You met him by appointment; didn't you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't think so. Mr. Carter?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes; Mr. Carter.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Carter, by appointment, I think.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was prearranged, then, wasn't it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. To meet him, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. We had better get that straightened out. That same question was propounded to the witness a moment or two ago and he said "No." Now, was it by prearrangement? That has been asked twice, here, and has been answered two ways.

Mr. FORTAS. I think the previous question was the dinner by prearrangement, Senator.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I think it was.

Mr. FORTAS. The record will show.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Could we check that on the record?

Mr. SOURWINE. The record will speak for itself as to the question. If the witness is now testifying that he did meet Mr. Carter by prearrangement, that is what I was trying to find out.

The CHAIRMAN. You can answer that question "Yes" or "No." Was it by prearrangement that you met Mr. Carter that day?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It was by prearrangement of some sort. May I elaborate a little bit?

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think it needs any elaboration.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The question is whether it was called in from Baltimore, or here.

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment. You have answered the question.

Mr. LATTIMORE. All right.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, the witness' mention of calling from Baltimore or calling from here raises an interesting question I would like to ask.

Does that indicate, sir, that you initiated this meeting with him?

The CHAIRMAN. With whom?

Mr. SOURWINE. With Mr. Carter. That you sought to meet Mr. Carter on that day?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That I don't recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, you said you don't remember whether you called him from Baltimore or called him from here. That would indicate you remember you called him, wouldn't it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe I called him, but the reason why I say I don't remember is that he may have let me know from New York previously that he was coming down here.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean you may have had a previous understanding that you would meet with him after he finished testifying that day.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know whether I knew that or not, or whether he simply told me from New York that he was coming down here, and then I had the idea of seeing him here.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right, sir.

Turning to another subject, Mr. Lattimore, when did you first meet Mr. Dean Acheson.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have never met Mr. Acheson.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't know him at all.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know him at all.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you ever corresponded with him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe I have.

Senator FERGUSON. On that, could you be a little more definite?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am sure that I have never corresponded with Mr. Acheson. The reason why I say I believe I haven't is that I may have had occasion in the past to write some letter to the State Department, where you are supposed to address the letter to the Secretary.

Senator FERGUSON. I wondered about the October 1949 meetings, whether you were invited. Your wife is now handing you a folder, and I wondered whether or not you had a wire, as some of the other people had, or a letter, from the Secretary of State.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I believe that correspondence was in the hands of Mr. Jessup and the other members of that special committee, Mr. Case and Mr.—I forget his name. My wife has just reminded me that I did write a letter or send a telegram to Mr. Acheson requesting him to release the transcript of my remarks at that 1949 meeting.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that the only letter or telegram or other communication?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is the only one, I believe.

Mr. SOURWINE. That you ever sent Mr. Acheson?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever speak at the Army War College?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have spoken there maybe once, maybe twice.

Mr. SOURWINE. Not more than twice?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. And at least once?

Mr. LATTIMORE. And at least once.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember when?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Oh, it must have been about 1945 or 1946, possibly 1947. I am not sure.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what you talked about?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember in detail. Probably some general talk on the Far East.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember how your talk was arranged?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember who made the contact or who invited you to speak?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recommend the assignment or transfer of any person in the State Department to any post in the Far East?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I ever did.

Mr. SOURWINE. You never made such a recommendation to anyone?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever make such a recommendation with regard to John S. Service?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I am pretty sure I never did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Miriam Farley?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. T. A. Bisson?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know of any Communist or pro-Communist who was employed by the Office of War Information?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Either Chinese or American Communist or pro-Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not that I considered Communist or pro-Communist at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, leaving aside the question of what you considered, I want to ask you this question: Do you know of any person, either Chinese or American, racially, who was employed by the Office of War Information, who was a person under Communist discipline or who had voluntarily and knowingly cooperated or collaborated with Communist Party members in furtherance of Communist Party objectives?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have anything to do with the employment of anyone to a position of importance with UNRRA—UNRRA—for China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever know anyone who held a position of importance with UNRRA for China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I knew Mr. Benjamin Kizer.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is he the only person who fills that specification?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He is the only one I can recall at the moment.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is, he is the only person who ever held a position of importance with UNRRA for China that you knew?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That I recall; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you had nothing to do with his appointment and made no recommendation with regard to it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you acquainted with any member of the United States Supreme Court?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have met Mr. Justice Douglas, and I have met Mr. Justice Black. I think those are the only two I have met.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you attend a discussion conference of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations in Washington on or about December 9 and 10, 1938?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall it. It would be quite possible.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, attempting to refresh—

Mr. LATTIMORE. Let's see. What date in '38?

Mr. SOURWINE. December 9 and 10, 1938.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, I was in Baltimore at that time, so it is very likely I would have been invited.

Mr. SOURWINE. Attempting to refresh your memory, do you remember attending such a discussion conference, at which Mr. Stanley Hornbeck was present?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall it. I have been at various IPR-sponsored discussions where Mr. Hornbeck was present.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was he a trustee of IPR at that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He has been a trustee of the IPR, I believe, in the past. I don't recall in 1938.

The CHAIRMAN. Was he at that time? That was the question.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall.

Mr. FORTAS. May I inquire whether the witness wants a recess and whether that is the pleasure of the committee? We have been going about 2 hours.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will stand in recess for 10 minutes.  
(Short recess.)

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

You may proceed, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, just before the recess, I asked you about your attendance at a discussion conference of the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, in Washington, D. C., on or about December 9 and 10, 1938.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, still attempting to refresh your memory with regard to such a discussion conference, do you remember attending such a conference, at which Mr. James Pennfield was in attendance?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember attending such a conference, at which Mr. Alger Hiss was in attendance?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember attending a conference at which Mr. or Mrs. Steven Roudabush was in attendance?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. You just can't remember any such conference?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I can't.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, I have just two or maybe three questions to ask Mr. Lattimore.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Lattimore, have you had any Russian visit you in your home?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think one. You mean one not an American of Russian origin?

Senator SMITH. I mean a person from Russia.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I think one.

Senator SMITH. Who was that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He was a man named Dolbin, D-o-l-b-i-n, who had been assigned by the Russians to accompany Mr. Wallace in Siberia, and then he was attached for a while here; I am not sure whether it was the Russian Embassy or the Russian United Nations delegation. And I invited him over to my house.

Senator SMITH. How long did he visit you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think he drove over for lunch and drove back the same day.

Senator SMITH. Now, when was that? About when?

I know it is difficult to remember the exact date.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Probably 1945.

Senator SMITH. Now, is the the only Russian individual that visited your home?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe so.

Senator SMITH. Did you never have a Russian individual, on further reflection, to visit you as your house guest?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I am pretty sure not.

Senator SMITH. Was there ever any such occasion where you met a Russian flying into Baltimore, where you met him at the airport?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I am pretty sure I never met a Russian flying into Baltimore.

Senator SMITH. And this one Russian is the only Russian individual that has been to your home?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is the only one I can recall.

Senator SMITH. All right.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the first name of this individual? I assume that was the last name you gave.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That was the last name. I don't remember the first name.

Senator SMITH. May I ask one other question?

Did you have occasion to have a conference with this same man here in Washington?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. I think I lunched with him once here in Washington.

Senator SMITH. Did you meet with him anywhere else?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In this country?

Senator SMITH. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator SMITH. Now, at how many places did you meet him in Russia?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, he was attached to Mr. Wallace's party.

The CHAIRMAN. How many places did you meet him in Russia?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am sorry, Senator. That question is not susceptible to an answer in terms of numbers, because he accompanied Mr. Wallace throughout his journey.

Senator SMITH. Now, is that the only occasion when you ever saw him in Russia?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator SMITH. Did you ever see him in China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator SMITH. Was he an official of the Soviet?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He was an official of the Soviet Union; yes.

Senator SMITH. Do you know what position he occupied?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; except that at the time of Mr. Wallace's trip in Siberia, Mr. Dolbin was described as assigned from the Soviet Foreign Office.

Senator SMITH. You assumed, did you, that he was a loyal Russian official?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Senator SMITH. And consequently a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, I couldn't assume that he was a Communist, because I understand that many Russian officials are not Communists.

Senator SMITH. At that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. At that time; I didn't inquire.

Senator SMITH. Did you discuss with him the situation developing then in China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; only in the most general terms.

The CHAIRMAN. You did discuss it with him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not with him alone.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it does not make any difference whether it was with him alone. Did you discuss it with him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The subject was discussed while we were in Russia, and I couldn't recollect at this moment whether he was the man who discussed it or some other member of the party.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have any conference with him in the presence of anyone else, or with anyone else in Russia?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think it was always in a group.

Senator SMITH. Do you have any idea how many conferences you had with him, or with him in a group?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't, because we were traveling in the same airplane, and therefore nobody would think of it in terms of conferences.

Senator SMITH. Do you know where he is now?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no idea.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all, Senator?

Senator SMITH. I believe that is all.

Senator FERGUSON. Did this Russian come back with you on the plane?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. But he came over after?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He came over at some later time; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And how did he contact you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Here?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Did he call you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. I think I contacted him.

Senator FERGUSON. At the Embassy?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I called the Embassy; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. How did you learn that he was here?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think from the newspapers; but I am not sure.

Senator FERGUSON. How long would you say he was at your home?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Two or three hours.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not meet him at the airport?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. The Senator asked you if you recalled meeting any Russian.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't.

Senator FERGUSON. Or any Russian coming from the airport to your home?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator SMITH. There was one other question.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well, Senator.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Lattimore, you told us, and you published in your book, that Mr. Hamilton Owens flew from here to London for the purpose of meeting you. You spent the evening together, the night together, and he flew back the next day.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; we had dinner together at the airport, and we immediately thereafter boarded the plane for home.

Senator SMITH. I thought you said that you spent a night in a good soft bed for the first time, or something of that kind.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir. That was when the journey was broken, in Ireland, and there was weather obstruction, and so on.

Senator SMITH. Did anyone else meet you with Mr. Owens when you were in London or in Ireland?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; except that the whole press was there at the airport.

Senator SMITH. I believe you told me you did not know any of those personally.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator SMITH. You were not acquainted with any of them?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator SMITH. Did Mr. Owens take you any information with respect to these charges that had just been made against you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator SMITH. Did he have any documents or papers with him at all?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator SMITH. What was the purpose of his meeting you, if you know, flying across the Atlantic to meet you and flying immediately back?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, I suppose as the editor of a Baltimore paper, his reaction was "Baltimore boy makes headline."

Senator SMITH. He was a personal friend of yours?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I would say a friend and acquaintance of many years.

Senator SMITH. I was just interested in his purpose in flying across the Atlantic, if you were flying back in the next day or two. Was there any significance to that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, I think he was probably trying to get a scoop.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he go with you to have breakfast with Carter after you landed?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. He did not go to that meeting when you saw the press release?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think I saw Carter after I landed.

Senator FERGUSON. I thought it was on the occasion of your landing that you saw Carter.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not see Carter at all after you landed?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think we did.

[To Mrs. Lattimore.] Did we?

The CHAIRMAN. Wait a minute. Your memory is what we want. Have you a question pending?

Senator FERGUSON. No. I will wait and get the book.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now that the name of Mr. Dolbin has been brought in, I have one question to ask about him. Did Mr. Wallace meet Mr. Dolbin?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Certainly.

Mr. SOURWINE. And knew that he was on the plane all the way?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Had some contact with him on the plane all the way?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes. He was attached to Mr. Wallace as an English-speaking Russian to facilitate Mr. Wallace's journey.

Mr. SOURWINE. He had frequent conversations with him, then, would you say?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Of a friendly nature?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you, sir, send a message to Mr. Lauchlin Currie at the White House in November of 1941 or at about that time

indicating that Chiang Kai-shek had reacted adversely to the proposed modus vivendi for Japan?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I transmitted such a message at the instructions of Chiang Kai-shek.

Mr. SOURWINE. He told you to transmit that message to the White House?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That's right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you urge to Mr. Currie that the President be told about Chiang's adverse reaction?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you in your message to Mr. Currie state that it was being sent at Chiang's direction?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember. The text of the message was drafted by myself and Madame Chiang Kai-shek.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you discuss with Mr. Vincent the fact that you had sent or would send or were sending such a message, or your intention to send such a message?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it the purpose of that message to convey a message from Chiang to the President?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes. My understanding was that Chiang was using all channels open to him to register in Washington his alarm.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have any part in the drafting or preparation or submission of the message under date of July 14, 1944, the text of which appears on page 560 of the State Department white paper, which I now show you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. August 31, 1944? Is that the one?

Mr. SOURWINE. The message under date of July 14, 1944, on page 560.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I see. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your answer is "No"? You did not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am assuming, Mr. Chairman, that page references to the white paper, which is a standard document, are sufficient for inclusion in this record by reference?

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you make any suggestions with regard to that message?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know about it at the time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know it was going to be sent?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know it had been sent?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I did. My recollection is that I had no conferences with Mr. Wallace after the plane returned.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know anything about the documents that that message itself refers to, that is, the Chiang telegram of July 8, and the letter to Chiang under date of June 12?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't know about those.

Mr. SOURWINE. You never saw such documents?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have anything to do with the preparation or transmission of a message to Chungking on or about July 25, 1944, quoting or paraphrasing Amerasia magazine?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't think I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know anything about a message sent to Ambassador Gauss in the fall of 1944, on or about September 19 of that year, over the signature of Secretary Hull, stating that he, Hull, and the President, then Roosevelt, were authorizing Ambassador Gauss to go over and speak very frankly to Chiang Kai-shek about the urgent need of trying to bring about a greater amount of unity in the military command of China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I am quite sure I didn't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have anything to do with the drafting or preparation of that telegram?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I am quite sure I didn't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know at the time that it was to be sent?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I believe this is the first I have heard of it, unless I noted it in the white paper when I first read it.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am referring to the telegram that appears on page 563 of the white paper, which I show you. Does that change your answer in any way?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. I have no recollection of having anything to do with that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know at the time that it had been sent?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know anything about a telegram to Chiang Kai-shek in the fall of 1944 over the signature of President Roosevelt?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't recollect anything about that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have anything to do with the preparation of such a telegram?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I am quite sure I didn't. In the fall, when?

Mr. SOURWINE. In the fall of 1944.

Mr. LATTIMORE. What month?

Mr. SOURWINE. I can't place it more closely.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. I am sure I didn't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have anything to do with the contents of such a telegram?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I am sure I didn't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss such a telegram or the contents or prospective contents of it with Mr. John Carter Vincent?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you first meet Mr. John Carter Vincent?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In Peking about 1929 or 1930.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are sure it wasn't earlier than that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes. I don't remember meeting him before that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could it have been while you were with Arnold & Co., Ltd., at Tientsin and Peking?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I am sure I didn't know him then.

Mr. SOURWINE. That would have been between 1922 and 1926?

Mr. LATTIMORE. 1922 and 1926; yet. No; I have no recollection of knowing him at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you regard Mr. John Carter Vincent as an expert on far eastern affairs?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you good friends?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would say quite good friends.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you last see him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It must have been several years ago.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have not seen him recently?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you discussed with him any of the hearings before this subcommittee?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or his appearance before this subcommittee? Or his actions here?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have any correspondence with him about those matters?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. John Carter Vincent get in touch with you when he got back from Switzerland, in November of 1940?

Mr. LATTIMORE. From Switzerland in November of 1940?

The CHAIRMAN. When he got back from Switzerland is the question.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know when he did get back?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I couldn't tell you.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you see him in November or December of 1940?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no recollection.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know when was the first time after December of 1940 that you did see him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The first that I can recall seeing him is in Chungking when I got there in 1941.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you see him at all between the time he got back from Geneva in 1940, in November, and the time he sailed for Shanghai in January or early February of 1941?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I should say it is quite likely, but I have no recollection of it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you speak to Mr. Vincent by telephone during that period?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Again all I can say is that it is very likely, but I don't remember it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you correspond with him while he was away?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I corresponded with him.

Mr. SOURWINE. I ask those questions, Mr. Chairman, in connection with exhibit 379, which is already a part of this record.

Do you know anything about what part, if any, Mr. Lauchlin Currie played in securing your assignment to accompany Mr. Wallace on his mission to China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't remember Mr. Currie having anything to do with it.

Mr. FORTAS. Mr. Chairman, could he see exhibit 379?

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know anything about what part, if any, Mr. Currie played with respect to your assignment in connection with the Pauley Commission?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; as far as I remember he had nothing to do with it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know about Mr. Wallace's book, Soviet Asia Mission, before it was published?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes. The galley proofs were sent to me.

Mr. SOURWINE. They were sent to you? By whom?

Mr. LATTIMORE. By—what was the man's name? Mr. Steiger, who assisted Mr. Wallace in writing the book.

Mr. SOURWINE. Why did he send you the galley proofs?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Presumably because my name was mentioned frequently.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he not say why he sent them to you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he just send you the proofs with no note, no message?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Oh, there must have been a covering letter of some kind.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't remember what was in it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember what was in it.

Mr. SOURWINE. What did you do with the proofs?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I read through them to check wherever my name was mentioned and sent them back.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you see the manuscript of that book at any time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't think I ever saw the manuscript.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you or Mrs. Lattimore, to your knowledge ever work on the manuscript for that book?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not to my recollection.

[To Mrs. Lattimore.] You didn't either; did you?

No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you correct the proofs at all?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember whether I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you make marginal suggestions?

Mr. LATTIMORE. If so, they were very few. I don't remember them.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you perform any editorial function with respect to that book or that manuscript?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; nothing that I would call an editorial function.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, do you remember a publication or an article or literary work that bore Mr. Wallace's name, which your wife had a hand in the writing of?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I do.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It was called "Our Task in Asia"; was it?

It was "Our Policy in Asia." Or "Our" something "in Asia."

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have anything to do with that publication in an editorial way?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think my wife consulted me at times on it.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did discuss it with her while she was working on it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I believe I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you perform any editorial function with respect to that book?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I wouldn't say so, unless she made any changes as a result of talking with me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you write anything for inclusion in that book, or that manuscript?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe I actually wrote anything.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you dictate anything?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't think so. I think I talked it over or talked over parts of it with Mr. Wallace once or twice, but I don't remember much in detail about it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you say it was wholly Mrs. Lattimore's work?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; my impression is that it was primarily Mr. Wallace's work.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you referring to the pamphlet, "Our Job in the Pacific"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. "Our Job in the Pacific." That must be it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, Mr. Dennett has testified that that project was initiated by you. Do you remember that testimony?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I remember some testimony to that effect, that the IPR asked me to speak to Mr. Wallace about it, or something of that sort. That is quite possible.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your question, now?

Mr. MORRIS. I was asking Mr. Lattimore if he had recalled Mr. Dennett's testimony on that subject.

Actually, what did happen with respect to it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember what happened in detail.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, what happened with regard to what? Let us get our line straight here.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I understand Mr. Morris is asking about the initiating of that pamphlet. I don't remember the steps.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you go to Mr. Wallace about it, or speak to him about it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I should say very likely; but I have no very clear recollection.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, did you consider at that time that he had knowledge on the subject that would be well worth while for the world?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I thought that the opinions of the Vice President of the United States were important for the world.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know why he did not write it alone, and why your wife helped him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My general recollection is that he had some ideas about America's increasing importance in the world and about various things that could be done in the way of development of trade, and investment, and so on, and that he didn't have first-hand knowledge of Asia, and therefore wanted some help on it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think the writing of that book was his idea?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That, I don't remember, whether it was his idea to begin with, or whether the idea came from somebody in the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was not your idea?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't think it was my idea.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are sure of that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I am not sure about it.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you not say that he did not know about Asia?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe he had ever been in Asia.

Senator FERGUSON. And yet you were having him write as an authority, using the name of the Vice President, for the IPR?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I wasn't having him write.

Senator FERGUSON. If one of these witnesses is correct, you instigated it. You conceived the idea.

MR. LATTIMORE. No. I remember, my general recollection, Senator, is that at that time there was a good deal in the press about Mr. Wallace's ideas of the development of unindustrialized countries that would be coming after the war, and presumably those references gave somebody the idea of getting Mr. Wallace to apply those ideas to what was eventually described in the pamphlet as "Our Job in the Pacific."

Senator FERGUSON. Now, in writing that, how do you account for the fact, then, that he got in touch with your wife to help him write the book?

MR. LATTIMORE. I don't remember what the steps were.

MR. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, may I interrupt at that point? The witness is in the field of pure conjecture. He has been for the last two or three answers. If it is true, as he states, that he does not remember, then his answer has to be "I can't explain it." A conjecture about what might have happened isn't any kind of an explanation at all.

The CHAIRMAN. That is true, but he has been wandering around in that field for a long while, so there is nothing new about that.

Senator FERGUSON. Go ahead with your next question.

MR. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss with Lauchlin Currie the matter of assigning or securing Mr. Vincent to accompany Mr. Wallace to China?

MR. LATTIMORE. I don't remember. I remember talking with Mr. Currie before we started, but I don't remember whether that was before or after Mr. Vincent had been appointed.

MR. SOURWINE. Well, didn't you discuss it first with Mr. Vincent and then with Mr. Currie?

MR. LATTIMORE. That I don't remember.

The CHAIRMAN. What is it you do not remember, now, in regard to that question, Mr. Lattimore? You do not remember what?

MR. LATTIMORE. I don't remember discussing it first with Mr. Vincent and then with Mr. Currie. Isn't that the order you put it in?

MR. SOURWINE. Do you remember discussing it with Mr. Vincent?

MR. LATTIMORE. I remember talking about the trip with Mr. Vincent before we started, but whether it was before he was appointed or only after he was appointed, I don't remember.

MR. SOURWINE. Do you remember talking about it with Mr. Currie?

MR. LATTIMORE. I remember talking about it with Mr. Currie; but, again, whether it was before or after the appointment of Mr. Vincent, I don't remember.

MR. SOURWINE. I mean, do you remember talking about Mr. Vincent's appointment with Mr. Currie?

MR. LATTIMORE. I don't remember whether Mr. Vincent's appointment was included in what we talked about or not.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not the question at all. Will you read the question, Mr. Reporter?

(The reporter reads, as requested.)

MR. LATTIMORE. No; I don't remember.

MR. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent has testified that he discussed with you his forthcoming trip with Mr. Wallace for some time before he left on a trip. Please tell us what you remember about those discussions.

MR. LATTIMORE. I suppose we talked in general about the countries we were going to be going through, but I don't remember any details whatever.

MR. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Vincent ask you for advice?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe he asked me for advice. He may have asked me for opinion.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you give him advice?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not that I remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you give him opinion?

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I answer that in this way——

The CHAIRMAN. The question is: Did you give him opinion?

Mr. LATTIMORE. If I gave him opinions, they were almost certainly directed to the frontier areas in which I was particularly interested.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you did or did not give him opinions?

Mr. LATTIMORE. All I can say is that I believe I probably did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember having any discussions with Mr. Vincent prior to the trip with Mr. Wallace, prior to leaving on that trip?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have a vague recollection of one or two very brief meetings.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know how they were arranged?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who called whom?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is all you can tell us about it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is all I can tell you about it.

Mr. SOURWINE. On how many occasions during the Wallace mission did you discuss with Mr. Vincent what had taken place in previous talks between Mr. Wallace and Chiang Kai-shek?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall Mr. Vincent discussing that subject with me.

Mr. SOURWINE. On how many occasions, if any, during the Wallace mission did you ever tell Mr. Vincent anything that had taken place or call his attention to anything that had taken place in a previous talk between Mr. Wallace and Chiang Kai-shek?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Did I tell Mr. Vincent?

Mr. SOURWINE. Or call his attention to anything that had taken place?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe I was present at only one talk between Mr. Wallace and Chiang Kai-shek, and I do not believe that I talked with Mr. Vincent about it afterward.

May I explain that?

My recollection of the subject of that talk is extremely hazy, because I was acting as one of the interpreters, and I always find it very difficult to concentrate on interpreting and afterward be able to give a connected account of what was said.

Mr. SOURWINE. On how many occasions did you discuss with Mr. Vincent other matters connected with the mission?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no idea.

Mr. SOURWINE. A number of occasions?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Probably a number of occasions in a general way, since it was a continuous trip and we were constantly thrown together.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where did you have those conferences?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Usually in the plane, I suppose.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am talking about times when you were not in the plane.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Times when we were not in the plane, we were very frequently quartered separately. So I would say that our conversations were usually on the plane.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you meaning to testify that during this trip with Mr. Wallace, you didn't discuss with Mr. Vincent matters connected with the mission except when you were on the plane?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think that our conversations were almost entirely on the plane. And may I add that I had no conversations with him on subjects that might be called "in the diplomatic field."

The CHAIRMAN. That is not called for in the question, and it is not even an explanation of your answer. The question did not call for anything "in the diplomatic field."

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it your testimony that except when you were on the plane you had no conversations with Mr. Vincent during the Wallace trip?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Certainly I had conversations with Mr. Vincent, but I don't recall them separately, or what they were about.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever confer with him in his room?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever confer with him in your room?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever confer with him out on the street?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you present at more than one of the conferences between Vice President Wallace and Chiang Kai-shek?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I believe only one.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you at any time make any memorandum with regard to the conference at which you were present?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever transmit any such memorandum to Mr. Vincent?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever transmit to Mr. Vincent or have any part in the transmission to him of any report or memorandum concerning any conversation between General Chiang and Mr. Wallace?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was John Hazard at the talks between Mr. Wallace and Chiang Kai-shek?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe he was at the one where I was present; and, of course, I can't speak for the ones where I wasn't present.

Mr. SOURWINE. While you were in China with Mr. Wallace, did you attend a conference with General Ferris?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes. I believe that was the one at which I was acting as one of the interpreters.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that a conference about sending a mission into North China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The general subject of the conversation was to send an American observer mission to North China; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember whether Mr. John Stewart Service and Mr. John Carter Vincent were both present at that meeting?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember whether Mr. Vincent was present. I remember Mr. Service being present, as an assistant interpreter to General Ferris.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was General Stilwell at that conference?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. General Ferris was his representative?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think General Ferris was representing him. I believe we didn't meet General Stilwell all the time we were in China.

Mr. SOURWINE. During Mr. Wallace's entire mission, you had no conferences with General Stilwell?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any knowledge of any conference between General Stilwell and John Carter Vincent?

Mr. LATTIMORE. At that time?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, during that Wallace mission.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I haven't. My recollection is, as I say, that General Stilwell was not even in China during that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know why Mr. Wallace recommended that General Stilwell be replaced or superseded?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I don't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was General Stilwell pro-Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I should say he was not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was General Stilwell a Marshall man?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have seen him so characterized in the press. I couldn't say of my own knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you have so regarded him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I had no knowledge on which to base such an opinion.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had and have no opinion on that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you accompany Mr. Wallace and Mr. Vincent to Kunming?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where did you stay while you were there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think I stayed at the American consulate in town.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where did they stay?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think they stayed at General Chennault's headquarters outside of town.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was there any reason why you split up?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No particular reason.

Well, I think lack of accommodations at General Chennault's.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you invited to General Chennault's?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I had several meals there; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is: Were you invited to General Chennault's?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were invited to stay there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't think I was invited to stay there. I think when we arrived the arrangements were made and I was quartered at the consulate.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you accompany members of the party on a visit to Mme. Sun Yat-sen?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't think I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether Mr. Wallace submitted a report to the President in writing after he returned from China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I know that from the press and from the hearings before this committee.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you, of your own knowledge, know whether Mr. Wallace submitted a report to the President in writing after he returned from China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Of my own knowledge; I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss with Mr. Wallace at any time such a report or the subject of such a report?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I was excluded from those discussions.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever see a rough draft of such a report or of memoranda prepared for such a report?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I am quite sure I didn't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever submit any suggested language orally or in writing for possible inclusion in such a report?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I don't believe I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Such a report would have been a most important thing in connection with Mr. Wallace's mission, would it not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. In your contemplation would there have been anything more important than his report to the President?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I should say that was probably the most important thing in his mission.

Mr. SOURWINE. And yet you never discussed it with him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I was not a member of the State Department, and I was excluded from all diplomatic activities.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you on any Government payroll at that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was representing OWI.

Senator FERGUSON. You were on that payroll?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That's right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you make any reports of your own with regard to the Wallace mission?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe I made a verbal report to Mr. Elmer Davis.

Mr. SOURWINE. By "verbal," do you mean oral?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Oral; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you make any written report to anybody?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know about the so-called Kunming cable?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I knew about that until afterward.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss at any time with Mr. Vincent any matter connected with Mr. Wallace's report to the President?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you seen the document which Mr. Wallace released as the text of his report to the President?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I believe I have.

Mr. SOURWINE. Had you ever seen the text of that document or any part of it before?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; it appeared strange to me.

Mr. SOURWINE. What part did you have, if any, in preparation of Mr. Wallace's speech to be given in Seattle upon his return from China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe I had no part in that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you give him any information for inclusion in that speech?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you talk to him about the speech?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. I knew he was writing the speech; but I don't believe I talked to him about it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Didn't he ask you for any aid or any material at all?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I believe he was met by somebody who was going to act as his campaign manager, and they went into a huddle and composed the speech.

Mr. SOURWINE. Didn't Mr. John Carter Vincent work on that speech on the airplane on the way back?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That I can't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you give Mr. Wallace the benefit of notes you had taken in Siberia to aid him in the preparation of that speech?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I may have. I don't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think that answer jibes with the last three answers you have just given?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know whether it jibes or not.

The CHAIRMAN. The witness is held responsible for his own answers, and whether they jibe or not is a matter for the conclusion of the committee.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you give Mr. Wallace anything? Did you give him any information, written or oral, or give him anything at all to aid him in the preparation of that Seattle speech?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I talked with Mr. Wallace whenever he wanted to talk to me; but I remember no talks the subject of which was a speech that he was about to write.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you furnish any substantial part of the factual information or the detail upon which that speech was based?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall the speech and so can't answer that. I know that in his book there are several references to information that he says came from me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Hazard assist in the preparation of that speech?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That I don't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you go with Mr. John Carter Vincent to see Mr. Lauchlin Currie after you got back from the Wallace mission?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Very likely. But I have no recollection.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am trying to find out whether you went with Mr. Vincent or whether you went alone. Can you not remember?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I can't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you go alone?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't even remember going to see Mr. Currie after that mission.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you say you didn't go to see Mr. Currie?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I can't say I didn't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it possible you might have gone to see him on one occasion with Mr. Vincent and on another occasion alone, or that you might have gone to see him with Mr. Vincent and then seen him for a time alone, Mr. Vincent having retired?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It is quite possible.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss with the President of the United States the question of declaring the Japanese Emperor to be a war criminal?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; to the best of my recollection, I never mentioned that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss that with Mr. Vincent?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Vincent? Declaring the Japanese Emperor to be a war criminal? No, I don't believe so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever go to see the President about the question of the fate of the Emperor?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir. To the best of my recollection, I mentioned Japan only as it is mentioned in that memorandum that you have for the record, and it was not mentioned at all in conversation.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss with Mr. Vincent your visit to the President on July 3, 1945?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I ever did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss with him the prospect of such a visit, the fact that you would go or might go?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you discuss with him the fact that you had written a letter to the President?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you discuss that with anyone else in the State Department?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe I discussed it with anybody in the State Department. I believe the only person with whom I discussed it was the president of my university.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know why General Marshall's directive for his mission to China was initiated in the State Department?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I have no knowledge of that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Wasn't General Marshall perfectly competent to draft his own directive?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is a subject on which I can't speak with any authority.

Mr. SOURWINE. Hadn't General Marshall had a lot of experience in China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I can't speak to that of my own knowledge. I have seen in the press that he was at one time stationed with the United States Fifteenth Infantry in Tientsin, I believe in the 1920's, but I didn't know him at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, he had served in China, hadn't he?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is my recollection; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you didn't know that of your own knowledge?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. He had also served in the Philippines, hadn't he?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I didn't know that of my own knowledge, either.

Mr. SOURWINE. Wouldn't that help his knowledge of China and the Chinese affairs?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Do you want me to speculate?

Mr. SOURWINE. Would it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, it is part of Asia. No, I think the Philippines and China are different enough so that knowledge of the Philippines is not necessarily part of the training of an expert on China.

Mr. SOURWINE. Marshall had to know about China when he was Chief of Staff, did he not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I presume so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you not say that General Marshall knew more about Asiatic Affairs when he became Secretary of State than he did about any other sector of foreign relations?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I couldn't speak to that.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have no opinion on that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No opinion on that.

Mr. SOURWINE. General Marshall's appointment as Secretary of State was a good break for Mr. Acheson and John Carter Vincent, wasn't it?

The CHAIRMAN. That interrogation certainly calls for a farfetched conclusion.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will the Chair indulge me for just three or four more questions?

Senator FERGUSON. Suppose the witness drew those conclusions previously. They might be farfetched.

Mr. SOURWINE. General Marshall's appointment as Secretary of State was a good break for Dean Acheson and John Carter Vincent, wasn't it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I can't speak to that.

Mr. SOURWINE. If almost anyone else had become Secretary of State at that time, wouldn't it have been much tougher for them to put across their ideas of far eastern policy?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I can't speak to that.

Senator FERGUSON. Just a moment. The answer is "I can't speak to that." What do you mean by that answer?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no personal knowledge which would entitle me to an opinion of any value on that subject.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever express an opinion along that line?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, think a moment.

Mr. SOURWINE. If almost anyone else had become Secretary of State at that time, wouldn't it have been much tougher for Acheson and Vincent to put across their ideas with regard to far eastern policy?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir. I can't answer that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you agree that General Marshall's policy in China deflected the pressure somewhat away from Russia?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I wouldn't be able to agree or disagree with that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Didn't General Marshall bring about a change in the far eastern policy America had been following, a change that involved a softer attitude toward Russia?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I could characterize it in that way.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever characterize it in that way?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you agree that the Marshall policy moved us away from a show-down with Russia, whereas the policy we had been following before that time had been a get-tough policy that was moving us toward a show-down with Russia?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you do not have to ask your counsel.

Mr. FORTAS. Mr. Chairman, these are rather unusual questions.

The CHAIRMAN. They may be unusual, but they are in line. He can answer it "Yes" or "No," or he can say he cannot answer.

Mr. FORTAS. Can we have that question again?

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you agree that the Marshall policy moved us away from a show-down with Russia, whereas the policy we had been

following before that time had been a get-tough policy that was moving us toward a show-down with Russia?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I may have believed so at the time. I have no clear recollection of it.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever express that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I might have.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know on what occasion?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, was not the same thing true with regard to Europe, that the Marshall policy deflected the pressure away from Russia and away from a show-down with Russia?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That the Marshall policy in China——

Mr. SOURWINE. No. Wasn't the same thing true with regard to Europe, that the Marshall policy deflected the pressure away from Russia and away from a show-down with Russia?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It might have.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can't you see the comparison between the moves made in China and the moves made in Europe? Isn't that a fair comparison?

Mr. FORTAS. Is that a question, too?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Can you tell me what year you are speaking of?

Mr. SOURWINE. Is there any year in which that was not true?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, I am trying to recall the years in which General Marshall was Secretary of State.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, he was Secretary of State to your knowledge was he not?

Mr. SOURWINE. Would that have been true in 1945, 1946, and 1947?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The reason I am asking, Mr. Sourwine, is that it seems to me there is an overlap here between what is sometimes called the Marshall policy in China at a time when Marshall was not yet Secretary of State, and the Marshall policy in Europe after the time when Marshall was Secretary of State and when the Marshall plan became the basis of policy in Europe.

Mr. SOURWINE. Don't you think the Marshall policy in China and the Marshall policy in Europe were comparable?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think they were comparable, in the sense of trying to save the situation in both areas.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you believe that Chinese Communists now are controlled by Russia or that they are free to determine for themselves what course they will follow and to make whatever kind of a bargain they want to make with the Western Powers or with Russia?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Now? Right now?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Right now I would say that the Chinese Communists are clearly ideologically subordinate to Russia. But the degree of Russian operational control is something that is disputed among different authorities in the field.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would the same thing have been true in 1946 and 1947?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In 1946-47, I believe the Chinese Communists would have been perhaps more free to operate on their own.

Mr. SOURWINE. You think they would in 1946 or 1947 have been free to determine for themselves the course they were going to follow, to

make whatever kind of a bargain they might want to make with either the Western Powers or Russia, as they saw fit?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think that is possible.

Senator FERGUSON. When did the change take place?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I should say after the Korean war.

Senator FERGUSON. After the Korean war? When? Before they entered into the Korean war?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I would say once the Korean war began.

Senator FERGUSON. That is before China got into it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think Czechoslovakia or Poland would be free to break away from Russian domination and make peace with the non-Communist powers on whatever terms they might decide, without Russian influence?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Now?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think they could have done it in 1946 or 1947?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, Yugoslavia did at some period subsequent to 1947.

Mr. SOURWINE. I spoke of Czechoslovakia and Poland.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Oh, I thought you said Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Sorry.

I think that as of 1946-47, there was a reasonable prospect that Czechoslovakia and Poland might have become much less satellites of Russia.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think the Chinese Communists at that time were comparable with Czechoslovakia and Poland in that regard?

Mr. LATTIMORE. More comparable than they are now.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, I hold in my hand a clipping of an article entitled, "The Marshall Policy—A Steady Pattern," by Owen Lattimore, from the New York Herald Tribune of August 2, 1947. I ask you if you wrote that article.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I wrote that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I ask that that may be inserted in the record at this point.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be inserted in the record.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 605" and is as follows:)

#### EXHIBIT No. 605

#### THE MARSHALL POLICY—A STEADY PATTERN

#### EUROPE-CHINA PARALLEL DEMONSTRATES THAT EAST-WEST SHOW-DOWN IS STILL AN ILLUSION

(By Owen Lattimore)

BRATISLAVA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA.—As an old China hand with a summer vacation balcony seat overlooking the spectacle of Europe, I have been watching with absorbed interest the progress of United States policy as directed by Secretary of State George C. Marshall.

As an old China hand, I probably compare moves made in China with moves made in Europe more carefully than do most Americans. As an old China hand who happened to be in Europe at the moment when Czechoslovakia and the other Slav states turned down the chance to enter the Paris economic discussions, I have probably been more conscious than many people of the resemblance between

the result of certain moves made in China and recent moves made in Europe. For what my views are worth, here they are.

Czechoslovakia knows much more about America than America does about Czechoslovakia. Judging from the American cables and publications reaching Czechoslovakia, the prevailing belief is that the line has been drawn much more sharply than ever before between Russia and her eastern European satellites and America and Britain and their western European satellites. I am convinced that this is an illusion. The final lines have not yet been drawn and the final positions have not yet been taken.

The key to an analysis of the prevailing illusion is to be found by comparing the Marshall policy in China with the Marshall policy in Europe. In China at the end of the war the United States began with certain steps in the direction of a show-down with Russia. These steps may be described as an early version of the Truman doctrine, and they presumably were taken on the assumption that a show-down with Russia was either inevitable or desirable. Heavy emphasis was laid on the government of Chiang Kai-shek as the "only legitimate government."

Repeated allusions were made to Russia's treaty obligations to recognize and give aid and comfort only to that Government. An all-out American effort was made on an ostentatious scale to complete the equipment of the Kuomintang armies, even though the war was over, and to transport them to such advantageous positions that, should there be a civil war, it would be a push-over.

Then General Marshall was sent out to China. Instead of continuing in the direction of a show-down with Russia, he diverted the policy in the direction of a show-down between conflicting political and economic ideas in China, and the conflicting regional groupings of power that were already established there. He avoided being trapped by the Kuomintang into signing a blank check for American support in the civil war; but at the same time he continued American aid and maintained the American strategic positions on such a scale that the United States can always step back into the field to prevent a complete collapse of the Kuomintang.

Russian comments on American policy have been every bit as uncomplimentary as American suspicions of what the Russians may be up to in China. But it is noteworthy that in China the Russians followed the Marshall lead in the one respect which was all important: they did not act as though we were retreating. They did not rush in to follow us up or to tread on our heels. It can, in fact, be said that Russian policy in China has been responsive to American policy, although there has been no cooperation. As a consequence, if a way ever opens up for the renewal of negotiations between the two sides in the Chinese civil war on something resembling the original Marshall basis, then the way will also be open for a Russo-American understanding to underwrite the results of such negotiations.

In Europe, as in China, we had an early or "Truman" phase of American policy, followed by a second or "Marshall" phase. The Truman policy in Greece and Turkey, like the pre-Marshall policy of trying to set up the best possible civil war in China, took the form of highly publicized steps toward a show-down with Russia. The Marshall policy in Europe, like the Marshall policy in China (in spite of all the publicity about a show-down), has in fact deflected the pressure somewhat away from Russia and placed the emphasis instead on the European countries between Russia and the west. The original Marshall proposal did not call on the European nations to align themselves; it called on them to group themselves.

The work of alignment can be fairly described not as the Marshall proposal, but as the Bevin policy. British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin has in this respect (to continue the comparison with China), played the part of Chiang Kai-shek. The British Labor Party has played the part of the Kuomintang, with the dominant wing convinced that a good anti-Russian policy is better than a good European policy, while the weaker wing trails along but keeps hankering for a "common policy for all European Socialists."

The Bevin policy in Europe, however—like the Kuomintang policy in China—has not yet succeeded in forcing a show-down between America and Russia. The very essence of the situation is that American policy is still in a position of free maneuver, free to push forward, to draw back, or to modify its direction.

Russia, correspondingly, has not been forced into a corner, but is also still free to maneuver. And the Russian satellites, about whose alignment with Russia there has been so much excited comment, are in fact still free to come to terms with other European states, just as the Chinese Communists are still in

a position to come to terms, with strong bargaining power, with the rest of China.

This analysis is confirmed by the fact that neither in China nor in Europe has the United States said either "these are all my cards" or "these are all the cards I am going to play." Still less have we said: "Here is the exact sum of money that backs these cards—count it."

And the briefest summing up of the Russian policy is that in Europe, as in China, it has not been cooperative, it has certainly not been accompanied by complimentary language, but it has been responsive. It has followed the Marshall lead. The Russians have reserved for themselves the same freedom of maneuver that we have kept for ourselves. In Europe, as in China, therefore, to the extent that Europeans may find that they cannot get on without each other, America and Russia are free to endorse any renewed trend toward getting together.—New York Herald Tribune, August 2, 1947.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, I show you an excerpt from the Congressional Record of January 24, 1947, being extension of remarks by the Honorable James E. Murray, of Montana, the full text of an article entitled "Asia and the State Department" by Owen Lattimore.

I ask you if that is the text of an article which you wrote?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; that is an article I wrote.

Senator FERGUSON. Could I see it?

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I ask that that may be inserted in the record at this point.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be inserted in the record.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 606" and is as follows:)

#### ASIA AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF HON. JAMES E. MURRAY, OF MONTANA, IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, FRIDAY, JANUARY 24 (LEGISLATIVE DAY OF WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 15), 1947

Mr. MURRAY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the appendix of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD an article, Asia and the State Department, written by Owen Lattimore, director of the Walter Hines Page School of International Relations.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### ASIA AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT (BY OWEN LATTIMORE)

WASHINGTON.—The appointment and speedy confirmation of Gen. George C. Marshall as Secretary of State have drawn a flood of comment. Most of it is interesting. Great men are not always interesting men, but General Marshall is one of the great men of our time who, in spite of his modest avoidance of publicity, has always had, without asking for it, the interest of the people.

Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., in a book review in the current issue of the Atlantic Monthly, says acidly that "small men have now succeeded great men in the United States, but small problems have not succeeded great problems."

General Marshall stands apart from this sweeping condemnation. He is a great man who can cope with the greatest problems; and it is not only America that knows it. The world knows it.

Yet in the comment about General Marshall, and about the problems that will now come to his desk, one most important combination of circumstances has been overlooked, and that is the significance, in the bureaucracy of the State Department, of General Marshall's exceptional experience in Asia and knowledge of Asiatic affairs. He is the first Secretary of State in our history whose knowledge of Asiatic affairs is greater than his knowledge of any other sector of our foreign relations, and the first Secretary of State to step into office directly from an assignment of topmost policy-making importance in Asia.

Only people who have been dealing with the Far Eastern Division of the Department of State over a period of years can fully appreciate the significance of the state. It is the literal truth that the upper crust of the State Department bureaucracy has always tended to reduce policy in Asia to a second or third priority, as compared to policy in Europe. Men in the Far Eastern Division and

its subdivisions have had to waste hours of ingenuity in wriggling through channels to get far eastern questions taken up—and taken up in time—by Secretaries preoccupied with European and Latin-American decisions, controversies, pressures, and counterpressures.

Particularly damaging to the development of a well-rounded national policy has been the practice—not dead yet—of subordinating the recommendations of various far-eastern desks to review by the desks dealing with European powers which have possessions and interests in Asia. These things are important in a bureaucracy, and the State Department is one of the most bureaucratic bureaucracies in Washington. The bureaucrats whose vested interests are in European policy have almost always been able to block, or at least to narrow, the channels by which the far easterners had to approach the Secretary.

It is true that Dean Acheson, as Under Secretary, has done a great deal to improve the working of a poor organizational system, by sacrificing an enormous amount of time to conferences at which all division chiefs have their say in the presence of other division chiefs. It is true also that the Far Eastern Division is at present exceptionally strong because its Chief, John Carter Vincent, in addition to his thorough grasp of far-eastern policy, has had a good deal of European experience and has a knowledge of European politics which puts him on a level footing with the European experts.

Vincent had the confidence of Byrnes, and he will certainly have the continuing confidence of Marshall; but had the successor of Byrnes been almost anyone but Marshall, Acheson and Vincent and the Far Eastern Division would have had to start once more on the old weary treadmill of "briefing" and educating a Secretary who, through no fault of his own, would instinctively have called the European expert in and kept the far-eastern specialist waiting in the corridor whenever he had to make a choice in the allocation of urgent demands on his time.

While people naturally think of Marshall very largely in terms of his recent China experience, it is important to recall that this is not his only far-eastern experience. He had an earlier spell of service in China with the Fifteenth Infantry, the American regiment which used to garrison Tientsin, and in that assignment he had a ringside view of China in the war-lord period. As a younger man, moreover, he had a brilliant record in the Philippines. Finally, as Chief of Staff in the war years, he had China within his field of view as well as Europe and Russia. It should not be forgotten that "Uncle Joe" Stilwell, that great man whose greatness has not yet been adequately recognized either in China or in America was a "Marshall man."

Because of all this, the Marshall appointment has almost as important a bearing on policy in Japan as on policy in China. The spectacular MacArthur shadow has fallen across the policy-making functions of Washington from the moment that General MacArthur set foot in Japan as conqueror, as the symbol of American policy, and as the exponent of American policy whenever criticized or even questioned by the Russians, the British, and sometimes the Chinese. It is not an exaggeration to say that General of the Army Marshall will be the first and only American since the death of President Roosevelt to approach problems of policy in Japan without the political and psychological handicap of being dwarfed by the giant stature of General of the Army MacArthur.

The relationship between the two will not work out in any vulgar controversy. Both men are too big for that. But Marshall is the Democratic Secretary of State in an administration which the Republicans can outvote at any time; and MacArthur, in the hero worship of some of the Republicans, is a strange heraldic figure both a Wild Bull of the Pampas and a Sacred Cow.

Although under Marshall Asiatic policy will take its proper and proportional place in American world policy without tedious bureaucratic lobbying and maneuvering, the other components of our world policy will not be distorted. Marshall has a full grasp of the transition from war policy to postwar policy. He has never succumbed to either the tradition of contempt for the British or the tradition of implacable hate for the Russians which are characteristic of many of our professional Army and Navy men, but there is not the slightest danger that he will be taken into camp by either the Russians or the British.

We may fairly expect from General Marshall an integration of the policy of safeguarding and advancing the American interest with a policy of retaining what needs to be retained from the grand alliance which won the war.

Senator FERGUSON. Just a moment. Might I inquire?  
Did you ask Senator Murray to put this in the record?

MR. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I don't believe I ever knew Senator Murray.

SENATOR FERGUSON. Did you send him a copy of this?

MR. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I don't believe I did.

SENATOR FERGUSON. Where was this distributed?

MR. LATTIMORE. That was an article distributed through Overseas News Agency.

SENATOR FERGUSON. "Asia and the State Department"; is that right? That was the name of it?

MR. LATTIMORE. I don't know what title they sent it out under. Such articles are printed under different heads in different papers. Is there an indication in which paper that was published?

SENATOR FERGUSON. No. That is why I asked.

MR. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I have concluded all the questions I had to ask of this witness.

There is one matter I might call to the attention of the committee at this time. As the chairman and the members of the committee know, several requests have been received from persons who have been named in this hearing for the insertion of statements; that is, persons who feel that they have in one way or the other been maligned by this witness, or some other witness have written in asking that statements be inserted. It has been the policy of the committee, as the chairman and the committee know, to reply that there is nothing in the record except material under oath, and that if an affidavit will be submitted it will be considered.

In the case of Miss Freda Utley, such an affidavit has now been presented, and I offer it for consideration by the Chair for possible admission.

THE CHAIRMAN. I think I have seen the statement before.

It may be inserted in the record.

(The statement referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 607" and is as follows:)

#### EXHIBIT No. 607

1717 TWENTIETH STREET NW.,  
Washington 9, D. C., March 21, 1952.

TO: THE CHAIRMAN, THE McCARRAN SUBCOMMITTEE FOR INTERNAL SECURITY.

DEAR SENATOR: Although I have not appeared as a witness before your committee, my analysis of Mr. Lattimore's writings before the Tydings committee, and in my book *The China Story*, have evidently caused him sufficient disquiet for him to have made a special effort to smear me before your committee. Although I feel honored to be included by Mr. Lattimore in the company of distinguished Americans such as Senator Knowland and Admiral Cooke, whom he also defamed Mr. Lattimore's false and malicious accusation that I have "A record of pro-Nazi utterances" is calculated to hurt my reputation should it go unchallenged.

This accusation of Mr. Lattimore's is based on the same false premises as those of the Communists and their sympathisers, namely, that to be anti-Communist was to be pro-Nazi, and that to advocate a policy leading to the enlistment of the German and Japanese peoples into the ranks of the defenders of freedom is proof of pro-Nazi sentiments. Thus, Mr. Lattimore, before your committee, has repeated the smear of the Communists and their sympathisers who condemned my 1940 book on Soviet Russia, called *The Dream We Lost* in which I wrote that Stalin was even worse than Hitler and even more dangerous—a fact which is now apparent to most of the American people.

Mr. Lattimore and his lawyers were allowed the utmost license to smear me before the Tydings committee, while I was instructed to answer only "yes" or "no" to their questions and those of Senator Green—a treatment in marked contrast to your patient hearing of Mr. Lattimore. They endeavored to prove by quotations out of context, and by citing unfavorable reviews of my books,

written by Communist sympathizers, that I was "pro-Nazi," because in my 1949 book called *The High Cost of Vengeance*, I pleaded for an intelligent, just and merciful policy toward the German people, and showed how those who favored the Morgenthau plan, or similar policies, were usually pro-Soviet. As I saw it, it was obvious that if we continued the policy of dismantling German industries and depriving millions of workers of their jobs, and continued to humiliate and revile the defeated people on the assumption that the Communist theory of collective guilt was valid, we should succeed in driving the despairing German people into the arms of Soviet Russia. The fact that the Morgenthau plan was written by Harry Dexter White, identified as a Communist or a Soviet agent before your committee, proves the truth of my argument that those who advocated a policy of vengeance were usually pro-Soviet. It is because I am both anti-Communist and anti-Nazi that I pleaded for the adoption an American policy which would prevent the Communist conquest of Germany, Japan, and China, and also prevent the revival of nazism. This fact was recognized by many reviewers, including William L. White, in the *Saturday Review of Literature*, but since you have correctly forbidden Lattimore to quote adverse reviews of my books I cannot quote the favorable ones either. However I hope it may be permissible to have inserted in the record the attached letter which I received from Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, which concerns both *The High Cost of Vengeance* and *The Dream We Lost*—republished in an abridged version in 1947 under the title "Lost Illusion."

As regards Mr. Lattimore's citations of my 1939 writings concerning the Chinese Communists, it is true that in 1938 in China at the time of the United Front against Japan, I was, foolishly, led to believe that the Chinese Communists had adopted a liberal policy. I have explained how this came about in my "China Story" which Mr. Lattimore, of course, ignores, however, as soon as I read Edgar Snow's November 1939 interview with Mao Tse-tung, published in the *China Weekly Review* in January 1940, I realized and acknowledged my mistake. For in that interview Mao made it abundantly clear that the Chinese Communist Party, like all other Communist parties, favored the Nazi side in the World War until Germany attacked Russia. Moreover the first Russo-Japanese pact, in 1940, led to the Chinese Communists directing their fire against the Nationalists instead of against the Japanese. From this time onwards I wrote articles and books showing that the Chinese Communist Party was as completely under Moscow's control as any other Communist Party in the world. All these facts are related in my 1947 book called *Last Chance in China*.

My lawyers have sent a letter to Mr. Lattimore, a copy of which is attached, demanding that he withdraw his libelous statement that I have a record of pro-Nazi utterances. This statement is, I understand, unprivileged since it was given to the press before Mr. Lattimore read it to your committee.

/s/ FRED A UTLEY.

WASHINGTON, D. C., ss:

MARCH 21, 1952.

Freda Utley personally appeared before me. Eva B. Adams, a notary public in and for the District of Columbia, Miss Freda Utley, personally known to me, who being sworn acknowledged the above to be her signature and stated that the foregoing statement and that all of the facts therein are true except such facts as may be stated on information and belief and that with respect to such facts she believes them to be true.

[SEAL]

/s/ EVA B. ADAMS, *Notary Public*.

My commission expires February 16, 1956.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,  
Washington 2, D. C., July 1949.

MY DEAR FRED A: I have carefully read your last book, *The High Cost of Vengeance*. Inasmuch as I have read practically every book that you have written and many of your magazine articles, I feel qualified to state that *The High Cost of Vengeance* is one of your finest contributions to the literary field. I have often told friends that in my opinion your book *Lost Illusion* will one day be considered a classic. I think that your latest book, *The High Cost of Vengeance*, has reached similar literary heights. The clear and succinct analysis of developments in Europe should assist many leaders in arriving at sound con-

clusions concerning our unfortunate direction or execution of our responsibilities, essentially in Germany.

Sincere good wishes for your continued success and congratulations upon a real accomplishment in the field of decency in human relationships.

Ever faithfully,

/s/ AL

(A. C. WEDEMAYER, Lt. General, G. S. C.)

Mr. SOURWINE. I have nothing further, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, what have your dealings been with Walther Heissig?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I met Mr. Heissig when I was in Peking for about 48 hours, about Christmas time, 1945. He came to see me, and he offered to buy Mongol books for me, and I left some money for him. He did buy the books and sent them to me. Since then, I have been in correspondence with him off and on.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, now, of what duration was your association with Mr. Heissig at that time? You said for a 48-hour period. You didn't see him continuously for 48 hours.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. I saw him for about half an hour.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, did you subsequently intervene on his behalf, after he had been convicted for 30 years by the military authorities?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you intervene in any way on his behalf with the military authorities?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I wrote to General Thorpe, who was at that time in Military Intelligence, and told him that there was such a man, that I understood him to be in Germany, and that he might have information useful to General Thorpe.

Mr. MORRIS. And do you so testify that that is the only effort you made on behalf of Mr. Heissig?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe so. I answer a little hesitantly, because I believe that some former German journalist in China used something presented to a court in Shanghai, something that I had once written, which he claimed was evidence showing that his ideas were different from those of the Nazis. And where Heissig was included in that, I don't know.

Mr. MORRIS. And is it your testimony that whatever you did on behalf of Mr. Heissig was done on the basis of your association of about a half hour in this 48-hour period in 1945?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That's right. Mr. Heissig gave me copies of some of his publications, and I was able to estimate that he was a man who had been in touch with Mongol sources of information for several years at a time when Americans were totally excluded from the region.

Mr. MORRIS. Had anyone ever told you that Mr. Heissig has transferred his allegiance from the German staff to the Soviet staff?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I never heard that.

Mr. MORRIS. You had no reason to believe that at all?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I had no reason to believe it at all.

Mr. MORRIS. What had been your associations with INDUSCO?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Was I trustee of INDUSCO?

Mr. MORRIS. I would like your own associations, Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. LATTIMORE. My own associations I can describe only in a general way, that I was very much in favor of INDUSCO and did a good deal to promote fund raising for INDUSCO in this country and believed that it was a very constructive activity in wartime China.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you still an honorary vice chairman of INDUSCO?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That I couldn't tell you.

Mr. MORRIS. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson?

Senator FERGUSON. Not at the present time. No questions now.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any further questions?

Senator FERGUSON. Oh, I did want to ask one question.

In relation to Mr. Fairbank, did you visit Mr. Fairbank in the last year?

Mr. SOURWINE. That is John K. Fairbank.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Let's see. Between March 1951 and now?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Almost certainly.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you see him here in Washington, or in Georgetown?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you go to his home, or his mother's home?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I did.

Senator FERGUSON. When?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think it was when he came down here first, expecting to have a hearing, and then the hearing was deferred, and he went back.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you go to see him to talk over the facts as to what he might say in his statement?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I had only a very general conversation with him.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have any conversation about his attitude toward the committee or what it should be or would be?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In a general way; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. What was it? What was your conversation with him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, that he was going to have a hearing before this committee.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; but did you have any about his attitude toward the committee, what stand he would take or should take?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not in detail; no.

The CHAIRMAN. In any way?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In a general way; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the conversation?

Mr. LATTIMORE. To the effect that he was going to say that the charges against him were totally unjustified.

Senator FERGUSON. Anything else? Anything about the committee?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't think so.

Senator FERGUSON. Nothing at all?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Nothing.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you tell him how tough you were going to be to the committee?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I had already appeared before the committee.

Senator FERGUSON. Oh, it was after you had appeared and read your statement?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That's right.

Senator FERGUSON. Then it is just recently that you saw him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I told you it was when he came down here to appear.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, but you did not give me the time.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am sorry. I thought I did. It was when he came down here expecting to be heard, and then his hearing was deferred and he went back. I think maybe a week later he came down again.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, how did you come to know that he was down here to make a statement to the committee?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He let us know he was coming down.

Senator FERGUSON. How?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know whether it was by phone or letter, or what it was.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you give him a copy of your statement?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have sent him a copy of my statement. I think it was before then.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you tell him that he should be more aggressive against the committee?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir. I left that to his judgment.

Senator FERGUSON. Nothing was said on that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He did not show me a copy of his statement, so I did not know in detail——

The CHAIRMAN. The question is whether anything was said on that subject.

Senator FERGUSON. On what his attitude should be in relation to the criticism of the committee.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, he told me that his attitude was going to be that the charges were totally unjustified.

Senator FERGUSON. Had the committee charged John Fairbank?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Many charges had been made against him before this committee.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, had the committee made any charges?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. And did you discuss any charges that the committee had made?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't think we did.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you go to see him for?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He was an old friend.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that all?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Not to discuss what he might say and his attitude toward the committee?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not in detail; no.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you come back to "not in detail." Give us what you did say about the committee.

Mr. LATTIMORE. He said that he was going to take a firm stand that the charges against him were unjustified.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that all that was said?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That was all.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you say?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I said I was glad to hear it.

Senator FERGUSON. How long did you see him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Maybe an hour.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, was that before you were asked questions here about seeing people that were witnesses or going to be witnesses?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, it was after.

Senator FERGUSON. You went to see him after you were questioned?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, might I inquire at that point, very briefly: Just to fix the date, Mr. Lattimore, you say that this occasion on which you saw Mr. Fairbank was about a week before he did in fact testify before the committee?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think it was that.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was a day on which he had been scheduled to appear before the committee and it had been deferred?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think it was the day before he had been scheduled to appear before the committee. And when we went to see him, he said he had just heard that his wife had received a telegram deferring the hearing.

Mr. SOURWINE. But he had come down here expecting to be heard; had he not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He had come down expecting to be heard.

Mr. SOURWINE. He had his statement all ready?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. He did not send it to you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had sent him a copy of your statement?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And he had his statement prepared, and he did not show it to you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you sent your statement up to him, up in Boston?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And how long before was it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. A couple of weeks.

Senator FERGUSON. What part of the statement did you think he would be interested in?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I thought he would be interested in the whole thing.

Senator FERGUSON. And did you write him a letter at the time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't think I did.

Senator FERGUSON. You just put the statement in an envelope and mailed it to him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think he was one among a number of people to whom I asked my secretary to mail copies.

Senator FERGUSON. And that is all you know about it, just that you mailed him a copy, no remarks or anything?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right, I believe.

Senator FERGUSON. But he did not send you a copy of his statement?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He sent me one subsequently.

Senator FERGUSON. When?

Mr. LATTIMORE. After it had been released.

Senator FERGUSON. Was yours sent to him before it was released?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. After it was released?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It was sent after it was released.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you released it one day and testified the next? Or was that 2 days?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think it was released simultaneously with testimony.

Senator FERGUSON. And then you mailed it after that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That's right.

Senator FERGUSON. I thought you had released it to the press at least 1 day before.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe so. I think it was sent to the press at the same time; marked for release at the opening of the hearing.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you sent it to the press?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did any of the papers print any of it before you testified?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not to my knowledge.

Senator FERGUSON. And had you mailed it to Fairbank before you testified?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I believe that all the copies to friends of ours went out, oh, some few days later, and some a week or so later, and so on.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. We are about to close the hearings. Have you anything you wish to offer or say, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. FORTAS. Senator, there are various documents that have been asked for and various types of information that have been asked for. I assume that those may be submitted.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Beyond that I have nothing further to add at this time, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Then the hearings of the witness, Owen Lattimore, are now closed.

But the committee has something to say. What I am going to say now comes from the unanimous committee that has heard this hearing.

It has been the settled practice of this committee to reserve its conclusions, with respect to the substance of testimony that is taken, until the conclusion of the hearings on the particular matter under investigation. After careful consideration, however, this committee feels it proper at this time to make a statement with respect to the conduct of this witness, as a witness, during the time he has been before us. In doing this, the committee is not reversing its policy of reserving judgment. What the committee has to say now represents facts, not conclusions—not the findings of the committee, but its observations with respect to the deportment and conduct of Mr. Lattimore as a witness.

Mr. Lattimore came here at his own request to appear and testify. He came with a 50-page statement which was no casual document. It bore obvious indicia of careful preparation, and the witness testified he had been working on it for months, and had been assisted by his counsel. It was released to the press before delivery, and Mr. Lattimore's invective was scattered to all parts of the country. Many times when asked if he had facts to support his insulting conclusions, the witness replied that he did not.

The committee has been confronted here with an individual so flagrantly defiant of the United States Senate, so outspoken in his discourtesy, and so persistent in his efforts to confuse and obscure the facts, that the committee feels constrained to take due notice of his conduct. The United States Senate is a constitutional institution, representing the States and the people thereof. A deliberate affront to the Senate of the United States, or to the Congress, is not necessarily an affront to the individuals who compose those bodies, but is an affront to the people of this Nation, who are here represented.

The committee might have had a right to expect that a witness who claimed to be an objective scholar and a patriotic citizen would first objectively analyze the past policy of the United States in the Far East and help point the way to a determination of what has been wrong, and what corrective measures may be required. The committee might have had a right to expect that he would lend eager aid in exposing whatever Communist infiltration there may have been in the Institute of Pacific Relations, or in any other organization in a position to exert influence on the thinking of our diplomats and the conduct of our foreign affairs. The committee might have had a right to expect that Mr. Lattimore's statement would be calm, temperate, and factual.

Instead, the committee was confronted with an initial fusillade of invective, and a consistently evasive, contentious, and belligerent attitude.

Suggestions have been made that the committee should seek to discipline Mr. Lattimore for his contumacious and contemptuous conduct.

Clearly Mr. Lattimore did, on many occasions, stand in contempt of the committee. Clearly he took that position voluntarily and intentionally. Mr. Lattimore used, toward the committee, language which was insolent, overbearing, arrogant, and disdainful. He flouted the committee, he scoffed at the committee's efforts, he impugned the committee's methods, and he slandered the committee's staff. His language was frequently such as to outrage and offend both the committee as a whole and its members individually and, apparently, with intent to do so.

There has been no striking back on the part of the committee. The committee has employed no sanctions against Mr. Lattimore because, through forbearance, it has been found possible to make progress without disciplinary action. Despite Mr. Lattimore's recalcitrance at many points, the committee believes a record has been made covering his essential testimony with respect to the major matters here being investigated.

The fact remains that Mr. Lattimore was allowed to use the witness chair as a rostrum from which to attack the committee, its staff, and its hearings. He was, to use a phrase from his own prepared statement before the committee, "accorded the publicity facilities" of the committee's hearings; and the record shows in many ways that neither was he insensible of his opportunity in that regard, nor did he fail to take advantage of it. There is no other country in the world where a witness before a committee of the principal legislative body of the Nation would be granted any such latitude.

Few witnesses within the memory of the members of this committee have been permitted to use language as intemperate, provocative, and abusive of the committee as Mr. Lattimore used in his prepared statement, which he was permitted to read. No witness, so far as any member of the subcommittee can recall, ever before was given free rein to read, before a Senate committee, a prepared statement so clearly contemptuous of the committee and of the Senate.

The committee is aware that in this direction lies one of the present dangers to our democratic way of life: the fact that there are those in this country today who seek to use the right of free speech in furtherance of their efforts to set up a system within which freedom of speech will not exist. But the committee has preferred to err,

if at all, on the side of allowing the witness too much latitude, rather than on the side of allowing too little. That preference does not include any predilection toward allowing a witness to escape reproof for contumacy.

Contumacy may take many forms, as Mr. Lattimore has demonstrated during his appearances here. Willful unresponsiveness is one of the forms of contumacy often resorted to by disputatious witnesses, and this witness has proved himself expert at disputation. The committee frequently found it extremely difficult to get Mr. Lattimore to give a direct answer; and on numerous occasions he was reluctant to give any responsive answer at all. This witness, who had stated he was "not interested in fine or technical distinctions," proceeded throughout his testimony to split hairs with glib facility.

At times Mr. Lattimore refused to testify with respect to conclusions; at other times, he appeared eager to do so; and he did so testify on a number of occasions. In fact, in some instances he testified vehemently to conclusions which the committee found itself unable to draw from facts of record—as in the case of his testimony that he did not have any influence on United States foreign policy with respect to the Far East.

On this point, as on other matters of substance, the committee prefers to reserve its own conclusions. However, Mr. Lattimore's testimony is significant with respect to the facts. He testified that he wrote a letter to the President of the United States, in 1945, making certain statements with regard to conditions in the Far East, and urging a review of United States foreign policy with respect to the Far East, from which review then top officials of the State Department should be excluded. Mr. Lattimore testified that he saw the President personally, and left with him memoranda suggesting certain courses of action with respect to Japan and China; and that these memoranda included a recommendation for giving a larger measure of high authority to officials with China backgrounds.

Soon thereafter, according to Mr. Lattimore's own testimony, the then top officials of the State Department were replaced, including former Ambassador Grew. Further, the number and importance of top jobs in the State Department, held by persons with China backgrounds, was increased. Finally this witness testified that the policy advocated, shortly thereafter, in the so-called directive of December 15, 1945, on China policy, and which our Government sought to carry out in China, was substantially the same as the policy outlined in Mr. Lattimore's memoranda with respect to China; and that the policy adopted by the United States, with respect to Japan, was substantially the same as the policy with respect to Japan outlined in Mr. Lattimore's memoranda.

These facts, to which Mr. Lattimore testified before this committee, went unmentioned by him during his testimony before the Tydings committee.

Mr. Lattimore has testified to having a type of memory with which the committee is quite familiar. With respect to some matters, he has demonstrated that his memory is extremely good. But he has testified that his memory was unreliable with respect to matters which ordinary men might be expected to remember most clearly. Very few men forget about their visits to the President of the United States, if the number of such visits is small. But Mr. Lattimore, who

said he saw President Truman just once, wanted this committee to believe he had forgotten the incident when he testified before the Tydings committee with respect to his influence on foreign policy.

Mr. Lattimore also has testified before this committee that all during that prior Senate investigation he forgot the fact that he had a desk in the State Department Building for 4, 5, or 6 months during the last war.

The precise extent to which Mr. Lattimore gave untruthful testimony before this committee will never be determined. Human limitations will prevent us from ever attaining the complete knowledge of all his activities which would make it possible to assess each statement he has made and to catalog fully whatever untruths he may have uttered. That he has uttered untruths stands clear on the record. Some of these have been so patent and so flagrant as to merit mention at this time, as illustrative of the conduct and attitude of the witness.

The witness testified concerning an occasion when he had luncheon with the Soviet Ambassador to the United States. The date of this luncheon was later placed as during the period when Soviet Russia elected, for its own purposes, to team up with the Nazi war machine. But in spite of the anxiety which freemen throughout the world experienced at the alliance of those two totalitarian colossi, the witness testified that his luncheon with the Soviet Ambassador took place after the Soviet Union had abandoned its alliance with the Nazis. Confronted later with evidence that the meeting took place during the Hitler-Stalin pact, the witness admitted he had testified incorrectly.

In connection with that same matter, the witness testified there had been much publicity about his appointment as adviser to Chiang Kai-shek, at the time of his meeting with the Soviet Ambassador, with whom he had discussed the appointment, though the record shows that the announcement of the appointment was not made until 11 days after the luncheon meeting in question.

The witness testified that he never read an article by a Mr. T. A. Bisson which had provoked considerable controversy within the Institute of Pacific Relations in 1943. He testified further that the expressions of opinion in that article were contrary to what he himself was writing at that time. Thereafter the witness identified a letter over his own signature which indicated that he had not only read the Bisson article but had agreed with it; and that the only fault he found with it was that the underlying thoughts could have been expressed more convincingly.

Mr. Lattimore has given us many plausible but differing answers as to when he realized that Frederick V. Field was pro-Communist. The witness and Field have been shown by frequent and extensive testimony to have been closely associated in the Institute of Pacific Relations. The witness initially testified that he discovered that Field was pro-Communist sometime in the 1940's, and not until then. When presented with a letter which he said he received in 1939, and which clearly reflected the Communist expressions of Mr. Field, the witness said that "judging from this letter my memory was in error by about 2 years."

Later in the hearings, the witness was shown to have recommended the same Mr. Field, at a time subsequent to 1939, as a person who could supply personnel for the Defense Advisory Commission. Thereupon Mr. Lattimore avoided admitting that he had recommended to

the Defense Advisory Commission a man whom he knew to be at least pro-Communist, by reversing his preceding testimony.

In going back to his original position, he stated that at the time when he testified his "memory was in error by about 2 years," his admission was not accurate because he was weary from long days of examinations. This explanation took no account of the fact that the admission in question took place during the first day of examination after the witness had finished reading his statement, and apparently ignored the existence of the letter which had impelled the first change in testimony on this point.

The witness made no similar claim of being unsure of himself when he testified erroneously with respect to handling Mr. Lauchlin Currie's mail. In reply to the question "Is it your testimony that you did not, at the request of Lauchlin Currie, take care of his mail at the White House when he was away?" Mr. Lattimore replied, "that certainly is my statement."

Subsequently, Mr. Lattimore identified a letter which he had written in July 1942, which included the statement:

Currie asked me to take care of his correspondence while he was away and in view of your telegram of today, I think I had better tell you that he has gone to China on a special trip. This news is absolutely confidential until released to the press.

When confronted with this letter, the witness said: "Obviously my memory was inaccurate."

When the witness was asked, in connection with discussion of a trip he had made in 1937 to Communist headquarters in China, "Did you or anyone in your party make prearrangements with the Communist Party in order to get in?" he answered, "None whatever." He was then presented with the text of an article which he had written for the London Times, and was asked if the statements in that article were true. After he affirmed that they were, he read into the record from that article—his own article—the statement: "I sent a letter to the Red Capital by ordinary mail and got in answer—"cordial invitation."

These are all instances of significant untruths, established as such. They all concern matters of obvious importance to this committee in trying to determine the nature of the organization, methods of operation, and influence of the Institute of Pacific Relations. The committee attempts to draw no conclusions from these matters at this time.

Aside from matters of self-contradiction, the record contains also instances of testimony by this witness concerning matters with respect to which other witnesses have testified to the exact opposite. Some of these instances concern matters which are highly relevant to the subject of the committee's inquiry and which are substantial in import.

For example: Over a period of 2 years, first before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate, later before this committee in executive session, and then again before us in open session, Mr. Lattimore stated that he did not know that Dr. Ch'ao-ting Chi was a Communist. Mr. Ch'ao-ting Chi was a man shown to have been an associate of the witness, and the witness admitted the association. But Mr. Lattimore testified that no one had told him that Chi was a Communist, or shown him a report that Chi was a Communist, or given him any reason whatever to believe that Chi was a Communist.

On the other hand, Prof. Karl Wittfogel of Columbia University, a witness before this committee, and E. Newton Steeley of the Review Board of the Civil Service Commission, have given testimony that flatly contradicts Mr. Lattimore's clear and unequivocal assertions in this regard.

Another instance concerns the question of whether Mr. Lattimore knew that a certain German Communist who wrote under the pseudonym of Asiaticus for the publication *Pacific Affairs* while Lattimore was editing it, was, in fact, a Communist, Mr. Lattimore has flatly asserted that he did not know or have reason to believe this writer to be a Communist. Contra, the record contains the testimony of Prof. Karl Wittfogel that he did tell Mr. Lattimore about the Communist background and the Communist affiliation of Asiaticus. Minutes of meetings in Moscow, taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and a letter written by Mr. Lattimore, are among the items of evidence in the record which also purport to show that Mr. Lattimore knew or believed Asiaticus to be a Communist writer.

One of the most important, relevant, and substantial questions respecting which the committee has been seeking the truth is whether when this witness was working with, and publishing articles for, certain Communists, he knew them to be Communists. The finding on this question is essential to a proper characterization of a whole series of actions by Mr. Lattimore, and will directly affect the committee's ultimate findings with respect to the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The shaping of United States policy with respect to China was a factor in the success of communism in that land, in the establishment of firm roots for Soviet influence in all Asia and in the subsequent ordeal through which United States boys now are being taken in Korea, if this policy in its initial stages, or at any time, was affected by acts or stratagems on the part of anyone having any slightest purpose except the welfare of this Nation, it would be a matter not to be lightly dealt with, nor one which the American people should easily overlook or forget. The intimate knowledge which this witness had of Asia and of Asiatic affairs, coupled with his deliberate and adroit attempts to mold American thinking with respect to those affairs, including his effort to establish certain concepts, in the mind of the Chief Executive of the United States, necessarily bring this witness within the orbit of any realistic appraisal of this whole situation. When, in the face of the record, he undertook before this committee a deliberate attempt to deny or cover up pertinent facts, this witness placed himself in a most unenviable position.

The hearing is closed.

(Whereupon, at 5:30 p. m., Friday, March 21, 1952, the hearing was recessed, subject to the call of the Chair.)

## APPENDIX I

### EXHIBIT No. 470

[Source: Pacific Affairs, vol XIII, No. 3, September 1940, pp. 279-319]

#### THE UNITED STATES, CHINA, AND THE WORLD MARKET

(By William Brandt)

##### "1. A MODERN MYTH

"The only thing that seems to weather revolution and war in the Far East is the myth of a Chinese market of 450 million legendary customers. Disregarding the historical conditions of the problem, the existence of the Chinese market is taken simply for granted, as if the only things to be decided were how to get at it and how to divide it. American writers like to describe this market in rosy colors as a prospect for American industry; in dark colors when they discuss it as a possible vehicle of Japanese competition. Japanese writers like to expatiate on the disaster of this 'vast market' falling to Russia.

"The truth is that the market problem of China is inseparable from the problem of the world market. No new market of world importance can be opened up without new investments of capital on a very large scale, and moreover, unless new markets are opened up, capital itself cannot continue to accumulate and grow. This is the hurdle, and it is capital that has to take the hurdle, both for the sake of itself and for the sake of the market.

"The undeveloped areas of the world that can still be tapped by capital are inhabited by the majority of the population of the globe—the 'prospective customers' of our modern mythology. Geographically, their heaviest concentration is in Asia, while by far the heaviest concentration of capital is in Western Europe and North America. These are the antipodes of our economic globe. The difficulty is that exchange between the opposite extremes of accumulated capital and undeveloped market is not the same thing as integration of the two in an expanded world order that is organically whole. Even if the backward countries were to be subordinated to the rule of capital, there are well-nigh insurmountable obstacles—economic, social, and political—to incorporation of them within the domain of capital.

"China is a huge potential market. The emphasis lies on the word 'potential'. Before speculating about its dimensions, the conditions that have so long kept it merely potential should be examined. Two processes in the operation of capital must be borne in mind—that by which it is accumulated and that by which it is reinvested for the further development of the market. These processes, moreover, work at two levels—the level obtaining in the advanced countries while they are developing their own internal markets, and the level of more acute competition when the internal markets have been saturated and the advanced countries turn to the development of the world market.

"These two levels are by no means entirely separate, because as long as the internal market in the advanced countries is capable of substantial further development, there is a real world market; capital can choose between investment at home and investment abroad. The world market can be justly thought of in terms of unlimited potentialities. After the saturation of the internal market, the horizon narrows. The world market is no longer an unknown quantity full of promising potentialities, but well-known, circumscribed, scanned and measured, even acquired (in the form of colonies), but with its development still down at the level of unrealized potentialities. When this phase has been reached, the problem of the external market for the advanced countries merges into the problem of the internal market in the backward countries. To expand the external market requires the development of the internal market in the backward countries.

"This describes, diagrammatically as it were, the situation of the world today. In India, the other British colonies, and China, alone, capital confronted with about one billion economically backward people. These people are becoming increasingly and desperately conscious both of the insupportability of their own backwardness and of the hopelessness of sufficient capital to lift them out of it. The very future of mankind depends, of course, on the reestablishment of normal economic intercourse between the advanced countries and this immense backward area. Can this be done by the development, through capital investment, of the stagnant market? The difficulty is aggravated by the fact that in China, which has become symbolical of the backward area as a whole, there is already going on a titanic struggle for political liberation from the economic deadlock. There is, accordingly, no better approach to the problem of the world market as a whole than through analysis of the different concepts and policies that interpenetrate and conflict with each other on the Chinese field of battle.

## "2. THREE CONCEPTIONS OF THE CHINA MARKET

"The twin principles of equal opportunity and of the territorial and administrative integrity of China imply the interest of American capital in the industrialization and the development of the internal market of China as a prerequisite and concomitant of the penetration of American enterprise. Directly opposed to the American view and the American interest is the attitude of Japanese imperialism, which is openly inimical to the building up of native industries and the development of the internal market in China. As far back as 1932 the Japanese Foreign Office made clear this standpoint in a memorandum to the League of Nations: 'the development of capitalist enterprise in China will make the economic activities of all foreign nations in China very difficult or even impossible to carry on.'<sup>1</sup>

"The truth, as brought to light by subsequent events, is that it has not been 'the development of capitalist enterprise' but Japanese aggression launched for the specific purpose of preventing the development of China by international enterprise, that has made 'the economic activities of all foreign nations in China very difficult or even impossible to carry on.' The British, who in 1932 lent a willing ear to the Japanese argument, were the first to learn later on, with an unpleasant shock, the real meaning of it. The point, however, is that here we have concisely stated two diametrically opposed conceptions of the China market: the Japanese 'New Order in East Asia' and the American 'Open Door.' As the Japanese and American aspects of a problem which is of world scale, they correspond directly to the difference in the structure of the internal market in Japan and in America.

"Between these two extremes stands the British conception, which can best be illustrated by excerpts from a memorandum which Sir Arthur Salter submitted to the Chinese Government:

"Most of the heavy industries (apart from the 'extractive' industries) must probably be considered unsuitable for China at her present stage of development. They usually demand very expensive capital equipment and need a large market.<sup>2</sup>

"The argument here is that the establishment of heavy industry (or, for that matter, as will be seen presently, of any large-scale industry) is impossible on account of the lack of a large market. It is not pointed out that a large market on the other hand, could be developed only by the establishment of large-scale industry. This second point, though crucial, is evaded, and thus the statement of the market problem in China is left in a kind of twilight. After discarding from the outset the possibility of large-scale industry in China (presupposing, by implication, the impossibility of large-scale capital export to China) Sir Arthur continues:

"Since, with the exceptions indicated, China's industrial development must depend mainly upon the purchasing power of the Chinese public, it cannot be too emphatically stated that for China industrialization is not an alternative to agricultural development. On the contrary, the increase in the agriculturist's margin of production must be the essential foundation on which industrial development must be built.

"\* \* \* For these as for other reasons, the increase of the production of the average agriculturist remains the fundamental problem of China's economy, whether that increase is secured by extension of the areas of

<sup>1</sup> Japan Foreign Office, *The Present Conditions in China*, 1932, p. 39.

<sup>2</sup> China and Silver, New York, 1934, p. 93.

cultivable land; or a reduction of population (enabling the average farm holding to be enlarged); or improvements in methods of agriculture; or the development of handicraft or small rural industries by means of which those living on the land can supplement their agricultural production.<sup>3</sup>

"The British position is, as can be seen, half-way between the American and the Japanese. Native industries and the development of the internal market in China should be encouraged, but only to a strictly limited extent; there should be industrialization but not much of it. The British expert even prescribed that the rhythm of development should proceed 'stage by stage and gradually' (p. 89)."

"Yet at that very time (1934), economic and social catastrophe was closing in on China—*not* stage by stage and gradually, but by leaps and bounds. In this, incidentally, China was no exception. In no country in the world has industrialization ever proceeded stage by stage and gradually. Without exception, industrialization takes place by leaps and bounds, this being in the very nature of the accumulation of capital. In China, as a late-comer, a backward country existing side by side with very highly developed countries, this historical economic law of suddenly and forcibly accentuated development has worked with even more pronounced effect.

"The core of Sir Arthur Salter's argument, and the key to the traditional British view of the way in which the development of China should proceed, is in his statement that 'the essential foundation of industrial development.' He does not discuss the practical aspects of 'increasing the agriculturist's margin of production,' but they have been vividly described by a Chinese investigator:

"While landlords take the lion's share of the products of the peasants in the form of rent, tax collectors who are usually also landlords and merchants, take another considerable share of the form of levies, taxes, subtaxes, and so forth. Debts of the previous year often compel the peasant to give up the remainder of his meager earnings. If anything is left after the harvest it is as a rule little more than nothing. All he can do to maintain life and carry on his tasks during the rest of the year is to go to the landlords, pawnshops, local gentry, grain dealers, groceries, and sometimes rich peasants, to start the vicious circle of borrowing once again."

"From this description it is plain that, under the conditions actually obtaining in China, the 'increase in the agriculturist's margin of production' is no solution at all, but, on the contrary, a factor effectively retarding both the industrialization of China and the development of its internal market. A radical change in the agricultural feudalism and peasant economy of China is the indispensable historical prerequisite both to industrialization and to the development of China's internal market. The fact must be faced what such a change would be not only radical but revolutionary, and that it would, in its incipient phases at least, tend inevitably to restrict drastically 'the agriculturist's margin of production'; although—and because—it would tremendously increase the agriculturist's margin of subsistence, and would save millions from famine. The agriculturist's margin of production is that part of the results of his labor which goes to the Chinese landlord, usurer, and taxgatherer, and to foreign capital. The practice of increasing this 'margin,' by the process of tightening the farmer's belt beyond the limit of human endurance, is precisely what has conjured up economic and social chaos in China.

"Significantly, the Japanese experts do not try to confine the issue to such empty generalities. They are not afraid to go into the economic and social structure of China; but then, they want to prove a point slightly different from that of the British. The Japanese Foreign Office memorandum already cited gives the following picture of the economic and social structure in which, it asserts, Chinese Communism is rooted:

"VI. Factors contributing to the rise of the Chinese Communist movement and its future.

"\* \* \* (2) Economic Factors:

"Ever since the opening of China to foreign commerce, not only the cost of living has been increased through the introduction of foreign merchandise, but the subsidiary industries of the farming community such as sericulture, cotton spinning, and tea growing have declined. These economic factors, combined with political factors enumerated above such as civil war, over-

<sup>3</sup> Op. cit., pp. 94 sqq.

<sup>4</sup> "Merchant Capital and Usury Capital in Rural China," by Leonard T. K. Wu, in *Far Eastern Survey*, New York, March 25, 1936.

taxation and squeeze, have completely ruined agricultural communities. According to statistics, in the 4 years between 1914 and 1918 lands left uncultivated increased by 490,000,000 mu and farming households decreased by 6,000,000. In 1 year, from 1918 and 1919, the percentage of peasant proprietors was reduced from 53 to 49 percent, while that of tenant farmers increased from 26 to 32 percent. The middle-class farmers became poor peasants, and poor peasants turn proletarians. The industries in China being still too undeveloped to provide work for the vast proletarian mass, the majority of the rural unemployed become either bandits or vagabonds, soldiers or medics.

"Of the total Chinese population of 400 millions, approximately 336 million are said to be agricultural. Of these, 55 percent do not own any land: 20 percent belong to the class of petty farmers possessing 1 to 10 mu of land: 12 percent are middle-class farmers possessing from 10 to 30 mu of land; so-called rich farmers owning 30 mu or more and still larger landed proprietors make up only 13 percent.

"\* \* \* It is easy to see how the land policy of the Communists received the endorsement of an overwhelming majority of the Chinese rural population. \* \* \* The fact that the Party had behind it Russia, which has renounced unequal treaties and certain rights and interests concluded and acquired in China during the Tsarist regime, won popular approval and confidence in its movement.<sup>5</sup>

"This picture of Chinese economic and social reality, drawn with a few bold strokes, contrasts strangely with the prim blue-print of the British expert. Withal, the two pictures are complementary. From both it is plain that there is economic breakdown and chaos in China. The protagonist of the status quo tries to get around this by a scheme for making the peasant, who already suffers most, suffer a little more. The antagonist of the status quo faces the real conditions boldly, because he is about to tackle them in his own way, by making them an excuse for aggression. The Japanese endeavors to make a strong case for himself out of the appalling conditions which actually exist, whereas the attempt to hush them up is the weak point of the British argument. The British expert expects a peaceful development 'stage by stage and gradually,' the Japanese braces himself for a violent attempt to overthrow the status quo; that is why he emphasizes its intolerability.

"The treatise of the British adviser could be reduced in simple, undiplomatic and unacademic language to the following propositions: 'Capital export to China is ruled out by circumstances. Let us, then, omit these circumstances, for they would mean either Japanese aggression or Chinese antifeudal and anti-imperialist revolution, or both. Either possibility is distasteful. The best advice I can give in the circumstances is to muddle through.'

"The Japanese counterproposition could be summarized in equally blunt language, as follows: 'The status quo is very honorable. However, considering the circumstances, particularly that absence of large-scale capital export from the West which is tacitly assumed by the British expert to be the cornerstone of the status quo, it is clearly impossible. The best thing I can do in the circumstances is to attack.'

"In actual fact, there are three links in the chain: (i) absence of large-scale capital exports from the West; (ii) Japanese aggression; (iii) Chinese struggle for national liberation. The decisive link is the Chinese struggle for national liberation, for by its final outcome will be determined the new forms of economic intercourse between China and the rest of the world.

"Both China's foreign policy and the policy of the Kuomintang within China are intimately tied up with the character of the unfolding Chinese Revolution since Sun Yat-sen. The one important point of orientation in foreign policy is the answer to the question whether or not Western capital help is indispensable for the success of the revolution. The answer itself depends on a definite view of the character of the revolution. If it is believed, as Sun Yat-sen originally believed, that the Chinese Revolution must lean, in order to be successful, on Western capital, the only policy that is possible is one which is resigned to the inevitability of semi-independence. The signal lesson of postwar history has been that China cannot successfully evolve 'stage by stage and gradually' from semi-independence to full independence: though it took some time for Dr. Sun himself to realize that Western capital would support the Chinese Revolution only as the rope supports the hanged man. It was the flat refusal of his memorandum

<sup>5</sup> The Present Conditions in China, Appendix III, "Communism in China," pp. 29 sqq.

to the Versailles Conference which taught him the crucial lesson that the success of the Chinese Revolution could not be staked on Western capital help.

"The whole conception had to be revised. It became obvious to Sun Yat-sen that the road to complete independence did not lead through an intermediary stage of semi-independence. A different course had to be envisaged. The concept of a period of 'tutelage,' before achieving complete independence and full popular sovereignty, which had been a cardinal part of his theory, had to be greatly modified if not eliminated altogether. For the period of tutelage was based on the assumption of a relatively long period of peaceful development, assured by foreign capital help. The realization that China would have to shift for itself reacted on the content and character of the revolution. It is a superficial and one-sided observation to say that from here on the revolution assumed an antiforeign complexion. This was a mere symptom at most, the thing that struck the foreign eye.

"The fundamental change consisted in grasping the only alternative left, in the absence of large-scale foreign capital help: the large-scale mobilization of the people; the speeding-up of the rate of the revolution; struggle instead of tutelage; a reaching out for complete independence after the hope of an intermediate stage of semi-independence turned out to be a dangerous self-deception. This resulted in a fundamental transformation of Sun Yat-senism. With the changed prospect of the Chinese Revolution thus envisaged by Sun Yat-sen before his death, a corresponding change took place in the character, content, leadership, and social composition of the revolution. With the mobilizing of the peasants the leadership shifted away from the radical intelligentsia to proletarian and semiproletarian elements. An agrarian upheaval became manifestly the content of the revolution. In foreign policy there was a degree of reorientation toward Soviet Russia, initiated by Sun Yat-sen himself.

"The bulk of the Kuomintang officialdom, however, was by no means ready yet to accept this legacy of Sun Yat-sen. Its leadership contested, frightened by the plebeian elements and methods of the agrarian revolution, it began to lean heavily (politically speaking, for its life) on the support of foreign capital. It lashed out violently against the agrarian revolution and solicited and got the support of Western capital for its military campaigns.

"It testifies to the greatness of character and acumen of Sun Yat-sen that he was able to discard the illusion of semi-independence after his experience with the Versailles peacemakers. Chiang Kai-shek's wasteful efforts to stamp out Communism (i. e., to crush the agrarian revolution) were a fateful departure from this final, mature form of Sun Yat-senism. The attempt to attain national salvation by pleasing foreign capital was futile. It did not achieve its end but courted Japanese aggression. Wang Ching-wei, the most consistent protagonist in the Kuomintang of leaning on foreign capital as a method of keeping down the 'excesses' of the agrarian revolution and as a guarantee of Chinese semi-independence, ended up as a Japanese puppet. The Japanese themselves appreciated better than Wang Ching-wei what was actually going on. The memorandum quoted above shows that they were keenly aware of the content and character of the struggle between Kuomintang and Communists to determine the agrarian future of China and watched its outcome. They launched their aggression when it became clear that the Kuomintang could not become an instrument of Japanese tutelage or, in their vernacular, could not 'cope with the red menace.'

"It was during the abortive period of attempted 'tutelage,' between 1927 and the beginning of the United Front in 1937, that the problem of the China market and of its development by foreign capital was threshed out, all of its conditions posed, its contending forces weighed, its possibilities tested. Any analysis that tries to solve the problem by overlooking this process and any theoretical solution of the problem that is not based on the analysis of it is bound to be barren.

### 3. THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA: TWO EXTREMES OF MARKET DEVELOPMENT

"In the classic examples of capitalism, in Western Europe and the United States, the creation of the market by merchant capital and its development by industrial capital occurred in two successive large-scale economic and social transformations. In the first stage only enough capital had been accumulated to subordinate the products of handicrafts and home industries to the control of merchants. In the second stage capital had become vigorous enough to take over the whole process of production. The transition was not primarily a technological performance (as the label 'industrial revolution' suggests), but required also a new structure of capital and a new grouping of society.

"The main source of the growth of capital at the first stage was the merchant's profit on his transactions with the small semi-independent producers. This primitive precapitalistic method of accumulation has a great survival vitality, and may be either a progressive or a retarding influence, according to circumstances. Even after it has ceased to be the predominant method of accumulating capital, it often survives after the transition to the second stage. It is a concomitant of the Feudal survivals which are never completely eliminated even in the most highly developed countries. It is the degree of survival that is important. If the particular circumstances permit the preponderance of merchant and usuary capital to survive as the prevalent method of accumulating capital, then the jump from the first to the second stage in the evolution of capital cannot be made; the economy, disintegrated but not yet lifted to a higher level, sticks at the stage of transition. This is as much as to say that the market has been created to a certain extent, but is not yet being developed.

"This has been the case with China, where, as Wu expresses it, 'The operation of the present system of usuary-merchant-landlordism must lead to disintegration of rural China . . . Usury-merchant-landlordism in China is destroying instead of creating markets.'<sup>6</sup>

"In the evolution of the world market the United States represents the highest stage of development and China the lowest. Japan, where the transition from the first to the second stage of the evolution of the market has been accomplished, but in a peculiar way and not to the required extent, stands historically between the American and the Chinese extremes. In comparing the development of the market in these three countries, it is necessary to take into account firstly the development of the internal market, and secondly the internal market as a stepping stone to the world market.

"The visible signs of a developed internal market are: (i) a railroad network stretching over the whole national area; (ii) a customs union and the introduction of a national tariff; (iii) a unified and centralized currency. All three of these have been in existence in the United States since the sixties, and all three are still lacking in China.

"It is significant that Japanese aggression in its drive to destroy the incipient internal market in China struck crippling blows at precisely these three things, by occupying the railroads,<sup>7</sup> seizing the customs, and undermining Chinese currency through smuggling and through compulsory circulation of the yen.<sup>8</sup>

"Taking the different countries historically, it may first be noted that in the United States the moving frontier of westward migration signified the development of the internal market. Railroad building was important in effecting both the westward expansion of the market from the trading and manufacturing centers of the Atlantic coast and the transition from merchant enterprise to full industrialism. Until this time, manufacturing had been an appendage of trading and shipping. It is important to make it clear, however, that they were not the cause which created it. The appearance of a new kind of market was not simply a technological miracle resulting from 'the spanning of the continent.' Both the market and the railroads were created by capital, and as far as the order of priority is concerned, the railroads followed in the wake of the expanding market. Having followed the market, however, they also created new capital and thus contributed to the additional expansion of the market. This they were able to do because the original great land grants to the railroad builders were in effect a levy in advance which converted part of the purchasing power of the farmers into capital, since the very large tracts of land turned over to the railroads drove up prices for all comers. Capital was thus created by a form of expropriation which had a distinctly political tone.

<sup>6</sup> Leonard T. K. Wu, op. cit., p. 68.

<sup>7</sup> "At the end of 1938, fully two-thirds, or 6,500 kilometers, of the railway mileage of China proper, was in territory occupied by Japanese military forces, whereas less than half of that amount, or about 3,200 kilometers, remained under Chinese control." *Economic Review of Foreign Countries*, 1939. U. S. Department of Commerce, p. 212.

<sup>8</sup> "Already, China is staggering along under five different currency issues, all of differing values. First, there is the national currency which looks to Chungking for the maintenance of exchange values; second, there is the (Japanese-controlled) Federal Reserve Bank of North China, the attempts of which at currency stabilization have been a lamentable failure; third, there is the Japanese yen, circulating in the coastal regions, which is an unknown quantity; fourth, there are the Japanese military notes, an entirely unsecured issue totalling unknown millions, and fifth, there is the Hua-Hsing currency, issued at Shanghai by the Bank founded by the defunct Nanking reformed government (Japanese-controlled).

"If the Wang Ching-wei regime should ill-advisedly issue a sixth, it is contended that the confusion would be terrific and that probably all the interrelated issues would crash." Despatch from Hallett Abend, in *New York Times*, April 9, 1940.

"There followed a second process of expropriation, or preemption, more economic in tone, which transferred part of the purchasing power of the farmer to railroad capital, through the operation of freight rates. This in turn led to disparity between agricultural and industrial freight rates, and to such phenomena as the freight differential of the Southern States. In the economic history of capital, this meant that the railroads led the way in the first large-scale merging of industrial and banking capital. In social history, this was accompanied by migration on a national scale from the farm to the city. To say that this widened the social gap and spread the social differential between agricultural and industry is another way of describing the development of the market.

"China represents the other extreme of market development and railroad building. The spanning of the American continent was a saga of unbridled competition in creating and developing a vast internal market. The complete failure to span the Chinese continent, on the other hand, was the result of stultifying competition between the foreign powers for shares in the undeveloped Chinese market.<sup>9</sup> The internal market in China was paralyzed, its economy caught in the framework of transition between the trading centers of the eastern seacoast dominated by the foreigners, and the huge precapitalistic hinterland of the west. China's mass-migration to the west has not followed in the wake of the railroads but has been an exodus to escape the Japanese.

"Is railroad building, in the circumstances, the panacea? To suggest it is to put the cart before the horse, the building of railroads before the conditions requisite to it. Sixty million refugees have to be rehabilitated, and the problem that led up to this catastrophe has to be solved before the problem of the railroads can be dealt with. Under the conditions which now exist it is actually the Japanese military machine that is blazing the trail of the China market. It is therefore necessary to see what Japanese aggression means in economic terms.

"Reduced to its economic content, Japanese aggression is a primitive attempt to accumulate capital by land-grabbing and mass expropriation, under military sanctions. The resort to military methods was possible partly because the organization of the state power in Japan provided for military power, and particularly because in China itself the crude war-lord method of 'raising capital' (thus retarding the development of the internal market) had been preserved for an unduly long period by the intricate interlocking of feudalistic vested interests in the interior and imperialistic vested interests on the fringe of China. The way had thus been opened for Japan, because already, for a long time, outside imperialistic influences had operated as Chinese inside influences by reinforcing the native feudalistic elements, which in the specialized form of warlords took on an imperialistic tinge by becoming puppets of the great powers.

"This peculiar 'peaceful' set-up of a combined feudal-imperialistic stranglehold on the Chinese internal market laid China open to military aggression by Japan, the very power which combines the characteristics of both feudalism and imperialism in the most concentrated form. It is accordingly not surprising that the Japanese-sponsored puppet regimes draw whatever strength they have from Japanese imperialism and the feudal landlord-merchant-usurer survivals in China. They represent an alliance of these two forces. Since their failure is a fair index of Chinese national unification achieved in the process of struggle against imperialist aggression, their abolition will mean riddance from both feudalistic and imperialistic vested interests.

"The disappearance of feudalism is clearly an indispensable prerequisite for the development of the Chinese internal market. This factor is bound to have a decisive influence on the forms the economic development of China is going to assume after the ending of the war. It might proceed under forms different from those we are familiar with under the name 'internal market.' One of these forms may be discernible already under war conditions in the shape of the industrial cooperatives of Ssueh'uan. A deviation in economic development away from the customary market form is, in turn, bound to have a decisive influence on the form taken by Western capital help and investment. The least one can say is that capital export to China is not likely to retain the form of a financial venture, necessitating by its very nature a risk premium.

"Not to recognize that Japan's attempt to conquer China is also an attempt to link up with an anachronistic internal system from which China is struggling to free itself means to lose orientation and to forsake objectivity of analysis.

<sup>9</sup> China and the United States have about the same area in square miles, but the railroad mileage of China proper is about 9,000 miles, against 238,000 miles in the United States. Statesman's Year Book, London, 1940.

It means underestimating the character of the war and accepting the Japanese contention that it is a mere 'incident' and at the same time overestimating the possibilities of a Japanese imperialism which pretends that it is establishing a 'New Order' where in actual reality there is nothing but the unbridled reign of feudal imperialism and a relapse into pre-capitalistic methods of colonial rule.

"If the Japanese attempt at conquest goes no further than its present methods of plunder and expropriation, the great future market in China, in the modern capitalistic sense, can be neither created nor developed. This is indeed the insuperable difficulty that now confronts Japanese imperialism in China, after its military successes. The various 'Development Companies' remain in the stage of wistful projects.

"The point can be made plain by a simple comparison. It is as if the railroad entrepreneurs in America, after having accepted the land grants and pocketed the money for the railroad shares they had sold, had expressed heart-felt appreciation to the Government and to the public in general and retired with the curt statement that conditions for building the railroads were not favorable. Nothing of the sort happened, however, because conditions were favorable: a steadily swelling stream of capital, combined with a steady migration from the farms to industry, created the market which capital needed.

"These are the very conditions that are lacking in China, and in Japan too. The flood of landless peasants from the villages is there all right, but there is no steady flow of capital accumulation, no carrying strength of an internal market, with which it can combine. The primitive method of accumulating capital by military aggression is not in itself enough of a lever to create and develop the market. On the contrary, it is a steam roller destroying whatever is left of the internal market. Japan cannot make good economically in China.

"It is a reliable index of the degree of structural decay in Japanese economy that what is required most urgently for its maintenance is no longer additional markets, but new capital. It cannot recover through increased commodity exports, but must have capital imports for reexport. After the annexation of Manchuria the then Minister of Finance warned the Japanese Diet that capital export to Manchuria would acutely endanger the yen. Japanese imperialism launched its wholesale aggression against China when it found itself cornered by the limitations of its own internal market; when the export drive had suffered a set-back after making the yen more rickety than before; when the urgency of capital exports had been superimposed on the necessity of increased commodity exports.

"A military campaign supported by huge armaments is, of course, a form of capital export, however freakish. It means that the capital of the country is drained, concentrated, and switched for the purpose of forcibly expanding the external market. But it has to be followed up by 'peaceful' or 'genuine' capital exports in order to make the original outlay effective. It is here that the Japanese failed. Japan's rulers obviously reckoned on the help, whether grudging or friendly, of the great capital exporting countries of the West, eager to develop China as a market. In 1936, the Japanese promoter Aikawa was publicizing schemes of this kind; but help was not forthcoming, mainly because of effective Chinese military resistance, beginning in 1937, and the American reluctance to cooperate in the 'New Order in East Asia.' All that Japan's rulers could do in the circumstances was to complain about regrettable Western misunderstandings and misinterpretation of their intentions, and to fall back on a crude feudalistic monopolization of China's economic resources in the occupied areas. Ironically, this way of ruining the internal market is entrusted to what are known as 'development companies.'

"Turning now to the question of the way in which the transition is made, in economic history, from the mercantile age to that of industrialism, the point must be made that a tariff-protected internal market constitutes the economic foundation underlying the political process of national unification and the emergence of the modern national state. National industrial monopolization of the internal market is effected by the tearing down of internal tariff barriers and the erection of an outer tariff wall. The McKinley tariff is a classic case of protectionism designed to monopolize the internal market. The fact that in the same period Free Trade held sway in England was due to the unique historical circumstances that British capital virtually monopolized the world market. British Free Trade was doomed when Britain lost this dominance after the first World War.

"Against this background of the normal course of market development, China's tariff experience stands out in sharp contrast. The Chinese tariff, far from being a means of protecting the internal market for Chinese capital, was from

the outset a means by which the undeveloped Chinese market was laid under tribute to foreign capital, to which Chinese tariff revenues were from the beginning mortgaged.

"After the conditions for industrialization and the full development of the internal market were established in the United States, the advocates of free silver, who were the spokesmen of the farming interest, were defeated by the irresistible sweep of capital. Resistance to a unified currency was broken down by the forces promoting an unhampered development of the internal market. In China, on the other hand, the fact that the national economy 'stuck' at the stage of transition is reflected in the Chinese currency problem. The retention of silver as the metallic base of currency means that China did not complete the full transition from commodity economy to money economy. Silver is money, but not exactly and not definitively; for a certain high level of economic maturity must be attained before precious metal can be genuinely invested with the money function. This can be seen from the way in which a flight into silver, and a flight of silver away from the interior and away from the country altogether, is a normal occurrence whenever an economic adversity befalls China. At a higher level of economic development, such flights could be counteracted by capital movement. Silver has been looked upon, however, more as a valuable commodity than a means of exchange. That is why it is always on the jump for hoarding instead of for accumulation.

"Silver, in this behavior, reflects the predominance of mercantile, preindustrial exchange within China and in China's dealings with the more highly developed outside world. Through the manipulation of silver China has been made the prey of speculation and economic exploitation. At the same time, silver can serve this function only because of the 'sticking' of China's economy at the stage of transition. The 'silver question' is accordingly a symptom rather than an underlying cause; in case of economic or political adversity the interior is drained of silver, which flees to Shanghai and from there abroad. Thus the very presence of trading outposts of the advanced countries accentuates the prevailing economic stagnation and retrogression. Sir Arthur Salter states the facts:

"China indeed, needing capital development more than almost any country, is not being capitalized but 'decapitalized' \* \* \*

"The result is not only a starving of new development but also, since the capital is in the form of silver, the country's currency, a secondary form of currency deflation, forcing prices down further. \* \* \* The actual mechanism of trade is, indeed, in many cases breaking down.<sup>10</sup>

"What Sir Arthur does not see in that capital in the form of silver is, in China, a symbol of the fact that capital has been kept down at the lower historical level of merchant and usury capital. What has kept it at this level has been the fact that it has been easier for foreign capital to draw tribute from the internal market of China than to make it part of the world market. That is the point.

"With the precipitous fall in the price of silver after the onset of the world crisis China's economy was hit particularly hard. The devaluation of the chief gold currencies increased the price of silver in terms of gold, and thus increased the economic tribute sent abroad by China. The silver buying program of the United States Treasury intensified the drain of silver out of China. Eventually, in November 1935, China was forced of silver and left with a 'managed currency.' Managed by what forces, and to what ends? Chinese currency has always been managed, both in the sense of having a shaky national standing and in the sense of being at the mercy of the economic backwardness of China in its intercourse with the advanced countries. Silver stood for the export of economic tribute, made more onerous by the lack of capital imports.

"At this point it is useful to apply the comparison with America to the history of Japanese market development, in which three periods can be conveniently distinguished. The unification and monopolization of the internal market occurred simultaneously in the two countries, with the Meiji Restoration in Japan and the Civil War in the United States. However, for a number of reasons, feudal survivals were destroyed more thoroughly during and after the upheaval in the United States than they were in Japan. This resulted in the significant difference that the development of the internal market in Japan instead of proceeding by a relatively smooth evolution, was prompted spasmodically by subsequent wars abroad.

<sup>10</sup> Salter, *op. cit.*, pp. 7, 8, 11.

"In America the internal market had great scope in which to open out peacefully. This even had a mitigating effect on the character of the war against Spain in 1898:

"If the State Department and the Navy could have found adequate support in Congress, the American flag would have been hoisted in Eastern waters long before the Philippines were wrested from Spain in 1898.

"But it took some time for the country at large to see the spheres of usefulness early discovered by the men in high posts of observation. Indeed the tariff policy introduced by Seward's party colleagues helped to relax temporarily the early economic interest in Pacific imperialism. Well protected by high duties in competing goods, American manufacturers commanded for many years after 1861 an immense and growing market at home, and, until that was saturated, felt no overpowering need for more foreign trading facilities.<sup>11</sup>

"It is interesting to compare this 'mild' American colonial war with the almost contemporary Japanese war against China in 1894-95. The Japanese war, instead of being 'toned down' by the desire to tend to opportunities at home, was already stimulated by the limitations of the internal market. Lack of opportunity at home encouraged adventure abroad.

"By 1914 the situation had changed so fundamentally that America began to follow the pattern sketched earlier by Japanese development. America's entry into the war was urged on by the limitations of the internal market. War activity, economic and military, promoted a far-reaching and sudden increase in America's agricultural and industrial production apparatus, and brought about a temporary expansion of the market to absorb the increased producing capacity. It was the most important turning point in modern history. The country with the strongest capital equipment entered a claim to an adequate share in the world market. All the appalling difficulties and vicissitudes of American economy, gravely accentuated after the outbreak of the Great Crisis in 1929, however, serve to drive home the signal lesson that for this greatest and best developed industrial country development of the world market by no means follows automatically on the acquisition of a 'fair share' in the market. The claim can be asserted by economic and political pressure, but actual development responds only to an increase in capital exports.

"At present we are living under conditions of war, on a world scale, for a further redivision of the world market. We should be warned, however, that the prospect of redivision does not of itself warrant the expectation of a development of the Chinese market, or any undeveloped sector of the world market, 'after peace is concluded.' It is essential to remember that the nondevelopment of the Chinese market was one of the chief underlying factors in unleashing the second world war which has followed on Japan's aggression in 1931. It is an illusion to think that China will arise, out of the holocaust, a 'huge market.'

"It would be far more reasonable to assume, by projecting into the future trends that already exist, that life will reassert itself in forms of human intercourse modified by sloughing off some of what have hitherto been essential characteristics of the market, the operation of capital, and their concomitant forms of social and international relations.

"The incipient industrial cooperatives of China are one of these prophetic trends. They certainly represent a step in the direction of overcoming the market form of economic relations, for what we mean by 'the market' is not simply the exchange of goods, but the exchange of goods under strictly defined historical conditions: hitherto, between private producers.

"A corresponding transformation is bound to affect capital. The sums collected abroad to aid the cooperative movement in China cannot be called capital in the strict connotation of the term. They are being advanced without expectation of the return of either principal or interest. Cooperative production is not being harnessed to the servicing of these 'capital outlays.' On the contrary, it is capital which is being harnessed to facilitate cooperative production.

"These are the sproutings of a new economic life which will flourish after the Japanese military machine has stamped out the remaining vestiges of what used to be the internal market. These new manifestations cannot be easily uprooted by Japanese aggression, because they depend primarily on the initiative of the people, evoked by aggression, and are taking root because they resist aggression successfully. Do they, however, increase China's 'capacity to receive'? On the answer to this question hinges the economic future of China, and

<sup>11</sup> Charles A. Beard, *The Rise of American Civilization*, New York, 1929, vol. II, p. 491.

of the United States as well. The answer itself, of course, hinges on the outcome of the struggle in China.

"Assuming the victory of the Chinese people, it can be tentatively suggested that cooperative production will spread over the whole field of light industry, on a national scale, and will cease to be a merely local or regional matter. This in itself, however, presupposes and necessitates the building of heavy industry, together with means of transport and communication, which will require huge capital outlays that can be procured only from abroad.

"Assuming, further, that the required capital can be procured from the United States, what role will it play in China's economic development? By its very magnitude, its source of origin, and the fields in which it would be invested, it would be bound to play an economically superior, but not necessarily a dominating role. That is, its economic superiority would not be reinforced politically, and could not be used as a political instrument of pressure. The control and supervision of a sovereign Chinese Government would assure that, and at the same time assure the complete safety of the capital.

"In short, this would still be capital export, but of a new, historically higher type, lacking some of the old political features of 'normal' capital export. It could not serve to control the Government, for the Government would have the task of controlling this kind of capital import. Capital import would be modified by the modified nature of the internal market. Foreign capital would acquire no claim to property title. China's national wealth, developed and undeveloped, would henceforth be inalienable. Economic intercourse between backward China and highly developed America would be based on the cardinal principle of unchallenged independence and national sovereignty. Yet in the process of development foreign capital would reap the lucrative remuneration rightly due to its economic superiority. These profits would represent a tribute paid by China, but a tribute due solely to China's economic backwardness. It would thus tend to diminish in the course of China's economic development, and would not be reinforced by political means. This kind of tribute, shorn of political features, could not be perpetuated, but it would enable China to reach the point, in some calculable future, where foreign capital could receive a final indemnity for services rendered paid out of a steadily mounting export surplus from China.

"The final question is whether such a relationship would increase China's 'capacity to receive.' The lesson of history from the first to the second World War is that it is the only possible way in which to increase China's capacity to receive. American capital is caught in the Far East between war and revolution. The puny detachments of 20 and 25 million dollars thus far lent to China are patrols in an economic no-man's land. They do not represent capital export but short-term self-liquidating commodity credit. This is less than a palliative. Moreover, this insistence on self-liquidating capital transactions is ominous. If it practices such extremes of caution, American capital risks becoming self-liquidating in the true sense.

"What inducements would the relationship outlined above hold out to foreign capital? Would the inducements be outweighed by the infringements on the 'rights and freedom' of capital? The actual choice is not between freedom and control, but between control by Japan's imperialist 'New Order' or by the sovereign Chinese nation. To put it in another way: Japan can only get control over foreign capital by reducing China to a colonial status.

"All the rights, privileges, and freedom of foreign capital have not developed the Chinese market to such an extent that had new capital been attracted, China's capacity to receive would have been enhanced by it. Quite the contrary. Special rights and privileges have served as an effective barrier to further capital investments. The social and economic status of semicolonial China set definite limits to capital imports. Remer classifies these capital imports under two main subdivisions: 'Business Investment,' and 'Foreign Obligations of the Government.'<sup>12</sup> The peculiar character of both of these investment forms was determined by the economic weakness of the internal market and the political weakness of the Government. They had in common the feature of being mainly unproductive and highly political, serving the privileged position, property claims, and property titles of foreign capital.

"The privilege to be gained by foreign capital was the chief purpose of investment and the chief criterion in the choice between investment in business or in Government obligations. The money was invested, in both cases, in gaining

<sup>12</sup> C. F. Remer, *Foreign Investments in China*, New York, 1933.

a foothold. That is the main reason why foreign loans petered out after the intensification of the revolution and after the Japanese onslaught. The various foreign footholds thus established were converted into bases of Japanese aggression; in launching its wholesale aggression against China, the Japanese army seized upon them immediately as military footholds and pawns of blackmail. This outcome was predictable long before the actual event, from the rate at which, and the methods by which, the Japanese foothold was augmented, as the following tables show:

*Business investments in China by countries, showing percentage distribution*<sup>12</sup>

	1902		1914		1931	
	Mill. U. S. \$	Percent of total	Mill. U. S. \$	Percent of total	Mill. U. S. \$	Percent of total
Great Britain.....	150.1	29.8	400.0	36.9	963.4	38.9
Japan.....	1.0	.2	210.0	19.4	212.8	36.9
Russia.....	220.1	43.7	236.5	21.8	273.2	11.1
U. S. A.....	17.5	3.5	42.0	3.9	155.1	6.3
France.....	29.6	5.9	60.0	5.5	95.0	3.8
Germany.....	85.0	16.9	136.0	12.5	75.0	3.0
Total.....	503.2	100.0	1,084.5	100.0	2,474.5	100.0

*Holdings of Chinese Government obligations by countries, showing percentage distribution*<sup>14</sup>

	1902		1914		1931	
	Mill. U. S. \$	Percent of total	Mill. U. S. \$	Percent of total	Mill. U. S. \$	Percent of total
Great Britain.....	110.3	39.4	207.5	41.8	211.6	36.1
Japan.....	0	0	9.6	1.9	224.1	38.2
Russia.....	26.4	9.4	32.8	6.6	0	0
United States.....	2.2	.8	7.3	1.5	41.7	7.1
France.....	61.5	22.0	111.4	22.5	97.4	16.6
Germany.....	79.3	28.4	127.6	25.7	12.0	2.0
Total.....	279.7	100.0	408.2	100.0	586.8	100.0

<sup>12</sup> Remer, op. cit., p. 99.

<sup>14</sup> Op. cit., p. 138.

"The chief methods by which the Japanese foothold was augmented were through British lending to Japan, as in the building of the South Manchuria Railway, or through British lending to China to pay the war indemnities to Japan. The Chinese Government has been an indemnity-paying rather than a capital-importing institution.<sup>15</sup>

"Add to this the major diplomatic intrigues at the end of the first World War: the Anglo-Japanese treaty of 1917, the Lansing-Ishii agreement of 1919, and finally the way in which the assembled peacemakers in Versailles cold-shouldered Sun Yat-sen's plea for capital help. These data complete the picture showing why and how Japan gained its oversized foothold; how it used this, and the footholds of its 'friendly rivals,' for an attack on the whole of China; and why the Chinese people were eventually constrained to make a stand.

"In the economic and social set-up of an independent China the character and structure of capital imports would be radically changed. China's capacity to receive would not be hamstrung by the shakiness of the internal market and of the Government. The distinction between economic and political investment, very vague in a semicolonial China, would disappear insofar as the political objective of capital export would be eliminated. The distinction between business investments and Government obligations would fade out correspondingly, because investment in Government obligations would be economic in nature.

"By this radical change, moreover, the safety of capital would be assured. About the political guarantees an independent China could give for the safety

<sup>15</sup> Op. cit., p. 162.

of capital there can be no difference of opinion. However, the change in the nature of economic guarantees needs elucidation. The economic bases of sovereignty, like the customs revenue, would no longer be mortgaged for the servicing of foreign capital. At the same time cooperative production in light industry, greatly enhanced by the installation of heavy industry through capital import, would release increasing amounts of Government revenue, out of which foreign capital investments could be serviced. The increased productivity of the Chinese people would not be drained into the channels of private accumulation, but a great and increasing leeway would be left for taxation, out of which the economic tribute to foreign capital could be paid. Simultaneously, the burden of taxation could to a certain extent be shifted away from agricultural production.

"These are the dim outlines of the economic set-up for a free China and its intercourse with the better developed outer world. One could call it state capitalism, supplemented by economic concessions to foreign capital; but the label does not matter. What matters is the necessity, for China, of a greatly accelerated economic development after the war is over and this can take place only in an economic and political setting of national freedom. The economic prerequisite and counterpart of complete national unification is the nationalization of China's natural resources. Only if they are nationalized can the state organs of the sovereign Chinese people employ foreign capital for the utilization and development of these natural resources on the large scale required. Only in this way can the Chinese people maintain their sovereignty and turn it to good account economically.

"This represents a deviation from the norm of development in Western European or American capitalism; it is rendered imperative by the very circumstance that China has to make up for its backwardness as compared with Western Europe or America, and must do so, in order to succeed, not gradually but by leaps and bounds.

"The alternative is relapse into a colonial status. When the national unity of America was jeopardized by the threatening spread of the slave-holding system, Lincoln made it a strong point that 'this country with its institutions belongs to the people who inhabit it.' Chinese national sovereignty cannot be underpinned or asserted in any other way. The required rate of Chinese economic development is not possible without full sovereignty. If China emerges victorious, sovereign control over capital imports is prescribed by the sheer necessity to maintain its hard-won national independence. As far as American interests are concerned, it seems fairly certain that the principle of the Open Door can be put into practice in no other way.

#### 4. CAPITAL EXPORT AND ECONOMIC TRIBUTE

"There are two kinds of economic tribute. In the primitive one, the money capital of merchants and usurers levies a tribute from pre-capitalistic production. Here the non-capitalistic producer, coerced by the need of money, gives something for nothing in every transaction with capital. The later economic tribute is that paid by the smaller and more weakly organized units of capital to the larger and more highly developed units. This latter form operates within the framework of capitalism, while the former is characteristic of exchange between capitalist and pre-capitalist economic formations.

"The primitive form of economic tribute has the virtue of enabling capital to take control of a pre-capitalistic economy and lift it to the level of capitalism. On the other hand, in order to accomplish this, capital itself has to hurdle this primitive level by developing from merchant enterprise and usury to the level of industrial capital.

"Whenever, for some reason or other, this historic jump cannot be taken by capital, we have a situation in which the prerequisites of the market have been created, by disintegrating the old economy and making it too narrow for the subsistence of the population, but in which the market itself cannot be developed. Self-sufficiency becomes anachronistic. It no longer means what it says, because it is no longer adequate for subsistence, but is merely self-sufficient in the sense of not being integrated with the market.

"This makes for social tension and eventually for an attempt on the part of the people to help themselves in the absence of capital help. This has clearly been the case in China, where it has provided the economic compulsion toward anti-feudal revolution. To make the point more striking we may take the opposite extreme of market development in the United States. Here the two forms of economic tribute can still be observed in the economic intercourse between

industry and agriculture. In all exchanges between the pre-capitalistic agricultural producer of the South and all forms of capital, including merchants, industry, and the banks, capital gets something for nothing. At the present time this sector of exchange transactions is tending to widen, instead of narrowing down, which means that the market generally is shrinking instead of being developed. It is in this sense that President Roosevelt's remark that 'the South is the number one economic problem of the nation' holds true.

"In contrast with the economic tribute paid by the South, the farmer who himself has capital pays economic tribute of the normal type, because of the difference in volume and the technological level between agricultural and industrial capital. This inequivalence tends to diminish as agricultural capital grows and becomes modernized. It disappears altogether when agricultural capital is fused with industrial and banking capital, as in certain Californian farming enterprises which require considerable capital investment, combined with high technological development. This kind of 'industrialized agriculture,' however, thrusts growing numbers of marginal farmers back to the pre-capitalistic level, thus widening the gap between the highest level attained by agricultural capital, and all other agriculture.<sup>16</sup>

"The difference (and it is all the difference in the world) is that in the case of the United States the tension sets in a very high level of capitalist development, whereas in the case of China it occurs at a very low level, at the very beginning of industrialization. The interconnection between these two extremes of market development is that in the United States the market stoppage and the superabundance of capital associated with it coincides with the cessation of capital export, whereas in China it is due to lack of capital import. When this happens, capital export loses its ability to weld economically advanced and backward areas into a structure of market relations, and the world market fails to develop.

"The anti-imperialist character of the Chinese revolution shows that capital is resisted if it aims at domination and does not at the same time carry forward market development and industrialization. The subordination of an economy is a preliminary step; its success depends on whether it leads up to the next stage, which is the incorporation of the economy in the domain of capital. Military subjection might or might not prepare the ground for these two successive stages of a successful colonizing. That depends, by and large, on the level of capitalist development on a world scale. In the present period of world capitalism military subjection serves not as a preliminary but as a substitute for the economic process; as such it means that these two economic objectives are incapable of attainment. (Italian imperialism in Ethiopia, Japanese imperialism in China.) China's resistance is focused against Japanese aggression because Japan, not possessing the power of peaceful penetration, market development, and industrialization by capital export, has launched into a clear-cut attempt to subordinate and dominate China's economy. The insistence of Japanese spokesmen that their intentions are misinterpreted by the West, and that all they want is to insure the safety of Western capital in China (under Japanese domination) seems, therefore, very logical. What they do not take into consideration is only that their own aggression is essentially a militarization of the preceding Western capital export to China, which also aimed merely at the domination of Chinese economy and not at its development. The Japanese method is to use arms instead of dollars. The fact that the difference is in methods rather than in aims accounts for the way in which Western capital hesitates to aid China resistance.

"Capital export combines 'primitive' and 'normal' economic tribute. If it is the primitive phase that predominates, capital export does not lift the economically backward areas from their precapitalistic level, but leaves them stuck at the state of transition. If, on the other hand, the 'normal' phase predominates, then capital export to a certain extent works against itself. For by promoting the industrialization of backward areas, capital export reduces the gap between their capital equipment and that of the advanced countries. As the productivity of backward labor grows by means of capital import, there is a decrease in the economic tribute it has to pay in the process of exchange with the highly developed countries. Moreover, with an increasing capital supply from abroad the rate of interest falls, and economic dependence thus tends to diminish, unless counteracted by simultaneously increasing political pressure. Since there is almost always an attempt to enforce continued political dependence, it is a

<sup>16</sup> See Disadvantaged Classes in American Agriculture, U. S. Dept. of Agriculture, Washington, D. C.

fallacy to look upon capital export as an economic category pure and simple, a vehicle of mere economic exchange between countries at different stages of economic development.

"The process as a whole can be termed the law of diminishing returns of capital export. That is precisely why 'normal' capital export never runs its full course, and why the industrialization of backward areas by means of capital import stops short at a certain point. History does not conform to the pattern of academic economies, which assumes an automatic flow of capital to the backward areas of the world. In terms of history the flow of capital, far from being automatic, ceased almost altogether after a point can be fixed at about the outbreak of the Great Crisis in 1929.

"A theoretical conclusion is here suggested: the flow of capital does not obey physical laws in the sense that capital automatically flows down from the higher to the lower plateau, from economically highly developed to economically backward countries. The flow continues, by and large, only as long as the graph of world capitalism moves upward, with expanding markets and growing capital accumulation mutually reinforcing each other. When these conditions no longer prevail the line is broken and the classic law of the flow of capital no longer holds.

"From 1929 on India and China, traditionally gold and silver importing countries, released their gold and silver in increasing amounts to the advanced creditor countries of the West. The balance of payments were radically changed into the very opposite of their habitual structure. No 'norm' obtained any longer, in the sense of an academic scheme of the 'normal' course of economic events. The reversal of the normal trend of capital flow is both a symptom and an aggravating factor of the economic decay in the advanced countries which Sir Robert Kindersley was the first to formulate, with reference to Great Britain: 'From the point of view of the United Kingdom, a progressive deterioration in our position as a long-term creditor may in the long run result in a substantial and permanent decline in income from abroad. This would make it difficult to deal with the continued rise in imports without enforcing upon us a socially disturbing and detrimental reduction in the general standard, in order to lower costs and raise the volume of visible exports.'<sup>17</sup>

Capital export defeats itself in the long run. Balking at the prospect of diminishing returns, it attempts to compensate for the stoppage of capital export by raising the rate of economic tribute. After all, the motive power of capital export is not the requirements of industrialization in the backward country, but the profit requirement of capital in the advanced country. What might be a definitely too low level of industrialization from the standpoint of the capital importing country, may therefore be a definitely too high level of industrialization from the standpoint of those who have capital to export from an advanced country. The stagnation and deterioration of the French colonies illustrates this point. Here the initial spurt of capital export was predominantly speculative in character, and the motive for further capital exports was lacking. Capital export for purposes of industrialization could not possibly match the profits which had already accrued from sheer speculation and land-grabbing. Hence the long-standing economic and social grievances of the native population of the French colonies, the inability to raise the economic standard, the lag of industrialization behind other colonial empires.<sup>18</sup> At the point where a certain stage of industrialization by means of capital export threatens to upset the usual "terms of trade," the trend is reversed by the cessation of capital export.<sup>19</sup>

The prerequisites for the development of a huge internal market in China began maturing at a time when the effects of the diminishing returns of capital export were already clearly shaping up, on a world scale. This is the gist of the problem. It is aggravated by the fact that the concessions, which are the political and legal buttresses of the system of economic tribute laid on China, were so firmly established at the outset that they have not become an economic Chinese Wall, effectively barring both the development of the internal market in China and capital export to China.

<sup>17</sup> "British Oversea Investments in 1935 and 1936" in *Economic Journal*, London, December 1937, p. 662.

<sup>18</sup> On the scandalous and detrimental practices of French finance in the colonies see the work of the former Minister of Colonies, Albert Sarraut, *La Mise en Valeur des Colonies Françaises*, Paris, 1923.

<sup>19</sup> "At the present time China's imports of machinery (valued at \$42,000,000 in 1932) represent only 3/2 percent of her total imports. Textile machinery alone accounts for one-fifth of the whole." G. E. Hubbard, *Eastern Industrialization and Its Effect on the West*, London, 1935, p. 231.

## 5. DISINTEGRATION OF THE WORLD MARKET

"The system of economic tribute leads to an eventual reversal of the flow of capital, and this in turn intensifies the inequity of exchange, and results in a disintegration of the world market. Adam Smith's optimistic picture of world free trade as both the result and the vehicle of increasing international division of labor is hopelessly outmoded. The crashing of the world's leading currencies in the Great Crisis, beginning in 1929, with repercussions on the world's economically backward areas, marks a definite turning point in the competition between the capital-owning countries and the economic relations between them and the backward countries. Nor is it a coincidence that both the stoppage of capital export and the shrinkage of the world market became critical when this turning point was reached.

"It is important to note the order of succession in the different aspects of this crisis. Retarded industrialization of the colonial and semicolonial countries, caused by cessation of capital export, followed the crisis in the highly developed countries. Colonial retardation then backfired, choking industrial progress all over the world. While lack of capital prevented industrialization in the backward countries, it was in the most advanced countries, with the most capital, that the fall in the rate of new industrial production was most conspicuous. What made the problem of the world market as a whole so acute and desperate was the way in which nondevelopment of the internal market in the backward areas coincided exactly with deterioration of the internal market in the advanced countries.

"Professor Cassel estimates that the normal yearly rate of increase in world production is 3 percent. The following League of Nations figures show the change in yearly new production in the postwar period:

*Yearly percentage changes of world production (per caput figures)<sup>20</sup>*

	Production of crude foodstuffs (excl. meat and milk)	Manufacture of consumption goods	Manufacture of producers' investment goods
World (excl. U. S. S. R.):			
1920-1937.....	0.6	1.4	1.5
1920-1929.....	1.4	3.1	3.5
1929-1937.....	-4	-4	-6
North America:			
1920-1937.....	-9	.1	.1
1920-1929.....	-1.3	1.4	2.5
1929-1937.....	-4	-1.3	-2.4

<sup>20</sup> World Production and Prices, 1937-38, p. 32.

"Cassel's 'normal' rate of increase is halved in the post-war period. In the prosperity decade of the twenties we have the normal rate but it is offset by a decline of production in the following crisis decade.

"If, moreover, we take America, economically the most highly developed part of the capitalist world, representing one-third to one-half of world production, the picture of the postwar crisis becomes even more striking. The per capita yearly rate of interest is negligible all through; in the crisis decade it becomes abruptly a minus quantity. The yearly rate of increase in the manufacture of producers' investment goods, which is the actual index of expanded production, is for the whole post-war period 1920-37 the same as for the manufacture of consumption goods—a startling measure of continued economic stagnation.

"A greatly increased rate of industrialization of the backward areas would be required to make up for the lagging rate of increase in the advanced countries. This, however, would necessitate greatly increased amounts of capital export, which would suddenly change the established system of economic tribute from the backward countries. Comparing this with the fact that the diminishing prospect of economic tribute is what militates against further large-scale capital export, we find ourselves back in our vicious circle.

"Disruption of the unified world currency system is a harbinger of the disintegration of the world market. The spreading depreciation of currencies stems from the inability of debtors to pay. This, in turn, makes worse their 'incapacity to receive.' The currencies of the backward countries depreciate at a higher rate

than those of the advanced countries, thus catastrophically widening the gap between the two structures, and increasing the amount of capital export that would be needed to bridge the gulf.

"In the second half of the nineteenth century and up to 1914 capital export increased the amount of economic tribute paid by the colonial and backward countries. Since the war and especially since 1929, the stoppage of capital export has raised the rate of economic tribute, in an effort to offset the dwindling amount. What was formerly the normal method of economic intercourse with the backward areas of the world, through the investment of capital, thus led up to something that is its very opposite. In the initial spurt of capital export, the primitive form of economic tribute predominated, because the exchange was between countries which had capital and countries which were precapitalistic. By and large, this gave way in the second half of the nineteenth century to capital export as a vehicle of normal economic tribute, based on differences in the level of capital equipment. We are now in a third phase, in which capital export is foundering on the rocks of diminishing returns, on account of what Sir Arthur Salter calls a 'too high degree of industrialization' in the backward areas. This phase includes both the last world war and the present one. When it was no longer profitable to develop backward markets by capital export, an attempt was made to tighten up the annexation of markets. Then the first world war broke out, and the development of existing markets yielded in importance to the acquisition of new markets. The surplus capital which had been employed in capital export was switched into armaments. This, however, did not solve the fundamental problem. The reallocation of the world market, divided into colonies and mandates, did not lead to further market development. The failure shows up in the following table of world currency depreciation after 1929:

*Values of currencies as percentage of their gold parity in 1929*<sup>21</sup>

	U. S. A.	Mexico	Philippines	China	Britain	India	Malaya
1928	100.0	96.5	99.2	110.1	100.0	99.9	99.1
1929	100.0	96.7	99.8	100.0	99.8	99.2	98.7
1930	100.0	94.6	99.8	71.6	99.9	98.8	98.6
1931	100.0	85.5	99.8	53.3	93.2	92.3	92.4
1932	100.0	63.9	99.5	52.5	72.0	72.2	71.2
1933	80.7	45.7	80.6	49.4	68.1	68.2	67.8
1934	59.6	33.2	59.7	48.7	61.8	61.9	62.0
1935	59.4	33.1	59.3	52.0	59.8	60.1	59.8
1936	59.2	33.0	59.3	42.2	60.5	60.8	60.7
1937	59.1	32.9	59.3	41.9	60.0	60.4	60.3
1938	59.1	26.2	58.9	30.2	59.3	59.2	59.2

<sup>21</sup> Statistical Yearbook of the League of Nations, pp. 228, 229.

"In this table the two chief creditor countries are compared with colonies and semicolonies. As a result of a currency truce between the two chief creditor countries, their rate of depreciation has been the same. The currencies of their colonial dependencies have been depreciated—as a matter of policy—at the same rate. A higher rate of depreciation would have corresponded more closely to the economic status of the colonies, compared with the mother countries; therefore their currencies were actually overvalued when held at the former ratio. The explanation is that a higher rate of depreciation would have tended to decrease their imports and increase their exports, and would have made it difficult if not impossible to repay their debts. The enforced repayment of debts from the colonies was, however, one of the chief means by which the mother country, after the devaluation of its own currency, was able to avoid panic and keep a managed currency at the desired level of parity. This holds true particularly for India and Great Britain.

"In sharp contrast to this, the currencies of the semi-colonial countries like Mexico and China were allowed to fluctuate wildly, depreciating at a much higher rate. The silver-buying program of the Roosevelt administration did not stop the headlong depreciation but accentuated it by draining away the metallic base of their currencies.

"The complete failure of this panacea throws light on the fallacy of the monetary theory in vogue. The development of commodity production into a money economy, and of money into capital, follows two consecutive stages in the economic progress of backward countries. The precarious status of a backward country stuck at the stage of transition is revealed by the unstable equilibrium

of its currency, 'managed' by capital export, or the cessation of capital export, or the withdrawal of capital. When capital export to backward countries is withheld, and capital already invested is withdrawn, the currency is bound to deteriorate, both in quantity and in exchange parity, under the impact of this double pressure. The backward economies can no longer depend on the support of the advanced countries.

"For the economic support withheld and withdrawn there is substituted a 'support of the currency' by silver buying. This is a complete misnomer, for what it amounts to in the circumstances is an aggravation of the economic problem, by stripping silver of its quality as capital and even as money (means of circulation). The silver-buying program, as substitute for capital export and a means of facilitating the withdrawal of capital, amounts to no more than the manipulation of a particular commodity. It does not support the currency, which can be supported only by a strengthening of the economy itself. It leads to a 'deflation' in the backward countries which is really a switching back, through outside influence, from capital into money and from money into a particular commodity. This again does not support the currency, but undermines it by rendering it incapable of serving as the basis of circulation and as a medium of capital accumulation. Thus it is not only in the quantitative but in this qualitative, historical sense too that these countries have been 'decapitalized.' The agglomeration of gold at the other extreme of market development, in the United States, is a complementary phenomenon. Official gold hoarding in such unparalleled dimensions means that, to that extent, gold ceases to function either as world money or as the basis of world capital accumulation. Functionally, it is switched back, by uncontrollable forces, from a general equivalent into a particular precious commodity.

"From the standpoint of the advanced country the compound result is a widening gap between its own economic structure and that of the backward countries, increasing the onus of the economic tribute borne by the backward countries. The economic status of these countries, struck at the stage of transition between precapitalism and capitalism, becomes absolutely insupportable. They are forced to help themselves, lest they be strangled at the stage of economic transition. Hence the accentuation of the anti-feudal, anti-imperialist revolutions in both China and Mexico.

"If the backward countries can no longer rely on capital help, the powers rely more and more on political pressure as an instrument of economic policy. The silver-buying program is a remarkable example, for it is used as a sword of Damocles hanging over these semidependent countries. Mexico's expropriation of foreign capital illustrates the overlapping of the political and the economic aspects. American capital, constrained by the economic crisis at home, tried to speed up the recovery of its original investment in Mexico, and the accruing profits, by wage cuts in the oil industry. This was tantamount to a large scale withdrawal of capital, disintegrating the Mexican internal market. Mexico resisted by expropriating the foreign holdings, to which the retort was renewed pressure: demands for immediate payment, a boycott of Mexican oil, a threat to withdraw the American Treasury's support of silver. Yet immediate payment would have been possible only if American finance had extended long-term credits, to be serviced out of increased sales of Mexican oil to the United States. The vicious circle is here complete: for this would have been a form of capital export to Mexico, whereas the trouble had arisen out of the attempt to recover capital previously exported.

"One of the forms taken by the attempt to escape from the disintegration of the world market is the creation of huge political-economic-currency blocs, initiated by the creation of the Sterling bloc at the Ottawa conference. This was followed by the creation of the Yen bloc by Japan. After the breaking up of the Gold bloc, France and its dependencies formed a Franc bloc. The United States, Britain, and France then concluded a make-shift currency truce, which went to pieces after the outbreak of the war, was engaged in the creation of a Central and South-Eastern European Mark bloc.

"In significance, this trend outstrips the schemes of autarchy or a 'federated Europe.' It is both a symptom of and an aggravating factor in the disintegration of the world market. This splitting up of the world market into such watertight compartments additionally retards the economic development, through industrialization, of the colonial and semicolonial countries.

"Two examples illustrate the trend. In the Dutch East Indies:

"Through the Regulation of Industry Ordinance of 1934 and the similar enactment of 1937, the Government obtained a further broad extension of its regulatory powers. By this authority, it may now intervene in all branches

of industry to control the development of established industries or the creation of new ones. The purpose of the ordinance is to prevent 'destructive competition.' In less generalized terms, it is intended as a restriction of possible Japanese enterprise in the industries of Netherlands India; as a method of insuring the prosperity of present industries which are considered useful to the country by preventing an increase of production beyond effective consumer demands; as a safeguard against the establishment of new industries which might threaten existing native industries, for example the mass production of batiks; and as a means for preventing local production from entirely displacing imports in categories for which quotas have been assigned to the Netherlands or other supplying countries. The last point represents a new policy, since earlier, whenever local production was able to supply local demand, permissible imports in protected categories were regularly cut down.<sup>22</sup>

"This is open governmental intervention to prevent, forcibly, further industrialization and the further development of the internal market. It demonstrates the clash between the requirements of the internal market in the colonies and those of the capital of the mother country.

"French colonial policy follows the same pattern. 'L'Industrialisation de l'Indo-Chinese,' a report submitted by the official Société d'Etudes et d'Information Economique, gives the following data and conclusions:

"France is the chief provider of Indochina, supplying about one-half of the colony's yearly imports, which in 1937 were valued at 1,578 million francs.

"\* \* \* The main difficulty appears to be that it is hard to find a market in Indochina or in the neighboring countries which can offer adequate compensation for any large-scale investment in industry.

"The main conclusion reached was that any large-scale plan for the industrialization of Indochina was impractical.<sup>23</sup>

"This trend is accompanied by the confinement of a major portion of foreign trade within artificial currency areas. Half of Britain's trade is with the Empire. The same holds for France, and the tendency is greatly accelerated by the war. It applies equally to Japan. In 1939 the Japanese balance of trade was active by more than 600 million yen but after deduction of the trade with the yen bloc it was passive by 400 million yen.

"The very nature of modern imperialism undergoes a change through these developments. It relapses into a more sophisticated and destructive eighteenth century mercantilism. The 'terms of trade' run always against the backward countries, but less and less so as their industrialization proceeds; but this is now being actively interfered with by withholding large-scale capital export, and by official 'regulation' and dictation. The rapid industrialization of Manchuria, by heavy capital export from Japan for military purposes, is only an apparent exception. Actually, it confirms the rule, for it has not developed the internal market in Manchuria, but destroyed it, and has not been a genuine export outlet for Japan, but has further deteriorated the Japanese internal market by draining away capital. As the Shanghai correspondent of the London Economist puts it:

"Manchurian imports last year rose in value by 40 percent and Manchurians exports increased by 14 percent, with Japan in each case accounting for the entire increase. A substantial portion of these increases in the value of trade resulted from sharp price increases in the Yen bloc countries. However, the Kwantung Army's influence upon the Tokyo Government proved strong enough to compel Japan, in spite of her own shortages of all sorts of commodities, to ship a considerable volume of supplies to Manchuria for the construction there of the new Japanese continental war industry base. The M\$957,176,000 surplus of imports arose almost exclusively from trade with Japan. This import surplus was chiefly financed by means of Manchurian bond and industrial debenture flotations in Japan, where in 1939 Manchurian issues formed one-third of all nongovernmental bond issues.<sup>24</sup>

"These changes, shaping up behind the fire and smoke of war, are more fundamental than dreams of a Federated Europe or International Free Trade. Repercussions on the economy of the advanced countries are inevitable. The economic impoverishment of the backward areas of the world is lucrative while it lasts, but cannot be kept up. Individual countries may temporarily increase their markets

<sup>22</sup> Far Eastern Survey, Aug. 16, 1939.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., Feb. 15, 1939.

<sup>24</sup> Economist, March 2, 1940, p. 378.

at the expense of others, but this is no solution for the world market itself, the world economic system, and the economic destinies of the backward nations. It amounts to no more than individual attempts to extend internal markets by the addition of areas that used to be part of the external market.

"The trend is toward a monopolization, by each power, of its share of the World market. This monopolization is historically different from the monopolization of the internal market and therefore ushers in an epoch of more protracted and more exacerbated international conflicts and convulsions; trade wars, currency war, military collisions.

"To what extent does China share in the market? The figures are illuminating.

"The comparative figures of per capita import and exports show conclusively the relative economic weakness of China's economy, and serve to reestablish a sense of proportion for the problem of the Chinese market. They suggest the amounts of suddenly increased commodity and capital import that would enable China to become a 'huge market' for foreign capital. These are the lags that Sir Arthur Salter advises us to span 'step by step and gradually.'

*Per capita trade, by countries (calendar year 1937)<sup>25</sup>*

	Population estimates (thousands)	Per capita trade imports	(Current \$) exports
United States.....	131,514	25.10	22.90
United Kingdom.....	47,029	108.20	54.85
Japan.....	71,252	15.25	12.85
China.....	466,786	0.60	0.55
India.....	338,171	1.80	2.25
Indochina.....	23,030	2.70	4.40

*Imports and exports as percentages of the world total<sup>26</sup>*

	Imports				Exports			
	1911-13	1935	1936	1937	1911-13	1935	1936	1937
United States.....	8.4	10.0	11.0	11.3	12.4	12.0	11.9	13.2
United Kingdom.....	17.4	18.0	19.1	18.6	15.3	12.4	12.1	11.7
Japan.....	1.5	3.5	3.6	4.0	1.4	3.8	3.8	3.6
China.....	1.8	1.7	1.3	1.0	1.5	1.1	1.0	1.0

<sup>25</sup> Foreign Commerce Year Book, Washington, D. C., 1938, p. 427.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

"The figures relate to the situation prior to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war, which made them out of date but by no means irrelevant. For the economic backwardness and prostration of China and the economic lag between China and the surrounding world which large-scale capital export from the advanced countries failed to bridge, made Japanese aggression against China possible.

"The second tabulation might suggest the superficial view that China's share in world trade is almost negligible, and hardly capable of creating a problem for the time being. Though such a view may suit the conceptions of the adherents of gradualism, the very opposite holds true. Actually, China's share in the world market is too small not to create a serious problem. The one percent to the extent of which China participates in the world market is trifling if compared with the world market, but more than enough to disintegrate China's economy, and at the same time far from enough to develop China's internal market. That is the point. The 'negligible' one percent covers the whole ceaseless ferment that makes for wars and revolutions in the Far East. China's one percent, in relation to the hundred percent which is the world market, accounts for the contraction of the absolute magnitude that the hundred percent represents.

"Take the position of the two rivals—the United States and Japan—in the world market and the China market. In spite of its spectacular rise in the last two decades, Japan's share of commodity export in the world market remains small, and so does its capital export; but its share in China's trade and capital import has become second only to Great Britain's. It is exactly the other way about with the United States. Its share in the world market and in world

capital export is second only to that of Great Britain. Its share in the commodity and capital import of China remains, however, in spite of an accelerated rate of growth in the postwar period, trifling compared with those of Great Britain and Japan.

"These are precisely the factors that determine the trend of the struggle for the world market. The Economic Intelligence Service of the League of Nations observed in 1926 that 'trade is passing from the Atlantic to the Pacific. The fact that this observation has not been borne out is a fateful comment on the unfolding of the world market. The World Economic Survey of the League, 1935-36, from which the statement is quoted, adds:

"The depression years 1929-32 saw a sharp reversal of the trend. The inherent trading strength of the European countries, combined with the creditor position of some of them, was such that the fall in export prices was concentrated mainly upon the agricultural-exporting countries, many of whom were outside Europe (p. 166).

"The international sugar, tea, tin, rubber restriction schemes aggravated this reversal of the trend and, at the same time, threw light on its causes and significance. Capital, in the form of financial investment, dictates the terms of production and trade. For the agricultural and raw material producing countries of the East this has meant enforced restriction of production and trade and enforced retardation of further industrialization and internal market development."<sup>27</sup>

"In conclusion, we may state the case broadly as follows:

"From the end of the fifteenth century the center of gravity of the world market shifted from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic. This resulted, at the time, in a deindustrialization of Northern Italy, which had been the cradle of capitalistic production. The beginning of a further shift of the center of gravity from the Atlantic to the Pacific in the first decades of the twentieth century would have resulted in industrializing the countries of the Far East, had it not encountered overwhelming obstacles.

"The conclusion is permissible that whereas the shift of the center of gravity of the world market from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic was a harbinger of its unfolding, all the obstructions to a further shift from the Atlantic to the Pacific are indicative of the beginning of disintegration. The obstructions hampering the industrialization of the East are thus intimately connected with those impeding the expansion and the complete unfolding of the world market, the capitalization of the globe."

NEW YORK, June 1940.

#### EXHIBIT No. 472

[Our Times, People's Daily World, vol. 12, No. 35, Section II. Friday, February 18, 1949]

#### A GENERAL LOOKS AT THE SOVIET UNION

(By Ralph Izard)

Gen. Philip R. Faymonville, military aide to President Roosevelt, has spent 15 years in the U. S. S. R. His views on Soviet aims are somewhat at variance with "red menace" tales.

By the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor most of the military "experts" writing for American newspapers were on a diet of newsprint. They were eating the columns in which they had predicted "defeat of the Russians" in six weeks, then three months, then six months.

Fortunately for the American people, President Roosevelt did not have to rely on Hearst generals, Scripps-Howard master minds, and such profoundly warped military opinion as that purveyed by Hanson Baldwin in *The New York Times*. In the time of our country's greatest peril, he put his faith in the intelligence provided him by Philip R. Faymonville, then a colonel and military attaché in the U. S. Embassy in Moscow, now Brigadier General Faymonville, retired.

<sup>27</sup> The military strategic necessities of the Allies in the first World War were the most potent single factor in accelerating the industrialization of the East. The same necessities might evoke a stepping-up of production and export from these countries in the course of the second World War, but the situation is modified by large existing excess capacities in these countries, built up and carried through in the postwar period. A consideration of these changes, however, is beyond the scope of the present article.

Then, as now, everything General Faymonville reported as the result of a professional lifetime spent in the Soviet Union ran counter to the barrage of lies laid down daily in the commercial press. And of the situation today, in which "the Russian menace" has replaced "the yellow peril" as a daily source of scareheads, General Faymonville says:

"There is no Napoleonism in the Soviet Union, no desire for the conquest of other peoples.

"After 1,000 years of invasions, defense is today the Number One objective of the Soviet government, and they will not yield one point of that defense. But there is no such thing in the Soviet Union as hostility to other nations, or a desire for their conquest."

The general speaks such astringent truths as a matter of personal knowledge gained during four tours of duty in the Soviet Union. His 15 years of roving the great land bridge that links Europe to Asia, his knowledge of the Russian language, his study of history, all combine to make him something far different than Wall Street's conception of "the very model of a modern major general"—which, perhaps, explains why he was retired from active duty.

Slender of waist and ruddy of face, General Faymonville was born in San Francisco, April 30, 1888. At the time of the 1906 earthquake and fire he was living with his family in their newly built home at No. 1 Presidio St. The general's mother fed and housed dozens of the refugees from the devastated sectors of the city, and with his father he made a survey of the hundreds who flooded the Presidio grounds, securing a list of their names for the city authorities.

Unmarried, the general now makes his home in San Francisco's Olympic Club, since for him there are only three cities in the world worth living in—"San Francisco, New York, and Moscow." In his retirement, which began last year, he is continuing his study of history, languages, music, and economics.

Occasionally the general speaks on the Soviet Union. What he has to say is often unpalatable to those force-fed by the Hearst press. Recently he was badgered by a questioner in the audience at a lecture he gave before the Council on World Affairs. The eager heckler asked, "Just where do the Communist parties of the various nations fit into the Soviet goal of peace?"

The general laughed quietly, then said:

"Communist parties are groups of nationals influenced by certain social and political doctrines that have grown up in the last 100 years. Such parties have nothing to do with the Russians. Political and social doctrine knows no national boundaries."

The general's interest in things Russian began when he was a mere shavetail, four years out of West Point, where he stood ninth among the 97 cadets in the Class of 1912. Stationed on Luzon in the Philippine Islands, he had come to the conclusion by the time World War I began that in the U. S. Army there was a glaring lack of knowledge about Russia and the Russians.

In 1918, after less than two years' study of the Russian language, he was ordered into a situation requiring its daily use. Maj. Gen. William S. Graves had been appointed commanding officer of an American expeditionary force to Siberia. For obvious reasons he selected General Faymonville as his ordnance officer.

The Army's Siberian adventure was a direct consequence of British pressure on Washington. The British Foreign Office sought American soldiers to "re-erect the Eastern Front." According to General Faymonville, it is due almost entirely to "President Wilson's stubbornness" that U. S. intervention in Siberia never assumed the disastrous consequences that would have ensued had Wilson yielded to the British.

General Graves' orders restricted U. S. troops to guarding certain military stores "which may be subsequently needed by the Russian forces"; to repatriating German, Austrian, Hungarian, and Czech soldiers from Siberian prisoner-of-war camps, and "to steadying any efforts at self-government or self-defense in which the Russians may be willing to accept assistance."

U. S. soldiers were thrown into battle against forces led by the Bolsheviks along the Ussuri river, shortly after the U. S. troops disembarked. This, the only large-scale action in which Americans took part, came about as a consequence of British intelligence, which represented the Czechs the Americans had been ordered to guard as "menaced by the Bolsheviks."

In the complicated diplomatic maneuvering of that time, the Yanks, according to General Faymonville, were on hand as much to "keep an eye on the Japanese," who were trying to take over the Trans-Siberian railway, as for any other reason.

But neither the Americans nor any of the other four intervening nations—Britain, France, China, and Japan—found friends or allies as a result of their

action. They found the White armies a rabble led by madmen, nobles, and ex-Czarist officers who had suddenly found themselves flung in the ashcan by revolution. But the U. S. Army's Siberian adventure only ended, General Faymonville says today, "when all the intervening powers found themselves facing complete defeat or starvation." Then, along with "the westward-bound Czechs," the German, Hungarian, and Austrian prisoners, the French, Chinese, and British military contingents, General Graves and the 8,000 men in his command cleared through Vladivostok.

General Faymonville was only gone from the bleak, gale-swept vastness for two years. He returned to the Maritime Provinces in 1921, as the official American military observer to what is now only a footnote to Soviet history. This was the formation of the Far Eastern Republic.

Set up as a coalition government nominally independent of Moscow and the Soviets, the Republic first came to public notice when its delegates appeared at the Washington Arms Conference of 1921. Their credentials unhonored, their country unrecognized, they proceeded nonetheless with negotiations for exploitation of the oil resources of their area.

These negotiations, conducted with Harry F. Sinclair, later to become involved in the Teapot Dome scandal, were undertaken in the expectation that U. S. aid in expelling the Japanese would follow the granting of oil leases. While these diplomatic maneuvers were going on, General Faymonville was roaming the Maritimes, from the Pacific Coast to Lake Baikal. He was back in Chita Nov. 13, 1922, when the Republic's national assembly passed what he calls "the most far-reaching resolution I've ever heard."

The resolution was the direct consequence of an evacuation agreement to which the Japanese had at last acceded. Thus, says the general, "the national assembly voted to dissolve itself, to turn over all its powers to a revolutionary committee, and to affiliate with the new Soviet republics." The great landbridge stretched unbroken from Europe to the Pacific.

This early experience with Japanese expansionist ambitions, and three later years as military attaché in the Tokio Embassy, prepared General Faymonville for the Tanaka Memorial. Baron Tanaka's blueprint for Japanese conquest spelled out Nippon's plans as completely as Hitler later outlined those of the Nazis in his book, *Mein Kampf*. And it met much the same reception from the world of capitalism.

Exposed by a Russian newspaperman, the document was belittled as mere Bolshevik propaganda. What it forecast was nothing less than Pearl Harbor, Guadalcanal, New Guinea, the Philippines, and all the bloody islands of the Pacific. General Faymonville vouched for its authenticity at the time it was published. But his voucher was no more acceptable to those in command of U. S. foreign policy than is a Stalin peace offer now.

General Faymonville has said of recent American-Soviet developments: "Despite the different answers found to social problems by the Soviet Union and the United States, the Russians firmly believe that they can coexist with other nations widely different in economic structure.

"The Soviet Union is completely sincere in backing global cooperation. Its leaders want an organized and peaceful world."

After his stay in Tokio, General Faymonville returned to the United States for further training. Between 1926 and 1931 he attended those Army schools reserved for the most brilliant officers of field grade and above—the Industrial College, the Chemical Warfare School, and the top strategy school, the War College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

He made the White House his home during 1933 and 1934, when he was senior military aide to President Roosevelt. The President, embarking on a new diplomatic policy that began with U. S. recognition of the Soviet Union, apparently respected the qualities of mind and personality he found in his senior military aide. Because in 1934 General Faymonville was asked to return to Soviet territory as military attaché in the U. S. Embassy in Moscow. He stayed until 1939, first serving with Ambassador William G. Bullitt, then with Joseph E. Davies, who laid the ground for American-Soviet cooperation to defeat fascism.

This was the period of the Trotskyist trials, of which so much was made in the U. S. press. Many of those tried were personal acquaintances of General Faymonville, and of them he says:

"Their betrayal—or attempted betrayal—of their country, was born of personal resentment. Most of them felt that as old Bolsheviks the rewards accorded them had been inadequate.

"Added to this was the programmatic defeat that they had also suffered. And moving freely as they did among high foreign officials resident in Moscow, they

fell in with a group of very active, very intelligent foreign agents. These agents took advantage of and played upon these points of resentment."

General Faymonville returned to Moscow in 1941, this time as coordinator for Lend-Lease at the Russian end of the 10,000-mile pipeline. As the man primarily responsible for the items of equipment received by the Soviet armies, the general is under no delusion that they were the decisive factor.

"What we sent the Soviet Union was most carefully planned in advance," he said. "Basically it was a question as to which would be the most effective, and which would take the least shipping space—the finished product, or the machine that could make that product.

"But of the total of war material used by the Soviet Union against Hitler, no more than 5 percent was of foreign origin."

What is the most vivid and lasting impression General Faymonville retains from his 15 years in the Soviet Union?

"The unity of Soviet man," he said, "is the most impressive thing to be found there. The peoples of the Soviet Union have a vast sense of humanity, of kinship with all mankind.

"Add to this their vast tolerance and their intense curiosity about everything. They are even intensely curious about such American activities as flagpole sitting, though they drop such an interest when they find it is without meaning for Soviet life."

As to the charge usually hurled by the Roman Catholic Church against the Soviet organization of society—that it is "gross materialism," the general says:

"The special feeling that the Soviet citizen has for the ballet is in itself a refutation of that charge.

"The same thing is true for his deep love of music, and the rapt attention he gives any stage production."

From this wealth of personal experience with the people of the Soviet Union, with her leaders in every walk of life, and his close study of Soviet intentions, General Faymonville knows the "get tough" and "gang up on Russia" schools of thought now dominating U. S. foreign policy are foredoomed to failure.

"Threats will not divert the Soviet Union from the path it has taken," he says. "The Soviet peoples are determined to take their place with the greatest nations of earth, and in this effort they have the complete support of the entire population."

Furthermore, the storms outridden by the Soviet government since its revolutionary birth in 1917 have given the Soviet peoples "supreme faith in the ability of their government to win through all situations."

It may be that the American people, halting the present drive to war short of disaster, will see fit one day to recall General Faymonville to active duty. After all, he will not be 61 until April 30. General Douglas MacArthur is still on active duty in Japan at 68.

Perhaps such considerations play some role in the general's thinking in his present retirement. He is continuing his reading in German, French, Spanish, and Italian, although he freely admits that his Japanese is now a bit rusty.

To keep his Russian polished and flexible he is taking an advanced course with the best instruction he could find in San Francisco—at the California Labor School.

EXHIBIT No. 477

#### WHO WANTED TO RECOGNIZE RED CHINA

*Ernest T. Weir, Chairman, National Steel Corporation, in Statement on Our Foreign Situation, January 5, 1951, page 12*

"If we refuse to recognize and deal with the present Chinese Government because it is communistic, we assume the dangerous position of trying to tell the people of other important nations what kind of government they must have.

"No matter what claims may be made that our attitude toward China is the result of Chinese aggression in Korea, I think the fact is very evident that if the present situation results in extension of the war it will be due to our refusal to recognize the Chinese Government because it is communistic."

*Walter Lippmann, in New York Herald Tribune, January 2, 1950*

"In theory \* \* \* we could still refuse, alone among the nations concerned with Asia, to recognize Red China. We should have to explain this strange situation by saying that everybody is out of step but father."

*William R. Herod, President, General Electric Company, State Department Conference, October 1949 (October 6-8, "Jessup Conference")*

"I would suggest that we watch the situation daily, and if and when the Nationalists lose control completely and the Communists attain the position of having machinery of state that we at that time accord them recognition unless in the meantime there has been some other factor."

*William S. Robertson, American and Foreign Power Company, State Department Conference, October 1949*

"Mr. Ambassador, I'd like to associate myself with Mr. Herod in this question of recognition."

*J. Morden Murphy, Vice President, Bankers Trust Company, State Department Conference, October 1949*

"Therefore, I think that however inconvenient in the Council and in the Assembly the presence of Chinese Communist members may be, I think we have to take our chances when the time comes."

*John W. Decker, International Missionary Council, State Department Conference, October 1949*

"I would associate myself with those favoring recognition \* \* \* although I want to say something about timing."

*Arthur Holcombe, Harvard Professor, State Department Conference, October 1949*

"I go along with those who have spoken and I guess most of us do—perhaps all—on the question of recognition and the question of timing and I take it that most of those who have spoken would also add that since to get exactly the right time is exceedingly difficult, it is better to be too early than too late. At any rate, that would be my view."

*American Friends Service Committee Executive Board, as reported in the New York Times, January 19, 1950*

"In an open letter to Mr. Truman the Quaker organization stated that 'further intervention will result in the hardening of Chinese resentment against America and the strengthening of Sino-Russian ties. By treating Communist China as an enemy and by refusing to recognize her,' the letter added, 'we are not isolating China, we are isolating ourselves and throwing away the chance of influencing the course of events in the Orient.'"

*John A. MacKay, Chairman of the International Missionary Council, at a meeting of Protestant foreign missionary and world church leaders, as reported in the New York Times, January 5, 1950*

"I think we will be obliged to recognize the new government. Otherwise we will be alienating the Chinese people who by their attitude repudiated the other regime."

*Student Conference sponsored by the West Point Military Academy and the Carnegie Corporation and attended by 150 students from 52 colleges, as reported in the New York Times, December 10, 1950*

"While expressing opposition to the expansion of communism, the conference adopted a conciliatory attitude toward the present Chinese regime.

"It proposed that the United States declare itself willing to negotiate with the Chinese Communists through the United Nations; that the United States refrain from opposing their admission to the United Nations if the Communists accepted the United Nations resolution on Korea, and that the United States should not oppose any decision that the United Nations might reach on Formosa."

#### EXHIBIT No. 475

#### ONE WHO SURVIVED

(By Alexander Barmine (pp. 194-95))

"I began to understand this raid when I learned that the order of search had been issued by the district attorney of Mons, a city which I had never visited and where I had no friends or correspondents. Mons at that time was the scene of a miners' strike which had been full of dramatic incidents. The miners had greeted the moderate socialist minister, Vandervelde, with catcalls, had thrown

several police officers into the canal, and had locked a number of engineers and mine managers into their offices. Who was behind these excesses? It never occurred to anyone that the miners might have been sufficiently discontented and overwrought to resort to violence on their own. No, there happened to be at Brussels an official Bolshevik agent who pretended to be concerned only with matters of business but who in reality was doubtless spending his nights manipulating invisible threads which would set in motion a riot in a distant mining district!

"\* \* \* I knew that the police inspector had submitted a detailed report in which he made a great point of the Bolshevik insolence of my attitude.

" 'Police headquarters have got it in for you,' said my Belgian friends. 'Because of the Mons strikes, I supposed?' \* \* \*

"The Belgian consul general there explained, with an air of considerable embarrassment, that he had received categorical instructions to refuse me a visa and inform me that I was forbidden to cross the Belgian frontier \* \* \*

"I have since learned, more or less, what lay behind all this comic business. A former agent of the G. P. U., Agabekov, who had fled to Belgium after making a mess of various jobs in counterespionage in the Levant, had become the principal informer for the Belgian police in all matters connected with the Soviets. What he didn't know he invented. In order to maintain his status, he would himself recruit Belgians for a fake G. P. U. and then denounce them to the government. To him it would have been a small matter to invent a participation by the Soviets in the strikes at Mons."

#### EXHIBIT No. 476

#### WHO SAID THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS WERE NOT REAL COMMUNISTS?

*Patrick J. Hurley, Ambassador to China, in U. S. Relations With China, 1945, p. 86*

"\* \* \* the Communists are not in fact Communists, they are striving for democratic principles; \* \* \*

*Hallett Abend, New York Times correspondent, in My Life in China, 1943, p. 125*

"The Chinese Communists are not now, and have not for many years, been 'Communists' in the Soviet Russian meaning of that term—nor in the Lenin-Trotsky meaning, or in what is now called communist under Joseph Stalin. The so-called communist movement in China is an agrarian movement, a labor movement; it is a party organized against the tenant-farmer system of China, and against the exploitation of labor by what, before this war, was China's growing industrialism and capitalism. For years Chinese Communists have received neither cash nor munitions from Soviet Russia; even before Hitler attacked Russia in June of 1941, when regular shipments of munitions were being made into China over the long desert road through Sinkiang, these munitions went to the Chinese Government, not to the Chinese Reds."

*Freda Utley*

"The Chinese Communist Party, however, is less subservient to Moscow than the artificially created Communist parties of Europe and America; it has in recent years enlisted in its ranks many prominent intellectuals, men primarily liberals and patriots; and it is rooted in a peasant movement in no sense Bolshevik in its aspiration. It is doubtful, therefore, whether a majority of its members would obey an order from Moscow to abandon the war of national liberation for a civil war against Chiang Kai-shek and Kuomintang \* \* \*," p. 279, "Japan's Red Flirtation," Nation, Feb. 21, 1940.

"Communism in China having become almost entirely an agrarian movement, had by 1935 been transmuted by the logic of history into a movement of peasant emancipation," p. 252 (China at War).

"The Communists seemed to me to be the greatest realists in the country, and in many ways the most modern-minded element. I believe that they are sincere in saying that what they hope for in China is some form of democratic State," p. 256 (China at War, 1939).

"Moreover, the Chinese Communist Party long ago abandoned the dream of establishing its own dictatorship. Now that its social basis is amongst the peasants of the most backward provinces in China, and amongst the middle-class youth and the liberal reformers, its aim has genuinely become social and political reform along capitalist and democratic lines," p. 254 (China at War, 1939).

*In New Statesman and Nation, Jan. 28, 1939*

"\* \* \* the Chinese Communists today neither proclaim nor follow a revolutionary policy fatal to the processing classes or to Chiang Kai-shek himself \* \* \*

"It would probably be better for China, and it would certainly clarify the position to the outside world, if instead of retaining the name of Communists they were to call themselves Radicals in the English Nineteenth century meaning of the word."

*In the Nation, Feb. 24, 1940: "Japan's Red Flirtation"*

"Since the Chinese Communists abandoned the class war in 1935, they have both advocated and practiced a policy of agrarian and governmental reform—not expropriation but rent reduction, not a Communist dictatorship but representative government."

#### EXHIBIT No. 599-A

WAY OF A FIGHTER, CLAIRE LEE CHENNAULT, EDITED BY ROBERT HOTZ, G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS, NEW YORK, 1949

#### FOREWORD

The United States is losing the Pacific war.

Three years after V-J day this country is facing the loss of everything it won during the four bloody years it took to defeat Japan.

Here are the facts:

General George C. Marshall told Congress in the spring of 1948 that if Manchuria were lost to the Chinese Communists, the United States position in southern Korea would be untenable.

Manchuria has been lost to the Chinese Communists.

General Marshall also told Congress that if the Chinese Communists controlled North China the United States position in Japan would be "extremely serious."

North China has been lost to the Chinese Communists.

General Douglas MacArthur warned the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the fall of 1948 that if the Chinese Communists take the lower Yangtze Valley and Shanghai the American military bastion on Okinawa will be outflanked and his position in Japan will be as exposed and untenable as it was in the Philippines during 1941.

As this is written, the Chinese Communists are fighting toward the Yangtze at Nanking. They are aiming to force a Yangtze crossing and sweep to Shanghai.

A complete Communist victory in China will channelize the undercurrents of native unrest already swirling through Burma, India, Malaya, and Indonesia into another rising tide of Communist victories. The ring of Red bases can be stretched from Siberia to Saigon. Then the stage will be set for the unannounced explosion of World War III.

I have completed a decade of observing and administering American policy in Asia. I am convinced that this policy is plunging us into a disastrous repetition of the errors that dragged us into World War II. I can hear the time fuse of a third world war sputtering in China as it burns toward the final powder keg, and I cannot stand idly by without making every effort in my power to snuff it out.

It was not an easy decision for me to publish this book. I have had my share of heartbreaks and have always felt it best to keep my peace. I have no taste for muckraking as a pastime, and I believe it is important for a people to have confidence in its leaders.

However, it is axiomatic that in periods of crisis a nation must have the very best of its leadership if it is to survive. The last war seared Russia to its heart. In the bloody catastrophes of the early war years the Russian leadership was pured to the hard, competent core that engineered Soviet survival. It is leadership of the very best the Russian can offer that we face today.

I am not so sure the United States has shaken down to its very best leadership. Even now the lingering fog of wartime military censorship obscures the sharp edge of disaster on which we teetered in the spring of 1942 when Japan swept the southern seas. In the flush of final military victory it was only human to forget the lessons of the mistakes that led us into jeopardy. In the relief of the slaughter's end it is all too easy to weary of the battle to keep the peace that follows every war.

Many of the things in this book have been set down with genuine regret. I realize that much written here may be painful for some of the personalities

discussed and that the counter criticism that is sure to come may be personally distasteful to me. But I can remain silent no longer. The stakes are now too high. I must take the long chance that by offering my evidence on the last decade in the Orient I may contribute something to an accurate estimate of the problems we now face and the direction in which we are drifting. Nothing less than our national survival depends on how well we understand this drift and navigate a new course.

China is the key to the Pacific. Politics are variable, but geography is a constant. It is the geography of China that makes that unhappy land so important. Whatever sentimental appeal there may be in the American aid for China, the United States attitude toward China should be based on a thoroughly realistic appraisal of China's value to the United States.

This country is now engaged in a world-wide struggle with Russia over organization of the world. The problem is whether war with Russia is inevitable or whether the world can be organized as a cooperative venture in peace. This decision depends entirely on the shifting balance of strength between the positions of the United States and Russia.

There is a growing accumulation of intelligence to indicate that Soviet leaders already consider their Asiatic victories of sufficient strategic importance to tip the world balance of power decisively in favor of Russia.

The Russians understand the role of China in this balance well. Since the beginning of the Chinese Revolution in the early 1920's Russians have been active in bending China to their purpose. After they lost their first chance to gain control of China in 1927, the Soviet leaders vigorously aided any cause that might weaken the Japanese program to hitch China to its imperialistic chariot. Now, with Japan defeated, Russia is again shrewdly exploiting the weakness of American policy in China to make her most determined bid for domination of that vast, strategic area.

The Russians seem to learn something from history. They have watched their German neighbors go down to shattering defeat twice in a two-front war. There is considerable evidence that the Soviet leaders are determined to avoid that pitfall. While Germany was a prewar menace on the western flank, Russia carefully avoided war with Japan despite ample provocation by the Japanese. Pitched battles using airplanes and tanks were fought on the Manchurian frontier in 1932 and 1936 between the Russians and Japanese, but the Russians refused to be baited into a full-scale war. Russia was also wary of taking on even a badly mauled Japan in 1945 until the Soviet victory over Germany was complete.

I seriously question that Russia will make anything more than probing skirmishes in Europe until her Asiatic flank is secure. The flurries of Russian activity in Europe are largely tests of American policy and smoke screens to divert attention from the fact that Russia is acquiring vast natural resources, strategic bases, and securing its most vulnerable flank in the Orient.

The Russians are well aware, even if most Americans are not, of the strategic implications of China. North China and Manchuria were the industrial bases that furnished more than one-third of all Japanese war production. From air bases built for the Americans during the last war at Chengtu, Sian, and Lanchow in northwest China, all of the vast Russian industry east of the Ural Mountains is open to air attack. From these same bases and dozens of others in North China the slender thread of Russian communications between eastern and western Siberia could be snapped by even a small air force. With North China controlled by a government friendly to the United States, Russia's only access to these fields would be across a thousand miles of Turkestan desert. As a result of the Communist sweep in China many of these vital fields are already in the hands of Chinese Communists. From Okinawa, Japan, and the Philippines, American air power can only peck away at the perimeter of Russia's vitals. From North and central China the same force could strike deeply into Russia's industrial heart.

These, then, are the stakes for which we are playing in China. If China remains friendly to the United States, the Russians will dare not move deeper into Europe leaving their vitals exposed on the Asiatic flank. If the Asiatic flank is secured and American airpower is pushed out beyond a critical range, then the way will be open for new and more powerful ventures in Europe.

It is now obvious that the United States played its prewar hand in Asia badly. Initial Japanese aggression in Manchuria during 1931 and 1932 was the tip-off to the potential aggressors that the world would not be organized on a basis of collective security. It showed clearly that the Western powers would not stick together to keep the peace. It is the answer to precisely this same

question that the Russians are probing for today. On this answer will depend their future plans. Our record in China so far has provided them with the same answer as in 1931. If our China policy continues along its present course the Russians will probably be justified in concluding that our determination to preserve the peace is no stronger now than that of the Western nations in 1931-32. In that case, their decision will favor further aggression that can only lead to war.

After Japanese attacks on China in 1937 the United States failed to enforce its "Open Door Policy" in China and allowed Japan to exclude us from the Yangtze and China's coastal ports. At the same time the United States sold enormous quantities of scrap iron, oil, and aviation supplies to Japan. We were awakened from that fool's dream one Sunday morning by the sound of Japanese bombs blasting Pearl Harbor.

Our wartime policy in China failed to retrieve our prewar losses. Primarily because of the leadership of General Joseph W. Stilwell, we failed to achieve either the Military or the political objectives desired in China. Not until Stilwell was succeeded by Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer did American policy in China bear any resemblance to that of two allies fighting a common foe.

Immediately after the war Wedemeyer continued to execute a firm and constructive policy. Already he had regained much of the ground lost by Stilwell and had promising prospects of complete success. Collapse of Japan found the Generalissimo's armies still in South and West China far from the vital ports and industrial centers held by the Japanese. Chinese Communist armies, in contrast, lay along the lower Yangtze Valley and near all the major centers of North China. But in this race to relieve the Japanese the United States provided air lift that enabled the Generalissimo's armies to leapfrog Communist forces in their path and occupy the key cities. Navy transports later moved other Chinese divisions to Manchurian ports to begin occupation of the vital area.

To his everlasting credit, Wedemeyer diagnosed the situation accurately and acted with promptness and decision to avert this initial Communist crisis and prevent the Chinese Communists from taking over control of China's key areas from the Japanese. Later Wedemeyer made a thorough study of China's postwar problems and blueprinted a detailed plan for the type and quantity of American aid required to help the Chinese effectively reorganize their shattered country. The recommendations of this report were not only ignored but the report itself was ruthlessly suppressed, and the American people and their Congress have been deprived of the testimony of a man who is perhaps our best authority on postwar China. Even at this late date the Wedemeyer report on China should be made public.

After a summer of diplomatic maneuvering between the Generalissimo and Chinese Communist leaders, the civil war broke out into the open again in October 1945. The Generalissimo's armies still had their American-supplied equipment. Well equipped with trucks, artillery, machine guns, and mortars, they began a systematic mop-up of Communist troops wherever they could be found. The Generalissimo's offensive was well under way and progressing successfully when General George C. Marshall reached China in November 1945 as a special emissary. Marshall has now retired in poor health after devoting a lifetime of great service to his country. He carries with him the respect of all those, including myself, who worked with him during the war and of all who shared his labors during the trying postwar years.

It was unfortunate that his assignment in China was to carry out a policy set for him by the State Department that was utterly impossible to execute. The failure of Marshall's China mission had its roots in these faulty orders. Under normal circumstances it would seem less than fair not to ignore this episode in the career of a man who has done so much for his country. However, a full discussion of this period in our China policy is absolutely essential to understand what is going on in Asia and why our national survival is at stake. Here in Shanghai, with China crumbling before my eyes, I have no choice but to discuss the Marshall mission frankly.

Marshall was a rigidly disciplined "spit and polish" soldier of the "Black Jack" Pershing school, and he came to China fresh from five years as the head of the most powerful military organization in the world. Marshall was used to conducting his business through direct orders promptly executed without question. By the time Marshall reached China that country was reduced to a state of disorganization where getting things accomplished by the Chinese government required rare tact, flexibility, and judgment. Only four years of a far less brutal enemy occupation reduced France to a position where it is still impossible to organize a responsible government. China suffered eight years of occupation

interlarded with intermittent civil war that left economic chaos and political turbulence so violent it was impossible for an Occidental to understand it at first glance. Marshall's judgment of China by his strict soldier's standards and tight concept of organization could hardly have aided his understanding of the Chinese problems he came to solve.

Marshall also came to China with a set of orders utterly impossible to carry out. They were given to him by a State Department that was the source of a Russian policy now admitted to have been a grievous error. Marshall did not originate that policy, and, when he became Secretary of State, he was the leader in the fight to change it. However, in his China mission he was saddled with these State Department orders; good soldier that he was, he strove to carry them out to the letter despite all obstacles and regardless of how hopeless he himself may have thought the task set for him.

Marshall's orders were to bring an end to the Chinese civil war and stimulate a coalition government in China by taking the Chinese Communists into the existing government headed by the Generalissimo. These orders were the product of the Yalta-Potsdam political climate that based American policy on the assumption that it was both possible and necessary to cooperate with the Russians. During the period when this utterly mistaken notion guided American policy it was China that suffered the most serious consequences.

To guide him in this complex and difficult role, Marshall had the conflicting testimony of two of his close personal friends—Stilwell and Wedemeyer. Unfortunately, he accepted Stilwell's version of China and Chinese leadership almost at face value. This could not help but complicate his task.

Net result of Marshall's fifteen-month mission to China was much the same as Stilwell's earlier experience. The trend of a gradually stronger Central Government was reversed and the military balance shifted again in favor of the Chinese Communists.

Stripped to its essential, here is what the Marshall mission did to China. It forced a truce to the Chinese civil war at a time when the Central Government forces were winning. When the Generalissimo naturally balked at endorsing a policy that meant military disaster for his forces, Marshall applied pressure in the Stilwell manner by shutting off the flow of all American military aid to China including war surplus bought and paid for by the Chinese. This arms embargo lasted for nearly a year. He also summarily scuttled a Sino-American agreement made in September 1945 whereby the United States agreed to supply China with planes and equipment for an eight and one-third group air force including four-engine bombers. Marshall also extracted a promise from the Generalissimo not to use the Chinese Air Force already in China against the Communists on the grounds that this would constitute offensive action. Restricting the Chinese Air Force deprived the Generalissimo of his most potent weapon. It was also implied that discussions regarding a \$500,000,000 loan to China could not be resumed until a truce was effected in the civil war. Marshall did not know then that the most effective Washington opposition to the Chinese loan was coming from Henry Wallace, a man whose position on Russia has since become quite clear.

The truce sponsored and pushed by Marshall, with all the diplomatic resources of the United States at his disposal, forced the Generalissimo to halt his anti-Communist offensive at a time when it was on the verge of wiping out large bodies of Chinese Communist troops. Some fifty truce teams each were dispatched to trouble spots all over China. Each was headed by an elderly American colonel specially picked for his white hair to impress the Chinese. Here are some specific examples of what they accomplished.

North of Hankow some 200,000 government troops had surrounded 70,000 Communist troops and were beginning a methodical job of extermination. The Communists appealed to Marshall on the basis of his truce proposal, and arrangements were made for the fighting to cease while the Communists marched out of the trap and on to Shantung Province, where a large Communist offensive began about a year later. On the East River near Canton some 100,000 Communist troops were trapped by government forces. The truce teams effected their release and allowed the Communists to march unmolested to Bias Bay where they boarded junks and sailed to Shantung.

The worst fiasco was at Kalgan Pass. This gap in the North China Mountains is a historic gateway between China and Manchuria. At the end of the war there were no organized Communists in Manchuria. Chinese Communists flocked from their base in northwest China through the Kalgan Pass to join the Russian troops in Manchuria. When the Chinese government troops occupied

Manchuria they found the great industrial centers stripped bare of machinery and the tremendous arsenals of the famed Japanese Kwantung Army empty. There was no trace of either the Kwantung Army or its equipment.

Early in 1946 a government offensive captured Kalgan and sealed off the pass trapping nearly a million Chinese Communists in northwest China who were moving toward Manchuria. The Communists complained that they were merely returning to their prewar homes in Manchuria. Marshall made strenuous efforts to get the Generalissimo to open the Kalgan Pass for these Communists. Eventually the Generalissimo yielded, withdrew his troops in June 1946, and the Communist horde poured into Manchuria. The Communists then broke the truce by fortifying Kalgan Pass. A year later Chinese government armies had to fight a bloody campaign to recapture the pass they voluntarily evacuated under the truce.

In January 1947 the mystery of what happened to the Japanese Kwantung Army equipment was solved. The poorly armed Chinese Communists who marched north the year before now swarmed south from Manchuria armed with Japanese rifles, machine guns, mortars, tanks, and artillery. They even had Japanese aircraft but no gas or pilots to operate them. The Russians had simply turned over the Japanese equipment to the Chinese Communists and thus endowed them with a rich military legacy.

Conservative estimates of the Japanese military stockpile in Manchuria seized by the Russians apprise it as sufficient matériel to supply a million men for ten years of fighting. By using Japanese munitions the Russians avoided the necessity of investing their own resources and are able to claim that no Russian arms were sent to China. The Manchurian booty represents the total investment the Russians can afford in China at present. They lack the industry in eastern Siberia to supply a sustained war effort even for themselves. Transportation facilities across Siberia are too meager to supply China from the Russian Ural industrial area.

It was these troops who marched under a safe-conduct of the American-sponsored truce through Kalgan Pass and returned with Japanese arms that won the decisive battles in Manchuria in the summer of 1947. They were opposed by the government's American-trained divisions. While the Communists were being rearmed by the Russians, the government divisions had their supplies cut off by what Marshall freely admits was a ten-month embargo on American military supplies to China. Since these Chinese divisions had been equipped in the spring and summer of 1945 their arms, ammunition, and trucks badly needed replacement. Two years of hard campaigning had worn their rifle barrels smooth, exhausted their ammunition, and battered the trucks they relied on for transport and supply. All of their equipment was American and without American replacements, spare parts, and ammunition it was virtually useless.

It did not take long for the well-armed Communists to chew up the government divisions armed only with the worn remnants of two-year old American equipment and minus an effective air force. The Chinese armies that Stilwell and Wedemeyer trained in India and West China perished early in 1947 on the frozen Manchurian plains. The stage was set for the final mop-up of Manchuria in the summer of 1948 and the Communist offensive into North China that at this writing has swept almost to the north bank of the Yangtze and gravely threatens Nanking and Shanghai.

Marshall also sought, as part of his orders, to force the Generalissimo into a variety of political changes including formation of a coalition government with Communists in the cabinet.

At the time of the Marshall mission the Chinese Communists terms for entering the Chinese National government were one-third of the cabinet members including the War Minister, retention of a Communist army of forty-eight divisions, and the governorships of all provinces where the Communist troops then claimed occupation of a majority of the area. The fate of Czechoslovakia has since proved how fatal this would have been to the existing government of China. Inclusion of Communists in a coalition front is a standard preliminary tactical maneuver in a Communist seizure of power. It is a technique that may well be attempted again in China if the Communists feel that an attempt to gain complete military victory may cost more than they can afford.

The Generalissimo had been dealing with Communists inside and outside the Chinese government for more than twenty years. He spent part of his education in Moscow's Communist academies. He thoroughly understood the Communist motives and techniques and knew that a Communist minority in a coalition government would actually result in complete Communist domination of China.

Marshall was then just beginning his political dealings with the Communists. It is obvious he has learned a good deal about their tactics since then. Marshall's orders in China did not permit him to act as though the struggle between the Communists and Chinese government were anything more than minor maneuvering between rival political factions. He was not able then to view it as the basic struggle that it certainly is wherever that issue is drawn. Marshall had to persist in professing the idea that including Communists in a coalition government was no more serious than adding a few Republicans to a Democratic cabinet. Too many Americans tend to interpret the life and death struggles of foreign politics in the same light as the bitter but by no means fatal rivalry of American politics. There is a vast difference.

When his coalition plans collapsed and fighting flared again, Marshall finally gave up his China venture. He returned to the United States with a "plague on both your houses" speech that was a remarkable confession that his early profession of faith in the integrity of the Communists was not justified by their subsequent actions. Marshall's disillusionment over the prospect of working with Communists on a basis of mutual trust was symptomatic of the general shift in American policy toward Russia that occurred during roughly the same period. American policy in Europe was adjusted to this realistic appraisal of the Communists and their intentions. Our China policy never changed.

While Marshall has done a good job of applying the lessons of his Chinese political education to Europe, he has been reluctant to undertake the fundamental reappraisal of his China policy required by subsequent events. Current American aid to China is largely food relief because of the State Department's insistence that military aid cannot be effective until the Chinese government inaugurates sweeping political and economic reforms.

In this policy I believe the State Department has the cart before the horse. Military aid should have top priority. Without a military decision there can never be the internal stability required for any effective reforms. Last March when the Marshall plan for China was presented to Congress, I was appalled to note that only one-sixth of the program was devoted to the military aid so desperately needed.

At the request of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, then headed by Representative Charles Eaton of New Jersey, I flew from Shanghai to Washington to plead for a more realistic approach to China's problems and a more intelligent understanding of the United States stake in Asia. My fifty-one-hour flight in a great circle course from Shanghai to Washington via Northwest Airlines offered dramatic evidence of how the Pacific world had shrunk when compared with my initial fourteen-day steamship trip to China in 1937.

I told Congress last March that unless effective military aid was immediately forthcoming for China, the Chinese Communists would overrun Manchuria and be well on their way to taking all of North China within six months. Congress authorized military aid of \$125,000,000 to China, but the summer was spent in endless dickering with the State Department and National Military Establishment over details of that aid, and not until October of 1948 did these munitions begin to flow to China. By then, seven months after my gloomy prophecy, the Communists had all of Manchuria and most of North China, and were marching toward Nanking.

The situation is now deteriorating so rapidly in China that I cannot venture further prophecy on its outcome. However, there are two salient facts of which I am sure. First is that the United States needs a new and effective policy in China. This will require a thorough reexamination of our present policy and our capacity to support any changes. But there is an acute danger that we may no longer have time for such consideration and that the Communists may win complete victory in China before a new American policy can be formed. Reliable reports indicate that the Communist generals are planning to force a Yangtze crossing early in the spring of 1949. Russians are now reported to be training a Chinese Communist air force near Mukden to provide the air cover without which a crossing of the Yangtze might be impossible. Captured Japanese planes and Russian second-line fighters are being turned over to the Chinese Communist air center.

In view of this situation the immediate goal of the United States must be some sort of holding action that will prevent a decisive Communist victory while our China policy is being debated. This action requires neither vast monetary nor military outlays. Its principal requirement is swift action lest we lose our chance forever. The recent history of China is studded with examples of how small, technically well-equipped forces can exert decisive influence in China out of all proportion to their size.

This holding action in China to prevent the Communists from organizing the great Chinese land mass against us is imperative if we are to gain the time required for a searching analysis of our world-wide foreign policy and the development of a sound method of working with the Chinese to replace our present policy of sticking a finger in the European dike while the Asiatic dam bursts.

My second certainty is that the price of peace in the Pacific world is going up at an astronomical rate, and we shall eventually have to pay that bill in full. Looking back over the last decade, we can easily trace the soaring cost of an effective American policy in China.

During the war, cost of such a program would have been negligible. During the twin goals of defeating Japan and establishing a strong, friendly Chinese regime were originally inseparable segments of a common goal. Stilwell's failure to recognize this fact lost that opportunity and helped set off the chain reaction that brought us to the brink of the current crisis.

Immediately after the war the cost of China aid rose only slightly. Thanks to the good work done by Wedemeyer and his staff and the availability of a vast stock of war surplus in the Pacific bases, the Chinese government could have been given the military power to withstand aggression and turn to the pressing problems of internal reform with little additional cost to the American taxpayer. Marshall's arms embargo on China squandered that opportunity and gave the Chinese Communists the breathing spell they needed to refurbish their ragged hordes at the captured Japanese stockpiles in Manchuria.

By the spring of 1948 official estimates of the cost of China aid had risen to a billion and a half dollars plus establishment of a large American military mission in China. That opportunity, too, was lost largely as a result of the State Department's insistence on "economic" aid that did little but waste American dollars, instead of the military aid required. How high the cost will eventually go or how many further opportunities we will allow to pass without action I cannot guess. I am only sure that eventually we shall have to pay it in full just as we had to pay the long-deferred bill for a decade's indifference to the Orient that Japan presented at Pearl Harbor just seven years ago.

We face essentially the same choice the British faced in 1938 in Munich. I am well aware of the dangers of bleeding American economy white through a vast arms program and foreign aid. That could be as disastrous as military defeat. But we must face up to our present problem as the British failed to do at Munich. Then they were appalled at the possible price for resisting German aggression. They felt they could not afford that cost. Yet that choice only boosted the final bill to the fantastic total they had to pay. When the bill was finally presented they had no choice but to pay it or accept the end of their nation. The failure to pay the price at Munich eventually cost the British five grinding years of war that eroded their national economy to a bare sustenance level and lost the bulk of their empire. The United States must not make the same mistake simply because we shrink from facing facts.

Many people now admit the validity of this thesis. Few, however, believe there is anything we can do about it. Can we really do anything? We most emphatically can. First we can throw in small, carefully selected military aid tailored to meet the specific problem of the moment in China—a holding action to defend the lower Yangtze Valley and Shanghai. If Shanghai can be held, it will prevent the Communists from organizing the north bank of the Yangtze well enough to support a military thrust across the river into South China.

Along with this aid we must send technically skilled and imaginative leaders who can improvise to meet rapidly changing situations and who can gain the confidence of the Chinese with whom they work. The Chinese may not understand the workings of an internal combustion engine, but they can see through a man and tell what makes him tick in an instant. They have been evaluating human nature for thousands of years and are experts. Naturally the Chinese will not work effectively with foreigners unless they feel these foreigners are genuinely sympathetic to their cause and country.

We must recognize that the Orient is a primary field of American interest and must stop allowing our affairs in this area to be conducted by second-rate men. We are only now beginning to develop some China experts in the field who show real promise, but policy in Washington is still formulated by incompetent scrubs in the State Department, not deemed fit to play in the European game, while men of Wedemeyer's caliber and ability sit on the side lines.

Many of our so-called China experts contend that things are so bad in China now that it is impossible to do anything to change them. This is sheer nonsense. This is the same type of thinking that said it was impossible for China to resist Japan in 1937. Yet it was Japan who suffered the final defeat.

The experts said the American Volunteer Group wouldn't last three weeks in combat, yet with 250 men and \$8,000,000 we smashed the Japanese air force over China and kept bombs off Chinese cities for the first time in three years.

The experts wrote off China as finished again when the Japanese took Burma and cut the last land line of supply. They said the air lift across the Hump was impractical and impossible. The airmen of the Air Transport Command and China National Aviation Corporation did the impossible by flying more than a million tons across the Hump and kept China going on airborne supply for as long as was necessary. The military experts said the Japanese Army would run the Fourteenth Air Force out of East China, but again a handful of good men with good airplanes refused to be licked. In the spring of 1945 it was the starving Japanese Army that was getting out of East China as fast as its underfed legs could carry it, and not the Fourteenth Air Force.

Again after the war I was assured by the experts that it would be impossible for me to organize a new air line in China. Today that air line is flying 4,000,000 ton miles a month. I have been working with Americans and Chinese for so long now who have been doing the alleged "impossible" for many years that I have no patience with the critics who are experts only at inventing reasons for doing nothing. I think it is high time we scuttled them in favor of leaders who have the imagination, energy, and intelligence to accomplish the so-called impossible. That is certainly the type of leadership that has made the United States a great nation.

It is not yet too late for effective action in China. The Chinese Communist armies are operating off lines of supply that are badly stretched. Their present position is similar to that of the Japanese at the end of their initial push into East China in 1944 when they were vulnerable to the stranglehold of airpower. The Communists are now moving into territory that has not been politically organized in their favor as well as the northern provinces. The Communists, like the Japanese before them, do not—as yet—have the air umbrella necessary to protect their ground offensives against sustained air attacks. It is certainly not impossible for a small force of stout men who know the terrain to apply the best of modern equipment against critical Communist weak spots and halt the advance in its tracks. This would save the lower Yangtze Valley and South and West China as a base in which Chinese nationalism could reorganize, and after learning the lessons of its defeat, political and military, set out again under its own steam to liberate the rest of China.

Whatever happens in China's immediate future, if it is considered United States policy to prevent Communist organization of that country, it is necessary to maintain this base and maintain some form of non-Communist central government in China. If the territory not yet conquered by the Chinese Communists is allowed to revert to the domination of provincial war lords, it will eventually be divided, defeated, and absorbed by the Communists piecemeal just like the small separate states of eastern Europe.

The creation and preservation of a central government has been the historic role of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in modern China. He has been the driving will that has held together a country of loose political organization and primitive communications in even a semblance of national unity. It is significant that leaders of all the divergent political elements in China except the Communists have appreciated the necessity of Chinese unity. For this reason they have supported the Generalissimo on broad national issues regardless of their disagreements with him on internal policy. It is for this reason that I, too, have loyally supported the Generalissimo during my long residence in China. It was the Generalissimo who stood between China and surrender to Japan, and it was the Generalissimo who stood between China and complete chaos after the war.

Whatever the future may hold, it will be necessary to have some centralizing force to preserve the independent spirit of China and prevent its domination by foreign powers.

Despite a decade of American bungling in China this country still has a vast reservoir of good will among the Chinese people. The Chinese government now has little faith in us because of the long record of broken American promises and action that only served to strengthen the Communist opposition. In the coastal ports most Chinese look on the Americans as successors to the British and French economic imperialists whose only aim is to exploit China for personal profit. But in the vast hinterland there are millions of Chinese who still look on the United States as the only hope in establishing a peaceful and independent China and still remember the American airmen as the reason Japanese bombs stopped falling.

It would not take much concrete effective aid to capitalize on this sentiment. Many Chinese are now accepting the Communists only because they feel the United States has abandoned China to its fate. At the first real sign of American interest in China these marginal millions would abandon the Communists.

As a practicing warrior for many years, I am convinced of the complete futility of war. It settles only problems of the past and creates the new problems of the future. There is no place in the world today for the narrow, competitive nationalism that sparks the tinder of war. My long experience as an airman has taught me the folly of the artificial borders of political states. The ease with which the airman passes them by with his load of peaceful commerce or atomic destruction should have served notice long since that they are no longer necessary.

I am convinced that the people of this planet must ultimately and inevitably move toward a single form of world government if civilization is to survive. But is our immediate task to see that this world government comes as a mutual federation of free peoples rather than through the ruthless domination of a master state enslaving all the others. In this struggle there are still many battles that cannot be avoided. The most critical of these now is to prevent the Communists from organizing the vast and rich land mass of China under their whip and turning its weight against us and the other free peoples of the world.

CLAIRE LEE CHENNAULT.

SHANGHAI, CHINA, *January 1949.*

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